US President, Bill Clinton, drew worldwide attention last week by ordering cruise missile attacks on military installations around Baghdad to punish Iraq for the armed incursion into Kurd-populated north.

The thrust of Washingon’s diplomacy since then has been to win over support of its allies for the extended no-fly zone in sourthern Iraq. If that was easy during the 1991 Gulf War, the current foray in the backdrop of a Presidential election this year, was by no means an easy task.

One of the causes for it was echoed by none other than a close US ally, King Hussein of Jordan. He declared “no party or force should be allowed to make use of the extraordinary situation in Iraq to interfere in its affaris.”

But that was an issue where the sophisticated military might of the world’s only surviving super power was at play. Like in other parts of the world there was considerable interest over these developments in Sri Lanka too. The response of the PA Government also indicates the attitude of nations against unilateral military intervention unless it emanates from the United Nations.

But cruise missiles, B 52 bombers and extended no-fly zones did not deter Washington’s envoy in Colombo from making his own foray, not to make war but to end one.

Whilst his President Bill Clinton was preparing for his early morning address to the nation from the Oval Office at the White House in Washington last Tuesday. Ambassador Peter Burleigh, was receiving a first hand account of the ethnic crisis at his sprawling official residence, “Jefferson House” at Horton Place.

The occasion was a 15o-minute meeting with leaders of Tamil political parties with the exception of the TULF. In attendance were Suresh Premachandran (EPRLF), Shankar Raji (EROS), Sri Skanda (TELO), Douglas Devananda (EPDP) and T. Sitharthan (PLOT).

The discussion began over soft drinks and continued through a meal of rice, fish, carrot curry and salad. EPDP leader Douglas Devananda, excused himself and left before a desert of mixed fruit was served.

Though other duties forced him to forego desert, Mr. Devananda did not mince his words when it came to one of the key topics of discussion - the declaration of a permanent ceasefire between the security forces and the LTTE.

He said he was strongly opposed to such a move. But the rest agreed that there should be one. The proposed ceasefire is mooted as a precursor to any talks with the LTTE.

The Tamil political parties were unanimous in their call for third party mediation to successfully end the ethnic conflict. They were of the view that such mediation was inevitable if an everlasting political solution was to be found.

These Tamil political leaders said the third party mediators, whoever they are, should talk to the LTTE. Tamil political parties, the Government of Sri Lanka and the United National Party.

The statements drew a string of questions from Ambassador Burleigh. He asked whether the LTTE would sincerely accept third party mediation or whether they would renege on them like during negotiations with successive Governments in the past. he also asked whether the LTTE would give up its demand for a separate state and accept an alternative.

Though the word terrorist does not seem to have been mentioned, the inquiries posed by Ambassador Burleignh are indeed relevant. Rightly so, as in the aftemath of the bombing at the World Trade Centre in New York, Oklahoma, Atlanta and the US actions against Libya and Iran. The US would naturally have to work within its declared parameters against terrorism.

Ambassador Burleigh wound up by saying that he concurred with most views expressed by the Tamil political party leaders. However, he explained that he had different views on some matters concerning the LTTE.

On hand with Ambassador Burleigh were US Embassy’s Political Officer, Scot Belisi and Lieutenant Colonel Michale Harold Poore, Defence and Army Attache. The latter succeeds Lt. Col. Carl Cookrum, who ended a successful stint in Colombo last month.

The sufferings of people in the north/east, the problem of displaced persons from areas of tighting in Killinochchi, arriving in Vavuniya and the distribution of food were among other items covered during he luncheon meeting.

The Tamil political leaders conceded that there was no starvation among civilians in the Wanni since food lorries were moving from Vavuniya. Another significant point they made was that the civilians arriving in Vavuniya from uncleared areas in the Wanni were not “refugees” . The vast majority of them were coming to attend to personal matters. This had included even students and others who wished to travel out of Sri Lanka.

They pointed out that at present the returnees were being directed to ”Refugee Camps” . Until last week 40 Government officials who wanted to travel to Trincomalee and Colombo were still held up there. In Colombo there were over 6,000 civilians, who have registered themselves and were awaiting their turn to travel to Jaffna. There were over 15,000 in Jaffna who were wanting to travel to Colombo and other areas.

Although there is no question of starvation, medical and relief supplies are not reaching some of the areas satisfactorily, according to Kandiah Ganesh, the Government Agent Vavuniya.

He says there are 423 families or 1400 displaced persons in Vavuniya. A large number of them were those who have come to attend to personal maters. Those displaced persons who had arrived earlier (before the fighting in Kilinochchi) were now being sent in batches to Jaffna. The first batch of 372 persons were sent last week by train to Trincomalee and thereafter by ship to Jaffna. Last Wednesday, a further 300 were sent.

While the focal point of attention in the past few weeks has been on displacd persons, on the ground there appears to be a stalemate between the security forces and Tiger guerrillas. As I mentioned in these columns last week, recent incidents have related to infiltration and attack by the guerrillas.

There were reports that attempts are being made by Tiger guerrillas to destabilise villages located in border areas of the north and east. Since the Mullaitivu debacle in July, the LTTE, intelligence sources say, has intensified its recruitment campaign in the east. The Tigers are also said to be training groups of cadres in the Nedunkerny jungles.

Like his predecessor, Teresita Schaffer, the ongoing separatist war and the current efforts to resolve the ethnic conflict have engaged greater attention of Ambassador Burleigh than most of his predecesors in the recent years . If Ms Schaffer’s initiatives during the UNP administration led to closer military co-operation, such measures began to materialise only during Mr. Burleigh’s time.

