If "Operation Desert Strike", was on the early eve of the 1996 US Presidential elections, operation "Sath Jaya" (Phase Three) was on the eve of the 1997 budget day in Sri Lanka.

Whereas the US public approved of President Bill Clinton's Middle East adventure, reflected in his rise at opinion polls, no similar approbation was manifest over the new phase of "Sath Jaya."

Why was this so? Is there a comparison or a lesson to be learnt?

The striking difference in the two cases was in the full fanfare of publicity which propelled the enthusiasm of the US public as compared to the compelled tameness of the Sri Lankan media now under a tight censorship in reporting news of the separatist war.

No war is strictly a military affair. Each has political, economic and psychological ingredients which generate enthusiasm for the conduct of war itself as well as public support for its conduct. Failure to whip up that enthusiasm reflects on the failure by the people to understand what the nation is fighting about. Consequently there develops flagging public support. Here the media has its role to play.

Sadly the media in Sri Lanka is denied the freedom to move and report on the gallant efforts by the country's fighting forces. They deserve better. In that climate rumour takes over unless the readers are to believe official figures and rhetoric. This over the long period of the censorship has come to be disbelieved by the public.

Amongst the many such instances of contradictory rhetoric, a recent example was the comical situation where a Minister declared that the objective of the second phase of "Operation Sath Jaya" was Killinochchi, a military spokesman with characteristic glib avoided any reference. Perhaps there prevails an official fear that the free media through a sense of irresponsibility may transmit the information to the enemy.

As if the enemy who is in contact with the Army on a road which leads to nowhere else but to Kilinochchi and beyond would be unaware of the operational destination.

Needless to say, phase two of "Operation Sath Jaya" was not carried through to its ultimate conclusion. Hence the ongoing phase three.

The public are confused not only with the omissions of official dissemination but equally and perhaps more importantly on the designed cover up of news. The Mullaitivu debacle was the most glaring example. Further elaboration is to invite the Censor's red pencil.

In this confusion there is not only a state of ignorance created but there is also heartbreak and human suffering. Many next of kin of the brave men who served in Mullaitivu are still unaware of the fate of their loved ones except that they are categorised under the acronym "MIA" (Missing In Action). These unfortunates wander from soothsayers to light readers after having exhausted official channels forever in the hope that their near and dear are still alive.

Perhaps this is an unfortunate aspect of war. Whilst the official dilemma to such personal situations is perhaps understandable, the overall attitude to the Mullaitivu incident is not considered to be a debacle or a major set back boggles any sane mind.

It is this confusion and the news blackout or management which denies the media its role in not only a balanced reportage both in support of the war, if it is so perceived, but also in the advocacy of national understanding as an end to the conflict.

In this regard, it may be relevant to quote a student at the United States War College who penned:

"The government, the press, and the people as a whole had no enthusiasm for the war, indeed failed to understand what the nation was fighting about. This showed in lack of spirit in the troops sent to the east and in failure of the people at home to support the war. Such support is necessary in any war... Unless the people are enthusiastic about war, unless they have a strong will to win it, they will become discouraged by repeated (deferments of victory)... (This) war shows that wars may be won or lost in the home country as well as on the battlefield and that no government can go to war with hope of success unless it is assured that the people as a whole know what the war is about, that they believe in their cause, are enthusiastic for it, and possess a determination to win. If these conditions are not present the government should take steps to create them or keep the peace."

The above was written by Major G. T. Baldwin, in 1928 referring to Russia's ineptitude in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 to 1905. But this message is universal and timeless. How much longer will the government keep denying the free media its role in a free and sovereign democracy?

The government's propaganda machinery was accused in the past weeks of making advances that have not occurred. But the story was the other way around last week.

At dawn last Sunday, troops broke out from newly set up defences at the Paranthan Army Base. For a good 36 hours there was no official word that a much awaited major military operation had begun.

