Dawn had broken on October 20, when two fibre glass Inshore Patrol Craft (IPCs) or Water Jets of the Sri Lanka Navy packed with commandos of the Special Boat Squadron (SBS) headed towards the shores of Ponnaituduwai in Chundikulam, a migratory fishing hamlet on the thin land mass that juts out of the mainland to link with the Jaffna peninsula.

Located south east of Elephant Pass (eight kilometres south of the military base at Vettilaikerny), Chundikulam is wedged between the Jaffna lagoon and the Indian ocean. In the yester years, it was well known for its bird sanctuary. But the shallow marshes and the bushy outgrowth on land are no more home for many of the feathery tribes. They had given way to a feline species of sorts, the Tiger guerrillas.

As the 40 foot long IPCs cut through the calm blue waters, the roar of their engines were drowned by the winds that swept across. The weather was misty but did not deter visibility. Clad in full battle gear the SBS commandos had their weapons pointed towards the shore, ready to respond if they were spotted and attracted enemy fire.

As the coast came closer, tension began to grow. Sailors manning the General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMGs) and the Automatic Grenade Launchers mounted on the IPCs had their fingers on the trigger. They were ready to fire their way through to a forced landing should the necessity arise. But, all was calm and quiet. It bolstered their belief that surprise was very much on their side. That feeling grew as the bows of the boat hit the sandy shores and the men began to alight. Hardly had the last few commandos set foot, all hell broke loose.

Loud explosions and the crackle of gunfire disturbed the otherwise quiet morning calm. The Navy commandos had come under heavy fire. Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), grenade launchers and machine gun fire were being directed at them.

Lt. Cmdr. Waruna Gallage, who was commanding the men aboard one IPC was getting ready to disembark when he was hit on his hip by bullets and fell into the water. When he was rescued, he had died, reportedly from drowning. That was the tragic end to the life of a Naval Officer who won national colours for his swimming prowess. Four other SBS commandos also fell dead. Two more were missing in action and 20 others were wounded.

That encounter signalled the launch of "Operation Dirithara" - a combined Army, Navy and Air Force operation. Its declared aim was to destroy a radar station operating from a Sea Tiger facility in the Chundikulam coast.

The time was precisely 7.03 a.m. Exactly 13 minutes earlier, Army's Special Forces commandos had landed by MI 17 helicopters north of the Sea Tiger Radar Station. One group was tasked to cut off re- inforcements rushing to help and another was to launch an assault. Israeli built Kfir jets and the Russian MI 24 Hind helicopters began strafing LTTE positions around the station.

For a second time, an airborne command aboard a Sri Lanka Air Force aircraft was directing the tri services operation. The first occasion was when "Operation Thrivida Pahara" was launched after the LTTE over-ran the Mullaitivu military base on July 18, this year. This operation was later abandoned.

Operating from the Airborne Command was Rear Admiral D. K. Dassanayake, Commander of Sri Lanka Navy's Eastern Command who functioned as Operations Commander. This is the first time in recent years that a senior Naval Officer has been tasked to direct a combined joint services operation.

Also on hand were Brigadier Percy Fernando, Commander, Special Forces, Colonel Raj Wijesiri (SF), Group Captain Roshan Gunatilleke, Sri Lanka Air Force Zonal Commander (North) and Wing Commander Kolitha Abeywickrema.

This was also the last major military operation the Overall Operations Commander (OOC) Major General Srilal Weerasuriya directed. Next week, he assumes duties as Deputy Chief of Staff. Succeeding him as OOC is Major General Asoka Jayawardena, currently Director General - General Staff (DGGS) at Army Headquarters.

Communications equipment with access to Army, Navy and Air Force were carried by the respective senior officers who were in the Airborne Command. They were constantly in touch with men who were on the ground, giving them instructions and advice on target acquisitions.

At the same time as Sea Tigers allowed the two fibre glass water jets to land on shore and sprang a surprise on them by firing RPGs, machine guns and grenade launchers, elsewhere in the general area, the airborne command was directing other activity. The MI 17 helicopters from the SLAF Six Helicopter Squadron in Vavuniya were also disgorging Army's Special Forces commandos south of Chundikulam.

Their task was to cut off reinforcements rushing to the assistance of the Sea Tiger Radar Station. In addition Kfir jets and MI 24 V Hind helicopter gunships pounded two other Sea Tiger bases. One was at Nailathannithoduwai and the other at Chalai, both located south of Chundikulam. The idea was to commit the two neighbouring camps so cadres cannot rush help.

