Air
Marshal Oliver Mathew Ranasinghe
Air Force Commander, Air Marshal
Oliver Mathew Ranasinghe, won an extension of his term of office last Monday,
February 17, trouncing his critics and proving that he was still a strong,
influential man in Sri Lanka’s defence establishment.
The unenviable task of asking him to continue in office fell on none other than the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, Chandrananda de Silva.
For those who believed in time honoured armed forces conventions and traditions, it seemed a strange paradox. It was Mr. de Silva who headed a Committee appointed by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga to probe 16 Sri Lanka Air Force air crashes within just two years.
Together with four other members, all men of standing, Mr. de Silva in a report to President Kumaratunga declared there was “complete lack of responsibility” by the Commander (Air Marshal Ranasinghe) in respect of two Avro crashes that killed 105 persons, mostly soldiers and a group of journalists. Other findings made by the Committee, repeated in these columns, give an idea of the indictments made against the Air Force Commander.
And yet, it fell on Mr. de Silva to ask the same Air Marshal Oliver Ranasinghe to continue in his office as Air Force Commander. As I said in these columns last week, a powerful section of the Government that lobbied for his extension in office, notwithstanding the disclosures made by the Presidential Committee, succeeded not only in having him remain but also in seeing the unceremonious exit of the Chief of Staff, Air Vice Marshal Anslem Peiris.
It became mandatory for Air Vice Marshal Peiris to retire on Tuesday, February 17 when he reached the maximum of three years in rank. Fifty three-year-old AVM Peiris wrote through his Commander to the Ministry of Defence seeking an extension.
The official response that his request would not be granted came in the form of a copy of a letter Defence Secretary de Silva wrote to Air Vice Marshal Jayalath Weerakkody, Director Operations at the SLAF. The letter dated February 17, a Defence Ministry source said, was titled ‘Vacancy in the Post of Chief of Staff’ and said that AVM Peiris has completed his term of office.
It said Her Excellency the President has appointed Air Vice Marshal Weerakkody as Chief of Staff. The source said AVM Peiris has been allowed to use official facilities for three months before beginning a retired life.
The appointment of Air Vice Marshal Weerakkody, an experienced pilot, also brought about other changes. Group Captain Loksana Salgado, Commanding Officer of the SLAF base in Katunayake has been named the new Director of Operations. Taking over as Base Commander is Air Commodore E.Vijith Tennekoon, a close confidante of the Air Force Commander and currently Chief Provost Marshal.
The billion dollar question in defence circles yesterday was for how long Air Marshal Ranasinghe’s term of office has been extended. An Asian diplomat who spoke to a close aide about arranging a dinner for a visiting delegation next month was told “he will be there as long as the PA Government is in office.” But others said Air Marshal Ranasinghe will begin his round of farewells shortly and relinquish office by mid April. Yet others speculated that he will continue until November, this year, when Air Commodore Donald Perera, returns after the ongoing course at the National Defence College in New Delhi.
If Air Vice Marshal Weerakkody succeeds Air Marshal Ranasinghe as the new Air Force Commander, Air Commodore Donald Perera, is the most senior officer to assume the position of Chief of Staff.
Like in the SLAF, top level changes get under way in the Sri Lanka Army tomorrow.
Overall Operations Commander (OOC) Major General Srilal Weerasuriya takes over as Chief of Staff on Monday (tomorrow) with the retirement of the present incumbent, Major General Somadasa Hapuaratchi. Maj. Gen. Weerasuriya will continue to function as OOC and oversee the ongoing ten month long Operation Jaya Sikurui or Victory Assured. Brigadier Vasantha Perera has assumed duties as the new Adjutant General.
There has been a great deal of talk regarding the period of the tenure in office of Service Commanders.
The Commanders of the services are appointed by the President in terms of provisions in both the Constitution and the Service Acts of the individual services that the Commander will be appointed by the President.
These provisions do not stipulate a period of tenure of office. The understanding that the period of office for a service commander will be four years appears to be the convention that has evolved over the years than a statutory or administrative stipulation.
On the other hand the tenure of service of an officer in a specified rank has been stipulated by the Officers Regulations of the services or has been administratively directed by the Ministry of Defence. Also stipulated has been the age limit when retirement is mandatory, which is 55 years.
In the case of the Commanders of the services, as the conditions of the appointment do not stipulate a mandatory period in office or an age limit, some Commanders have served for over four years in the appointment, and some of them have continued even after the 55 year age ceiling for normal retirement. Some of course have opted retirement within the limit of age or the four year conventional limit.
