The Situation Report

19th April 1998

Mi24s: the fraud and the farce

By Iqbal Athas

Exposed to the elements: two of the three outdated MI24 choppers lying exposed to the elements at the SLAF base in Katunayake

Dusk had enveloped the Sri Lanka Air Force Base at Katunayake that February 9, 1996, when a Soviet built Antonov 124 transport plane was cleared for touch down by Air Traffic Controllers.

Around 7.30 p.m. the aircraft, the world's largest transport plane, taxied along to park on the apron at the SLAF Base. Senior SLAF officials were awaiting the flight from Tashkent. They were bringing in three MI 24 'Hind' helicopters.

This was part of a consignment of six for which orders had been placed and a contract signed on September 29, 1995. (Contract No: SLAF/95/18/Air of 29.9. 1995).

The MI 24s are described as "helicopter battle cruisers." According to one flight journal, its main advantage is its ability to fight in several different ways: by dropping an anti tank platoon, complete with missiles, while defending itself against ground fire with the nose gun: by acting as its own escort on troop -carrying flights: or by acting as a tank killer pure and simple, with a vast capacity for even the heaviest reload rounds. But an inevitable corollary of this, the journal said, was the "combination of all arms" in a single aircraft, however, is that the vehicle's size and weight rule out evasive flying, and render it difficult to escape alert, well equipped defences.

The Sri Lanka Air Force had decided that they needed the MI 24s to replace the US built Bell 212s that had been providing close air support to ground troops with 12.7 mm Machine Guns mounted on either side and manned by door gunners. That was why they had decided to purchase these reportedly re-conditioned MI 24s at US $ 1.35 million dollars (or over Rs 83 million) each.

SLAF officials boarded the AN 124 to check on the three MI 24s before giving clearance to unload them. They had with them the serial numbers and other particulars of the helicopters that had been ordered in terms of the September, 1995, contract. But the details did not match the three MI 24s on board. They were different machines.

The officials took up cudgels with Mr. Jumari Suwiti, Executive Director of the Singapore based firm Global Omarus Technologies - a firm that has been putting through millions of dollars or billions of rupees worth of military deals during the past three years with the Army, Navy and the Air Force. Mr. Suwiti had arrived in the AN 124 that brought the three MI 24s. They complained that the helicopters were not the ones ordered by the SLAF.

Then Air Force Commander, Air Marshal Oliver Ranasinghe, was away in Singapore. Officials brought this to the attention of the Acting Commander, Air Vice Marshal Anselm Peiris. It was AVM Peiris who led a team of SLAF officials to Kazakhstan to select the six MI 24 helicopters. The three that had arrived, it was found, were entirely different machines and were not among those selected.

Whilst the AN 124 lay parked, SLAF officials debated with Mr. Suwiti from the Katunayake base and telephoned AVM Peiris. Though Mr. Suwiti was advised to meet the acting Commander the next morning (February 10, 1996), he had insisted he had to leave for Singapore that night to attend to very urgent business.

After more talks a compromise was reached. The AN 124 with the three MI24s would lay on the ground until Mr. Suwiti issued a letter. The letter was to say that the three MI 24s were being unloaded in Colombo at the request of Global Omarus Technologies without any obligation either to the SLAF or the Government of Sri Lanka. This is what the letter said:

"RE: DELIVERY OF MI - 24 B - HELICOPTERS TO SLAF

09th February, 1996

"Reference is made to the above mentioned subject.

"We have today delivered to you three (03) units of the above mentioned MI - 24 B helicopters bearing (serial numbers are given) respectively together with aggregates and spares on board flight ADB 141/142 from Tashkent to Colombo at our expense without obligation on your part. Your consideration to accept these units are subject to you fully satisfied with the conditions and meeting with your requirements after the full inspection, although these units are not those that were inspected by the Inspection Team led by Air Vice Marshal K.G.A. Peiris.

" Due to some unforeseen circumstances and the present changes at the Ministry of Defence of Kazakhstan, we are unable to deliver to you the contracted serial nos. that were entered with you at the moment as we have to address this matter very shortly with the Ministry of Defence of Kazakhstan and advise you accordingly.

"However, we are pleased to assure you that these three units are in very good condition and we have with us specialists from MIL Design Bureau to certify these unit for your consideration to accept.

"Thanking you in anticipation.

"Jumari Suwiti

Executive Director"

That was how the three helicopters were unloaded on February 10, 1996. They were immediately moved to a hangar where they lay for over six months.

