Editorial

Last week, the Supreme Court in the case relating to a decision to award free marks for the leaked part of last year’s Grade 5 Scholarship Exam paper made some piercing observations on public service decision-making and the independence of state officials vis-à-vis higher political and supervisory officers.

The judgment highlights the authority vested by law in a ‘public functionary’—in’ this instance, the Commissioner General of Examinations—to act independently where “no one else may decide on his behalf” and opines that the political and administrative supervisory authorities may advise or guide the public functionary but shall not in any manner influence his/her independent decision-making.

Clearly, a first-time government has to rely on an experienced public service to implement the key policy objectives it has outlined in programmes against corruption, rapid digitalisation, ‘Clean Sri Lanka,’ and the achievement of economic stability. Towards these ends, it has placed a high value on creating, according to President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, “an efficient, honest, and people-focused public service.”

But the actual experience of governance, it would seem, has exposed the complexities of the issue. The initial comfort zone where the new Government was overwhelmingly endorsed by public servants (80% of postal votes) so on acquired a different emphasis with key ministers making references to the many deficiencies of the public service: corruption, waste, irregularities, incompetence, and lack of dynamic leadership. The Cabinet even decided to establish investigation units within ministries in view of complaints regarding irregularities, corruption, and fraud.

Some state institutions were seen as hindering rapid progress, including implementing justice on alleged corruption. This familiar refrain of blaming public servants for obstructing government plans caused Opposition MPs to take to X to remind the Government that public servants who abide by laws and regulations must not be blamed by impatient politicians. Others questioned whether a deliberate “politicisation” of the independent state apparatus was underway. And some even saw the IMF-led rationalisation of public expenditures and concerns over the oversized state sector as being the catalyst.

Against this backdrop, the SC judgment is particularly relevant as it touches on a key intersection—the one between the public servant and the political authority. Those in senior government roles vested with decision-making power prefer the “safe route” of relegating that power to politicians who then benefit from a deferential and passive public service. The nexus between the public servant and the politician for personal benefit must be replaced with respect for each other’s respective spheres of authority and competence.

To rectify the glaring deficiencies in our public service, there is a need for effective recruitment and promotion policies. Any kind of serious public service performance evaluation is almost non-existent. The Indian Government has agreed to train 1,500 Sri Lankan public servants per year. Sri Lanka can also seek to benefit from similar technical cooperation from Singapore, considered the gold standard of clean and efficient public service. However, there is also a need to revive Sri Lanka’s own public service management and training capacities.

In recent days, the ‘Clean Sri Lanka’ programme (which the Prime Minister states needs implementation at local government, district, and national levels) was launched to what is apparently an uncoordinated, confused start owing to a lack of coherence between the political authorities and its public delivery and communication apparatus.

The new Government’s policy initiatives will clearly need backing from an independent and experienced public service.

The China factor

Hot on the heels of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s state visit to New Delhi last month comes his state visit to Beijing next week. It is plain to see why it is important for Sri Lanka’s leadership to balance the geopolitical undercurrents prevailing in this ‘neck of the woods’—or’ the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. That he did not change the priority of which country to visit first may also message that the NPP Government did not want to send the wrong signals.

Sri Lanka’s foreign policy is trapped between the tussle for supremacy by these competing forces—both emerging powerhouses in the world with not just regional but global ambitions. The current power play comes in the backdrop of India not too long ago backing a separatist insurgency within Sri Lanka and China extending its fullest support diplomatically and militarily to defeat that armed uprising.

Having so supported Sri Lanka in facing challenges internally and externally during the separatist insurgency, China stepped in financially in the post-conflict economy. In the end, Sri Lanka went broke, unable to repay its loans. And China is sensitive to the Western narrative that it was its loans that sank the Sri Lankan economy.

Our inside news story shows China’s economic support has not always been altruistic. It has extracted tough returns for delays in the development of the Port City and Sri Lanka’s inability to pay for the Hambantota port. On Page 1 the report has details of how it clinched the controversial Central Expressway project by getting the NPP Government agree last month to the same terms the previous Government signed to. On the eve of the visit, it also got the Cabinet to reconfirm Sri Lanka’s support for the ‘One China’ policy.

Several MoUs are on the cards during the state visit on agricultural cooperation and fisheries, but a key focus by Beijing is the moratorium—the effective ban on ‘research vessels’ nosing around in Sri Lankan waters. China will also not want Sri Lanka backsliding on the proposed FTA (Free Trade Agreement) in view of the excessive production of its goods and will want an advancement of its BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) with Hambantota port as a nodal point. New Delhi extracted a promise from President Dissanayake that not an inch of Sri Lanka would be given for hostile activity against India.

China has become very active recently directly with the local Sri Lankan population in fisheries, schools, Buddhist activities, etc. It has long been a friend of Sri Lanka, and its avowed foreign policy statement is that it never interferes in the internal affairs of other countries. These, along with China’s continued support for Sri Lanka in global forums, are likely to emerge during the official talks. Count a gratuitous mention of a line in the upcoming Joint Statement for the need for Sri Lanka to maintain “an independent” foreign policy—a broad hint at not bowing to pressure from a third country.