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Easter Sunday attacks: The COI version
The authorities failed to take adequate and effective steps to meet the threat from Islamic extremism in the critical build-up phase from 2016 to 2019 prior to the Easter Sunday terror attacks, the Commission of Inquiry (COI) that investigated the attacks has noted in its final report.
Volume 1 of the final report, a copy of which has been seen by the Sunday Times, describes in extensive detail how Zaharan Hashim, the ringleader of the terror cell that carried out the attack, had transformed over the years from a radical preacher to fully-fledged terrorist and how repeated warnings made to the authorities regarding his radicalisation fell on deaf ears.
It also notes how he travelled to various parts of the country, recruiting followers, giving sermons and conducting training camps where participants were given weapons training in addition to being indoctrinated in extremist ideology. Much of this took place despite Zaharan being well known to law enforcement authorities and despite him being sought after by authorities from March 2017.
The report also specifically identifies that it was from an Indian counterpart that the then Director of the State Intelligence Service (SIS) Nilantha Jayawardena had received an intelligence warning of an impending suicide attack by Zaharan and his followers.
The aftermath of the terror attack at the Katuwapitiya church
The warning, received as a WhatsApp message on April 4, 2019, had noted that the group was “planning to target some important churches.” It had also stated that the group had conducted reconnaissance of the Indian High Commission of Sri Lanka and that it is one of the targets for the planned attack. The message specifically named six individuals including Zaharan (identified as Zaharan Hashmi in the message) and his brother Rilwan.
On April 5, a second Indian counterpart had confirmed to the SIS Director, the intelligence given by the first source the day before, the COI notes, adding that one of the Indian counterparts had messaged the SIS Director again on April 20, 2019, asking him for feedback on the earlier input and giving him warning that an attack was due to take place on or before April 21, 2019, noting that a dry run had already been carried out in Kattankudy.
While the Indian counterpart had requested that their input be “enquired into on priority and a feedback given to us,” the COI has concluded that the SIS Director did not give feedback to either of his Indian counterparts.
The COI has noted that then Secretary of Defence Hemasiri Fernando, Director SIS Nilantha Jayawardena and then Chief of National Intelligence (CNI) Sisira Mendis must be held accountable for their failure to discuss the Indian intelligence at the Intelligence Coordinating Meeting held on April 9 despite their knowledge of it. This was because officers from Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), which also possessed substantial intelligence on Zaharan and his group, attended this meeting. The failure to discuss the Indian intelligence at the meeting “prevented a coordinated attempt at thwarting the attack,” it adds.
The authorities also missed several other opportunities to thwart Zaharan’s plans over the months leading up to the attacks. In one example, on May 8, 2018, police arrived at a house in Shanthipura, Nuwara Eliya where Zaharan’s group was conducting a training camp. They had been alerted by a suspicious neighbour.
Zaharan’s wife Fathima Hadiya, who gave evidence before the Commission, stated that police officers who arrived at the location had even searched a bag where a pistol was hidden but failed to find it. The pistol had been hidden along with jewellery in a laptop bag belonging to Zaharan. The police had only taken the jewellery out without finding the pistol. A T56 weapon that had been used to give training to those at the camp had been hidden in a well situated within the premises, she testified.
Zaharan’s brother Rilwan, meanwhile, suffered life threatening injuries on August 27, 2018 whilst experimenting with explosives at Palamunai, Kattankudy. He had thereafter been transported to Colombo by accomplices and admitted to the National Hospital for treatment under a false name of M.I. Shahid.
Hospital authorities had been informed that the injuries were due to a gas cylinder explosion. The doctor at the Emergency Treatment Unit who examined the patient, however, had noted that the injuries were not consistent with the patient’s history and had given an endorsement that police should be informed. Rilwan’s bed head ticket, however, had been taken by an individual claiming to be his guardian to the hospital’s police post with an endorsement in Tamil claiming no further action was required. Accordingly, no action was taken, though the Police Sergeant on duty at the time had admitted before the COI that he could not read Tamil.
The Commission has noted more information regarding the incident and preparations for the violent activities of the group may have been uncovered, had action been taken on Rilwan’s bed head ticket. It has also expressed concern that Rilwan had been able to obtain treatment without divulging his true identity.