The meticulously planned operation of the three services, endorsed by their respective commanders, was to have lasted exactly four hours. But the surprise attack and the subsequent counter offensive led to its completion in seven hours.

It was Lt. Cmdr. Gallage's action some three weeks earlier that had led to the discovery of the Sea Tiger Radar Station at Ponnaituduwai in Chundikulam. He was leading a team of Navy personnel on a short range patrol in two boats.

As they moved closer to the coast at Chundikulam, the patrol had spotted a man in sarong walking along the beach. They thought he was a civilian. One of the boats were diverted to hit the shore so the Navy could pick him up and interview him for some information on LTTE activity in the area. Hardly had the Navy men alighted from the boat were they fired upon. They saw the fire come from well-dug trenches. So the Navy men withdrew. Subsequent inquiries, both by Naval and Military intelligence, bared the existence of the Sea Tiger Radar Station.

One of the water jets (IPCs) literally melted for the 3500 degree centigrade heat generated when it was hit by an RPG. Three MI 17 helicopters were also damaged when they were hit by LTTE fire. They, however, were able to land at the Vettilaikerny Army base.

Although the declared aim of "Operation Dirithara" - to destroy the radar at Ponnaituduwai - could not be achieved, the joint services action was not a total failure. Military officials say they were able to cause damage to the Sea Tiger facility made up of some 15 huts. Troops found 60 aluminium plates with the Tamil letter Onaa (a code identifying Sea Tigers). Where the radar was located, there were sand bags in a circular formation. There were trenches around the area. Troops destroyed the Radar Station complex. However, the radar had been dismantled and taken away by the LTTE before troops could get there.

The Ponnaituduwai Radar Station of the LTTE, it has now come to light, has been an important facility for Sea Tigers who have established control over a vast area extending from south of Vettilaikerny to Kokkutuduwai. According to military intelligence sources, this general area has been used as a staging post for Sea Tiger forays into the Jaffna Peninsula. Enhancing this situation, they believe, is the recent setting up of a major Sea Tiger base in Nallur. This sprang up soon after the government decided to shut down the Pooneryn defence complex and re-distribute the strength to other military bases in the North. Within days Tigers moved into the area, cleared mines around the former complex and set up the new base in Nallur, just south east from Pooneryn. An area by the name Nallur also exists in the Jaffna Peninsula.

With the Sea Tiger base in Nallur, the LTTE now has maritime access to the Peninsula both from the western side as well as from the east.

There were some compelling reasons that forced the government to abandon the Pooneryn defence complex. The conduct of phase three of "Operation Sathjaya" which led to the capture of Kilinochchi had further spread the security forces far too thin on the ground. Needless to say the stepped-up efforts to enhance recruitment to the Army, Navy and Air Force have a direct bearing on this.

After the debacle at Mullaitivu, there has been considerable re-thinking about continuing to maintain the Pooneryn defence complex. Until the Mullaitivu incident, Pooneryn was the scene of the worst debacle for the Army. It occurred on Novermber 10 and 11, 1993 - a period when the onset of the monsoon is at its height thus making naval and air movemnts a difficult task. With the monsoon season in full swing again, the security establishment did not want to expose the Pooneryn defence complex to an attack like the one that occured in Mullaitivu.

The closure has led to the increase in strength in a few strategic camps in the North including Kilinochchi, Paranthan and Elephant Pass - areas in the Wanni where the government's attention has begun to focus increasingly in the recent months, against the backdrop of a gradually deteriorating situation in the Jaffna peninsula.

Although the government makes out that with the capture of Kilonochchi, Pooneryn has lost its strategic significance, the entire validity of this claim is open to question. No doubt Pooneryn was detached from the main defence complex of the peninsula and the islands. Furthermore, any relief to Pooneryn, if under threat, would have to come from the peninsula and the off shore islands across the Jaffna lagoon.

The size of this problem, as it exists today, is not as great as it was when Pooneryn was nearly over- run in LTTE's "Operation Frog Leap" in November, 1993. Compared to the situations that existed then, the security forces not only control the off shore islands but also are in control of much of the peninsula which dominates the Jaffna lagoon.

For this reason, any relief or counter attack operations to Pooneryn, even in the north west monsoon period, would have been feasible. Of course the logistics and tactical difficulties in doing so have to be balanced with the strategic worth of the Pooneryn defence complex.

