
Coming close to the edge in Pakistan
This issue of JUSTICE features a commentary on ongoing
developments in Pakistan that could have disturbing implications for the
region as far as secularism and the State is concerned. It also includes
a special report by a child rights activist which illustrates very clearly
how laws protecting children have little or no effect in actual practice.
JUSTICE has, in addition, synopses of two judgements of the Supreme Court
and the High Court of Colombo that are of primary importance in their different
areas of the law.
By Kishali Pinto Jayawardena
Human rights activists and lawyers in Pakistan are up in arms over recent
moves by the Nawaz Sharif Government to impose constitutional reform which
they see as having drastic implications for non-Muslims living in the country.
A proposed 15th amendment termed as the Shariat Bill is presently before
the National State Assembly, which makes the Shariah Law the supreme law
of the land, and the Pakistani Constitution unabashedly and dangerously
non-secular.
"If this amendment gets through, then it will become supra constitutional
and other provisions of the Constitution will become subordinate to it.
We see it as an attempt to replace a written constitution with some kind
of an unwritten constitution. "It is a very serious matter,"
says Sohail Warraich, a human rights activist working with Shirkat Gah,
one of Pakistan's most well known activist groups. Pakistani activists
are opposing the Bill to the full, with public protest meetings being held
in major cities.
The opposition parties are also opposing it, while splits in the ruling
party over its provisions have led to voting being delayed in the National
Assembly. The current thinking is that while the Government might push
the law through in the National Assembly, it will be short of the required
two-thirds majority in the Senate. That the proposed Bill is being violently
resisted is not surprising, given its provisions that are unprecedentedly
out of line with modern day thinking. Once passed, the law would have effect
nothwithstanding anything contained in the constitution, any law and very
importantly, any judgement of any court.
Moreover, though a two-thirds majority is presently required for crucial
constitutional amendment, the proposed law allows this to be done by a
simple majority, if any amendment is required for the enforcement of any
matter relating to Sharia and the implementation of its injunctions. Activists
fear that basic rights of the individual such as the right of equality
before law, freedom of association, freedom of speech and the right to
life of minority communities living in the country will be affected, with
the worse hit being women and minority communities.
Again, the amendment allows each sect to have its own interpretation
of Sharia which is criticized as encouraging sectarianism. There will be,
in effect, no uniform law in the country. The judiciary meanwhile would
have minimum control over protection of basic rights of the Pakistani people,
as the amendment specifically overrides the judgement of any court. The
amendment also is seen as affecting the very spirit and structure of the
constitution, as it gives the federal government power to issue directives
to enforce the Sharia and take necessary action against state functionaries
for non- compliance of its directives. This has led to protest that this
transferal of authority to the centre would adversely undermine provincial
autonomy.
"We are in the process of getting ready to challenge the law before
the Supreme Court. While the Court can strike down certain objectionable
provisions of the law such as the relaxed procedure of constitutional amendment,
the overriding of the judiciary and the negation of provincial autonomy,
it would not be able to change the main thrust of the law that makes Islam
the supreme law of the land" predicts Warraich. What would actually
happen, of course, remains to be seen. The very fact of its introduction
is seen as an example of religious cum political fundamentalism that is
foretold as having dangerous implications for the entire region, taken
together with the current happenings in Afghanistan.
The question now concerns the extent of religious and personal space
that non-Muslims in Pakistan can lay claim to.
That this space is being progressively narrowed by a series of laws
enacted in a technically faultless manner is seen by some as comparable
to the situation that existed, for example, in Nazi Germany when the rights
of Jews were taken away by legislation duly passed and they were ultimately
butchered in their millions. This was to later serve as an enduring example
of the horrors that could be perpetrated in the name of law, leading to
the concept of international human rights and the warning that no state
has the unfettered power to decide for itself what fate befalls the people
under its care.
That the situation in Pakistan is becoming increasingly out of hand
is demonstrated recently in the sentencing to death of a young Christian,
Ayub Masih who had been accused of having uttered derogatory words about
Prophet Mohammed during a dispute with a fellow villager. The sentence
was promulgated under the Blasphemy Laws in the Pakistani Penal Code and
led to immediate protests by lawyers and activists both in Pakistan and
internationally. Their dissent was based on the argument that the decision
by the Court against Masih was only on the verbal testimony of the complainants
and that no evidence, circumstantial or otherwise had been proved against
the accused.
Matters were further aggravated when a Roman Catholic Bishop of Faizalabad,
John Joseph shot himself right in front of the iron gate of the Sessions
Court that convicted Masih and sentenced him to death on April 27th 1998.
