The
mystery of the missing ship carrying 32,400 rounds of 81 mm mortar bombs to
Colombo has at last begun to unravel.
Thirty nine days after it left the east African port of Madagascar, this military cargo in 12 containers destined for Colombo, is now confirmed missing.
Friendly Governments whose assistance was sought to locate the ship have said their respective state agencies have not been able to track down the whereabouts of the vessel or the cargo. They include the United States, United Kingdom and India.
Similar responses, I understand, have also come from Interpol, the international police organisation, which sent out a world-wide alert through their desks in member countries. So has the UK-based International Maritime Organisation (IMO), which promotes co-operation on technical matters affecting international shipping.
That is not to say the search has been called off altogether. The countries concerned, Interpol and IMO will remain alert and report any new information they gather to the Sri Lankan authorities.
The mystery of the missing vessel began unfolding last Saturday (August 2) when Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Rohan De S. Daluwatte, had a meeting with a high official of the Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI). It took place at the Commander's Office at Army Headquarters.
The meeting came 48 hours before Lt. Gen. Daluwatte flew to Pakistan on an official visit in response to an invitation extended by his Pakistani counterpart. He is expected to return today.
The Zimbabwean official arrived incognito in Colombo on Wednesday (July 30). He checked into a star class hotel reportedly under a different identity. High ranking military sources would only identify him as Mr. Mwera.
During a 90-minute meeting with Lt. Gen. Daluwatte, Mr Mwera is learnt to have produced documentation to confirm that the Sri Lanka Defence Ministry's order for the 32,400 rounds of 81 mm mortar ammunition had in fact been executed.
The order had been placed in February, this year, after Colonel Tshinga Dube, Chief Executive of Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI), said to be one of the largest state-owned ventures in the African continent, visited Colombo.
It was only in late May, this year, the ZDI secured a five million US dollar contract from the Democratic Republic of Congo to supply arms and ammunition. It came after the ouster of the Government of Mobutu Sese Seko. In an interview with the Zimbabwean newspaper Sunday Mail about this deal, Col Dube is quoted as saying "At our factories we manufacture small arms, ammunition, filling grenades, mortar bombs and shells with high explosives...We are delighted that we are doing business with the DRC just like what we have been doing with the international business community. We have sold some of our arms to overseas countries. That speaks volumes about us...."
According to Mr. Mwera, the military consignment for Sri Lanka was first moved by road across the Zimbabwean border to Mozambique. Thereafter it had been loaded to a vessel from the port of Beira.
As reported in these columns last week, Mr. Mwera has claimed that the shipment was loaded on May 21 to a vessel which the Zimbabwe Defence Industries had 'part chartered' with an Israeli company. It had reportedly sailed to Walvis Bay (South Africa) with cargo destined for Windhoek in Namibia. Thereafter the vessel had arrived in Madagascar on July 2 and was destined to sail to Colombo.
According to shipping companies in Colombo, the time taken to sail from Madagascar to Colombo is anything between six days (during better weather conditions) to ten days when sea conditions are adverse. Today is the 39th day since the vessel was scheduled to depart Madagascar, time enough to arrive in Colombo even if the vessel had sailed first to Karachi or ports in western India en route. Moreover, such stop overs would have resulted in authorities in Colombo receiving reports of the ship's movements. There has been no word on the ship either after it was scheduled to leave Madagascar or before.
Compounding the situation are reports Colombo's intelligence agencies have received that the LTTE tricked the Zimbabwean authorities into loading the military cargo to one of its vessels and thereafter moving it to a secret destination. One such report spoke of the seized cargo being shipped to a South Asian country and plans by the LTTE to later smuggle them in small quantities through international shipping lanes and thereafter via the east coast.
A high-ranking intelligence source who spoke on grounds of anonymity (for obvious reasons) said "we are carefully investigating the information we are receiving from our sources. There is strong evidence pointing to an LTTE involvement but we are yet to establish it conclusively. We will probe until we know what has happened."
Fuelling suspicions on the LTTE, the source explained, are two key factors among many.
According to the ZDI official, the chartering of a vessel to carry the military cargo to Sri Lanka had been made in Madagascar. Did the LTTE, which is known to run three separate international shipping companies, offer through its agents (in Madagascar) a lower cargo rate to the unsuspecting Zimbabwean authorities? Did the LTTE front the name of the Israeli company as a 'part charterer'?
