Columns

Not a day seems to pass in the country without a killing or attempted killing which is increasingly a matter of concern for the public. The nation, already grappling with political and economic challenges, now faces another crisis: an upsurge in violent crime, much of it driven by firearms. This crisis is not new, nor did it emerge overnight. Rather, it is the product of years—if not decades—of state neglect, institutional decay, and the proliferation of arms, often enabled or overlooked by successive governments.

The current administration, early in its term, set a deadline for the return of unauthorised and illegal firearms. While this initiative was a step in the right direction, it has failed to yield tangible results. Firearms—from military-grade T56 rifles to pistols—continue to circulate freely and are used with alarming frequency to settle disputes, carry out contract killings, and wage battles between rival narcotic factions. The violence has become not just routine but systemic.

To understand how we arrived at this point, it is essential to trace the roots of the crisis. In the decades following independence, organised violent crime in Sri Lanka was relatively rare and largely confined to crimes of passion—domestic disputes, personal vendettas, and spontaneous acts of violence. However, this began to shift dramatically with the onset of the armed conflict in the late seventies and eighties. In response to security threats, the state created armed civilian units—such as home guards—meant to protect villages and communities from militant attacks. The long-term consequences of such decisions have been catastrophic. 

Civilians, often with minimal training and little oversight, were handed weapons. During the insurrection of 1987–1988, the state went even further, distributing arms to politicians and civilians alike to combat perceived threats. In doing so, it created an extensive, poorly regulated arsenal outside formal military or police control. Many of these weapons disappeared into the black market or were stashed away, only to resurface later in the hands of criminals.

After the war ended in 2009, one might have expected a disarmament programme, a national strategy to sweep up leftover arms and reintegrate ex-combatants. But that opportunity was missed. Many deserters from both state forces and militant groups melted back into civilian life, often taking their weapons with them. The country was flooded with guns, and law enforcement agencies, already under-resourced and overstretched, were simply unable to keep up.

The Police Department, in particular, is in crisis. Plagued by chronic understaffing, lack of training, and political interference, it has failed to serve as an effective deterrent to crime. In some regions, entire communities operate under the shadow of organised crime networks that wield more power and instill more fear than the police themselves. Drug trafficking, extortion, and contract killings are now so embedded in some areas that they resemble criminal fiefdoms. The fact that many of these killings take place in the Southern, Western and North Western Provinces in fairly close proximity to the sea coast is also a pointer that many of these are due to Narcotic related disputes.

Another disturbing feature of the current criminal landscape is that many of the killings are planned and directed from overseas locations like Dubai and India which was unheard of in the past. The Government has also taken note of the fact that some of the personnel in the law enforcement agencies themselves have been drawn into the web of criminal activity.

In a welcome move the Government has now announced its decision to recruit more police personnel including Tamil speaking officers to man police stations in the North and East.

Although the present government did not create this crisis, it cannot wash its hands of responsibility. It is now incumbent upon those in power to take bold, decisive, and comprehensive steps to stem the tide of violence. The cost of inaction is far too high—not just in terms of human lives lost but in the erosion of public trust in the state’s ability to protect its citizens.

It is time for the Government to take urgent and effective action to curb this menace which can otherwise go further out of control.

1. A Nationwide gun amnesty and crackdown

First and foremost, the government must relaunch and enforce a robust nationwide gun amnesty, offering a limited window during which individuals can surrender illegal firearms without fear of prosecution. However, this must be followed by a no-nonsense crackdown on illegal possession, use, and trafficking of arms. It is not enough to request that weapons be returned; there must be accountability for those who continue to violate the law. It maybe prudent to entrust this task to a specialised Unit set up within the Police with an exclusive mandate to carry out mopping up operations within a limited time frame of three to six months at most.

2. Strengthening law enforcement

The police force must be modernised and strengthened. This means better training in intelligence gathering, crime scene investigation, and forensics. It also means better pay and protection to reduce the temptations of corruption and political manipulation. The government should consider establishing specialised anti-gang and anti-narcotic task forces with clearly defined mandates, adequate resources, and insulation from political influence.

3. Judicial and legal reforms

Law enforcement cannot work in isolation. The judicial system must be equipped to handle organised crime and gun violence with greater efficiency. Cases involving firearms and violent crime should be fast-tracked, and convictions should carry meaningful penalties. At present, delays, corruption, and lack of evidence too often allow offenders to walk free, emboldening criminal networks.

4. Community-based policing

Top-down approaches must be complemented with bottom-up solutions. Community-based policing, where officers work within and build relationships with communities, has proven effective in reducing crime in many parts of the world. When communities trust the police, they are more likely to report crimes and cooperate in investigations.

5. Addressing root causes

Ultimately, violence thrives where there is desperation. High youth unemployment, poor education, lack of recreational facilities, and social marginalisation create fertile ground for crime. The government must invest in social programmes, education, and employment initiatives, particularly in crime-prone areas. Vocational training and employment schemes for youth—especially former convicts or ex-combatants—can help divert potential recruits away from criminal activity.

6. Reclaiming state responsibility

Most importantly, the state must reclaim its responsibility to safeguard the public. Too often, the government has abdicated this role—outsourcing security to militias, turning a blind eye to politically connected criminals, or ignoring the slow decay of law enforcement institutions. This abdication must end. Citizens must once again believe that the state is the final arbiter of justice—not the drug lord, the gang leader, or the armed vigilante.

Conclusion

The surge in killings and violent crime is not a mere law-and-order problem—it is a national emergency. It is a reflection of the weakening of institutions, the consequences of political expediency, and years of systemic neglect. Reversing this trend will not be easy. It will require political will, institutional reform, and a long-term commitment to rebuilding public trust.

But it must be done. Because a nation that cannot protect its people is a nation on the brink. We cannot afford to let organised crime, guns, and impunity define the next chapter of our history. The time for urgent and comprehensive action is now (javidyusuf@gmail.com)