Air
Marshal Mathew Ranasinghe: VSV, RWP, psc, ndc
Last week's exclusive
report in The Sunday Times about the findings of a top level Committee,
appointed by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, to probe 16 Sri Lanka
Air Force air crashes had widespread repercussions.
It came as a painful reminder to the next of kin of more than 100 soldiers and journalist colleagues at the Lake House. Two years after their beloved ones had parted, it was most hurtful for them to learn that their lives may have been saved. That was, as the Committee report revealed, if the Commander of the Sri Lanka Air Force had taken intelligence reports seriously.
International news agencies sent The Sunday Times exclusive world-wide. Readers who were shocked made phone calls and even wrote letters. I had several calls from those in the Air Force itself but what they expressed must remain confidential for their own safety. I must, however, record one sentiment most expressed — they warned me to be concerned about my own safety. Other callers were irked that though the report had been handed over on August 27, no action has still been taken.
Voicing its concern about the findings of the Committee, The Island of October 27 editorialised on The Sunday Times revelations the previous day. It observed "The moral of our military stories is that one can be guilty of the most serious lapses and get away..."
It added "...Those who pinpoint faults and give sincere advice are penalised. The guilty are promoted...."
But the most curious of all the responses came from none other than Air Marshal Oliver Mathew Ranasinghe, Commander of the Sri Lanka Air Force. Since The Sunday Times hit the streets last week, he and his close advisors discussed a strategy to counter, if not negate, the obviously damaging conclusions by the Committee.
And that saw Air Marshal Ranasinghe meeting representatives of sections of the media at his office last Friday. He was ably assisted by his newly appointed Media Relations Officer, Squadron Leader B.F.J. Hasheem, who was kind enough to offer even SLAF transport to some reporters.
Early this week, Sqn. Ldr. Hasheem telephoned me. "You have exploded a bombshell about our Commander. Why don't you stop," he said referring to last week's The Sunday Times report. The bomb which he referred to was not exploded by anyone other than by the Air Force Commander himself. I explained to him that the Committee's report was of utmost public interest. He said he would speak to the Commander and "come back" but did not contact me.
What was shocking about the Air Force Commander's media meetings was the two sets of documents Sqn. Ldr. Hasheem handed out to the media personnel. They were ready–made questions and answers. One stapled document contained five pages and the other, four.
In other words, the questions, which would appear as if they were asked by the media and answered by the Air Force Commander, were prepared for or by the SLAF and handed out to the media, an act which is not even done by any propaganda arm of the Government. Even the Government Department of Information, in such circumstances, arranges a news conference and invites all media. But for obvious reasons, even the Department (not to mention the Military Spokesman and Director Media at the Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence) were completely in the dark about this peculiar media event.
Neither The Sunday Times nor its sister newspaper, The Lankadeepa, were invited. But I obtained the copies of the two documents from a colleague who took part in the meeting with the Air Force Commander. In a box story on this page, I have reproduced some questions and answers that relate to The Sunday Times with observations and others which are both revealing and thought provoking by themselves.
The SLAF's ready-made questions and answers to the media, needless to say, will find space in some sections of the media in part, full or story form. The Air Force Commander also answered a few other questions put to him by journalists who met him.
But one senior Editor to whom the copies were handed over was not pleased with the SLAF doing the media job. "We are not there to wash other people's mud," he told his reporter. The first question in the ready–made five page document says "It is alleged that you are blamed by a Committee of Inquiry for the aircraft crashes in the Air Force. What are your
comments ?"
The answer: "This was the first time I heard of it. Perhaps this must be a different committee of inquiry reporting to unofficial sources."
The first ready made question in the second document (four pages) says "Commander, have you seen the Committee Report?"
The answer: "No. I have not seen or read the report. It has not been given to me."
The most staggering and the unbelievable aspect of the prepared questions and answers is that Air Marshal Oliver Ranasinghe does not seem to have seen or read the report by this Committee.
Any intelligent reader would expect that when the Committee Report was published in The Sunday Times, the first thing the Commander of the Air Force should have done was to have checked with the Ministry of Defence whether indeed such a report existed. For him that would have meant only a telephone call to his immediate superior, Defence Secretary, Chandrananda de Silva.
