Despite disasters that deplete the resources of the security forces drastically and lead to colossal losses a disturbing trend that has begun to rise in 1997 the government has some good news in store for Sri Lankans.

An official announcement yesterday heralded the re-opening of the Vavuniya-Mannar Road. The move in effect has resulted in annexing to "controlled" Vavuniya district, the hitherto uncontrolled" areas of the Mannar district.

The propaganda hype, which will undoubtedly accompany the official announcement, will come in the backdrop of the tense political campaign now underway for the March 21 local government elections. Whether it will assume the high pitch reminiscent of the liberation of Jaffna following the string of operations Riviresa" has to be seen.

The immediate outcome of linking Vavuniya with Mannar is the re-opening of the main highway between these two key towns. Instead of the circuitous journey, firstly by sea from Mannar to Kalpitiya and thereafter overland, more than 60 per cent of Colombo's fish supply will soon arrive by road. So will be some agricultural produce. Civilians in Mannar who had to travel to other parts of the country had to use the same route.

They will now be able to use public transport overland thus opening a new world of commerce in Mannar. Another blessing is more devotees would visit the sacred Madhu Church.

All these benefits to the civilian public will become possible due to the successful conclusion of Operation Edibala." Unlike all major previous military operations under the PA government, this offensive is somewhat unique there was hardly any resistance from Tiger guerrillas. It was as easy as running a knife through unfrozen butter," an elated Brigade Commander involved in the operation told me. Of course, he did not want himself identified.

Operation Edibala" began on February 4 when troops of the Army's 53 division made up of commandos and the Air Mobile Brigade, broke out of Poovarasankulam the furthest point west of the Vavuniya defences under the control of the security forces.

The move was led by the General Officer Commanding (53 Div.) Brigadier Vasantha Perera and his Deputy, Brig. Nanda Mallawaratchi, both frontline infantry officers. This was Brigadier Perera's first assignment since he took over as GOC from Major General Neil Dias who is now on a stint at the National Defence College in New Delhi.

Joining in to provide cover on the two flanks of the advancing columns were two battalions of the Sri Lankan National Guard. They were led by Brigadier Saliya Kulatunga, Commander Eight Brigade - the first serving volunteer officer to head a Brigade. Others included the Commando Brigade led by Lt. Col. Chandrawansa, Air Mobile Brigade led by Col. Sivali Wanigasekera (currently on a stint with the US Army's Pacific Command) and the Twentieth Brigade led by Lt. Col. Sunil de Silva.

Major General Patrick Fernando, General Officer Commanding Task Force Two, is in charge of Operation Edibala" whilst the Overall Operations Commander is Major General Asoka Jayawardena.

The first phase of the operation concluded with troops reaching Parayanakulam. After a break of nearly ten days, troops began their advance at dawn last Monday. They advanced past Madhu and arrived at Murunkan almost unopposed. The only encounter of sorts was some small arms fire a group of Tiger guerrillas aimed from near a bridge. As the troops advanced, the Tigers beat a hasty retreat.

Whilst the troops that advanced westwards from Vavuniya consolidated their positions in Murunkan Five Brigade began their advance from Mannar eastwards towards Vavuniya and are due to link up thus completing the Vavuniya to Mannar MSR (main supply route).

The government hopes to have many operational benefits as a result of the Operation Edibala" strategy. The most apparent is the obvious re-opening of the supply and communication route to Mannar, thus obviating the cumbersome logistics of maritime support operations to maintain the military and civilian population of the Mannar mainland and its offshore islands. The government also hopes to gain a psychological political benefit by providing road access to the Holy Madhu Church. Obviously it hopes to cash in on this at the forthcoming local elections with the Catholic voters.

In addition, the military control of the Vavuniya-Mannar axis divides the western half of the Wanni jungles from the Silavathurai-Mullikulam and Wilpattu route. The government has been sensitive to the LTTE build-up in that zone claiming that it is a supply route for arms smuggling and infiltration of cadres by the LTTE to Colombo.

In fact, the Inspector General of Police, W.B. Rajaguru, underscored the government's concerns in this regard when he briefed heads of selected diplomatic missions at the Foreign Ministry last week. More on the IGP's briefing later.

It is debatable whether the smuggling of arms to Colombo trickles through the Wilpattu jungles or whether it is not supplied by boat landing on the coast astride Puttalam. Many arms detections in and around the area of Puttalam, the detection of LTTE cadres in that area and the spotting of unidentified boats off the Puttalam coast seem to indicate that direct boat operations is the preferred smuggling route rather than the tedious land overhaul.

In this regard the Kalpitiya Naval Base has an important role to play and whether Naval resources have permitted that base to exercise its full operational responsibilities is another question.

