The attack on the Mullaitivu Army Camp has put paid to Government propaganda, in the backdrop of a tight censorship, repeated rhetoric echoed by state-run media and official spokesman that as a result of Operations Riviresa, the LTTE is a spent force that could be defeated by the end of the year or next.

It also questions the bravado expressed by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, that the war would be terminated by the end of next year or even the more flippant statement by the Deputy Minister of Defence, General Anuruddha Ratwatte, that the east can be brought under control in just five days.

Of course that was the latest in Gen. Ratwatte's forecasts. Early this year, he declared in Hambantota that the separatist war would be ended by the Sinhala and Hindu New Year in April. Thereafter, he declared that 70 per cent of the separatist war was over and only a mere 30 per cent remains to be finished.

Sad though it is, and even sadder to the families of those brave men of the fighting forces, the lesson of these circumstances is never to underestimate your enemy. This is a historically proven fact and a fundamental tenet.

The tragedy of Mullaitivu is still not over. No clear assessment of the situation as it stands now is possible because of the lack of access to the battle areas by independent observers. All information depends on what the Government chooses to release.

From what is known at the moment, it appears that the attack on the Mullaitivu Army Camp may turn out to be the worst debacle of the 13 year long war. How did all this happen?

Observers say that any operation logically contribute to the continuity of operational aims and war strategies.

The LTTE offered little resistance to the military onslaught of Operation Riviresa except for the defence of Neerveli. It is significant that throughout Operation Riviresa of nearly four months duration, the Sea Tigers were dormant. More importantly with the beginning of Operation Riviresa, the Sea Tiger bases in the north and east coast of the peninsula were thinked out and later withdrawn to the coasts of the Wanni and Eastern Province.

These facts by themselves, indicated that the LTTE strategy was not to resist the SLA in the peninsula but to regroup in the Wanni belt for a strategic offensive once the Army had, in the LTTE perception, over stretched their deployment. This is a classic tactic of guerrillas as best expressed by Mao Tse Tung:

"When the enemy advances, we retreat.

When he escape we harass.

When he retreats we pursue.

When he is tired we attack.

When he burns we put out the fire.

When he loots we attack.

When he pursues we hide.

When he retreats we return.

The immediate post-Riviresa phase developed to a stalemate situation, with the LTTE lying militarily dormant. During this phase the LTTE strategy focused on a political dimension. This was a period when the LTTE international organisation was active in promoting intervention either through third party mediation or canvassing for international support of the LTTE cause through seminars and conferences.

The LTTE, however, were not to remain militarily inactive for too long. It must have been in their mind that to remain so could have forced a psychological shift of the Jaffna population towards the government in the belief that the LTTE was a marginalised force. The promise of victory and political deliverence is a fundamental principle for the guerrilla to win and retain the confidence of the population.

The resurgent LTTE strategy appears to follow the pattern of the war of the flea that is by pin prick attacks on the security forces on all fronts. In the past two to three weeks, the LTTE has suicide-bombed targets in Jaffna, attacked Vanathavillu a village near the Wilpattu jungles, attacked the border villages of the Wanni divide, maintained a series of attacks in the Batticaloa district and executed a hit and run operations into Yala.

In addition LTTE terror groups have steadfastly maintained pressure on Colombo by the threat of suicide bombing. The LTTE has culminated these series of widespread sporadic attacks by a devastating conventional style onslaught on the Mullaitivu camp.

The LTTE has eyed Mullaitivu for a considerable period. Of all the military establishments in the Northern province, the Mullaitivu base territory-wise is the smallest save perhaps for the Pooneryn defence complex. The Pooneryn Complex was of strategic importance to the LTTE so long as they were in control of the peninsula and needed free movement in the Jaffna lagoon. That requirement, at least for now, no longer exists.

Yet for all, Pooneryn does remains an obstacle to LTTE communications between the mainland and the peninsula. However, in the altered strategic scenario after the re-capture of the peninsula, Pooneryn is not an entirely isolated complex, as it is now within a complementary defence arrangement encompassing Elephant Pass, Pooneryn, the Mullaitivu, Kayts Island and the peninsula.

Thus the Mullaitivu camp remains the only isolated outpost in the Northern Province. The comparatively small extent of this complex as compared to the more expansive territorial defence establishment of Mannar, which embraces both the Mannar island and the mainland, makes Mullaitivu an attractive target.

Furthermore, it is strategically located midway on the East coast on the Navy lines of communication between Trincomalee and Jaffna. Thus its strategic importance to the LTTE and the Sea Tigers. The elimination of the Mullaitivu base would also permit the LTTE easier land access from the Wanni to the border areas of Kokilai, Pulmodai, westwards to Janakapura, Padaviya and to Vavuniya.

In addition Mullaitivu also dominates the south eastern access to the Wanni jungles where Velupillai Prabhakran has established his headquarters and his operational base. The expansion of Mullaitivu into a launch pad by the security forces to extend operations northwards combined with south focused operations from Elephant Pass would seriously threaten Prabhakaran's Wanni base.

The combination of these factors, in the present strategic equation enhanced the significance of Mullaitivu as a serious threat to the security perceptions of the LTTE. If this factor is discernible to a civilian like this columnist with little knowledge of matters military, then with specialised knowledge of the facilities available to military intelligence, the Mullaitivu camp should have been seen as a high priority target to the LTTE.

There are many more questions that arise to the lay mind but in the blackout of information it will be inappropriate to raise some of them. Yet some other questions also cannot be raised because of the little knowledge trickling through from the war front.

But I believe it is not inappropriate to raise one question which seems relevant even from the scant information dished out by the Government's news management, that is - considering the importance of Mullaitivu and its isolated location whether the contingency plans to support this base in the event of LTTE attack were adequate.

That even after 48 hours after the LTTE attack reinforcements have not yet linked with Mullaitivu, or any counter attack successful, underscores the vital importance of the questions raised. The confusion of implementing contingency relief operations is all too remniscent of the previous debacles at Pooneryn, Mankulam and Kokilai.

At least in the present state of affairs it seems that the lessons of history has not been learnt.

It is all too easy to raise questions. But in the public interest it is essential to do so and it is so done without devaluing in any way the gallant efforts of the security forces in combatting a deadly war.

It cannot be over stressed that only continuous pressure against the LTTE that could keep them on the run and compel them to make mistakes which could lead to their final annihilation and thus create the ground conditions for a much needed peace and political solution.

To sum up, I quote once more the famous saying of Henry Kissinger:

"The guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The Army loses if it does not win."

The next few days will surely reveal whether what seems to be a debacle at Mullaitivu is a result of military inadequacies or the consequence of bungled politico-military expediency.