In the case of the extension given to Air Marshal Ranasinghe, the public concern is not of legalities, but whether it was appropriate in the light of the Presidential Committee report which has passed strictures questioning his lack of responsibility on some issues and on the management in the Air Force, of which since he was the Commander also reflects on him.
Heightening these concerns is the fact that, to public knowledge, the Presidential Committee Report has so far not been acted upon.
Public concern in the matter is therefore certainly understandable. It should be remembered that resulting from the loss of 16 aircraft, some of which the Presidential Committee found was due to negligence and mismanagement, the sacrifice by the public and the country has been enormous; not just in rupees and cents but much more importantly the loss of valuable lives.
For that the Commander of the Air Force and any others found to have been at fault must answer. Their accountability is not only to the country but also to the kith and kin of those whose loved ones lost their lives in those unnecessary tragedies.
Furthermore, the Government is accountable to the public that the armed forces of this country are managed efficiently, effectively and that the many who brave to fight to maintain sovereignty of Sri Lanka are assured of the best quality of command and administration.
So long as Committees and Commissions appointed by the President and the Government to investigate on matters concerning the forces are not acted upon or are covered up, inefficiency and ineffectiveness will prevail.
And this be at the cost of the lives of the youth of this country and public expenditure. These are the issues of concern regarding the extension of the command of Air Marshal Ranasinghe. Had the report by the Presidential Committee been finalised before this extension, then there is no issue.
The public are entitled to know what has happened to this report and the findings. This war is not the prerogative of any one political establishment or the vehicle for the personal aggrandisement of self appointed heroes.
The war is fought by the government on behalf of the people of Sri Lanka. Certainly matters of operational intelligence are not of public concern. Those and allied matters are restricted.
This is not in question. But matters concerning mismanagement and negligence are public concern and they are entitled to be kept informed, more so when it is their sons and daughters who are affected by the issues at question.
The issues at question are not concerning Air Marshal Ranasinghe per se. They are matters of national and public concern. That is why it is at issue.
Air Force Commander, Air
Marshal Oliver Ranasinghe, whose term of office expired last Monday, has been
granted an extension.
This is despite strictures made against him by a Presidential Committee of Inquiry headed by Defence Secretary, Chandrananda de Silva.
The other members of the Committee are Gen. Denis Perera (former Army Commander), Air Vice Marshal Paddy Mendis (a former Air Force Commander), Cyril Herath (a former Inspector General of Police) and C.R. de Silva (Addl. Solicitor General).
The Committee’s findings were reported exclusively in The Sunday Times of October 26. This is what the Committee that probed 16 SLAF crashes had to say:
*The Committee observes that certain purchases of aircraft have been made without adhering to accepted tender procedures. Whilst agreeing that for reasons of operational urgency, deviation from tender procedure may be necessary, the Committee is of the view that in such instances, adequate safeguards should be maintained to ensure that the most suitable item of equipment is purchased at the most economical price. In one instance in connection with the purchase of the Kfir aircraft, the Commander had been directed to recommend a suitable Ground Attack Aircraft for purchase.
This Committee is of the view that such recommendations should not be left to the Commander of the Air Force, but to a Committee comprising the Commander of the Air Force, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Director/Logistics, Director/Aeronautical Engineering and such other specialist officers who may be necessary.
*MI 24 HELICOPTER - Prior to Operation Riviresa a policy decision had been taken to replace the Bell 212, then in use. Since this was considered as an urgent need, a proposal made by the SLAF to proceed on some 11 offers then available with the SLAF as against inviting fresh quotations, had been accepted. These 11 offers had been received between May and August, 1995.
Firstly, these 11 offers were evaluated by a TEC (Technical Evaluation Team) of the SLAF. They made a recommendation that a team be despatched to examine the lowest offer made by the Ulan State Company of Kazaksthan. This inspection team has met with several obstacles and finally a MOU (memorandum of understanding) had been signed for 06 helicopters, none of which were received. In retrospect, it is observed that the Ulan State Company was only a front of Global Omarus, who had entered as financiers.
The urgency for overlooking the need for fresh quotations though acceptable in the content of the then prevailing situation, did not in fact stand the test of time, when finally the substitute aircraft (subjected to overhauls) were received months after operations were concluded, pushing the Government of Sri Lanka to lease out helicopters for urgent requirements.