The Ministry of Defence had by then learnt that the three MI 24s that were delivered were ones whose life expectancy had expired. Air Marshal Ranasinghe who had returned from Singapore by then had concurred with the Ministry view but pointed out that Global Omarus Technologies had agreed to overhaul the three helicopters at Katunayake within a period of one month and ten days. He was of the view that flying them back to Kazakhstan would take six months or more.

Global Omarus Technologies thereafter arranged to fly to Colombo a team from Kazakhstan . The team went to work on one of the MI 24s but there was a debate on whether it amounted to an overhaul or a mere life extension. Some senior SLAF officials claimed a proper overhaul would have cost a further US $ 1 million besides the cost price of US $ 1.35 million.

It is in this doubtful backdrop that the Ministry of Defence gave approval to Global Omarus Technologies to remove the two remaining MI 24 helicopters to Kanatop Overhaul Plant in Ukraine. The SLAF had recommended it as a suitable overhaul facility.

When Global Omarus Technologies informed the Ministry of Defence of the completion of the overhaul, a top level inspection team was despatched on July 17, 1997, to Ukraine. It comprised Air Vice Marshal Anselm Peiris, Chief of Staff, Air Commodore Lal Perera, Director, Aeronautical Engineering, Squadron Leader W.L.M.J.P. Rodrigo, Commanding Officer, No 9 Helicopter Squadron, Flight Lieutenant K.A.A.J. Ranaweera, Engineer Interpreter and Mr. Mahinda Bandusena, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Defence.

However, when they arrived, the overhaul was not complete. When the Ministry of Defence was informed of the position, the SLAF team was asked to stay behind and Mr. Bandusena returned to Colombo.

The inspection team's report makes some damning disclosures on the three MI 24s delivered by Global Omarus Technologies to the SLAF . The life expectancy of most important components of the three MI 24s had expired. They included the right engine, auxiliary power unit, main rotor blades, tail rotor hub, tail rotor blades, intermediate gear box and tail rotor gear box among other items. In other words the MI 24s were not flight worthy.

Interestingly the acquisition of the MI 24s drew the attention of the Presidential Committee of Inquiry that probed 16 SLAF air crashes which occurred between April, 1995 and May, 1997. It was headed by Defence Secretary, Chandrananda de Silva and comprised General Denis Perera, a former Army Commander, Air Vice Marshal Pathman (Paddy) Mendis, a former Air Force Commander, Cyril Herath, a former Inspector General of Police and C.R. de Silva, Additional Solicitor General.

This is what the Presidential Committee of Inquiry had to say on the MI 24s:

"Prior to Operation Riviresa a policy decision had been taken to replace the Bell 212, then in use. Since this was considered an urgent need, a proposal made by the SLAF to proceed on some 11 offers then available with the SLAF as against inviting fresh quotations, had been accepted.

" These 11 offers had been received between May and August of 1995. Firstly, these 11 offers were evaluated by a TEC (Technical Evaluation Committee) of the SLAF. They made a recommendation that a team be despatched to examine the lowest offer made by the Ulan State Company of Kazakhstan. This inspection team has met with several obstacles and finally a MOU (memorandum of understanding) had been signed for 06 helicopters, none of which were received. In retrospect, it is observed that Ulan State Company was only a front of Global Omarus, who had entered as financiers.

"The urgency for overlooking the need for fresh quotations though acceptable in the context of the then prevailing situation, did not in fact stand the test of time, when finally the substitute aircraft (subjected to overhauls were received months after operations were concluded, pushing the GOSL (Government of Sri Lanka) to lease out helicopters for urgent requirements.

" The whole episode appears to be a questionable transaction…"

To sum up the MI 24 helicopter deal, it was first inspected in February, 1995. An year later, three helicopters were delivered. But they were found to be ones with life expectancy expired. Whilst one had its life expectancy extended, two which were sent for overhaul, were not ready until July, 1997. In other words, despite payment of moneys for the purchase of the helicopters, for well over two and half years, the SLAF was unable to get the full benefit of the three MI 24s.

And this period was to see a more disturbing development. The Sri Lanka Air Force came under heavy pressure from the military ground commanders. They badly needed close air support. Its absence was causing heavy casualties to ground troops. To save valuable lives, the helicopters were required most urgently.