On the other hand, if such a report did not exist, and as the Air Force Commander, subtlely imputes in his prepared questions and answers that publishing such reports is "anti national" and is intended to help the LTTE, then surely I should have been immediately arrested under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Moreso when a couple of months ago, "the dogs of war" which the Air Force Commander refers to were outside my own residence checking not only my movements but waiting to "catch red handed" those suspected of being my "informants."
There is more on this episode waiting to be revealed.
Air Marshal Ranasinghe doubts the Committee report published in last week's The Sunday Times was the one ordered by the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and President of Sri Lanka, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. What is not clear is whether that is his own personal view or that of the Government of Sri Lanka. Not a single government agency — the Department of Information, the state run media, television and above all, Defence Secretary, Chandrananda de Silva shared the views he expresses. Nor have the other members of the Committee, all of whom as, Air Marshal Ranasinghe says are "very honourable men." A montage of the Committee's recommendations together with their signatures appeared in The Sunday Times.
Whilst doing that, in his ready-made questions and answers, Air Marshal Ranasinghe goes on to refute and even ridicule the findings made by those whom he calls "very honourable men." And that too, made directly to his Commander-in-Chief and the President of Sri Lanka.
Take for example, the findings of the Committee that he did not take intelligence reports seriously. In page 15 paragraph 56, the Committee report said: "In evidence before this Committee, the Commander stated that D/MI (Director, Military Intelligence) gives various intelligence reports and if he were to accept all such reports 'there would be no Air Force flying!' This answer epitomises a complete lack of responsibility by the Commander and had he taken the intelligence reports seriously, the loss of Avro aircraft CR 834 and CR 835 may have been averted. It also appears from the Commander's statement that he did not believe the LTTE to possess Stinger missiles as 'the USA has recovered all Stinger missiles from the American Continent and was paying US $ 200,000 for all missiles surrendered in Afghanistan.' "
Let us examine the SLAF's ready-made question and answer. Here is the question: "You have been accused, in a newspaper that you did not take intelligence reports seriously. What do you have to say?"
The answer: "Of course, intelligence reports are seriously considered and they are graded according to the reliability of the informant and the relevance of the information in the context of the situation prevalent at the time."
Needless to say he does not directly answer the findings of the Committee in this regard. He speaks about grading and reliability of the informant. He does not say whether the DMI warning referred to by the Committee had been relegated to a low and unreliable grading. But the two subsequent questions are revealing. What is interesting is that these questions have been so framed, they form answers the authors want conveyed.
In addition to these, the Air Force Commander also answered other questions put to him. He made a shocking revelation — there is a mole in the Air Force "leaking" information to the LTTE. If as he claims there is one, that is a very serious matter. It would be interesting to know what action he has taken so far?
He also refers to this in the ready-made question and answer. There he says "some members of the press appear to be making heroes of moles." This indeed is treacherous. The Commander should initiate action to bring to book such traitors.
Here are some more ready-made questions and answers made available.
Question: Is it correct that the Directorate of Military Intelligence gives conflicting reports ?
Answer: I would not like to comment on that.
Question: Is it correct that the Directorate of Military Intelligence lulled the security services into a state of complacency, just prior to the Galadari bomb attack saying that there would be no attack in the immediate future?
Answer: I would not like to comment on that.
On to another finding of the Committee, the relationship between the Air Force Commander and the Chief of Staff. On page 17 paragraph 67 a, this is what it says: "Relationship between Commander and Chief of Staff — there appears to be open conflict between the Commander and his Chief of Staff. Some of the remarks made by the Commander in the C of I (Court of Inquiry) proceedings leave no doubt whatsoever regarding this. As a consequence of this open conflict the Chief of Staff has been sidelined from the decision making and Command process. In a disciplined Service, this has had its effect 'down the line' and there appears to be two camps backing one or the other.' "
The ready made question on this "Is the relationship between the Commander and the Chief of staff not that healthy. What have you got to say ?"
The reply: "This is the first time I am hearing such a thing.
More ready made question and answers go on to refute what Defence Secretary Chandrananda de Silva and the other Committee members — General Denis Perera, a former Army Commander, Air Vice Marshal Paddy (Pathman) Mendis, a former Air Force Commander Cyril Herath, a former Inspector General of Police and C.R. de Silva, Additional Solicitor General — told President Kumaratunga.