It is widely known that the LTTE has three separate international shipping concerns — The Yarl Shipping Corporation, Marine Shipping and Panama Marine Shipping Company. Together the LTTE is known to own at least five ships registered in three different countries — Greece, Cyprus and Panama. Yet another registered in Honduras, 'MV Yahat', was sunk in a confrontation with the Indian Coast Guard on January 13, 1993. LTTE top rungers including its one time 'Jaffna Commander', Sathasivam Krishnakumar alias Kittu died in this incident.
Nine other LTTE members who were arrested by Indian authorities were tried in the Designated Indian Court of P. Lakshmana Reddy. The judge acquitted them and directed the Police to hand them over to the Government of Honduras since 'MV Yahat' was registered in Honduras. The Indian authorities are now involved in a procedural wrangle on how to get the men to Honduras with proper travel documents. The Sri Lanka Deputy High Commission in Chennai (Madras) from whom they sought documents is willing to issue them to enable the group to get to Colombo. But the authorities are under orders to deport them to Honduras. The wrangle continues. But it transpired soon after the incident that the name 'MV Yahat' had been obliterated to read 'MV Ahat' — a standard practice the LTTE is known to use when moving 'important' cargo through international waters. This is in order to avoid detection.
It is also widely known that the LTTE fronted shipping concerns have agents in a number of countries, particularly in the Indian Ocean region. They are known to vie for cargo competing with other agents at much lower rates. In many instances they have succeeded in obtaining cargo for movement to ports in the Indian Ocean region from unsuspecting clientele. Such cover has been used to conceal LTTE's movement of military hardware.
The other key factor, the intelligence source explained, was the name of the ship carrying the military cargo to Sri Lanka. Every single name that has transpired in the mystery of the missing ship, it is now known, is not registered with the Lloyd's Register of Shipping. Lloyds is an association of underwriting firms specialising in marine insurance and known for insuring against losses of almost every conceivable kind.
The fact that a ship is not registered with Lloyds does not mean it does not exist. In almost all such instances such a situation occurs only when the ownership of a ship changes hands. The new owner chooses to give it a fresh name but there is a time lapse before a registration could occur. In such instances the ship is always traced in the Lloyds Register by its previous name.
However, in this long drawn mystery, every single name of a ship that has transpired, it has been revealed, is not registered with Lloyds. Whilst none of the previous names of these ships has surfaced, checks conducted by the friendly governments and international agencies have revealed that no ships have operated under the names that have transpired.
To understand what this means, it is relevant to go back to the origins of the missing ship mystery. I revealed the details in these columns on July 20. I said that a western diplomatic mission received a fax. In the course of checking its veracity, they contacted Army Headquarters and a highly disturbing drama began to unfold.
The western diplomatic mission in question is the United States Embassy in Colombo. For the record it is necessary to repeat the contents of this fax, particularly for those readers who may have missed out. This is what it said: WARNING WARNING WARNING
NOTICE AND WARNING
"We, the Tamil Tigers, inform you by the present that on 11 July 1997 we have hijacked a vessel carrying arms sailing under Liberian flag. The name of the vessel 'Stillus Victoria'. On the deck of the vessel there were 12 containers containing 32,400 mortar bombs 81 mm, destined for Colombo Sri-Lanka, Ministry of Defence.
"We know that the manufacturer and the supplier of the mortar bombs is Zimbabwe Defence Industry from Harare, Zimbabwe. We also know that the deal was executed by Col. Dube.D.G. of Zimbabwe Defense Industry.
"The cargo was confiscated by us and the vessel's crew was released by us unharmed.
"We make known and warn that we will take action against all persons participating in the supply of military equipment used against the legitimate rights of the Tamil people and we will severely punish those concerned.
"LTTE WARNING
"WARNING WARNING "
Whoever sent the fax, it is not clear why they chose to address it only to the United States Embassy in Colombo. Be that as it may, as I said in these columns (SITUATION REPORT July 20) the contents of the fax in as far as it concerned the order for the military hardware was accurate. Hence Army Headquarters took serious note of the document. This was particularly because the order for the military hardware was known only by three parties — those dealing with procurements at Army Headquarters, Zimbabwe Defence Industries (ZDI), who are the suppliers, and the Ship's Captain who had the cargo manifest.
Under normal circumstances all suppliers of military hardware to the Ministry of Defence in Sri Lanka and their local agents are required to uphold the rules of confidentiality governing military procurements. There are of course the few instances of an enraged unsuccessful tenderer reaching out to the media with his tale of woe. But in this instance there was no such media reportage of 'wrong procedures' leading to 'unfair award of tenders.' How then did the details of the ZDI deal leak out? Who originated the fax?
