LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran and his intelligence boss, Shiv Shankar alias Pottu Amman, were among ten indicted before the High Court by Attorney General Sarath Silva on a record 712 charges for complicity in the Central Bank bombing.

The Government Press will soon roll out posters for countrywide propaganda campaign, bearing photographs and the names of those involved. The posters will offer handsome rewards to those providing information leading to the arrest of Prabhakaran, Pottu Amman among others. Whether the arrests will materialise is as far fetched as calling upon the LTTE to surrender all their weapons before another round of peace talks could begin.

But the fact that the Government, which had earlier planned to ban the LTTE and deferred an official announcement until the Singer Cup cricket series ended in Colombo in August, this year eventually had second thoughts, fuelled speculation of a shift in its approach. In view of offers by some countries to be third party mediators, it was felt that a ban would deter local groups from making contacts with the leadership.

Unlike peace talks in similar situation, for example the one between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), where third party negotiators had direct access to both sides, it is pointed out, that it is different in the case of the LTTE. It was felt that direct access to the leadership who were now in Wanni, particularly to prepare the ground-work for any talks, had to be made through local channels. A ban would have deterred them, it was pointed out.

Giving credence to this speculation was President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga's willingness to accept third party mediation. She declared this in an interview with the Indian news magazine, Frontline. But the High Court indictment has clearly defined the Government's position. The message that the Government wants to crack down on the LTTE is now very clear.

But the move took many, including some Cabinet Ministers, by surprise. One of them was Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, who was away in the United States attending the UN General Assembly sessions. He was in London en route to Colombo when the indictments were made in the High Courts. Mr. Kadirgamar who is in the habit of making at least two telephone calls to his officials daily to find out what was going on, did not know the news of the indictment.

He was at the BBC studios for an interview in world service television when a presenter who spoke to him informally before the cameras whirled, mentioned it. Incidentally, the local broadcaster of BBC in Colombo wiped out the interview although there was no censorship. They were to later explain that they had not received direct instructions that the censorship was off.

The fact that Mr. Kadirgamar, who as Foreign Minister, was in the forefront of countering LTTE propaganda overseas was not aware of the impending indictment reflects on the lack of co-ordination in the totality of the anti-terrorist campaign. What is as surprising on this lack of consultation is the fact that Minister Kadirgamar by his own right is one of the foremost legal luminaries in the country and merited consultation.

The judicial offensive by the Government against the LTTE is two-pronged. One is the deliberation whether to proscribe it and the other to seek to convict its leadership through legal recourse. The difference between these two approaches is subtle. Should the Government proscribe the LTTE, it would quite apart from giving legality to an illegal organisation also imply that open negotiation with a proscribed organisation is not valid. On the other hand, criminally convicting the leadership through the judicial process confers on them a disability whilst keeping the doors for negotiation open with alternate leaders. Of course the rub here is that the LTTE is Prabhakaran and Prabhakaran is the LTTE. Whether he will brook any alternate leadership even in a nominal sense is most unlikely as Mahattaya et al have learnt at the cost of their lives.

The aspect of negotiation is only one. In fact whether Prabhakaran would even condescend to meaningfully negotiate is doubtful as his track record shows. The way out for him, if he is finally cornered, would be the fate of other dictators before him. E.g., Hitler, Mussolini etc.

Apart from negotiation, the judicial offensive against the LTTE leadership has other plus factors. If convicted, it will seriously dent the image of Prabhakaran as a freedom fighter which is what the LTTE overseas network pitches to lobby groups and the western democracies. He has been painted in their role model of other militant leaders who in the early 1950s, 1960s struggled for the freedom of their Nations against colonial domination. Those circumstances were historically quite different and have no validity today.

In the aftermath of Oklahoma, World Trade Centre, the Lockerbie air disaster and similar incidents, the international community is gravely concerned about terrorism and the tragetting of civilians. Hence any conviction in the Central Bank bombing would make Prabhakaran an outcast in international eyes. This will greatly contribute to convince the international community that the LTTE is an organisation which uses terrorist techniques.

The Government's overseas initiative to apprise the international community of the Eelam conflict has gained much support and the conviction of the LTTE leadership for complicity in the bomb carnage in March, 1996 whilst enhancing Government's image will further deny the LTTE lobby of international leverage.

The compliance of the Government to legal procedures against the LTTE leaders would also be recognised as the Government's intention to combat the separatist LTTE militancy by democratic means within governmental norms and not rely on the military juggernaut to steamroll the LTTE.

Criminal action against the LTTE leadership and Prabhakaran in particular will greatly assuage the Sinhala polity of the Government positiveness by implementing a positive politico-legal programme in conjunction with a successful military strategy. The Government will no doubt hope this would swing some of the uncommitted towards supporting the Government's devolution package. The success of the devolution proposals for the political and economic survival of the Government is essential. The only viable manner by which the Government could face upto measures to relieve the people of the economic hardships they now face is to divert defence expenditure to economic and social programmes. To do so, some easing of the level of conflict is critically important to a Government facing unpopularity due to mounting economic issues. The combination of a positive and well co-ordinated legal-political-military strategy would at least for now give the Government political breathing space.

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