Here are a few:
Question: Is it true that the Chief of Staff has been sidelined in the Air Force decision making ?
The answer: It appears somebody is trying to paint a very poor image of the Chief of Staff.
Question: Has the Chief of staff been sidelined ?
Answer: Certainly not. He runs the day to day matters of the Air Force for me so that I have more time for policy and strategic matters. Reading the article I felt very sorry for him, as the matter creates a poor picture of him.
Commenting on the Chain of Command on Page 18 of its report, the Committee observes:
"(c) Morale - This Committee is of the view that there is a loss of morale in the Air Force resulting from dissatisfaction in regard to Command and Control factors and a lack of consultative process in respect of procurement of aircraft and equipment."
This is what the ready-made question says: "Is it true that there is a 'loss of morale' in the Air Force?"
The answer: It is a very subjective statement. As far as I am aware, there is no such thing and we are working at the maximum efficiency.
Another prepared question says: Are there two camps in the Air Force?
The answer: The Air Force is a disciplined and a gentlemanly service. If there were another camp opposed to the Commander, it is being suggested that a group is working mutinously in the Air Force. When the LTTE are losing ground daily, they and their acolytes would love such a situation. That will never happen. As the saying goes 'dogs may bark and the caravan will move on relentlessly.'
In the above answer, what the Air Force Commander does not explain is who is suggesting that a group is working mutinously? Who are the acolytes and who are the dogs that are barking and who is the caravan? Is this statement an attempt to refute the recommendations made by the Committee? Is this not a gross insult on a team picked by the President herself? If not, are these words like the other ready-made questions an attempt to intimidate or silence The Sunday Times into not performing its public duty. This is not the first time I have heard security top brass make such accusations or try to hide their omissions and commissions behind words like "security sensitive information", "LTTE front organisations" and any other name that forms what they think are heavy armour to protect them from public exposure and criticism.
But threats from petty dictators are nothing new. Similar threats were aimed at The Sunday Times during the previous regime. Those who expressed the same sentiments, tried to intimidate and harass to cover up their wrong doings. They accused others of being LTTE acolytes.
Today they stand indicted before the law courts of this country.
Commenting on last week's The Sunday Times report, Air Marshal Ranasinghe says "it is mischievous and this may be the way to demoralise....." The less said about morale the better. I need hardly add to the Committee's finding that "there is a loss of morale in the Air Force resulting from dissatisfaction in regard to command and control factors and a lack of consultative process in respect of procurement of aircraft and equipment."
And this was said by a Committee of distinguished gentlemen whom the Commander calls "very honourable men."
Air Marshal Ranasinghe implies in his "mock up interview" that the "enemy's pen is mightier than the sword."
The question being asked by many is "were the so-called exposures made to block vital equipment and impede the operations in the north?"
He then asked himself (through the ready-made question and answer handout) "shouldn't such persons be investigated?"
Air Marshal Ranasinghe then replies to himself "I am seriously of the view that all 'front' organisations of the LTTE should be investigated thoroughly to see what is really going on behind the facade.'
In other words, in all these illusionary question and answers, his objective is to call The Sunday Times and myself a front organisation of the LTTE. I do not think the LTTE requires any front organisations in view of the self destructive system of administration that prevails under the command of Air Marshal Ranasinghe, as has been pointed out by the Committee report.
Need anything more be added to the Committee findings that the loss of lives and monetary losses to the SLAF since 1994:
a. The loss of crew members - 34
b. The loss of passengers - 262
c. The number of injured crew members - 1
d The number of injured passengers - 41
e The total value of the loss of SLAF equipment at the time of the loss is US dollars 30,847,666 or over Rs 1.8 billion.
Air Marshal Ranasinghe accepts, as has been said earlier, that the Committee consisted of "very honourable men."
His own admission of the calibre of the Committee adds credibility to their report and findings. At the same time, the very strength of these findings questions and negates the claims, lame excuses and hedging by Air Marshal Ranasinghe. As he very rightly says, perhaps for once, the SLAF is "a disciplined and gentlemanly service."
In the company of such a disciplined and gentlemanly body of men, now in the context of the report, there remains only one course of action left open to Air Marshal Oliver Mathew Ranasinghe.
