All censorship’s exist to prevent anyone from challenging current conceptions and existing institutions. All progress is initiated by challenging current conceptions.... Consequently, the first condition of progress is the removal of censorship.
-George Bernard Shaw
Dramatist

As we enter the 18th week under censor hip, one is not only denied the right to challenge current conceptions and existing institutions but also deprived from informing the public of a burning issue that affects them most - the escalating separatist war.

Even the best trained army in the world has logistic and planning hiccups. They learn from these mistakes and take corrective action to prevent their recurrence.

During the Gulf war, Britain’s elite Special Air Service (SAS) sent out a patrol - Bravo Two Zero - deep into Iraqi territory. For us in Sri Lanka, there is a moral in what happened.

On the run behind Iraqi lines, Chris Ryan, an SAS commando, walked 300 kilometres for seven days and eight nights, eating nothing except two packets of biscuits and without water most of the time.

In the course of his epic journey all his toe nails came out, he suffered serious damage to his teeth, gums and he lost 40 pounds. Yet Ryan never forgot his training as a member of the SAS and never lost his heart.

The story of his journey is related in chilling detail in Ryan’s own epic, The One That Got Away. An expert in the counter-terrorist field, Ryan was on an eight-man patrol behind Iraqi lines during the Gulf war, code named Bravo Two Zero.

Ryan’s heroism

The team’s dramatic exploits were first revealed by General Sir Peter de la Billiere, the Commander of the British forces in the Gulf in his autobiography Storm Command. The highly decorated General de la Billiere also commanded the SAS. Then the team leader of Bravo Two Zero, Andy McNab, gave the first detailed account. Unlike McNab who fell into Iraqi hands, Ryan was the only member of the team to escape capture, cross the Syrian border and return to his base in Saudi Arabia.

James Adams, one time Defence Correspondent of The Sunday Times, London, and now the newspaper’s Washington Correspondent, describes Ryan as a hero who surpassed the benchmark set by SAS Corporal Jack Sillitoe, who trekked more than 100 miles through the western desert of North Africa in 1942.

In a review of his book, which was on the best seller list for many months, Adams says when the story of Ryan’s feat began to circulate, immediately after the Gulf war, he was held up as an example of just how the men from Hereford (the home of SAS) can perform when circumstances demand. He quotes Field Marshal Lord Brammall, the former Chief of the defence staff, as saying your escape is a classic of its kind. What feat of courage and endurance....

Twenty years ago, Adams points out, such notes and, indeed, the story of the journey itself would have remained a secret to be shared over a beer between the small band of brothers that forms the special forces community. But times have changed: today is the era of kill and tell in the SAS, when any story or collection of tales (provided they are accompanied by the letters SAS) are certain to bring fame and fortune.

The operation for Bravo Two Zero would have been simple enough. The eight-man patrol was dropped deep in Iraqi territory by United States Air Force Chinook helicopters and ordered to relay intelligence on troop movements and to destroy Iraqi fibre-optic communications systems. The patrol was quickly discovered by the Iraqis. Ryan and two companions became separated from the main body.

In the end, three of the patrol died, two from exposure and one in a firefight with Iraqis. The remainder were captured and tortured, with the exception of Ryan who crossed the Eupharates into Syria and safety.

Adams notes that the bravery of the men of Bravo Two Zero is unquestioned, and both McNab and Ryan’s books tell their stories very well. It is Boy’s Own stuff but the worse for that, with all the action and drama that should be a hallmark of a good war story.

But there is a much darker side to this story, one that Ryan’s book reveals for the first time in all its terrible truth, observes Adams.

This is where the tale becomes relevant to Sri Lankans, more importantly to those in Government, the defence establishment and the security forces.

Adams makes some revealing observations. He says: Bravo Two Zero was a tale of derring do, but also a story of quite stunning incompetence by a force that has a reputation for efficiency and excellence second to none in the British Army.

He adds: Ryan reveals that the SAS, who want for nothing in terms of equipment, had deployed to the desert without the right kit. The Quarter Master had no grenades for their launchers; stocks of Claymore mines were never issued because of a communications error, the patrol making their own instead from ice cream cartons and scrounging some from other units; silenced pistols were not available.