They included the arrival in Sri Lanka of a team of Green Berets, America’s elite special forces from the Pacific Command in Hawaii. They trained the Sri Lanka Army, among other matters, in combat techniques in the Jungles of Wirawila. Another team of US Army non commissioned officers was in Sri Lanka training their local counterparts at a location near Anuradhapura. The teams have left after the completion of their assignments.

Foreign media exposure of their activity not only embarrassed US officials but also prompted them to explain there was no “quantum leap” in US relations with Sri Lanka. They said it was an extension of US efforts at countering global terrorism..

Be that as it may, there certainly was a qualitative difference. In the years past, US military assistance to Sri Lanka has centered on stints for Sri Lankan security forces officers in military academies in the US.

But in marked contrast, US military officials were for the first time on Sri Lankan soil training the security forces. That military expertise would have undoubtedly improved the efficiency of the security forces now engaged in the battle to weaken the LTTE.

But the LTTE seized the opportunity to launch a virulent anti-US campaign, particularly through the Internet about US military assistance to Sri Lanka. This was totally one sided. There was no Sri Lanka Government machinery to effectively counter LTTE’s overseas propaganda. And certainly no machinery at all to do so, on the Internet.

That brings us back to the futility of the ongoing censorship about which I have made repeated reference in these columns. The PA Government’s propaganda is confined to sketchy press releases put out by the Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence. Perhaps the only other addition are utterances by Ministers and officials at the weekly news briefings.

If the propaganda mechanism is amateur, the censorship on the local media has made a mockery of the entire system.

One of the main arguments for the local censorship is to deny the enemy of what is claimed to be important information. The instance cited above is a classic example of how foreign media reports have helped the LTTE to launch a campaign and effectively stall assistance Sri Lanka would have received.

Are we not our own enemy? If the local media was free to report, some of the adverse propaganda could have been easily negated. But we live in an era where under a censorship the public are made to believe that military advances have occured when in fact it was not so.

It is in this backdrop that in July, this year, a senior US Embassy official met a high ranking Sri Lanka Gvernment official to explain matters regarding military assistance. The official who has since ended his stint in Colombo told his local counterpart that the propaganda pitch against US was so high that some of the upcoming programmes would have to be “stretched out.” The carefully chosen words only meant that things have been put on hold.

Quite clearly this would not have happend if the Government had a professional propaganda mechanism and a more realistic attitude towards the media. The most important need is to separate the dissemination of information relating to the separatist war from the PA Government’s own political propaganda. The war is a national effort and should not be a stock in trade for any propaganda mileage for any political party or to boost the ego of a few politicians.

A major Government thrust against the LTTE in the coming weeks will come in the diplomatic front. Barring a last minute change of mind, an official announcement imposing a ban or proscription on the LTTE will be made. A decision has already been taken by the Government and a formal announcement was put off in view of the Singer Trophy cricket matches in Colombo during the last week.

The ban on the LTTE was also taken up for discussion by the Tamil political parties with Ambassador Burleigh last Tuesday. The party representatives made the point that whether or not a ban was imposed on the LTTE, the Government was continuing its military thrust against it.

If the aim of the proposed ban is to persuade other countries to follow suit there were clear indications that some important nations will not fall in line. British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, who was on an official visit to Sri Lanka last week made it clear that it will not be a reality in UK. Similarly, the United States, according to diplomatic sources, is not expected to ban the LTTE either.

The proposed ban of the LTTE is unlikely to have an impact on Western countries which today provide an overseas support base for the LTTE (even though not encouraged by those governments), then it could be asked what is to be achieved by imposing a ban?

If the ban (or proscription) is to be a comparision to the one imposed on the JVP, there is a qualitative difference between the two. The JVP was a registered political party and it is so even now. Hence, its proscription was meaninghful. The LTTE on the other hand is not a political party though it may prefer political objectives.

It is an organisation combatting the government militarily which by itself is illegal. Could therefore any group outside the pale of legality be banned? It is tantamount to imposing a ban on kasippu brewers or Pettah pick pockets. Therefore, in a sense, to ban (or proscribe) an illegal organisation is by itself is to give it official recognition.

What is in fact required is to take effective action against the LTTE, an illegal organisation, and its supporters. Action against the LTTE is already taking place militarily as is the Police action take against its supporters outside the operational areas.

Regrettably though, the judicial process against LTTE supporters is not swift enough to serve as a deterrent. A fast track judicial process is essential. This is not by any means to suggest justice through Kangaroo courts. But clearly the normal judicial process in the country which is known for its long drawn out process is totally inadequate to meet the exigencies of sabotage, murder and mayhem against established legal systems.

For instance, have those who have given logistic support to the LTTE in the many bombing of civilian targets in Colombo being brought to book? No, they are still lingering in prison or remand awaiting trial.

This is clearly not a deterrant to effectively ward off those providing logistic support to the LTTE in Colombo and in other areas outside the combat zones.

The Indian example of banning the LTTE is also different. In the Indian situation, the LTTE as a politically motivated group got involved in the domestic politics of Tamil Nadu. Hence its proscription had a political objective. Moreover the LTTE was recognised by the central government in India.

What is required today is for a fully co-ordinated military, political and legal offensive against the militancy of the LTTE rather than a ban which is domestically meaningless and unlikely to have any impact on the international scene. This again amply illustrates the absence of a total strategy in combatting the LTTE.