The LTTE treats the Batticalao and Ampara districts as one military administrative region. The overall commander of the region is Karuna. Local Tigers, with the exception of a few senior LTTE cadres, now address him respectfully as Amman. The head of the region’s political wing is Thurai. He had been in the small band of Tigers who fought the Indian army in the east. Visu, who belongs to Karuna’s “batch” in the order of seniority, is in charge of the TEEDOR which for the first time has opened a public office in the region. Ramanan is the head of the military intelligence in Batticalao and Ampara. The military affairs of the Batticaloa district is looked after by Ramesh. In the Ampara district the military wing is lead by Prabha. In the past the Batticalao Ampara region was divided into four military zones for operational and administrative purposes. The town and the Paduvankarai region were known by the call sign 4-9. The Vakarai and Valaichenai areas constituted the 4-6 zone. The Ampara district was designated 4-8. The large network of large and small camps in the dense and strategically located jungles of Kudumbimalai and Thoppikkal (called Thoppigala in army communiques) were and are still known as the Beirut complex. Under a recently introduced system the Batticalao- Ampara region has been divided into Kottams ( divisions), each with its own military unit. Currently there are three special attack groups operating in the region.
They are -
1)the Visalahan unit named after Joy who led and was killed in the Nithihaikulam battle south of Mullaithivu (at the age of 21) in which the LTTE massacred a large number of soldiers of the Gurkha unit which went to storm Prabhaharan’s hide out, including the commanding officer of the Gurkhas, Col. Bakshi.
2)the Vijayakanth unit named after a senior cadre from Batticalao who had fought the Indian army in Joy’s group and who was killed last year at Kiran.
3) the Vinothan unit. This is said to be the largest of the three military units in the region and has one thousand cadres. This unit returned to Batticaloa recently after taking part in operations in the north. The Vinothan unit is named after a cadre who led and died in the attack on the Kaddumurivu Special Forces camp last year (the place was overrun and destroyed by the Tigers).
But generally it is said that the Jeyanthan “Brigade” from Batticaloa which is currently stationed in the Wanni, is the most effective and deadly arm of the LTTE today. The brigade seems to be held in high esteem in the LTTE for what is claimed to be its military prowess and ruthless precision. The Jeyanthan ‘brigade” is led by Ram, who was formerly the LTTE’s Ampara commander. This is the LTTE’s second conventional type military unit after the Charles Antonio “brigade” commanded by Sornam. Some analysts and writers in Colombo referred to Charles Antony unit as a brigade when its presence first came to light. The LTTE, however, called the unit “Charles Antony Padaip Pirivu”. The LTTE seems to have, in this matter, evolved its own structural criteria, as is evident from the formation and deployment of the Jeyanthan Padaip Pirivu.
Thurai said that their military capability has so improved in recent times that they were in a position to retain and deploy most of the Batticalao military units to draw in, attack and push back the special forces vanguard of Op. Seda Sahara II which attempted to thrust towards the Pulping Al junction two KM west of Kiran on the eve of LTTE’s Op. Unceasing Waves which destroyed the Mullaithivu base. “ This shows that we can now simultaneously handle the army in major combats in the north as well as in the east” claimed Thurai.
In 1993 when the Pooneryn base was attacked, it was believed that almost all of the LTTE’s military units in Batticalao had to be called up by the Tiger high command to the north in order to achieve the concentration of forces which was required to overwhelm the camp.
The LTTE has opened several recruitment centres in areas under its control. Almost six years of severe economic restrictions which were placed on the region as part of the army’s counter insurgency program to “wipe out” the Tigers in the east have turned Paduvankarai - which in peaceful times produced almost twleve percent of the country’s paddy- into an impoverished landscape. An old classmate who now teaches in the area said that five boys from his school who had obtained very good results at the GCE OL exam last year have gone to herd cattle and work in the fields because of poverty.
Either the bread winner in the family is dead due to the violence or the family has had no income as a result of its paddy lands being in the zones where the army had banned cultivation since 1991. According to an official estimate of the District Reconstruction Coordinating Committee at the Batticalao GA’s office the extent of agricultural land affected by the war since Eelam war Two is 95290 acres. The same assessment says that more than three thousand fishing boats in the district have been damaged beyond reapair in the conflict.