If the fax message purportedly came from the LTTE, it was not on its letter head. LTTE's spokesman in London, Anton Raja, denied any knowledge in an interview he gave BBC's Sinhala programme, Sandeshaya. However, there was no mention of the matter in the daily news releases the LTTE puts out. Could the LTTE own up such an incident and thus earn the wrath of the world community for international piracy? There are many incidents the LTTE has been associated with but it has formally denied them. Two most recent instances were the assassination of former Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi and the bombing of the Central Bank.
Mr. Mwera, I understand, named the Sri Lankan representative of a rival supplier as a possible suspect. But he was unable to explain a more trickier question flowing from it — Could that rival supplier have delayed until today a shipment effected by the ZDI? That too after the supplier had picked a shipper of their own choosing in Madagascar ?
That apart, the name of the ship that purportedly carried the military cargo to Sri Lanka, was named in the fax message as 'Stillus Victoria' sailing under the Liberian flag. However, Army Headquarters thereafter learnt (SITUATION REPORT July 27) that the name of the ship was 'Stillus Limmasul' flying the Greek flag.
The first official confirmation that a ship bound to Sri Lanka with arms and ammunition had gone missing came when the Navy Commander, Rear Admiral Cecil Tissera, sent out a signal to Navy bases countrywide on June 18 warning that a 'vessel carrying arms/ammo' to Sri Lanka has gone missing (SITUATION REPORT July 27).
More facts on the signal the Navy Chief sent out are now available. Rear Admiral Tissera gave significant details in his signal. He said that the ship ('Stillus Limmasul') left Madagascar on July 2. He asserted that the name of the vessel was NOT in the Lloyds Shipping Register and warned of the possibility of the LTTE having hijacked it. He ordered the Naval bases to exercise greater surveillance and vigilance to prevent the military cargo being smuggled into Sri Lanka.
Mr. Mwera is learnt to have given the name of another vessel in which the military cargo had been shipped from Madagascar — 'Stillus Victoria'. None of the ships named had been registered with Lloyds of London. Nor were any previous registration names of the vessels available.
The Navy Commander's signal to bases countrywide was in essence the first official confirmation that a ship carrying military hardware from Madagascar to Colombo had gone missing. Needless to say that the Navy Chief put out that alert after serious concern in the security establishment over the fate of the vessel bringing in urgently required 34,200 rounds of 81 mm mortar ammunition.
If Zimbabwean suppliers had executed all their orders placed by the Ministry of Defence of Sri Lanka, there certainly would be no need for the Navy Chief to warn his bases countrywide about the fears of the LTTE having seized it. There is also no need then for him to ask these bases to look out for attempts by the LTTE to smuggle them into the country.
The mystery behind the missing ship drew considerable public interest. So much so, on Friday, August 1, media personnel, lawyers and political personalities attending a discussion on 'Criminal Defamation and Media Freedom' organised by the Friends of the Media at the Holiday Inn heard that the missing ship had arrived that night and was unloading the military cargo at the Colombo Port. Reuters Staffer and Free Media Movement leader, Varuna Karunatilleke, broke the news to the Leader of the Opposition, Ranil Wickremasinghe.
The reports of unloading military cargo was true. But it was a ship belonging to the Ceylon Shipping Corporation and was discharging cargo brought in from an Asian capital. This cargo had no connection to what was ordered from the Zimbabwe Defence Industries.
The 34,000 rounds of 81 mm mortar shells are said to run into millions of rupees. These mortars are fired from man portable launchers weighing nearly 40 kilos and have a maximum range of 5,700 metres or 5.7 kilometres. Although the LTTE is not known to possess a large number of 81 mm mortars, military officials say it seized a small quantity during attacks on the Mullaitivu military base in July, last year, and thereafter during the attack on the Police Special Task Force base at Pulukunawa on the Kandy-Amparai road.
Military officials still believe they would not suffer any financial loss as a result of the cargo going missing. "We will of course have some paper work to do. But we will claim it from insurance," one of them said. He added "if by some chance it has fallen into LTTE hands, then we have to exercise greater vigilance to prevent them being smuggled in."
The link-up
As reported in these columns last week, the link up of the two advancing columns in 'Operation Jaya Sikurui' occurred last week.
