Whilst most Sri Lankans were gripped in cricket fever over the ongoing Pepsi Cup tournament, alarm bells were ringing in the upper echelons of the defence establishment last week.
It was all over a shipment of millions of rupees worth of urgently needed military hardware.
Like all other ships that arrive, this would have been routine too. When vessels enter Sri Lanka's territorial waters some 12 miles outside Colombo, those carrying military hardware are escorted by Navy vessels.
Unlike vessels arriving in Colombo with commercial cargo who are listed in the official bulletin of the association of steamer agents, there is no official record of vessels bringing in Government cargo.
More so in the case of those bringing in military hardware. Hence, those arriving last week would have been routinely cleared under heavy security and the items moved to designated areas under escort.
But there was something unusually disturbing. A western diplomatic mission received a fax. In the course of checking its veracity, they contacted Army Headquarters and a highly disturbing drama began to unfold.
This is what the fax said:
"WARNING-WARNING-WARNING
NOTICE AND WARNING
We, the Tamil Tigers, inform you by the present that on 11 July 1997 we have hijacked a vessel carrying arms, sailing under the Liberian flag.
The name of the vessel "Stillus Victoria". On the deck of the vessel there were 12 containers containing 32,400 mortar bombs 81 mm, destined for Colombo Sri-Lanka, Ministry of Defence.
We know that the manufacturer and the supplier of the mortar bombs is Zimbabwe Defence Industry from Harare, Zimbabwe. We also know that the deal was executed by Col. Dube of Zimbabwe Defence Industry. The cargo was confiscated by us and the vessel's crew was released by us unharmed. We make known and warn that we will take action against all persons participating in the supply of military equipment used against the legitimate rights of the Tamil people and we will severely punish those concerned.
LTTE
WARNING-WARNING-WARNING"
Did the fax originate from the LTTE ? If so, why did they not use their letter head to send this message? Why did they restrict the so called warning to only one mission? If it was not the LTTE, who could be sending out such a warning ?
Did an unsuccessful arms dealer initiate the message to cause embarrassment to the Government ?
These were just a handful of a number of questions that top officials at the Army Headquarters pondered over. Their serious concern was heightened by one important fact - the Government of Sri Lanka had in fact ordered 32,400 mm mortar bombs - 81 mm calibre - from Harare, Zimbabwe.
Equally important was another fact - the shipment was also due to arrive early this month.
Government's intelligence channels went into immediate action. Not only the help of their counter parts in a number of countries was sought but Interpol Headquarters was also called upon to act immediately.
In London where the LTTE directs its media operations, spokesmen remained tight lipped about the incident. But other sources in London with knowledge of LTTE operations appeared to have knowledge.
A Sri Lankan source in London heard one of them remark " I am aware of a note but we have nothing to say officially."
LTTE's news release from London the next day( day after the faxed note) made no mention of this incident. It however did make reference to a policy statement in the LTTE official organ "Viduthalai Puligal" headlined 'SHIPS SUPPLYING THE MILITARY IN JAFFNA WILL BE TARGETED - LTTE."
This is what that statement said:
" We cannot be party to the government ruse of shipping war materials to Jaffna under the pretext of supplying food and necessities for the people", the LTTE leadership has said in a policy statement in its official organ Viduthalai Puligal.
The statement continues: while holding back the bare necessities to Tamils in Vanni, Sri Lanka is declaring that the people of Jaffna are being pampered, fed and clothed.
But the real situation is far different. The government is mainly engaged in feeding, clothing and equipping its Sinhala army of occupation in the peninsula while the Tamil inhabitants of Jaffna do not enter into its calculations at all.
"Under these conditions the LTTE has no option but to regard these military-servicing Sri Lankan vessels as legitimate military targets. Since these supply vessels constitute a threat to the Tamil people, they will not be permitted to carry out their sinister function.
"It is against the interests of the Tamil nation to allow Sri Lanka to strengthen its entirely Sinhalese military forces so they can better harm and repress the Tamil inhabitants of Jaffna and conduct further callous military operations against the Tamil people in Vanni.
The LTTE is not prepared to compromise the security of the Tamil people and will therefore do its utmost to prevent the traffic of items which do nothing other than strengthen Sri Lanka's military capability."
It is unusual for the LTTE to send communications without using the official letter head. That the fax message to the foreign mission did not contain the LTTE logo indicates that it was either not originated by the LTTE or else they preferred not to divulge their involvement if it was originated by them.
Quite apart from the mystery as to who originated this is the more remarkable fact that the fax message contained correct information regarding the consignment and its source of origin. The only incorrect details were the name of the ship and the country of registration.
According to sources at Army Headquarters, the name of the vessel is "Stillus Limmusul" and is registered in Greece.
With the military cargo on board, the last port from which it had set sail, it has now been established, is Madagascar, where it had left on July 2. The journey from there to Colombo is said to take anything between six to eight days. This particular deal has been concluded after Col. Dubey visited Sri Lanka.
The delay has prompted the Navy Commander, Rear Admiral Cecil Tissera, to send out an urgent alert to all Navy bases and patrol craft operating from there. They have been ordered to be vigilant about "Stillus Limmasul."