His suicide led to a wave of communal riots and tension in the area, allegedly
against the minority Christian community by Muslim fundamentalists. Masih's
appeal to the High Court is pending, but his lawyers have expressed disillusion
with the entire process, pointing out that given the atmosphere of intolerance,
even if his appeal succeeds, there is no guarantee that he will not be
killed by extremist elements.
Which is exactly what happened in the cases of others more unfortunate
than Masih. One particularly excruciating instance was when three Christians,
Salamat Masih, Manzoor Masih and Rehmat Masih were arrested on 11 May 1993.
Manzoor was shot dead outside the court on April 5 1994. Salamat and
Rehmat who were sentenced to death on February 9, 1995 were both acquitted
by Justice Arif Iqbal Bhatti later in the year and since then took refuge
abroad.
Two years later, Justice Bhatti was shot dead at his office by a man
believed to have been enraged by his judgement in favour of Salamat and
Rehmat. Meanwhile, two religious groups announced a prize of Pakistani
Rupees 1.3 million on the heads of Salamat and Rehmat
A leading human rights lawyer in Pakistan Naeem Shakir sums up the situation
in his country well when he says that the Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan are
so widely phrased that mandatory death penalty is imposed even for alleged
"innuendoes and insinuations" that are quite vague in nature.
He points out that these provisions are discriminatory as though they are
supposedly meant to Islamize the criminal law, these are applicable to
non-Muslims as well.
Thus if a non-Muslim professes to express his belief publicly, that
would amount to blasphemy according to the law. Once someone is charged
with the offence, he is doomed as the offence is non bailable and the death
penalty is mandatory in law.
"Justice is subject to religious frenzy," he says He is explicit
about one case in which he as the defence lawyer appeared for a Christian
convert from Islam who suffered from paralysis. Tahir Iqbal was an engine
mechanic in the Pakistani Air Force whose conversion to Christianity had
annoyed Muslims. A case of blasphemy was registered against him by the
Moslem cleric in charge of the mosque of that area alleging that when the
call for prayer was recited, Iqbal had reacted by abusing Prophet Mohammed.
Other charges against him included the accusation that "he imparts
anti Islamic education to children who come to him for tuition, defiles
the Holy Quran by underlining with green marker and thus seriously injures
religious feelings."
Iqbal was arrested by the police on blasphemy charges and his bail application
dismissed by a Sessions judge who incorrectly stated that since conversion
from Islam to Christianity was an offence in itself, no bail could be granted.
The case was meanwhile fixed for recording of prosecution evidence before
Court. However, on the date of hearing, the defence lawyers were informed
that Iqbal had died in jail the previous night. The accusations against
those responsible for his custody were immediate. Iqbal had been poisoned
to death because he had converted to Christianity. Other Pakistani nationals
who have been accused of blasphemy have meanwhile fled the country due
to their fear that they might suffer Iqbal's fate
The fact that there has been considerable subversion of the country's
judicial system in the entire process is perhaps the most disturbing feature
of all, with the establishing of a Federal Shariah Court to decide cases
on appeal under Shariah law. The Court is empowered to strike down any
statute law that may be deemed repugnant to the dictates of Islam. A non
Muslim lawyer is meanwhile not allowed to appear as a legal practitioner
before this Federal Court even though Shariat laws are applicable to non-Muslims.
Again, electoral lists in the country have been separated as Muslim voters
and non-Muslim voters. Both cannot vote for each other, and non Muslim
citizens have been said to be marginalised under this apartheid mode of
separate electorates. Enlightened Muslims in Pakistan point out that current
developments in their country contradict the basic tenets of Islam that
in fact stipulate a strict protection of the rights of non-Muslims.
The prevailing push in Pakistan towards a pronounced religious and political
intolerance has been so far quietly canvassed in international fora including
sessions at the UN Sub Commission on Minorities held in Geneva last month.
Aware of the extreme dangers of religious fundamentalism and more so in
the context of the precarious political state that Pakistan is in presently,
protests outside the country have been muted. Whether this selective silence
ought to continue in the context of trends that are growing increasingly
more evident in the South Asian region remains a moot point.
Judgment 1
Judgment of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka
Ihalapandithagedera Jayaratne of the Police Quarters, Ragama (presently
under detention at the Sri Lanka Police Reserve Head Quarters, Longden
Place, Colombo 7 ) Vs Chandrananda de Silva and others SC Application 609/96
(this application together with ten other applications were taken up for
hearing together as they involved the same questions of law and fact)
Before Fernando J.
Amerasinghe J.
Gunesekera J.
