Policemen
inspect the remains of the suspect LTTE truck bomb that went off prematurely
near Gall at predawn
For weeks before 1998 dawned bringing the
world closer to a new millennium, Sri Lanka's defence establishment has
remained preoccupied.
It was not over the all important declaration by General Anuruddha Ratwatte, that a land based Main Supply Route linking the northern Jaffna peninsula with the south would be established by February 4 - the fiftieth anniversary of independence. That in effect would end the nine month long "Operation Jaya Sikurui" (or Victory Assured).
Undoubtedly it has its forebodings in the new year. But the month of December was studded with other equally significant events which cast their shadows ominously in the coming months.
On December 11 General Ratwatte made a firm pledge at an impromptu news conference (during a dinner he gave at his residence to members of the Foreign Correspondents Association) about a north-south link up by February 4. For exactly 20 days after he made the declaration, troops deployed in "Operation Jaya Sikurui" were unable to resume their advance. For most of the time, heavy monsoonal showers continued.
On December 31, however, the troops made a formal resumption of the operation. If the two days preceding that day were bright and sunny, within hours after troops began flexing their muscles, heavy showers came down again. Vehicle movements were severely restricted with most soldiers advancing a limited distance by foot or by tractor. Later that day the advance was called off. Senior military officials say any concerted advance would have to await the slowing down of rains and the receding of flood waters.
General Ratwatte who was on helicopter shuttles taking part in a series of military functions was in for a rude shock. On December 20, he took part in Air Force and Army passing out parades at Diyatalawa. The next day (December 21) he and Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Cecil Tissera, boarded a helicopter for a flight to Trincomalee.
At the Eastern Naval Command headquarters in the Dockyard in Trincomalee, a passing out parade and other functions had been lined up for the Minister. Instead of flying direct to Dockyard, the helicopter carrying General Ratwatte and party made an unscheduled landing on the bund of the Kantalai tank. Earlier, troops had secured the area. In addition more than 200 troops had been deployed along the route from Kantalai to Trincomalee. General Ratwatte and party were driven under heavy armed escort via road to Trincomalee. Two Air Force MI 24 Hind Helicopters gave air cover all the way.
The Air Force authorities had declared that they could not ensure the safety of Gen. Ratwatte in the air space between Kantalai and Trincomalee since there were intelligence reports that at least four LTTE missile groups were reconnoitering the area. In fact, the SLAF had curtailed flights in the eastern sector since November 5 in view of these reports.
There was a flurry of activity in the SLAF when Gen. Ratwatte, who had finished his official duties, insisted he wanted to return to Colombo by air. The Director of Operations, Air Commodore Jayalath Weerakkody, had to fly to Trincomalee to plan out a helicopter flight under heavy escort.
The restriction of SLAF flights in the east due to the reported missile threat has posed serious problems to other services.
Regular food supplies to at least one military camp in the Trincomalee district has been disrupted forcing men to be on dry rations since November.
Senior military officials in Trincomalee said yesterday a clearing operation has already been launched and its aim included hunting down the missile groups.
This is the first time in the so called Eelam War Three that LTTE missile threats have forced Air Force to curtail flights in the east. The induction of more and more troops from the eastern theatre into "Operation Jaya Sikurui" has forced the security forces to thin out strengths drastically from the east, particularly from Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts.
Although senior defence officials argue that most areas in the east could be re-captured within a matter of a few days, there are others who believe the missile threats pose a new dimension.
President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga's hectic schedule in the past weeks did not keep her away from showing her presence at military ceremonies.
During a goodwill visit to Pakistan, she thanked Prime Minister, Nawaz Shariff, personally for all the support and cooperation on the military front.
No sooner AirLanka's Airbus A 340 special flight arrived at the Bandaranaike International Airport on December 23, President Bandaranaike Kumaratunga immediately boarded an Air Force helicopter for a flight to the Sinhalese Sports Club grounds.
From there she drove straight to BMICH for a sit down dinner for 600 guests that marked the colours night of the Sri Lanka Navy.
She was accompanied all the way from Pakistan for the event by Lt. Gen. Gerry de Silva, former Army Commander and now Sri Lanka's High Commissioner in Pakistan.
Defence Ministry officials had seized the opportunity to utilise the Navy function for another event - for President Bandaranaike Kumaratunga to award the Operation Riviresa Campaign medals to the top men - General Ratwatte, Lt. Gen. Gerry de Silva, Admiral Mohan Samarasekera (former Navy Commander) and Air Marshal O.M. Ranasinghe. All the medal recipients remained throughout the dinner except for Admiral Samarasekera who withdrew soon after he received his Medal.
Another event which has its forebodings for 1998 took place on December 28 at Magalle, a southern suburb of the Galle Town. An Isuzu Elf truck laden with explosives exploded killing three Tiger guerrillas at 2.30 a.m. The incident sparked off extensive speculation as to who the target was. It ranged from Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Cecil Tissera (who was at the Navy's southern base located near the scene of the incident) and President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga who was due in Galle for an official ceremony.
