It is usually a deliberate ploy of most Tamil politicians and commentators to accuse the Sinhalese of a majoritarian mindset discriminatory and detrimental to their interests. They conveniently ignore their mindset of ethnic communalism, nurtured over the last seventy five years, since the Tamil Mahajana Sabha (TMS) was formed in 1921. At its first meeting Sir A. Kanagasabai passed a Resolution demanding "Tamil seats in the Legislative Council equal in number to two thirds of Sinhalese seats". Communal and confrontational ethnicity in politics was born then, and A. Ramanathan, the Secretary of the TMS, nurtured this ethnic baby on a historically fatuous and dubious declaration that the Tamils are the original inhabitants of the island and have been here for millenniums and the researches of Sir John Marshall, Dr. Sayce and others have proved that Tamil land was the cradle of the human race. It was from this time onwards that the Tamil leaders used the separate Tamil identity and interest as their calling card with the British rulers of our country.
Governor Manning, the father of communal politics, soon rewarded the Tamils, in the 1923 Reforms, with 8 seats for a 11 per cent, while giving 16 seats to the Sinhalese for their 67 per cent of the population. The Donoughmore Commissioners (DC) claimed that this introduction of communal representation had been unfortunate, and had hindered the development of a true national identity. However, this ethnic monster has been, to this day, continuously fed on a diet of anti-Sinhalese prejudice by the Tamil politicians and propagandists.
In 1923 before the DC, A. Canagaratnam of the All Ceylon Tamil Conference (ACTC) demanded the ratio of two Tamils to three Sinhalese. The DC, in its report condemned communal politics as "the canker on the body politic eating deeper and deeper into the vital energies of the people, breeding self interest, suspicion and animosity, poisoning the new growth of political consciousness and effectively the development of a national or corporate spirit". Today, those words need no verification. In four constituencies in Jaffna, a boycott of the first elections to the State Council of 1931 was enforced by the Jaffna Youth Congress. This was indeed the partie honteuse (shameful part) played by the Tamil politicians in the springtime of Sri Lankan politics.
When the Sinhalese Board of Ministers with three Jaffna Tamil deputy ministers was formed in 1936, there were vociferous protests from Jaffna and G.G. Ponnambalam (GGP), who in 1937 was the Acting Minister of Communications and Works, demanded a Commission to inquire into the working of the Donoughmore Constitution. The protests by the Tamils were so unreasonably vehement that Governor Caldecott had to remind them, in his address to the State Council in 1937, that the "strength of the minorities must be commensurate with the reasonableness of their demand". The Reform debate, however, continued unabated on ethnic lines.
Rev. Dr. T.I. Tambyah, the President of ACTC, was the first to enunciate in 1937, the formula of equating the minority votes with that of the total Sinhala votes. It was this formula, which, in the hands of GGP became the "fifty fifty" slogan. In his Presidential address at the Tamil Congress in 1944, his warped arithmetic was clearly stated thus "...we merely want that 65 per cent of the (Sinhala) population should receive 50 per cent of the seats". The same address opened the can of worms of Tamil racism. He stated "I may with pardonable pride recall that our race Ñ one would call it a nation that the Tamil community remains indivisible and elementary rights are not denied to any section of our race. He backed this up by ethnic rhetoric against the Sinhalese. Sane voices as that of S. Sivasubramaniam, Secretary of the Tamil Congress till August 1947, that a communal Tamil party was a "fatal anachronism and blunder under the Soulbury constitution", were ignored.
In more recent times, the Federal Party incorporated this communal and separatist ideal as part of its constitution by demanding that they be permitted "to have their own autonomous state guaranteeing self government and self determination for the Tamil nation in the country: and to work indefatigably to the attainment of this objective". It was Professor C. Suntheralingam, who used the discredited Cleghorne's Minutes to claim a Tamil homeland "from Chilaw, northwards and eastwards.... to comprise the present Trincomalee District, Batticaloa District right down to the mouth of the Walawe Ganga. The TULF's Vaddukoddai Resolution of May 1976 formally asserted the right of the Tamil nation to form a "sovereign, secular socialist State of Tamil Eelam". This was further refined in the 1977 election manifesto of TULF to suit the fabricated history that "even before the Christian era the entire island was ruled by the Tamil kings" and that the claim for the "traditional homeland of the Tamils" was simply the continuation of that pristine kingdom of Jaffna. Reputable historians have already discredited this much trumpeted historical basis of this spurious Tamil claim.