Nevertheless, the re-opening of the Vavuniya-Mannar axis does confer a major logistics advantage to the security forces and does to some extent confer a limited tactical benefit.

In its tactical context, some military observers question the value of deploying considerable resources to maintain this newly re-occupied axis (which will have to be done) in comparison to the strategically more important eastern axis from Vavuniya, Kokilai, Mullaitivu. This is indeed an interesting comparison even to a non-military observer.

For years, the focus of LTTE ethnic cleansing has been in the Weli Oya areas and in other border Sinhala villages between Vavuniya-Mullaitivu-Polonnaruwa and Trincomalee. In other words, the eastern flank of the perceived Eelam. That sensitive belt between Mullaitivu district and Batticaloa district, i.e., the environs of the Trincomalee district, has been anathema to the Tigers as well as to the claimed moderate Tamil parties.

This is the area which the Eelam lobby claims to have been colonised and belongs to the traditional ÔTamil homeland.' This is a jewel in the crown" of the Eelam land grab. Without it and the Eastern Province, Eelam is meaningless.

This is the Golan heights" of the Eelam War. Furthermore it is in this disputed area that the most horrific ethnic cleansings, violating all tenets of human rights have taken place against unarmed civilians. This has been so for over the past decade, Kent, Dollar, Aranthalawa, Welikanda massacres are but a few examples.

In addition to the vital strategic need to defend and safeguard these sensitive" border areas it is also argued that the focus of the LTTE is on the eastern half of the Wanni jungles linking through Mullaitivu-Trincomalee to Batticaloa and not on the western half of the Wanni. There is indeed merit in this argument too as it is a contiguous territory in the Eelam context.

The build-up of LTTE operations in the East, particularly in the districts of Mullaitivu, Trincomalee and Batticaloa is a clear indication of the LTTE strategy. Thus it is argued that the Eastern flank is more strategically vital and so important to secure than the soft area of western flank the Vavuniya-Mannar axis. The very fact that the LTTE offered no resistance to Edibala forces tends to confirm that this western flank is not of significant importance to the Tiger plans.

On the other hand there is also an argument that with the opening of the Vavuniya-Mannar axis there is potential to extend those operations to open an MSR northwards through Illupaikaduwai, Pooneryn to Jaffna across the Sangupiddy ferry. There is merit in this proposition as well.

But then, it is argued as to why the Pooneryn Defence Complex was hastily removed if this alternate MSR strategy was an option? Some senior serving military officials argue that the entire planning in these circumstances indicates short sightedness and lacks the mapping of a viable strategy with achievable and realistic options.

The public, not totally aware of the nuances and intricacies of military strategies and planning, find the operational undertakings, co-incidentally interlocking with political issues.

In this regard, they equate Operation Leap Frog", Operation Riviresa One" and Operation Sathjaya" to have coincided with contentious political issues. In that category Operation Edibala" is included as well. Strangely it is another coincidence.

This inevitably raises amongst the public the quotation whether military operations are planned to cater for political exigencies or whether it is in continuance of a planned national war strategy.

Flag hoisting and other theatricals to claim military victories especially giving political prominence to those occasions, do not help to assuage public doubts. Perhaps there is a lesson in this?

Police Chief W.B. Rajaguru gave selected heads of Colombo-based diplomatic missions a detailed brief at the Foreign Ministry last Wednesday about possible LTTE threats. The move followed recent detections and intelligence assessments.

Of particular significance was the detection made by Inspector Nimal Fernando of the Mundel Police on February 6 following a tip off by two informants, about a buried arms cache. It had included a light anti-tank weapon (60mm) 18 grenades, 4 suicide kits, one T-81 weapon, 6 pouches, 7 double cyanide capsules, one revolver, 50 rounds revolver ammunition, some detonator wires, explosives triangle (to be placed against a wall and exploded to create an opening), batteries and a metre of white cloth.

Some unidentified persons who arrived by a boat at the seashore had dug a hole and buried them. Unnoticed by the group, the two informants had observed their actions and given the tip off.

The DIG in charge of the area, Sirisena Herath, commended Inspector Fernando's actions. Later IGP Rajaguru rewarded him with Rs. 200,000. The two informants were rewarded with Rs. 500,000.

Police have reason to believe that items were intended to be used in the attack of a VIP motorcade. They also say the Tigers had plans to storm into a building.

This find and other intelligence reports have prompted the intensification of security measures in the city and suburbs. Further measures including enhanced cover for VIPs have been made in view of the local elections.

During his briefing, Mr. Rajaguru, apprised the heads and representatives of the diplomatic missions the security situation and the various measures taken. For obvious reasons, some of the disclosures he made, have to remain undisclosed.

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