At 11 a.m. on Monday, September 23, when the silence was broken by a news release from the Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence, the contents were cautiously worded. The name of the operation, its aim or magnitude were not made clear. This is what the news release said:

"Domination of the areas well ahead of the Paranthan defences by the Security Forces commenced during the early hours of Sunday 22 Sep. 96. Ground troops backed by Armour, Artillery and the Air Force moved forward under heavy enemy resistance to dominate area east of the Colombo Kandy Road. By p.m. hours on Sunday, ground troops had dominated an area approximately 8 Kms ahead of the Paranthan defences. Terrorists fired small arms and mortars at the troops. Artillery and air support were used effectively to neutralise the pockets of enemy resistance. Ground troops and terrorist transmissions indicated over 200 casualties among the terrorists. The number of terrorists killed is yet to be ascertained. One officer and 21 soldiers were killed in action and 58 wounded during the day's fighting. Domination of areas well ahead of Paranthan defences will continue."

On September, 24 (Tuesday), even when Brigadier Sarath Munasinghe, official Military spokesman and Director Media at Army Headquarters, addressed the Colombo based Defence Attaches, a clear picture did not emerge. Perhaps for good reasons, Brigadier Munasinghe did not disclose that the phase three of "Operation Sath Jaya" had begun and that the troops were on their way to recapture Kilinochchi.

He focused attention more on the advance being made by one flank moving in an easterly direction (on the Colombo Kandy Road) from Paranthan the same statement contained in Monday's news release. He was emphatic there were no other columns on the move and that Kilinochchi was not the goal.

Brigadier Munasinghe was subjected to a barrage of questions from the DAs ranging from the ongoing military operations to the censorship, human rights and other matters. For obvious reasons, they cannot be elaborated.

For a good part of last Tuesday, Colombo's diplomatic community were piecing together the official statements and whatever little information that filtered out about the operation. They were being forced to an inevitable conclusion - was the latest military offensive aimed at assaulting the LTTE's One Four Base in the Nedunkerny jungles, widely believed to be Velupillai Prabhakaran's hideout. If that was the aim of the carefully chosen official announcements, it did not have the desired effect either in the media (both local and foreign) or the diplomatic community.

But that confusion lasted barely 24 hours. At the weekly media conference Brigadier Munasinghe bared details. He declared that phase three of "Operation Sath Jaya" had begun. He said one flank of advancing troops had moved seven kilometres in a south westerly direction from Paranthan. Another had advanced in a south easterly direction in an exercise where "a few Army divisions" were taking part. Though he did not say they were heading towards Kilinochchi, it was as clear as daylight that the capital of Wanni was the target. The declared aim of the two earlier phases of 'Operation Sath Jaya" had been that. And now the third phase had begun.

"Operation Sath Jaya" (phase three) shows the tussle for operational domination. The war remains a no win no lose phase.

Even when the Sri Lanka Army achieves its objective at Kilinochchi. It will be meaningless unless the operation leads to a continuing strategy. It does not require an oracle to predict that the military aim would be to open an MSR (Main Supply Route) from Elephant Pass to Vavuniya.

This in addition to the logistics bonus that would also segment the LTTE into operational areas in Vavuniya with a third operational area in the Eastern Province. But of course to accomplish such a strategy, the Army would require a far greater build up merely to protect the real estate it has occupied.

To launch into further offensive thereafter would require a further strength unless a successful pacification programme in the north will enable the re-deployment of troops. Should pacification be successful in the peninsula, it will perforce marginalise Prabhakaran and the LTTE to a willingness to compromise.

It is difficult to see an effective programme of pacification unless the non-militant Tamil political parties are able to play a role. This is unlikely unless the LTTE is marginalised.

In the current situation, therefore, the dilemma is that pacification cannot be total without its political content. On the other hand, to give a political content to the pacification programme, Prabhakaran and the LTTE must be adequately neutralised by military means or by political compromise. As the latter is more unlikely, the dilemma continues. Thus it would appear that the situation in the north is now at its military and political crossroads.

In this deadlock scenario, it is worth to remember that in a terrorist insurgency situation, pacification can never succeed without military operations whilst military operations are a waste unless they lead to pacification.