The maps issued to the patrol were designed for air crews and the scale was so small that they were virtually useless. Maps derived from satellites were available from Americans, but were never given to the men. Escape maps studied by each soldier were so old they had been printed in 1928 and then updated for the second World War; it was only just before they left, that more modern versions were issued. Intelligence was so poor that the men, who had practised building hides in the desert sands of Saudi Arabia, were dropped on to bedrock that was both flat and so hard but digging of any kind was impossible.

Even more serious, the patrol members found themselves unable to communicate with base because they had been given the wrong radio frequencies. To compound that error, their emergency beacons lacked the range to communicate with any overflying aircraft that might have been able to organise a rescue.

For an ordinary army patrol, much of this might be explained by the fog of war. But this was the SAS, the regiment that prides itself on its meticulous planning, on its determination to leave nothing to chance. It has been this attention to the smallest detail that has helped make the SAS so effective; yet here, in a real war, it was the detail that was ignored and it was the system that failed the men.

It is right that the men of Brave Two Zero should have been honoured with the medals they received for their courage. But medals and oft repeated tales of heroism should not be allowed to disguise the fact that three men died and others suffered terribly because of mistakes that should not have been made. What the next book about this patrol should tell us is what action has been taken to make sure those same mistakes do not happen.

Ever since the Gulf war, SAS soldiers have been emerging from behind Hereford’s veil of secrecy with details of covert operations. Another story centred around Operation Mikado during the Falklands war where the Staff Sergeant of B Squadron expressed reservations over the execution of an operation. He argued that the plan amounted to the needless and deliberate sacrifice of the squadron...

There is a clear message in this for political leaders and military top brass.

For political leaders, it is a reminder of reality. Governments contending with national security threats can be unexpectedly thrust into situations of defeat, debacles or disaster. That is part of a cycle in a confrontationist situation. Does one cover up such events by clamping a veil of total secrecy or be truthful to the public by baring the facts and highlighting whatever little good there is in that situation? In the case of Ryan’s story, it is his heroism and the glory it brought to SAS. The bad part, of course, was the blunders by others in the service in not providing the right kit and the right frequencies for communications.

For the military top brass, it is an eloquent message that no military outfit in the world is infallible. Shortcomings and failures are part and parcel of all armies. The experience of the elite SAS clearly illustrates this. Like in the SAS, even in the Sri Lanka Army (or for that matter the security forces and police) failures and shortcomings are inevitable.

Equally there is no dearth of heroes of the calibre of McNab and Ryan in Sri Lanka too. In 1989 when Tiger guerrillas ambushed a group of commandos in a questionable operation at Kattaiparichchan in the Trincomalee district, some of them scattered to the neighbouring coastal area.

Many months later, one of the commandos arrived in Colombo in a commercial flight from Bangkok. He had escaped in a boat that lay beached at the Kattaiparichchan coast and rode it to nowhere in the high seas. The man arrived in Thailand. That spoke well for the army commandos, their training and endurance. The recent Mullaitivu debacle is replete with heroic tales by soldiers. But sad enough, their valour, honour, commitment and bravery will go unsung, unheard and unseen by their fellow countrymen not to mention the outside world.

That certainly is not a way for a nation to show its gratitude to men and women who pay with their lives protecting the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. If an ill conceived censorship denies to them this signal honour, so is the attitude of military spokesmen who are more intent on publicising only large enemy casualties and heavy damage inflicted on them. This was clearly evident during the series of military operations in the north. Sketchy news releases in the backdrop of a tight censorship merely spoke of the dead, the wounded and the enormity of damage caused to the enemy.

Binding spirit

Valour, courage and sacrifice are the very essence and ethos of an Army. They are the binding spirit that has been glorified through the ages. Even in defeat or foolhardy actions of bravery, the courage of the fighting men has been recognised and sung. The phyrric saga of the Charge of the Light Brigade is treasured in the memorable verses by Alfred Lord Tennyson.

The soul and spirit of the Army lies in the gallantry of the officers and men. Without this motivating force an Army may as well be an armed rabble of men in common uniforms. To censor episodes which illustrate the valour and courage of the men of our armed forces is self defeating and demoralising.