After the election of 1977, A. Amirthalingam, the leader of TULF, was able to claim that the people of Tamil Eelam had given TULF the mandate to restore and reconstitute the free sovereign socialist State of Tamil Eelam. The separatist epigone nurtured and fostered by the Tamil politicians, had now matured in the LTTE, with devastating consequences both for the nation and the Tamil people themselves. The separatist ideology had lost the Tamils everything, their wealth, their jobs, their homes, their self respect and even their children. Thousands of them are reduced to living under duress in hovels in the wilds of Vanni. The other Tamil parties have not given up this genie either. They still have Eelam in their party names. This is the mindset of the Tamils, which refuses to accept, that we come to exist not in and on our own terms, but in reference to, in respect for others. So long as this mindset persists, the Tamil politicians have ruled themselves out of any compromises with the rest of the country. Non negotiable conditions and unreasonable demands will be part of their bargaining strategy. The mindset of the Tamils, therefore, needs as much change as the mindset of anyone else. But can they? Will they? One has only to look at their recent entrenched and intransigent stance before the Parliamentary Select Committee for an answer. It was very much in line with their Eelamist objective.
It was Hobbes who pointed out that everyone originally had a right to everything, but an exclusive right to nothing; but one could obtain an exclusive right to individual things by renouncing his right to all the rest, while others did the same with regard to what was chosen by him. The same applies to the Tamil separatists. Have they convinced us, the rest of the population, that they have exclusive rights in respect of 30 per cent of land and the exercise of absolute power therein? Have they renounced their rights to the rest of land and the exercise of power elsewhere? No. It is exclusive privilege at the expense of the rest of the population, that they demand. Any country which gives into such outrageous demands does not deserve to, nor will it remain as one indivisible country. The country has the right to demand the complete dismantling of all vestiges of the separatist ideology before any political settlement.
If it is the intention of the government to improve conditions in the rural areas, would it not be more simple to take the government to these rural areas, so that the bureaucracy can meet the people and work for them, instead of having a complicated, expensive and futile exercise in devolution, which no one seems to desire.
In this context it might be well to remember a quote by Krishna Menon of India, who said: "It is the habit of mediocrity to complicate a simple issue. It is the mark of genius to simplify a complex one."
Devolution will only divide the country and widen the rift between the Tamil people and the Sinhalese who have lived together through the centuries. Devolution will also afford the opportunity to unscrupulous politicians who have only a desire for power and wealth, to enrich themselves by employing thugs to intimidate anyone who does not support them.
The fact is that these politicians, particularly from the north who claim to be concerned about the masses who have gone through tribulation and stress in recent years, had not even tried to meet the people in the north. The only time they will meet the people briefly is before an election to make impossible promises of a Shangrila. They will promptly and conveniently forget them the moment they are returned to power by a trusting and gullible public.
These Satanic politicians who have only a greed for power and wealth indoctrinate the public with emotional issues which promote conflict and retard any progress that can be made for the people and the nation.
The democratic form of government and democracy in Sri Lanka ended in 1978 when an Executive Presidential system was foisted on the people in its stead. In the new system supreme power was exercised by one person, the President. In a democracy, supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by the people's representatives in Parliament. Parliament is supreme. Democracy is defined as "a government of the people, by the people, for the people". One critic called the innovation, "of J.R., by J.R., for J.R."
In a democracy no single person or a group of persons possess unlimited power and no one is above the restraints of the law, and no one is below its protection or denied of it.
A "Dharmishta" government, peace and prosperity was promised on assumption of office by the then Executive President. But with the seeming prosperity that came with Free Trade and the accelerated Mahaweli scheme, there came its concomitant evils. Bribery and corruption and moral decay. The 'Dharmishta' was forgotten. The rich became richer, the poor became poorer, and unable to obtain redress for wrongs done. Discontent was ripe but the government continued regardless.