The discovery of the large stock of explosives and weapons in Wanathawilluwa in January, 2019 had led Zaharan to expedite his plans for a suicide attack. Wanathawilluwa had been part of a massive plan to turn the country into “one bloodbath,” as one suspect had told CID investigators. It appears that the plan had been to launch a major attack in 2020, but the discovery of the explosives at Wanathawilluwa had brought the plans forward, the Commission observes.
The five-member COI was headed by Supreme Court Justice Janak de Silva. Other members of the Commission were Court of Appeal Judge Bandula Karunaratne, retired Court of Appeal Judge Sunil Rajapaksa, retired High Court Judge Bandula Atapattu and retired Justice Ministry Secretary W. M. M. R. Adikari.
| How Zaharan spread his terror ideology while in hidingZaharan went into hiding with his wife and children after a clash between members of his National Thowheed Jamath (NTJ) and Sufi Muslims from the Ishtihad Sunnathul Wal Jamath at Aliyar Junction in Kattankudy on March 10, 2017. While in hiding, he had created a group called “Ansar Kilafat” on the encrypted messaging app Telegram. The group had more than 200 members. He also reactivated his Facebook profile on August 18, 2017 and resumed posting pro-IS (Islamic State/ISIS) material and encouraging violent activities.  Faces of terror: Zaharan with his team of suicide bombers Towards the latter part of 2017 and early 2018, Zaharan began criticising the democratic governance structure of the country. Some of his speeches had violent undertones directed towards the judiciary. This was based on his understanding that there is no room for democracy in an Islamic State. “There is strong evidence, both direct and circumstantial, that by early 2018, Zaharan had taken a decision to launch attacks in Sri Lanka with a view to create a path towards the establishment of an Islamic State, (Province Willayath Ceylani) in Sri Lanka,” the report states. This had been fuelled by several factors. The primary driver of this was IS ideology and its activities around the world, along with Wahhabist ideology. In order to attract followers, Zaharan was planning to attack the Kandy Esala pageant and create disturbances among Sinhala and Muslim communities and then exploit the pressure that the police and security forces will put on Muslims to recruit aggrieved Muslims, the COI states. With these new followers, he had planned to launch attacks on police and army camps in the East and collect weapons. As part of his recruitment strategy, he used incidents targeting Muslims around the world and in Sri Lanka. Towards achieving this objective, beginning from end 2017, Zaharan held training camps and seminars in different parts of the country although he was on the run from the Police. For example, he held a training camp at Rambewa, Medawachchiya during November 2017. Around 13 persons had taken part in this camp and had given a pledge before an IS flag using a T-56 weapon. Zaharan exploited violent incidents targeting Muslims to attract disgruntled Muslim youth to his organisation. For example, he uploaded a video to his Facebook page after the Digana incident requesting Muslims to take up arms, attack and kill those who fight against Muslims, and made specific references to Jihad. The move appears to have been successful as the first training camp held after the Digana incident, at a bungalow in Kandy from March 23 to 25, 2018, attracted about 25 persons, with participants ranging from 15 to 35 persons at three subsequent training camps in Nuwara Eliya. Zaharan had been gradually evolving his group to begin Jihad (Holy War) as described by him when his plans were unexpectedly disrupted with the detection of the Wanathawilluwa camp by CID investigators probing the Mawanella incident. Accordingly, he had expedited the attacks as he believed investigators were closing in on him.