There has been occasions when the censor deleted references in reports to the name of even the Army Commander. Absurd as it may sound, the reason adduced was that the name would be intelligence to the enemy. Hence any reference to the name of an officer or a soldier, however, laudable their actions are, were completely expunged.

With the exception of operational plans which would provide advance information to the enemy, constraints on the media in reporting the ongoing war appears lop sided and ill conceived. If the argument for censoring the local media is to prevent the so-called claim that it would be providing information to the enemy, obviously those responsible are grossly ignorant of the way the news distribution system works.

It is widely known that the LTTE’s main propaganda headquarters is (or as they call it, the LTTE International Secretariat) is located at 211, Katherine Road, London, United Kingdom. It is from here that the LTTE transmits all its press releases to the Colombo offices of foreign correspondents and the editorial offices of the national newspapers. These press releases contain LTTE’s version or response to the fighting in the north/east and related matters. What is significant about these press releases is the fact that they arrive within 24 hours of an incident occurring in any part of Sri Lanka.

It is abundantly clear that there is a communications link between the LTTE in Sri Lanka and its office in London? How else could, for example, the news of an incident in the north reach London for the International Secretariat to put out press releases in double quick time? Sometimes their response comes in quicker than the press releases put out by the Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence. Why have the authorities not been able to stop the free flow of information from the LTTE in Sri Lanka to their offices in London?

This information does not end up in press releases alone. In important towns in the United States, Canada and even UK, it is recorded and played to those who telephone designated numbers. During July, these phones were constantly busy with callers wanting to find out more information on the LTTE attack on the Mullaitivu Military Base. In addition the material (together with photographs sent from battle areas in Sri Lanka) is published in a wide variety of newspapers and magazines. Video material of LTTE attacks on military camps and other incidents is freely distributed. That is not all. The news is also distributed the world over via the Internet.

The fact that the authorities are unable to detect, leave alone banning direct communication links from LTTE in Sri Lanka with their London office, places the Tiger guerrillas at a tremendous advantage in their propaganda campaign. That is while a censorship is clamped down on the local media on the grounds that some reports may be information to the enemy.

There is no censorship on the foreign media. Leading international news agencies, Colombo-based correspondents for leading newspapers, radio broadcasters and television agencies have been giving extensive coverage to developments in Sri Lanka. After the Mullaitivu debacle, the worst in the country’s military history, the top story for several days last month was on Sri Lanka.

Not only the LTTE Secretariat in London, but also its offices in other parts of the world including Australia, Canada, the USA, Germany and France monitor news reports. In some instances the London office of LTTE is known to have made contact with LTTE in Sri Lanka and thereafter issued clarifications or denials. The latest such denial was disassociating itself from a bomb explosion in a kovil in Batticaloa last Sunday.

Political shield

In the light of the above, one wonders whether a local censorship is a shield to keep away the truth from the Sri Lankan public and build up a politically advantageous climate for those in power. This is through orchestrated propaganda in the backdrop of a total news blackout.

The situation gets further confounded by the amateur approach to enforcing the censorship. In June, this year, The Dallas Morning News, published a report from Mark Kaufman (of the Philadelphia Inquirer) about how 12 Green Berets were training Sri Lankan soldiers. He wrote if after a visit to Sri Lanka and a journey to the jungles of Wirawila where the training was going on. The news report went all over the world through the Internet. When local newspapers wanted to publish it, it was censored. One newspaper even had a follow up story with reactions from officials of the US Embassy in Colombo. That too was censored. Now the LTTE is using this report as part of its campaign against the United States for assisting Sri Lanka. This is while the local media remains gagged. Even whilst a local censorship is in force, foreign media personnel can arrive in Sri Lanka and report freely to their organisations. Why this discrimination of the local media?

Another argument held out for censorship is on the question of procurements. It is not only the local media that reports on procurements. There have been many foreign media reports of Sri Lankan security forces procuring a wide variety of military hardware and services of foreign personnel. How does it become information to the enemy when it is reported only in the local media? Such a ban also has other ill effects. It is widely known that many procurement deals during the previous Government have come under investigation by the CID. Wide publicity has been given over state TV, radio and print media to serious irregularities in purchases. Present day procurements, in view of the news blackout, will have to await the arrival of another Government to probe.