Police sources, however, say there is now increasing evidence to suggest that the target may have been the Galle Prisons where some important LTTE cadres were being held. They suspect another LTTE contact group which had waited for the arrival of the Isuzu van had made good their escape.
Quite apart from whatever the target intended by the explosive laden Isuzu Elf van, security officials admit that the December 28 incident had also delivered a strong message - that the LTTE was able to infiltrate deep into the south. "The explosive laden lorry came right into Galle without any detection. The explosion that gave the show away was the result of their (LTTErs) own action and not our discovery," one senior Police official said. He warned more such acts cannot be ruled out.
Although newer developments portended fresh threats from the LTTE in the new year, the February 4 deadline to end "Operation Jaya Sikurui" appeared to be pre-occupying the military top brass.
So much so, Overall Operations Commander (OOC), Major General Srilal Weerasuriya, I understand, has already discussed the deadline issue with Gen. Ratwatte. According to highly placed military sources Gen. Weerasuriya is learnt to have explained the practical difficulties the security forces will face in trying to execute the new deadline and the enormous difficulties involved. In other words, he (Maj. Gen. Weerasuriya) had made it known that it would be practically impossible to keep to the deadline.
It is not immediately clear whether Gen. Ratwatte has accepted this position. Nor has any formal announcement in this regard been made since the latest deadline was announced on December 11. General Ratwatte himself returned to Colombo on Friday night after a visit to the Maldives.
The developing security situation perhaps indicates that LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, is widening his options in order to ease pressure from a re-inforced Jaya Sikurui threat.
So far the shortcomings in military planning have been a fortuitous bonus to the LTTE.
Consequential to the inability of "Operation Jaya Sikurui" to maintain its momentum in the initial months, it was unable to complete its aim before the onset of the monsoons. A situation which the defence planners appear not to have appreciated, considering that the advance is now bogged down due to adverse weather conditions. It is unimaginable that an Army equipped with modern weaponry and vehicles should grind itself to a near halt because of monsoon conditions. That notwithstanding, not to have planned for such an eventuality was a gross and costly miscalculation. Furthermore the lack of momentum has given the LTTE much needed time to consolidate resistance and develop other threat options.
The LTTE has to ensure that the Army will not be able to reinforce "Operation Jaya Sikurui " to any appreciable degree. For the Army to do so without the time consuming process of additional recruitment, it should be able to thin out in other areas of deployment. This is exactly what the LTTE must be planning to deny.
Hence, perhaps the increased LTTE activity in other areas, particularly in areas which are sensitive to the government politically and economically. The Southern Province and the Hill country can be particularly vulnerable in that regard. The southern province in particular because its geographical remoteness to the North and East has the potential to be used as a safe area for the LTTE as well as to be used in the transport of weapons and explosives to Colombo.
It can also be a convenient transit area for any material smuggled through the uninhibited Yala Coastline. The low profile security surveillance in the province compared to other provinces also makes subversive activity that much easier.
To deny the armed forces the freedom of air support and air logistics must also be a high priority in the LTTE agenda. The unrestricted air superiority available to the forces can only be denied by the use of surface to air missiles.
Hence the threat now posed to air movement from Trincomalee. However, this is a threat that should have been anticipated in the given circumstances for which contingency plans and counter measures should have been planned.
That an Air Commodore had to be flown to China Bay from Colombo to plan a return flight for the Deputy Minister of Defence questions the soundness of contingency planning.
Considering the overall situation it is apparent that the focus on "Operation Jaya Sikurui" is the expense of security in other areas. The immediate impact of this has been the deterioration of the security situation in the eastern province.
Though it is claimed that the situation in the Eastern Province can be restored in a few days it is extremely unlikely that it could be done with the resources now available. Even should Jaya Sikurui be completed the force requirement to secure the MSR on a daily basis will be so heavy that it would leave little spare to effectively neutralize the LTTE in the East in the short term.
With the upcoming elections in Jaffna the security requirement will further increase demanding additional measures. Whether the political parties contesting who have been permitted armed cadres can supplement security arrangements is yet to be seen. On the other hand whether the arming of political cadres will lead to internecine conflicts is also a troubling question. Yet in the prevailing situation there seems to be little other option. The success of the entire exercise of election depends on the course of action the LTTE adopts. Given their track record a favourable response to democratic measures is most unlikely.
The answer to many of the security issues depends on the successful completion of Operation Jaya Sikurui. To this the government is committed. There is no alternate military strategy. Only the successful political stabilization of Jaffna could alter the military course. And this seems unlikely in the immediate future.
It is equally unlikely that General Ratwatte's hopes of linking the North with a MSR by 4 Feb. 98 will materialize. It will most likely be another unrealized deadline like the many other deadlines that have passed unfulfilled.
The government most likely was hoping to have finalized most of these security issues before the celebration of 50 years Independence. That they remain open ended, overshadows the Feb. 4 activities and could be a lever for the LTTE to exploit.
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