The economy of the area was also affected by the heavy taxes farmers had to pay all round - to the LTTE, the Mohan group, ex Tamil miltants who had joined the army as privates etc.,
The general poverty in the region, induced mainly by the government’s ambitious but misguided counter insurgency program, is one of the main causes behind the LTTE’s extraordinarily high recruitment rate in the western hinterlands of the Batticaloa district.
The largest number of youth join the LTTE during the month of December every year. This is the time when most farming households in the area run very low on resources. I met a small time shopkeeper on my way to Karadiyanar from Kokkaddicholai on the dilapidated road in the interior who said that all his three sons have joined the LTTE. He is fortunate - none of his sons have died in action so far. Only his daughter and wife live with him now. I could see that there are many families like his in this part of the district from which more than one child has joined the Tigers.
While it is quite apparent that the declining economy of the region is one of the main causes contributing to the high rate of recruitment that the LTTE is able to sustain here, the government continues to impose a strict ban on a large number of essential items contributing to the further deterioration of the situation. There are severe strictures on the transport of fertilisers, pesticides, cement, fuel, batteries, steel, aluminium etc., beyond the STF and army check points at Kiran, Chenkalady(bridge), the Valaiyiravu bridge in Batticalao ( here the check point is generally manned by some ex Tamil militants working with the army, who some times take taxes in cash and kind from people), the Manmunai ferry, the Paddiripu bridge, the Kurumanveli ferry and at Vellaveli. The government has also placed restrictions on all building and irrigation work in the large region west of Chenkalady (through which runs the main trunk road to Badulla), in the Vadamunai(system B) area and in the Vakarai region. The people of Vakarai have been affected most by all this. Schools and other public buildings in the area were damaged heavily during Operation Seda Sahara in June. No medical facilities except for a meagre service run periodically by the ICRC is available. There is no public or private transport. Those who are sick or have urgent work in Valaichenai have to pay 150 rupees to bicycle owners to buy their passage one way.
Although the LTTE has established a TEEDOR office at Karadiyanar, it doesn’t seem to be in a position to engage in a major effort, as in the Wanni during Eelam War Two, to improve the general economy of the region with available local resources. Following
Op. Riviresa Three, the LTTE has been concentrating its resources and planning on further developing its military strength rather than on civil administration or economic development. However, the large tracts of paddy land which for long have remained “no go zones” for local farmers have come under cultivation again in Batticalao’s hinterland despite restrictions on fertilisers, pesticides etc., after the army camps which implemented the ban on cultivation in these areas were vacated.
The STF and the army have withdrawn from forty four camps in Batticaloa’s hinterland. The STF closed its camps at Porathivu, Palugamam, Ambalathady- Ambilanthurai, 40th colony, 39th colony, Thumpankerni, Puluhunaavi, Kokkaddicholai and Mahiladithivu. The closure of these STF camps appear to have been compelled by several successful attacks by the LTTE early this year and the pressure which the Tigers were stepping up on the Main Supply Route between Potthuvil and Akkaraipattu. The STF is an overstreched force in Batticaloa south and Ampara west - a shadow of its former self. In addition to this the STF has had to turn its attention on another matter- the interdiction of LTTE’s movement between its Kanjikudichcha Aru base and the Lahugala jungles which spread towards Yala.
On the other hand the closure of army camps mostly to the north and west of Batticalao appears to be prompted to some degree- particularly in Vakarai and System B - by the LTTE’s demonstrated potential since last year to overrun isolated camps but mainly by the government’s need to take troops to the north.
The government is able to keep a precarious hold on the district because it is still, despite losing soldiers regularly, able to hold on to the Welikanda- Valaichenai - Batticalao Main Supply Route. But it is clear that the LTTE, which appears to have achieved a level of forces today adequate to interdict the MSR if not overwhelm it temporarily, is playing its cards closer to its chest with a broader strategic purpose in mind. The army, running low on manpower, seems to be keeping its fingers crossed - and so do the people, but in fear and terror.
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