Things came to an unbearable point during the second Presidency - which ended tragically.
In 1994 the PA government came into power after a vicious and vituperous campaign of vilification on charges of 'Dhooshana' and 'Beeshana' against the previous regime. It is still doing so after nearly two years in office. Things have not changed for the better.
The fault is in the system of government - the Presidential system. It is contrary to democracy to entrust absolute power to one person or group. It is equally contrary to have a multiplicity of parties and even more so when they are on an ethnic basis. Unity in diversity is essential in a democracy. A democracy works best when there are only two main parties and a third to maintain a check on the majority party if they take advantage of that majority to misuse power. A return to democracy is the only remedy. The earlier it is done the better. The Executive Presidency and parties on ethnic religious basis are anathema in a democracy.
That Sri Lanka in many ways meets what would be expected of a potential location for an offshore capital "base and service centre for South Asia has never been in doubt - unlike the ability of this island's peoples to contain the contradictions that divide them in the interests of its realisation. This was confirmed by the World bank's Director for its Asia Department when she presented a pleasant projection of the prospects for Sri Lanka - prospects whose realisation, she emphasised, would be possible only within a context where the ongoing war is brought to an end and the task of conflict resolution entrusted to acceptable and non-violent methods. The growing perception of this conflict as one that will stretch out over a few more decades, make a mockery of the projection of such prospects, turning them into dreams that are cruel in their apparently impossible promises.
The urgent need for such an offshore capital base and service centre for the development of South Asia, generates its own tensions, and has led to hasty and insufficiently considered initiatives towards ending the fighting. The relationship between interests involved in the actual fighting, those involved in attempts to steer the fighting towards an acceptable end and those who view with some suspicion the possible global implications of the development of the island as a capital and service base to South Asia, are beginning to interact with greater and greater frequency, raising tensions at all levels.
At ground level, the mono-personal leadership of the LTTE along with its precarious guidance system has been displaced from the extreme north with its easy maritime access. These functions are now located in a more land-bound and central area where it is greatly dependent on peripheral second-rung leaders for both security and supplies. This southward movement has been secured through the movement of military men and material to the northern extremities of the island. The peculiar character of this move is that these men and material are now linked to their supply lines very tenuously. The inherent instability of concentrating the major portion of available troops and hardware to the north of the LTTE thus leaving access to the south open to that entity has been compounded by the urgent, but as yet unmet need for the rapid recruitment, training, equipping and deployment of tens of thousands of troops south of the LTTE to prevent its advance in that direction. In addition there is nothing to indicate that the question of depriving the LTTE of access to the coast has been addressed, thus leaving the naval wing of that organisation free to move in and cut off supply lines to the north if deemed necessary. As can thus be seen, a delicate situation prevails with a loud promise of possible catastrophe at any moment, but also with a thin whisper of hope whose realisation depends on many uncontrollable factors, whose happy conjunction may yet bring about the apparently impossible.
The fighting has cost the LTTE dearly, in terms of men, material and credibility, both amongst the population once under its control, as well as amidst the Tamils abroad. It is difficult to understand and probably will never be known why the LTTE decided to abandon peace talks and return to fighting. It is harder still to comprehend its reluctance to accept a political solution when it can, by gaining control of the state apparatus, decisively influence the decision making process regardless of who comes to power. A likely explanation would be that the LTTE seeks a solution that would be based on the recognition of its own understanding of the conflict and on the concepts underlying its actions and outlook.
But the fighting has taken its toll on the government's morale as well. Clearly, international approval and encouragement has not translated into economic support for the military offensive. It is of course true that international financial institutions are not mandated to finance wars. They would of course consider rehabilitation and reconstruction after the fighting has been brought to an end. But the failure of donor countries to offer to foot part of the bill for fighting the LTTE - a fight they all claim to see as being eminently justified and indeed one that is essential to peace in Sri Lanka has been perhaps the unkindest cut of all. Not surprisingly the government has in its frustration lashed out at potential donors, insisting that all funds now being channeled through NGO's be sent directly to the government itself. Donors who feel they will not be able to, or do not want to meet the expenses of monitoring aid utilisation, may now be forced to curtail aid flows until the conflict is ended and the focus of expenditure shifted to rehabilitation, reconstruction and development.