What did the SLAF do ? Whilst the two MI 24s were awaiting completion of overhaul, they went back to Global Omarus Technologies under "Crisis Purchases" to lease out three MI 24 helicopters at a cost of US $ 1,545,920 (or over Rs 95 Million). It became necessary because helicopters which were purchased earlier were not useful.

The lease deal also left open a number of questions. Documents available with The Sunday Times showed that in terms of the contract for the lease deal, the SLAF was to only provide ammunition for use on the guns that were said to be mounted on board. But the SLAF had not only purchased 7.62 mm Machine Guns to equip the leased MI 24s but had also paid for spare parts for the two leased helicopters. The hired MI 24 s were used for nearly ten months and the machines are now lying exposed to the elements at the SLAF Base in Katunayake.

The sequence of events leading to the procurement of the MI 24 helicopters raises a series of questions. Although there were 11 offers, it took the SLAF more than two and half years to acquire a fleet of three helicopters. Needless to say that an earlier acquisition would have saved the lives and limbs of ground troops. Despite the supplier delivering three units which were not the ones ordered for the SLAF, the lease was also entered into with the same supplier. Here too, despite a contractual arrangement, SLAF had to procure guns and spares for the leased helicopters.

In view of the clouded background to the acquisition of the first six MI 24s, the Ministry of Defence, sent another team of of SLAF officials to Ukraine. It was headed by Air Vice Marshal Anselm Peiris (former Chief of Staff).

According to Defence Ministry sources, three MI 24s, all three with brand new frames and re-conditioned engines, are due to arrive in Sri Lanka shortly. A very significant feature of this new deal is the fact that it was Government to Government. There were no middle-men involved and hence, obviously, no commissions.

The sequence of events leading to the procurement of MI 24s, pieced together by The Sunday Times with documents available and from other sources, will be one of the subjects of inquiry by the second Presidential Committee of Inquiry appointed to probe procurement of military aircraft, weapons and other equipment for the Sri Lanka Air Force.

As reported in these columns last week, the Committee is headed by Christie Silva, former Secretary, Ministry of Health and comprises I.M. Liyanage, former Judge of the High Court and Vice Admiral A.H. Asoka de Silva, one time Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy and Ambassador to Cuba.

A.N.R. Ameratunga, Senior Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Defence has been appointed as the Secretary to the three member Presidential committee. He will also serve as Secretary to the one man (I.M. Liyanage) Committee that will conduct a disciplinary inquiry into the case of Air Vice Marshal K. St. E. Perera, Director, Logistics, Sri Lanka Air Force.

The three member Committee had its first formal meeting last Friday at the Ministry of Defence. Later that evening they had a detailed discussion with Defence Secretary, Chandrananda de Silva.

It is manifestly clear that the MI24 deal has been a designed attempt to pass on unserviceable helicopters to the SLAF, unless one were to be charitable and accept that it was a mistake. That by itself would be a damning indictment on the administrative responsibility of the supplier even if the question of honesty were to be overlooked - a state of affairs, which would ordinarily more than cause caution in further dealings with such a supplier until all doubts are cleared.

Astonishingly though that does not seem to have been the case. The supplier, to say the least, must have regarded the SLAF to be exceedingly naïve, if not foolish, to attempt to slip through that deal. Or else there was a sleight of hand underlying the transaction. Self respect, at least, if not suspicion should have alerted the SLAF to circumspection.

Astonishingly, no again. More astoundingly the SLAF goes back to the same supplier to lease MI 24s as a stop gap arrangement until the defaulted procurement is delivered.

To have done so inspite of nearly having been gypped to accept unserviceable helicopters, needed urgently, displays faith unmatched by performance, or more appropriately, blind to performance. Normally a defaulting supplier should be black listed or at least suspended from further tender until a questionable transaction is inquired into and the supplier cleared. Yet, this supplier, Global Omarus Technologies continue to be suppliers to the armed forces.

Perhaps, this supplier has a valid explanation for the MI 24 fiasco. But in principle, until cleared by an inquiry, a defaulting supplier should be liable to restriction. Unless so, procurement procedures become not only farcical but also open for misuse and abuse.

The MI 24 transaction is a clear example of the lapses that prevail in the procurement process. There are many others.

Until the requirements for military equipment are properly assessed and their procurement regulated, it will not contribute to operational efficiency or to economy of defence expenditure. It will only contribute to corruption and degenerating moral values. To remedy this, a planned equipment policy is imperative.

Taraki's Column

Editorial/Opinion Contents