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| Action against Gnanasara Thera and BathiudeenIn addition to naming specific individuals for their failure to prevent the attacks, the COI has also identified several others who aided and abetted actions which caused racial and religious disturbances or gave support for such acts.Ven. Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara Thera – General Secretary, Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) The COI notes that actions of Gnanasara Thera resulted in reciprocal radicalisation of Muslim youth. The COI recommends that the AG consider whether criminal proceedings can be instituted against Gnanasara Thera in terms of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Act No.56 of 2007 for the speeches he made on February 17, 2013 at Maharagama and at Aluthgama on the day after the Poya Day in June, 2014. The COI is also of the view that the actions of the BBS is a threat to religious harmony and it should be proscribed. Rishad Bathiudeen The COI had determines that the words used by then Minister Bathiudeen when speaking on the phone to then Army Commander General Mahesh Senanayake regarding a suspect in custody appear to be an attempt at obtaining a benefit on behalf of the suspect. It has recommended the AG to consider instituting criminal proceedings against him in this regard. Evidence before the COI also established that there have been irregularities in the issuance of scrap metal, with an unusually high amount of scrap metal being issued to Colossus (Pvt) Ltd, which was owned by Easter Sunday bomber Inshaf Ahamed. The COI has recommended that the matter be forwarded to the Bribery Commission. How the hotel attacks were carried out Excerpts that describe the attacks on two key hotels: Shangri La Hotel: On April 17, 2019 Inshaf Ahamed had conducted reconnaissance of the target hotels and had made the reservation for Room No. 616 at the Shangri-La Hotel for April 20, 2019. CCTV footage from April 19 show Zaharan and Ilham Ahamed apparently conducting reconnaissance at the hotel. They had also gone to the Table One Restaurant and partaken food worth Rs 5999.90. The position of the table they chose provided a view of a spot where one explosion took place on April 21. The duo had checked into their room on the night of April 20, with each carrying a backpack and a baggage. At 8.50am on April 21, they are seen stepping out of Room 616 carrying heavily laden backpacks before proceeding towards the elevator to reach the third floor. CCTV footage from within the elevator shows Ilham and Zaharan shake hands in an apparent exchange of good wishes. The two of them entered Table One Restaurant on the third floor at 8.52am where a special breakfast celebration for Easter Sunday had been prepared. Both walk into the restaurant but Ilham then proceeds towards the escalator connecting the third and second floors. CCTV footage shows the first explosion carried out by Zaharan to have occurred at 8.54am. Ilham is shown proceeding towards the second floor through the escalator. He climbs the escalator that had stopped after the first blast and merges into the crowd of persons, including children attempting to escape after the first explosion, before detonating his bomb. The twin blasts at Shangri-La Hotel killed 35 persons (13 locals and 22 foreigners). Eight of the foreign nationals killed were children. The explosions injured 34 persons (22 locals and 12 foreigners). Cinnamon Grand Hotel: The suicide bomber, Inshaf checked into Room 425 around 7.17pm on the night of April 20 with one small luggage. He registers under a false name as Mohammad Assam Mohammad Mubarak. A specific request is made for a smoking room. He leaves the hotel around 8.08pm in a white car and returns at 7.05am on April 21 in a blue car with one heavy luggage which he carries himself. He enters Room 425 at 7.09am. Inshaf requests for a sewing kit around 7.50am which is given by house keeping. He leaves room around 8.46am and enters Taprobane restaurant and serves from the buffet. He returns to his room at 8.58am and re-emerges at 9.07am and enters Taprobane restaurant again and sits on a chair. At 9.11am, he gets up and proceeds to the middle of the restaurant and activates the bomb at 9.12am. A total of 22 persons were killed and 17 injured in this explosion. Those who should be held accountable Former President Maithripala Sirisena and former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe; the two most senior political figures in the country, are among those held culpable by the COI for their failure to prevent the terrorist attacks. Meanwhile, senior Government officials and police officers, including Secretary of Defence Hemasiri Fernando and Inspector General of Police (IGP) Pujith Jayasundara have also been held accountable. In some cases, the COI has recommended that the Attorney General initiate criminal proceedings against the persons it holds responsible for failures to prevent the attacks. Ex-President Maithripala Sirisena Meetings of the National Security Council (NSC) had not been held regularly since Mr Sirisena assumed duties as Minister of Defence. “This reflects an appalling lack of appreciation of the duties and functions of the Minister of Defence,” the COI observes. It adds that contrary to his initial assertions, Mr Sirisena had prior knowledge, at least from November, 2016, of the activities of Zaharan. Mr Sirisena had failed to consider Zaharan as a threat to national