It came when troops of Tenth Battalion of the Ceylon Light Infantry (CLI), part of the 55 Division marching along A 9, the main Vavuniya-Kilinochchi highway, advanced over a kilometre to meet up with special forces troops who formed the leading elements of the 53 Division. The men shook hands shortly before noon last Wednesday.
An hour later, Overall Operations Commander (OOC), Major General Asoka Jayawardena, flew in by helicopter to congratulate the troops. The link up had been preceded by a bitter gun battle in which five soldiers were killed and 31 were wounded. Troops from the 53 Division feigned an advance northwards from the general area of Nedunkerny whilst others fought their way towards an area south of the Puliyankulam Railway Station.
In a tactical move, the two advancing columns avoided a link-up at the main Puliyankulam Junction which is some two kilometres away from the spot where they merged. Field commanders felt that an immediate thrust into that area would entail higher casualties since Tiger guerrillas had fortified themselves with bunkers. Even the existing defended localities encompassing the linked-up areas were coming under heavy artillery and mortar fire from the LTTE.
The link-up at Puliyankulam had been delayed by three separate LTTE counter attacks. The last was on the western axis of the Police sector on the defences of the 55 Division. Over 70 security forces personnel and 160 Tiger guerrillas were killed in the incident.
The move caused a serious problem for the Overall Operations Commander, Maj. Gen. Jayawardena. Over 500 Policemen who were manning the sector in Omanthai had withdrawn forcing him to deploy the Sixth Battalion of the CLI to make up for the shortfall.
Maj. Gen. Jayawardena has commended Lionel Karunasena, DIG (Wanni) who had persuaded a sizeable number of the Policemen to return. Mr. Karunasena, a former Commandant of the Police Special Task Force (STF) had accompanied the Policemen from Vavuniya to their respective sectors. Thereafter a majority of the soldiers were re-deployed to other areas.
The link-up at Puliyankulam has prompted Army Headquarters to re-demarcate brigade areas. The Six Brigade (headquartered in Weli Oya) will now encompass Nedunkerny, Gajabapura, Kebettigollawa and Bogas Handiya.
The 17 Brigade will encompass Janakapura, Kiri Ibban Wewa, Pulmoddai upto Nilaweli in Trincomalee. The new headquarters of this brigade is to be located in Galkulama in the Weli Oya area.
Another brigade area west of the Weli Oya sector is likely to be set up. This is expected to be manned by the Sri Lanka Navy's recently established North Central Command. Defence officials do not rule out another similar brigade area coming under the purview of the Police.
With the link-up at Puliyankulam now over, troops have begun consolidating their defensive positions. The new defence lines extend northwards from Omanthai to Puliyankulam and eastwards thereafter through Nedunkerny, Gajabapura, Kent Farm, Ehatugaswewa, Nelumpura and almost upto Kokilai lagoon and Kokkutuduwai. Military officials say the 'process of consolidation' will take anything between two to three months and is intended to fully exploit the gains made by 'Operation Jaya Sikurui' so far.
It would now appear that the initial phase of 'Operation Jaya Sikurui' has been completed 90 days after its launch. From the statements made both by PA leaders and those in the defence establishment, it was apparent that the original aim of 'Operation Jaya Sikurui' was to link up with Kilinochchi to open the Main Supply Route to Jaffna peninsula.
Whether the original aim can be fulfilled before the north east monsoon sets in, judging from the slowness of the operation and LTTE resistance seems unlikely. Unless of course the operation continues regardless of casualties. This is unlikely to be acceptable both militarily and politically.
In the situation the consolidation of the operational zone on the line Puliyankulam-Nedunkerny to near Kokilai does seem tactically a sound decision.
This is particularly since this zone is anathema to the LTTE vision of Eelam as they allege the area to be colonised by successive governments at the expense of 'Tamil homeland.' In this regard, the Weli Oya basin has been the target of the most brutal programme of ethnic cleansing by the LTTE.
Various veiled statements made by Government leaders and sources reflect a very casual and nonchalant response to the mystery of the missing shipload of ammunition. To offer explanations that it is not of concern or that the cost will be recovered from insurance is to treat this matter with ridiculous frivolity.
To the public mind, it is unimaginable that the loss of 32,400 rounds of mortar ammunition, most likely into the LTTE armoury, should not be of the gravest concern to the defence establishment.
More so in the context that of military sources explaining the casualties of troops in 'Operation Jaya Sikurui' being the result of artillery/mortar fire from weapons (and ammunition) seized from the security forces, particularly after the attack on the Mullaitivu Military Base. The response to the missing ship episode does not inspire much public confidence.
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