Rajpal's Column

15th March 1998

Why these talks fail

By Rajpal Abeynayake

Jaffna talks: another failure; "need for a tectonic shift"

Review of Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka - Efforts, Failures and Lessons; Edited by Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe. Published by International Alert of London, UK.

(The book is a collection of edited papers presented in Lucerne, Switzerland, by a diverse group of participants who figured in some way in the ethnic conflict _ as diplomats, military generals, negotiators, and sometimes as conscientious observers.)

It is difficult to write of a book of this scope in one instalment, which is to threaten that there will be a second one soon. That said, it is pertinent to observe the moving spirit of the Lucerne conference, the dark and determined Dr. Kumar Rupesinghe noting in his introduction to the book that "almost all participants felt that a military solution to the conflict was not possible. Negotiations were the only way to bring about a settlement''. ( Readers could be prone to escape notice of the qualifier "almost''.)

Whether most agreed that a negotiated settlement "could'' be brought about in the current context is entirely another matter. What's noticeable in most papers is a fairly refreshing tendency to be cynical, in the interests of being realistic. Some are more cynical than the others, but at bottom, most are cynical anyway.

Though some major players in recent ethnic drama such as J. N. Dixit and Gen. Cyril Ranatunge are contributors to the book, it appeared that some of the most incisive contributions came from lesser known actors. One of them is P. Rajanayagam, a lawyer, and a former Editor of the Tamil Times. In his paper, this gentleman has addressed the vexed issue of "whether talks will work." In conclusion, he observes that the LTTE is engaged in a political project committed to what it views as the liberation of the Tamil nation and its homeland. The political and other constraints within which the government of Sri Lanka operates, would not permit them to concede to that project. That being the fundamental and irreconcilable contradiction between the respective positions, any talks that will not eventually deliver this project'', he says, "are bound to fail. " The destructive war, is bound to continue , unless the parties to the conflict in their wisdom are prepared to revisit their basic positions, and compromise in seeking a practical political solution.".

A fair translation of that would be to say that a negotiated settlement is not possible under the current parameters, as long as the fundamental political positions of both sides remain the same. Only a tectonic shift in the underlying political positions could engender some hopes for peace by way of talks.

Its not entirely irrelevant that the observation comes from a Tamil, who is not prepared to see things the LTTE way, or go the whole hog in the opposite direction and see the LTTE as the sole hurdle in the way of peace.

In a curious way it is interesting that most such realistic appraisals of the conflict come from Tamils, particularly Tamils who view the conflict from far afield as London and Washington. Following close on the heels of the paper by Rajanayagam, is a contribution by Chelvadurai Manogaran, a Professor of Geography and International Studies in a US campus. Says he, quoting Howard Wriggins, that the effect of the conflict on both the government and the LTTE was approaching a mutually hurting stalemate, that might presage compromise. But it was not yet sufficiently severe enough to conclude in a negotiated settlement.''

The inevitable conclusion is that a negotiated settlement is not impossible. But for that both sides must change sufficiently conceding the fact that a war hurts mutually. Most papers in the collection don't indicate that any substantial change in the antipodal positions of the two sides are possible anytime soon.

One reason for this is that most contributors are "seasoned operators'', people who have either been in the thick of the conflict or associated with it so closely that they have no illusions about pie - in - the sky solutions. In this category are hard boiled men such as Gen. Cyril Ranatunge, who says that," "On low intensity conflict it is possible to win every battle and lose the war.''. Politically motivated "hearts and minds programmes," says the military man, does not help build the confidence of the people in the military.

In the final analysis, the details may not be as important as the big picture. Dixit, Bernard Tillekeratne, Thomas Abraham and others assess the collapse of the Indo Lanka accord. ( Says Dixit in doublespeak that India should not have interfered in any way, even if developments in Sri Lanka endangered India's interests. Then, he gets derailed and says that Sri Lanka was only 18 miles away from Tamil Nadu, and that inter state relations are not governed by the logic of morality. The Premadasa LTTE talks are analysed.. Finally, the Kumaratunga LTTE talks are dissected.

Those who argue that various talks ( Premadasa-LTTE or Kumaratunga-LTTE) failed because of one party, can be eminently contrasted with others who argue with equal vim that those talks failed due to the other party. S J Emanuel argues that though the economic embargo was lifted by the Kumaratunge government, even a fraction of what was agreed and gazzetted was not reaching the people of the North.

He says: The military authorities of Vavuniya check points have been seeing to that. In a biblical language it was like the voice of Jacob and the hand of Esau." But others are not so sure that the government was entirely to blame for the collapse of talks.. Says Manogaran that the contents of the letters exchanged ( between the government and the LTTE) during the Kumaratunge talks ''indicate that the letters served to repeatedly assert and reassert the different positions of the parties rather than seeking to narrow the gap between them. The tone and content of the exchanges appeared to become, as months passed, distinctly unfriendly and very often accusatory.

While A.V .Chandrakanthan says that Premadasa dragged his feet on the issue of repealing the 6th amendment (requiring an oath against advocating secession ) undermining the confidence reposed in him by the LTTE, Bradman Weerakoon argues from being in a vantage point that Premadasa never had JR Jayewardene's majority to do away with the amendment with any degree of ease.

A holistic view of the collection of papers would point to the fact that both sides got some details wrong in the negotiations. Both sides erred, repeatedly, and it appears that it was normal to err on the details.

Why the talks failed was then, probably not because of the details, but due to the big picture. As stated by Rajanayagam, "the parties are unwilling to revisit their basic positions, and compromise in seeking a practical political solution." The quintessence of evidence in the book seems to support this conclusion, except of course that there are wholly diverging views from persons such as Dayan Jayatilleke who believe that the LTTE strategy was to bomb the peace process everytime the negotiations showed signs of leading to a solution.

Come to think of it, if what Rajanayagam says is correct, what Dayan says could be simultaneously correct as well.

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