The whole episode appears to be a questionable transaction, and two of the helicopters under this agreement are yet to be received, almost two years after the signing of the MOU in Kazaksthan.
*KFIR - The Commander informed the Committee that these aircraft were purchased outside tender procedure on the grounds that no other country would offer us Ground Attack Aircraft as India would object. The Committee finds that the Chinese Government had sold F-7 Fighter Aircraft to the SLAF and had offered A-5 Ground Attack Aircraft at the time of the Tucano/Pucara tender. This offer had been rejected as it did not conform to the tender specifications as it was a ‘jet’ aircraft, but two years later, Kfir aircraft (also Jet) was purchased. This Committee observes that China had offered 6 X A5 brand new aircraft in 1993 for a price of US$ 28.5 million whereas we paid US$ 28.9 million for 06 second hand Kfir aircraft in 1995.
*UAV SPY PLANE - This is a spy aircraft obtained outside tender procedure. Committee is made to understand that the SLAF had not examined the availability of the relative suitability of any other spy aircraft. Committee is made to understand that this spy plane was introduced by an Agent of the Israel Air Industries. One of these aircraft had been used for demonstration purposes.
*Evidence was placed before this Committee that Intelligence Reports both from the D/MI (Director, Military Intelligence) and D/NIB (Director, National Intelligence Bureau) indicated that the LTTE had missiles. These reports have been made available to the Commander of the Air Force in 1994. The Committee observes with concern that the intelligence reports were not given the attention that they deserve and no serious considerations had been given to the counter measures that should be taken and necessary preventive strategies planned and implemented on a systematic basis.
*In evidence before this Committee, the Commander stated that D/MI gives various intelligence reports and if he were to accept all such reports “there would be no Air Force flying.” The answer epitomises a complete lack of responsibility by the Commander and had he taken the intelligence reports seriously, the loss of Avro aircraft CR 834 and CR 835 may have been averted. It also appears from the Commander’s statement that he did not believe the LTTE to possess Stinger missiles as “the USA has recovered all Stinger missiles from the American continent and was paying US $ 200,000 for all missiles surrendered in Afghanistan.”
*A military service operates on the basis of discipline and morale. These two are very closely linked and any lowering of one has an adverse effect on the other. Discipline is maintained in the Service through a rank structure with the Commander at the apex and the Airmen at the base. By law, the Commander is given virtually dictatorial powers to maintain discipline and the service operates on the principle of “Comply and Complain.”
*The Commander and his Chief of Staff control the operational pilots and units and maintain discipline and morale through a Chain of Command consisting of Base Commanders, Wing Commanders, Squadron Commanders and Flight Commanders. However, the Commander has informed this Committee that the Air Force does not have many experienced and Senior Officers making his personal supervision necessary. This statement is not consistent with the ranks held by these Officers who must be made to accept responsibility commensurate with their ranks and appointments.
*The Committee finds the following accidents have had a strong element of command inadequacies:
a. AVRO CR 834 - (aircraft shot down over Palaly) Following the loss of CR 835 the previous day, CR 834 was detailed for a routine mission to Jaffna. The Squadron Commander had briefed their pilots of the possibility of missile attack. Soon after the loss of CR 835, CO Palaly had informed SASO (Senior Air Staff Officer) that intercepted LTTE transmissions revealed a claim by the LTTE of having destroyed 835. The Commander in the course of his evidence before this Committee stated that he was due to fly to Palaly the following morning - 29/4/1995. However, he cancelled the flight on hearing of the loss of CR 834. In answer to a question by this Committee, he stated that he would have taken a different route had he flown to Jaffna as planned. This would indicate that he had not ruled out the possibility of a missile attack on CR 835 the previous day. In the light of the intelligence reports and the answer of the Commander quoted above, this Committee finds it difficult to comprehend:
i. why the Commander permitted 834 to proceed
to Jaffna on a routine mission.
ii. why he failed to give specific orders to SASO to instruct all flying formations to take precautions
*COURTS OF INQUIRY:
The evaluation of the evidence and the findings thereon by the Courts of Inquiry in most instances have been inadequate. The Committee is constrained to observe that the Commander of the Air Force has failed to make a proper evaluation of the shortcomings of the Courts of Inquiry and to give proper directions to clarify and remedy these shortcomings. The Committee also observes that in most instances, the Commander has only made routine observations and failed to address his mind to substantial issues germane to the crashes.
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