This may also indicate a measure of desperation in the governments frantic efforts to find the resources required to pursue the war. Some of these countries have come forward to provide military training alone, thus making it abundantly clear that while they consider the pursuit of this war to be in their interests, they intend the Sri Lankan people to do the fighting and dying and the Sri Lankan government to foot the bill for the war. Such cynicism does indeed do little to inspire confidence, but the government should be well aware that in politics there are no friends only interests to be advanced. Undoubtedly the passionate national pride that has long characterised the Sri Lanka Freedom Party - so absolutely incompatible with the begging bowl has been sorely wounded. No wonder then the frenzied hurry and strange contortions in a desperate effort to make ends meet and thus preserve a measure of sovereignty, political autonomy and dignity through the sale of assets through what is being called privatisation. That the use of the proceeds to meet expenditure means in effect that we are consuming our capital, seems to be of no concern to the government or of anyone else either. Given this situation, it is difficult to see any greater credibility accrue to the government than to the LTTE.
Patterns of property development in Colombo and indications of recreational facilities soon to come, indicate that such facilities are soon to be required by the residents of this city. Those currently residing therein have got by very well without these luxuries and their construction indicates quite clearly that we are soon to be cast in the role of hosts to many persons accustomed to such facilities. These people will probably constitute the advanced human resources necessary for the servicing of capital and the conducting of sophisticated commercial activities. And it is also likely that these persons will not take kindly to a government unable to end the war and maintain peace whatever the contradictions are that it may be faced with. This factor undoubtedly contributes to the pressures acting on the government towards an end to the fighting.
The mono personal leadership of the LTTE is faced with pressures of a different sort. Isolated and surrounded in the central areas south of Jaffna with no direct maritime access, it is totally dependent on its second rung leadership for security and supplies. It is becoming apparent that these supplies and security are forthcoming only in keeping with the agenda of these second-rung leaders. The result is that there appears to be emerging a collective leadership body just below Mr. Prabhakaran, with the ability to impose a veto on his decisions in favour of their own. Just as Dr. Balasingham has played advisor to Mr. Prabhakaran, the emerging second-rung leadership has its own supportive nexus.
For their part the developed countries of the west appear to have achieved policy consensus on the nature of their response to the LTTE. They are prepared to talk to and recognise those of its elements operating within the recognised legal framework Ñ even to the extent of turning a blind eye to the ultimate destination of monies such elements may collect. At the same time they reserve the right to support the government of Sri Lanka in its responses military or otherwise Ñ to the military campaign of the LTTE. They have thus set the stage for the emergence of a political debate that will enable the LTTE to present its own perspectives and proposals to the world, depriving the government of the effectiveness of the control on information that it has successfully built up over the course of the recent fighting. But such LTTE related mechanisms operating within the legal and democratic framework will also be open to censure and be held morally accountable for actions that the LTTE may engage, in that are deemed unacceptable by the international community. The recent censure of the UN envoy may be an indication of the government's displeasure at this global response so contrary to its own policy. What is quite clear is that while the government has gone on record to the effect that it is not prepared to consider any proposals put forward by the LTTE - the recent massacres may well be a knee jerk reaction of the LTTE to the government's cavalierly rejection of its proposed confederation of two states Ñ many in the developed world may well consider this proposal put forward by the LTTE to be of sufficient weightage and credibility as to warrant serious consideration.
The government's recent decision to curtail, and perhaps totally prohibit the activities of an international NGO with an impeccable record of over three hundred years of experience in the field of non violent conflict resolution - may be another expression of its displeasure and dissatisfaction with the response of the international community. The NGO concerned has successfully contributed to the resolution of several complex conflicts arising from current international relations and is in fact the only organisation known to have been active in the field of conflict resolution for such a long period of time. Obviously it has gained a wealth of experience which any government seeking to resolve conflicts through methods of non violent conflict resolution would welcome. It is therefore most unfortunate in that this action of the government can easily read as a possible indicator of a commitment to violent military measures, with all their attendant death and destruction, as a means of ending the conflict. It could also read as a rejection on the part of the government of any foreign mediation towards a non-violent resolution of the ongoing war and, in time, even cast it in the now widely detested role of an aggressor against a whole people and oppressor of their legitimate aspirations.