Details of this order and its shipment should have been known only to the two parties concerned - the Government of Sri Lanka and the Ministry of Defence of Zimbabwe. The only other party who would have had knowledge of the contents of the shipment should have been the Master of the ship who would have had it recorded in its cargo manifest as it concerned explosives. Thus, quite obviously, there has been a breach of security in this channel.
Either to the LTTE or some other source, one would assume that the fax was an all out attempt to torpedo the delivery of this consignment. Even if one were to regard this letter as a possibility, as to why it should be sent to one Western mission which has nothing to do with that consignment cannot be reconciled
Further more any such action by a dissatisfied tenderer could not reverse the course of action nor to expose any malpractice even if one were to assume that such a situation prevails. However there is no such indication in this case. Hence the obvious conclusion is that it has been done by the LTTE.
The fact that it was sent to only one Western mission would perhaps be red herring to absolve the LTTE of any action they were to take against the ship and crew.
To augment this conclusion and making this episode more mysterious is the fact that "Stillus Limmasul," now appear to be missing. It left Madagascar on a sailing schedule to arrive in Colombo in the first week of July. It appears now that there is no contact with the ship and its whereabouts unknown in the two weeks beyond its scheduled arrival
In the background to this situation, the most reasonable conclusion is that the LTTE has most likely sabotaged the shipment. The coming weeks should throw further light on this mystery.
Even if one were to assume that the military cargo is lost, that would not mean the Government will suffer a financial loss. A local bank through which the transaction has been made has obtained insurance cover for the amount involved. However, other repercussions caused by a possible loss would be far reaching.
Arising from this incident, an important aspect, it appears, is the enormity of the LTTE intelligence network. It also exposes the inadequacies in Government's intelligence security and security intelligence.
Technicalities apart, the fact that the Government, security forces and the intelligence community have had serious shortcomings in this field in the 16 year history of the separatist war is a sad reality.
It is common knowledge that in the history of the war, successive governments have been more concerned with gathering intelligence about opposition political parties, its political enemies and more importantly (who leaks what to) the media.
Little wonder that with these misplaced priorities, the LTTE has successfully exploited the political ego, weaknesses and the vituperative divisiveness in national politics to gain the advantage in matters crucial to their interest.
"Operation Jaya Sikurui" continues to be stalemated for the last 69 days. Since the last counter attack on June 24, there has been two significant incidents involving troops in the 53 Division. In one, an officer and eight soldiers were killed. In another, one officer and 18 soldiers were killed.
Military spokesman and Director Media, Brigadier Sarath Munasinghe, said the LTTE also suffered heavy casualties. Last week's incidents increase the security forces death toll in "Operation Jayasikurui" to well over 400.
Security forces appear to be consolidating their bunker lines. The LTTE has retained the strategic mobility. It continues to maintain pressure in the eastern province and against re-captured territory in the northern province.
Though hackneyed, in this instance it is worth re quoting the adage that so long as the Government is not winning, it is losing and so long as the guerrillas are not losing, they are winning.
This is by no means to suggest that the security forces are at a losing end of the war. But it would suggest that in the phase of the stalemated much promised "Operation Jaya Sikurui", a strategic re-think is necessary.
Whilst the deadlock in the land battle exists, the LTTE Sea Tigers have focused on stepping up maritime operations. It is too early in the mystery of "Stillus Limmusol" to give credit to a Sea Tiger action.
However, judging from the Sea Tiger operations in the past three weeks, they appear to be confident of being able to disrupt the maritime lines of communications from Chundikulam to Mullaitivu east.
The Sea Tiger strategy is consonant with the LTTE declaration in Viduthalai Puligal which was referred to earlier.
Attempts by the LTTE to infiltrate into security forces areas in the north will be futile unless it is accompanied with an active agenda to disrupt the political, material and psychological rehabilitation/reconstruction of the northern province.
This is part of the planned strategy of the LTTE. As it now unfolds, the LTTE strategy is designed to deny the Government and Tamil political parties that support it from rehabilitating themselves in the peninsula. I emphasise the words "from rehabilitating themselves" as in the LTTE mind set, Jaffna and the Tamil nation belongs to them to lead and not to the Government.
In their view, therefore, it is the Government that has to rehabilitate itself among the Tamil polity rather than vice versa.
This thinking of the LTTE is food for thought to a government and security forces who are trying hard to rehabilitate and reconstruct a war-torn people.
Whilst that being so, the Government has embarked on a number of measures to combat corrupt practices and other irregularities in procurements for the security forces.
In one service organisation, personnel in the procurements section are being moved out. New hands are being moved. They have been given stricter guidelines to follow.
In respect of the Sri Lanka Air Force, a top level Committee headed by Chandrananda de Silva, Secretary, Ministry of Defence, is to hand over its report next week. July 25, has been set as the deadline for their task.
As reported in these columns (SITUATION REPORT June 15), other members of the Committee are General Denis Perera, Air Vice Marshal Pathman Mendis, Cyril Herath and C.R. de Silva. The latter, Deputy Solicitor General, has been appointed, among other matters, to the Committee to help it formulate its recommendations to be accompanied by legal measures that may become necessary.
Among the Committee's task are to probe the high number of SLAF air crashes, how many died, who is responsible, the suitability of the aircraft, how they were procured and many other matters.
Air Force sources said yesterday that among the matters the Committee went into was the acquisition of a fleet of MI 24 Hind helicopters. Three were reportedly purchased and three more were leased.
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