Protagonists of the censorship have been quick to respond with examples of what happened during the World War II, i.e., over 50 years ago. It may come as a surprise to many of them that the flow of information then (in a period in which there was no modern technological advancements or an information super highway) was much more than what is being disseminated today on the separatist war.

During World War II, US President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, communicated the course of the fighting to the nation over the national radio networks during his well known fireside chats. He suggested that listeners buy maps in order to follow along with him the paths of advancing Allied Forces, and he referred them to images in newsreels, Life, Saturday Evening Post, Time and other media of the day.

Besides stoking the already voracious appetites for news of the war, his suggestions generated a national flurry of map buying, a significant increase in the geographic sophistication of a nation and a personal feeling of involvement in the course of the war.

There were no calls then, 50 years ago, by commanders for blanket news censorship or to declare battle areas (including cleared areas) out of bounds to the media. Nor were there any spokesmen in uniform giving unrealistically high enemy casualties when there is an incident thus eroding his or her institution’s credibility. Nor was there a single bureaucrat bestowed with the responsibility of deciding what the public should or should not know or even determine what is good for troop morale.

Today, in this global TV age, technology has revolutionised many things and the resultant developments have confined the words censorship to a dictionary.

Lt. Col. Frank J. Stech of the United States Army notes in a recent paper he wrote that the unique experience of a real-time feedback at war’s outbreak from the opponent’s national capital offers a useful place to start thinking about conflict in the global TV age.

He says: Radio, invented near the turn of the century, led to new arsenals of electronic weaponry that radically changed military operations three decades later. Radio technology spawned new approaches to strategy (propaganda, strategic bombing), operations (navigation, electronic warfare) and tactics (mobile communications and improved command and control). Television, invented in the 1920s, began a similar cycle of invasion and adaptation in military operations in the 1970s, leading to the weaponry of the 1990s and beyond.

TV and videos are poised to change warfare as extensively and dramatically in the 21st century as radio changed conflict in this century, for policy makers as well as for combatants. To think as exclusively the province of the media would be as short-sighted today as thinking in 1930 that radio was merely for news broadcasts. The effects of TV, video and global communications on conflict management in the 21st century will extend beyond the relationships of TV news and the military...

Lt. Col. Stech says the military must help the political leadership by ensuing that the rationale and justification for military operations are completely consistent with policy objectives, and by helping policymakers explain to the public and press the connections between operations and policy.

US analysis

At a time when the People’s Alliance Government is welcoming American assistance to combat terrorism, it is relevant to mention a recent analysis carried out by the US Army War College on the effects of the media’s technological advances on policymaking, military planning and strategic decisions.

It noted: There is no longer a question of whether the news media will cover military operations; journalists will likely precede the force into the area of operation, and they will transmit images of events as they happen, perhaps from both sides of any conflict.

High technology has revolutionised the media. Dissemination of information can no longer remain in the hands of a few bureaucrats with no knowledge of the workings of the media and revolve around a few cryptic press releases. Like the speciality the Government is trying to bring into the security forces with training assistance from militarily developed countries, the media war will also have to be handled by specialised hands. The propaganda front is equally important as the battlefront in a guerrilla war. The sooner the authorities realise it, the better it is.

It must be borne in mind that the real heroes of this war are those men and women who are facing brunt of the enemy. Their only certainty is that they are living today. Their tomorrow is unknown. Unfortunately it is not to those heroes that the credit is often given. Their glory is usurped. Victory has many fathers but defeat is an orphan.

The censorship hides those who wish to remain in darkness and suffocates the revealing of the truth and the story of the true heroes.

The words of one of America’s most decorated soldiers, General Norman Schwarzkopf, the hero of the Gulf War, say it most succinctly:

It doesn’t take a hero to order men into battle. It takes a hero to be one of those men who goes into battle.

The self acclaimed Schwarzkopfs of Sri Lanka have a lot to learn while they keep an entire nation in the dark.