The incident involving this NGO has begun to take on an unnecessarily ugly character, with the Department of Inland Revenue having taken action to freeze their bank accounts. Heavy handed administrative actions of this nature, so common in our neighbourhood, are bound to raise questions in the minds of potential investors. The fear that Sri Lanka will exhibit the same type of administrative interventions in all spheres of life as for instance is widely expected to be seen in post 1997 Hong Kong - will definitely detract from its ability to realise its pleasing prospects for the future. The words and deeds of the Foreign Ministry once merely seen as exemplary in their impeccable articulation and constructive content, have now acquired an undertone of intolerance with a strong hint of national pride and arrogance, understandable perhaps considering that Sri Lanka alone offers to the world that capital base and service platform essential for the effective deployment of capital in South Asia, but quite obviously inappropriate to our well demonstrated and widely recognised inability to resolve the ongoing conflict ourselves as well.
The two perspectives of the government and the LTTE display a considerable degree of divergence. The Government considers its offer to restructure the Sri Lankan State in order to accommodate ethnic plurality and the devolution of power to be radical. It sees its offer as a magnanimous concession made in the interest of preserving the unity of the country. The concept developed by the LTTE is based on the perception of two nations uniting with mutual recognition, respect and dignity in order to better further mutual interests, and is thought by that organisation to be pragmatic and solidly based in reality.
We then have on the one hand, the government approaching what it sees as a need to preserve the unity of Sri Lanka through the restructuring of its state along the lines of a multi-ethnic entity and through the devolution of power to demarcated regions. On the other hand, we have the LTTE that sees two nations in conflict the one under its leadership seeking to free itself from domination by the other and to redefine relations between these two nations in a manner that permits them to function within the structures of a confederation of states. The very notion of parties to these divergent perceptions handling the task of resolving the conflict arising therefrom a task that demands a conciliation of these two concepts without the mediation of a third party skilled in such work, borders on the incredible. The government's apparently firm commitment to repeated attempts along this line runs the risk of being seen as postures adopted in response to internal political considerations and as an indication of a need for the development of much more sophisticated political skills, that permit the adoption of more realistic and credible policies.
Undoubtedly the reconciliation of these two different concepts will entail considerable effort and a great deal of skill. It will aIso necessitate the creation of a space for dialogue between parties to the conflict and neutral parties skilled in the task of conflict resolution. The policy position adopted by the developed nations of the west appears to hold out the potential for the emergence of just such a space not only on their own soil but hopefully also within Sri Lanka and the actual theatre of conflict as well. Based on the government's repeated assertions of its ability to resolve the conflict without foreign intervention, one would expect to see some interest on its part in creating such a space for Sri Lankans themselves to mediate between their government and the LTTE in order to find a way to resolve the conflict. However nothing of the sort has been visible despite engagement in this task surely being a right and responsibility of every citizen of this island. Its failure to create such a space for dialogue only serves to compound the complexity of a task that promises to take a great deal of time and patience, and demands an ability to tolerate high levels of frustration and disappointment.
The growing need for a capital and service base for the development of South Asia, however, has an urgency that cannot be ignored. This undeniable urgency seems to have led to the current predominance of attempts to resolve the conflict through conventional coercive military means - or at any rate to a consensus in this direction at regional level. The far more sophisticated response of the developed nations however shows a deeper understanding of the dynamics involved. They even provide for a synergistic relationship with the militarist policies of violent conflict resolution that apparently enjoy much support at regional level. These militaristic policies will play the stick to their carrot of recognition and support in exchange for the LTTE's de militarisation and democratisation. Put simply their policy makes it possible for them to do the talking to the LTTE while we do the fighting and dying which the implementation of our policies call for. One realises of course that there is no reason why we should continue to bring such calamities upon ourselves. The "War For Peace" has long since passed all understanding. Now it appears that the battle for our sanity is on.
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