Post-Riviresa II has had its successes and failures. Militarily it has been a daring success and reflected the ability of the leaders.
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Post-Riviresa II non-military activities - from rehabilitation and reconstruction - has not been executed with efficiency. The Government waited until the operation came to an end to appoint an authority to undertake rehabilitation and reconstruction. This reflected the lack of understanding of the political and the military leadership of the non-military component of the war.
The basics of counter-insurgency lies in minimizing the military component and maximizing the political and economic components. Without winning the hearts and the minds of the Sri Lankan Tamils in the north the war cannot be won. As long as there is discontentment among the Tamils the LTTE will have a ready pool to recruit and replenish the cadres that are killed in combat. How can the Tamils in the recovered or liberated areas made to feel and believe that it is counter-productive for them to live under LTTE domination or to support the LTTE? The strategy should have at least two elements.
Politically, the Tamils must be made to realize that the LTTE has failed in its primary objective. The LTTE has failed to provide safety and security for the Tamils. Further, the LTTE will not be able to deliver their promises even at a future date. The government has a generous political package to remedy the grievances of the Tamils and the government has already begun to implement the non- controversial sections of it.
Economically, the Tamils have suffered since the Tamil political leaders introduced communalism into their minds. Thoughts are the thinkers, and the Tamil people since the late 1970s at least began to see almost everything as Tamil and non-Tamil. Today, if the government can develop the Tamil areas recovered from the LTTE grip, there will be a change of heart. To consolidate the military gains and to pay way towards a political victory over the LTTE, the key is to economically empower the Tamils.
An analysis of the areas recovered by the Sri Lankan security forces show both hope and hopelessness.
First the return of the Tamils to the recovered areas is a political victory. The statistics speak for themselves. On April 20, 700 Tamils returned to areas under the control of the security forces. Gradually the number increased on April 21 to 2600, 22 to 6000, and an average of 30,000 up to 25. By the end of April, some 200,000 Tamils had left the LTTE-controlled areas for the security forces- controlled areas.
Many Tamils had also defied the LTTE order and returned to Colombo - others have migrated overseas. Of the three million Tamils, some 550,000 live abroad. That means one sixth of the Sri Lankan Tamil population live overseas.
The LTTE raise at least half of their budget from the Tamil diaspora. There is no concerted strategy to counter the exodus or the generation of funds.
If movement of Sri Lankan Tamils both in the LTTE-controlled areas and in the Sri Lankan forces-controlled areas are not regulated, then the attitude of Tamils can either favour or disfavour the LTTE.
Therefore, regulating the movement of Tamil civilians is vital in the counter insurgency campaign of the Sri Lankan forces directed against the LTTE. Such regulation can be achieved by providing physical and economic security to the Tamils in the areas under security forces-controlled and dominated areas. This is a difficult objective to achieve because the LTTE has already laid careful plans to infiltrate and strike the security forces from behind the lines. The LTTE has also a record of provoking the security forces in a manner to create friction among the civilians and the forces.
In aftermath of Operation Riviresa II that began exactly a year after the LTTE violated the cessation of hostilities (April 19, 1996), the infrastructure essential for a civil administration function could not be revived. This demonstrated two aspects. First, the lack of understanding of the political and military leaders of how a counter insurgency battle should be conducted, and second, the absence of an institutionalized arrangement for the civilian-military branches to function in an integrated fashion in the liberated areas.
Nearly one and a half decades after the Sri Lankan forces and the LTTE have fought battle after battle, there remains a solid reason why the Sri Lankan government has been unable to win the war. It is because the Sri Lankan forces had been fighting for territory - for bare land - and not for the hearts and minds of the Tamil public. There has been no concerted and enduring strategy to consolidate the military efforts.
Even today, the rehabilitation and reconstruction program launched by the government in the Vadamarachchi and Thenmarachchi areas are far from adequate to win over the hearts and minds of the Tamil public who had lived under LTTE domination for over a decade. If the Government is unable to develop a comprehensive program, it could always replicate the Indian program made operational by the IPKF and Indian Administrative Service Officials after the Indian military recovered the Jaffna peninsula from the grips of the LTTE. The best consultant for such a program will be Lt. Gen. S.C. Sardeshpande, General Officer Commanding the 54th Division of the Indian Army.
The most urgent services that the government ought to provide are: (a) food, (b) clean water, (c) health, (d) sewerage and sanitation, (e) repairing damaged houses, (f) restoring power supply, (g) provision of agricultural implements, (h) plant material, (i) fertilizer, (j) public transport, (k) mail services, (l) banks, (m) education, (n) religious services. The efficiency of the services and the physical security the Sri Lankan administrators and the security forces provide will determine the true victory or the defeat of Operation Riviresa I and II.
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