A set of ready-made questions and answers were handed over to representatives of a section of the media who met the Commander of the Air Force, Air Marshal Oliver Ranasinghe, at his office last Friday.
Air Marshal Ranasinghe denied any knowledge of the report by a top level Committee that probed 16 air crashes of the SLAF. The report was published exclusively in The Sunday Times last week.
The Committee was headed by Defence Secretary Chandrananda de Silva.
Some of the prepared questions are in response to reports in The Sunday Times. Other questions have been so formulated that they are really the answers. Yet other questions and answers conveyed their fuller meanings on their own. Here are a selection of them. Where references have been made to The Sunday Times reports, they are accompanied by a response.
Question: A reporter has apparently interviewed an Indian High Commission official and posed questions to him based on the alleged report.
Answer: Yes, I saw that. I thought that was very mischievous. It has been apparently suggested to the Indian High Commission official that India is interfering in our internal affairs.
The relationship between India and Sri Lanka is very strong and no mischievous attempt can destroy it. Only the LTTE can be happy with this type of insidious attempt.
The Sunday Times adds: If there is an "apparent suggestion" it came only from what the Air Force Commander told the Committee.
On page 7 (paragraph 26) the Committee report states "Kfir - The Commander informed the Committee that these aircraft were purchased outside tender procedure on the grounds that no other country would offer us Ground Attack as India would object...."
The Sunday Times challenges the Air Force Commander to prove his claim that "India would object". Very simply, all what the High Commission official did when asked about this question was to say :India has not taken any such stance. It is entirely an internal matter for Sri Lanka." Who is making a mischievous attempt by asserting "India would object?"
Question: What have you got to say about the report that appeared in the press?
Answer: I don't have a slightest idea whether it is a correct report or anything else, because, as far as I know, a highly confidential report of this nature will be known only by the Committee and the report must be with Her Excellency the President. And I don't see how this type of thing could come out.
The Sunday Times adds: On the one hand, he says he has not the "slightest idea whether it is a correct report" and on the other adds "a highly confidential report of this nature" will be known only by the Committee. That in itself is contradictory.
All he had to do was to ask any member of the Committee or its Chairman, Defence Secretary Chandrananda de Silva, if he had any doubts. The Air Force Commander himself has testified before the Committee. Here are the details as listed in the Committee Report's Appendix "A".
May 28, 1997 - 3.30 p.m. - Commander of the Air Force gives evidence on the purchase of the Pucara and AN 32 aircraft.
June 5, 1997 - 4.00 p.m. - Commander of the Air Force gives evidence on the purchase of Kfir, and Y 12 aircraft and gives clarifications on dissent report in respect of the Pucara aircraft.
July 14, 1997 - 4.00 p.m. - Commander answers the clarifications sought.
July 17, 1997 - 4.00 p.m. - Commander completes the clarifications sought.
The Sunday Times adds: The Air Force Commander is fully well aware of what transpired when he went before the Committee on the above dates. He would surely know at least the answers he gave.
Question: Has the Air Force purchased Laser Guided Designators with Guided bombs and are they lying in the SLAF warehouses ?
Answer: It is incorrect. I don't think that any Commander would comment on this type of a top secret project. Thinking for myself, I have got to live with my conscience because this type of information will only help the enemy. If this type of information is published by anyone, that is with ulterior motives.
The Sunday Times adds: Although he says any Commander would comment, he reveals there is a "top secret project." The Sunday Times report did not refer to the Air Force Commander's conscience. What the report said was about the purchase at a price of over US dollars 3.76 million (over Rs 221.8 million) of the designator and US dollars 40,000 (over Rs 2.3 million) for each bomb. They were "crisis purchases" (order number M-256 - Letter of Credit No 95/52365).
In a subsequent report, The Sunday Times said, the SLAF was ordered to return this piece of equipment idling at a warehouse. The Commander speaks of a "top secret project" and chose not to answer the issues raised.
The issue is that this sophisticated piece of gadgetry purchased at a cost running into millions of rupees of the tax payer's money is lying idle. How can this be intelligence to the enemy when it had been lying unused in a warehouse? As reported, even tests of this equipment raised more questions than answers.
As The Sunday Times has repeatedly stated, there are many, many more similar "crisis purchases". Some of them have been raised in the ready made questions and answers. For constraints of space, they have been held back.
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