security. He failed to monitor his own instructions relating to Zaharan, even though the extremists were reported to be having a hand in the explosives and other material recovered from Wanathawilluwa. “Would not a reasonable and prudent man have felt the danger that was coming?” the COI asks, noting that the President had failed in his duties and responsibilities and that this failure transcends beyond mere civil negligence. Based on the evidence, the COI is of the view that there is criminal liability on the part of Forner President Sirisena and has recommended that the AG consider instituting criminal proceedings against him under any suitable provision in the Penal Code. Ex-Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe The COI observes that the former Premier took a “soft approach” to Islamic extremism. Former Army Commander General Krishantha De Silva had testified that Mr Wickremesinghe did not accept intelligence presentations about the rising Islamic extremism in the country, particularly in the East. He had also opposed banning the niqab and burqa when the matter was raised at the NSC in 2015 and 2016. The COI is of the view that the lax approach of Mr. Wickremesinghe towards Islamic extremism as PM was one of the primary reasons for the failure on the part of the Government to take proactive steps towards Islamic extremism. This had facilitated its build-up to the point of the Easter attacks. Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando The COI observes that Mr Fernando has failed to act as required of the Secretary Defence. He had failed to act on the intelligence received on April 4, 2019. The COI notes that he should have at least acted immediately the moment he received intelligence from SIS Director Nilantha Jayawardena on April 20 informing that Zaharan and his associates had hatched a plan to carry out a suicide attack on or before April 21 and that they have already conducted a dry run in Kattankudy. At a minimum he should have called a Intelligence Coordinating Meeting and discussed action to be taken. The COI is of the view that there is criminal liability on his part and has recommended the AG to consider instituting criminal proceedings against Mr Fernando. Chief of National Intelligence (Sisira Mendis) CNI Mendis “knew of all the briefings on the activities of Zaharan. He should have realised the threat revealed by the intelligence,” the COI notes, recommending the AG to consider instituting criminal proceedings against him. Director State Intelligence Service (SIS), Senior DIG Nilantha Jayawardena The Director SIS knew that Zaharan was connected to the explosive cache found at Wanathawilluwa. The SIS had also sent an internal memo dated March 26, 2019 informing officers that there is a possibility of a launch of an IS style attack if Zaharan and the two brothers Sadeeq and Shahid (responsible for leading attacks on Buddha statues in Mawanella) continued to be in hiding. Despite all this, the SIS Director ha not given due weightage to the intelligence given on April 4, 2019, the COI observes. He did not take the intelligence seriously until the blast in Kattankudy (dry run for the attacks) occurred. As such, the COI is of the view that there is criminal liability on his part and has recommended that the AG consider instituting criminal proceedings against SDIG Jayawardena. Ex-IGP Pujith Jayasundara Based on its overall assessment of the evidence before it, the COI is of the view that the IGP’s failure to act despite the vast amount of intelligence reports that provided him the background, development and the conduct of Zaharan brings in an element of criminal liability. He has failed to take effective and decisive action as the IGP of the country. As such, it has recommended that the AG consider instituting criminal proceedings against Mr Jayasundara. Ex-SDIG Crimes and Commandant Secial Task Force M.R. Latheef The COI notes that it is “surprising” as to why the SDIG had not instructed his intelligence units to work on the intelligence received. Nandana Munasinghe - SDIG Western Province SDIG Munasinghe had failed to inform the clergy within his area after receiving intelligence of an impending attack on April 20 or on April 21, when the information of an attack on churches was confirmed by Director SIS Nilantha Jayawardena. When the names of the potential attackers had been provided to him on April 9, he did not take measures to gain knowledge of their identity and take measures to prevent their entry to vulnerable places within his area. The COI is of the view that there is criminal liability on his part and has recommended the AG consider instituting criminal proceedings against him. Deshabandhu Thennakoon - DIG (Colombo North) He had failed to call for reports pertaining to intelligence warnings from his junior officers before the attack and had merely conducted himself as a messenger and had failed to discharge his duties. Accordingly, the COI recommends that a disciplinary inquiry should be conducted against him. SP Sanjeewa Bandara (Colombo North) Though he had not taken any steps concerning the information received by C4 and C13D, he had instigated his subordinate officers to make false entries and forged official documents to depict that he had taken necessary precautionary measures to avert the attacks that took place on April 21 after the event. The COI observes that there is ample evidence to prefer criminal charges against him.
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