Pooneryn dominated the Jaffna lagoon and its sea entrance from the mainland side. It also was strategically located at the cross roads of the road axis eastwards to Paranthan - Kilinochchi and southwards to Mannar. Pooneryn and Mannar military complexes were at the north and south terminus of the western road axis which is not only the alternate southerly axis to the Kilinochchi-Vavuniya route but as importantly runs parallel to the narrow Palk Straits.

The Wanni jungle extends up to this road axis, the west coast and is convenient passage for communications between South India and the Wanni heartland. The narrowness of the Palk Straits and the shallow western coastline restricts Naval operations thus enhancing the value of the west coast to the LTTE.

In these circumstances, military circles question the wisdom of totally abandoning the Pooneryn defence complex which has undeniable strategic value. They, however, do not deny that considering the focus on the Kilinochchi-Vavuniya axis that there is a need to boost the central thrust by additional manpower and equipment resources.

Yet, some say that unless the advance beyond Kilinochchi materialises to set up a Main Supply Route (MSR), the sheer length of which is a formidable task to maintain, then the closure of the Pooneryn option may not be totally prudent.

They say that the more options the security forces keep open, the better not only to retain flexibility but also to divide LTTE defence options. Particularly so after the Mullaitivu debacle which now enables the LTTE to provide land support to any of their maritime operations or surveillance along the coastline from Vettilaikerny to Kokkutuduwai. This is underscored by "Operation Dirithara".

In maintaining this type of pressure by maritime operations against the LTTE, the tactical advantage to the LTTE is considerbale as they can support their coastal bases from the land as against the security forces which have to undertake marine type operations which are always difficult.

A month has elapsed since the security forces regained control of Kilinochchi. Tiger guerrilas continue to fire artillery and mortars to defensive positions established by the security forces. The latter have stepped up precautions along the defence lines extending from Kilinochchi to Elephant Pass after intelligence reports that Tiger guerrillas may attempt to strike in the middle and try to isolate Kilinochchi.

Attempts to persuade civillans to return to Killinochchi has become a subject of high priority for Deputy Defence Minister, General Anuruddha Ratwatte. Last week, he flew to Vavuniya to confer with top military officials. He directed the Brigade Commander there, Brigadier Nanda Mallawaratchchi, to relax controls at the Thandikulam barrier to enable civilians in uncleared (or guerrilla dominated areas) to enter Vavuniya.

Several schools have been commandeered and some 5,000 who have arrived by Friday are being accommodated. The security forces are to screen them, transport them by train to Trincomalee for a journey by ship to Jaffna. From there, they are to be moved by road through Kodikamam, Elephant Pass, Paranthan and Kilinochchi for re-settlement. But the majority of the civilians have other plans. They had domestic, personal or business chores and wanted to travel to Colombo. That is a wish that would take not only time but a lot of hassle.

Those wanting to come to Colombo would have to go through checks and subject themselves to a long drawn out procedure-all part of precautions the security forces are taking to prevent Tiger infiltration into the city.

The LTTE have succeeded not only in infiltrating cadres into the Jaffna peninsula, particularly the Valikamam sector, but are also known to be using both high and low frequency communications equipment from within the area. Although intelligence estimates placed the strength of the infiltrated Tiger guerrillas at around 150, other reliable sources said the figure was much higher, more than twice that number.

Although security forces dismiss it as an impossibility, they are not ignoring repeated LTTE pronouncements that it would regain control of the peninsula by November 27 just a day after its leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran's birthday.

Whether the LTTE threat is to be taken seriously or not is one thing but the reality is that in desperate situations, the Tigers will lash out in the most unpredictable manner. This has always been historically the unpredictable element in combating totalitarian militancies.

The security forces advance to Kilinochchi has greatly conferred a strategic advantage. On the other hand, as a result of the debacle at Mullaitivu and by the withdrawal from Pooneryn, the security forces appear to have been confined to a single option unless their manpower resources improve to greater strategic flexibility.

The LTTE on the other hand have been forced into a jungle operational base. By this they have lost advantage of population control and are compelled to revert to guerrilla-terrorist type operation. The classic theory of Mao Tse Tung, Von Giap etc. where the guerrila stage for operations transcends into a conventional capability is not a far dream for the LTTE.

Operations Riviresa and Sath Jaya have conclusively proved that the LTTE cannot match the might of the security forces at conventional war. Both the LTTE and security forces are now facing the problem of resources and the battle lines are being drawn to a war of attrition.

In the long run, it does not forebode well for the country as escalating costs of a protracted war is going to further economically burden the people already crippled by ever escalating living costs.

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