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There are multiple conclusions that one can draw from the results of the presidential election of 2024 concluded last week.

Although such an analysis has the benefit of hindsight, it is possible only to second guess why voters exercised their franchise in the way they did or what message the voter sought to convey. However, one has to guard against reading too much into the meaning of the results because, while some of the implications are self-evident, there are many conclusions that may be in the realm of conjecture and therefore cannot be confirmed with certainty.

Some of the positives that have been commented upon by many observers are worth repeating because of the positive vibe that it creates in the citizenry. According to the Election Commission and poll observers, last week’s election was the most peaceful in a long time, despite the intensity of the rivalry between the main contestants. This has even received encomiums from world leaders and international media. 

The other positive feature of the election is that the campaign was devoid of the divisive racial and religious fears that characterised the presidential election of 2019.

Viewed from the perspective of the outcome, it was evident during the final two weeks of the campaign that the National Peoples Power (NPP) and the Samagi Jana Balavegaya (SJB) were the front runners. As the final results show, the NPP won but fell short of the fifty percent plus one vote they anticipated and obtained 5,834,915 (42.31%). The SJB polled 4,363,035 (32.76%) votes.

While the NPP drew most of its support from areas that were predominantly Sinhala, the SJB scored heavily in the areas with mixed communities as well as minorities. However, it would be a mistake to attribute such a voting pattern to polarisation of the majority and minority communities but rather due to other reasons, including those that are outlined below.

The NPP, although not polling heavily in the North and East as well as in the plantation areas, did obtain a sizeable number of votes in these areas. For example, in the Nuwara Eliya district, the NPP obtained 105,057 votes (22.175%), while in the Batticaloa district, they polled 38,832 (12.19%), and in the Trincomalee district, their tally was 49,886 (20.83%).

The NPP’s poorest showing was in Jaffna and Wanni districts, but even here they polled 27,086 (Jaffna) and 21,412 (Wanni) votes. The reason for the NPP getting less than their national vote could be attributed to the fact that they and their leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake were virtually unknown to the Northern and Eastern voters, as well as the failure of the Tamil media to carry the NPPs message to the Northern and Eastern voters.

Sajith Premadasa, however, won all the districts in the North and East, while Ranil Wickremesinghe too polled more votes than he did in the South. One of the reasons that the two performed well could be that both of them were known to the people of these areas for a considerable period of time, while the Muslims in the East would undoubtedly have taken into account the valiant stand that the SJB leader took against the Gotabaya Rajapaksa Government’s policy of forced cremations during the COVID pandemic.

For Ranil Wickremesinghe, the response of the electorate to his candidature would have been disappointing but probably not unexpected. The thrust of his campaign was the role that he played during the last two years in trying to salvage the economy and keep the country afloat. However, he felt the absence of an organised political network to mobilise voters with the United National Party (UNP) being virtually non-functional. Consequently, he had to rely on the parliamentarians from the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) to take his message to the voters.

They, however, came with the baggage of the Gotabaya Rajapaksa presidency, which would have had a negative effect on the voter. Additionally, many of them had said nasty things about Mr. Wickremesinghe on public platforms previously, which were played on social media several times, resulting in a negative impact on his campaign.

The performance of Mr. Wickremesinghe in the electorates of these SLPPers reflects the negative effect that they had on his performance. In Homagama, Bandula Goonewardene could only muster 18.15% of the votes for the gas cylinder, in Negombo N.M. Lanza could only manage 11.28%, in Minuwangoda Prasanna Ranatunga could persuade only 13.94% of the voters, in Kalutara Rohitha Abeygunewardena succeeded in obtaining only 17.11% of the votes, in Nawalapitiya Mahindananda Alutgamage could only manage 24.02% of the votes, in Hanguranketa S. B. Dissanayake could muster only 15.44% of the voters, in Matara Kanchana Wijesekera could only manage 13.09% of the votes, while in Pelmadulla Pavithra Wanniarachi’s contribution to Ranil Wickremesinghe was only 22.59% of the votes.

With Parliament being dissolved, the country is gearing up for another election in November, and there is a flurry of activity to form alliances of one sort or another. What is most in the public eye is the call for an alliance between the UNP and the SJB. Those arguing for such an alliance (mostly from the UNP) claim that the merger of the two parties will ensure victory on the basis that the total of the votes polled by Sajith Premadasa and Ranil Wickremesinghe at the presidential election was in excess of what the NPP polled.

Not surprisingly, Sajith Premadasa and the SJBers, who were mocked at by Ranil Wickremesinghe and his camp during the campaign as not being prepared to take responsibilities, are not particularly enthusiastic about the call for such an alliance. Besides, the UNP will also bring into such an alliance the baggage of its association with the SLPP, which is not likely to be viewed favourably by the public.

Additionally, it is unlikely that the aggregate of the votes polled last week by the SJB and UNP will remain the same at a parliamentary election. The actual voting will also depend on the candidates who are put forward as well as many other considerations that reflect the concerns of the voters of a particular constituency.

On the basis of the votes obtained by the three main candidates, an approximate calculation of the seats that each party or formation will get at the parliamentary election is as follows: NPP (105), SJB (78), and Ranil Wickremesinghe’s group (37).

But anyone with an elementary knowledge of politics will know that there are many variables that will alter the final outcome as well as the number of seats that the political parties will get. (javidyusuf@gmail.com)