Decided on 21/09/1998 Fundamental Rights/ Articles 13(1) & (2)/
arrest under Emergency Regulations/ duty of care of executive when making
such arrests
Facts: The petitioner who is a sergeant in the police had been
arrested on 10/08/1996 by an undated order issued by the Secretary, Defence
under Emergency Regulation, detained without being produced before a Magistrate
and released on 21/09/1996 after the detention order was revoked. It was
argued by him that the arrest and detention was illegal as there was no
material whatsover to show that the arrest was necessary to prevent him
from acting in a manner prejudicial to national security or the maintenance
of public order. Secretary, Defence stated before court that he had given
the order to arrest on the basis that he had received confidential information
that various threats had been directed at the Presidential Commission investigating
the incidents at Batalanda, that there was information that police officers
whose names had transpired before the Commission were attempting to leave
the island and that there was a possiblity that they could inflict violence
on the Commissioners themselves and the witnesses who testified before
the Commission.
Judgement of Fernando J.
Allthough it was conceded on behalf of the Respondents that there was
no material whatsover implicating any of the Petitioners…..nevertheless,
it was submitted that the fourth Respondent who is the head of the police
force had deposed that he had reports and information that the Petitioners
were attempting to disrupt the activities of the Commission and to use
force on witnesses and even on the Commissioners, and that was enough to
justify the detention orders, even though that material was not disclosed
to Court. It was argued that there would have been a serious crisis if
that information had proved to be true and that therefore, the "balance
of convenience" required the arrest and preventive detention of the
Petitioners.
This is an argument which has to be mentioned only to be rejected. A
reasonable suspicion or apprehension of past or future wrongdoing is an
essential pre-requisite for the deprivation of personal liberty. Such deprivation
can never be justified by resorting to an expedient "balance of convenience"
which can be made to tilt towards the Executive on the purely speculative
assumption that something untoward might happen, but without any reasonable
basis for thinking that it would.
The first Respondent's (Secretary, Defence) order can only be upheld
if the material before him justifies it………neither before nor after the
arrest did the police have any material to justify the issue of detention
orders,….even the motions of investigating any wrongdoing or threat to
national security or public order had not been gone through,……the first
respondent had been misled into making the impugned orders by means of
exaggeration and distortions of the vague allegations that the police had.
….It is true that allegations of misconduct against police officers
must be dealt with promptly and effectively and that the (Respondents)
purported to be acting in order to prevent the subversion of the course
of justice before a Commission inquiring into unlawful arrests and unlawful
places of detention. However, it is distressing and disturbing that the
entire process of arrest and detention of the petitioners has been contrary
to basic constitutional safeguards.
(Court declared that the fundamental rights of the petitioners under
Articles 13(1) & (2) have been infringed. State ordered to pay Rs 50.000/=
as compensation and Rs 5.000/= as costs to each Petitioner. Direction also
made that payment shall be made and proof of payment submitted to the Registrar
of the Court on or before 30.10.98, failing which the Registrar is directed
to list the applications for an order of Court in regard to enforcement.)
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Judgment II
Judgment of the High Court of Colombo
B839/93 Republic of Sri Lanka Vs Abdul Rashak Kuthubdeen decided
on 03/03/1994
Facts; This was a prosecution under the Bribery Act where the
gratification solicited and accepted by the accused was sexual intercourse.
Uptodate, this is the first instance of its kind where the Court was called
upon to decide whether the request of sexual intercourse amounts to gratification
as defined in the law.
Here, the accused was a Senior Security Manager of the NHDA and the
principal witness for the prosecution was a female security guard who came
under the supervision and control of the accused. She alleged that the
accused had demanded that she have sexual intercourse with him as a condition
for granting her request for a transfer to Kalutara.
Judgment of Leslie Abeysekera HCJ.
Section 90 of the Bribery Act defines "gratification" to include
among other things, "any other service, favour or advantage of any
description whatsover.
"This definition would appear to be wide enough to include the
favour or advantage of sexual intercourse if it cannot also be called a
service. The Indian commentator, Dr Gour has observed that " the word
'gratification' is thus used in its larger sense as connoting anything
which affords gratification or satisfaction or pleasure to the taste, appetite
or the mind. Money, is of course, one source of affording pleasure inasmuch
as it implies command over things which afford pleasure, but there are
various other objects which afford gratification. The satisfaction of one's
desires, whether of body or of mind, is a gratification in the true sense
of the term. The craving for an honorary distinction or for sexual intercourse
is an example of mental or bodily desires, the satisfaction of which is
gratification even though it is not estimable in money."
It has been suggested by the defence that the principal witness is an
untrustworthy and unreliable witness. It has been said that her memory
has been unworthy and that her evidence elicited by a process of leading
questions. This Court cannot disregard the fact that ( she) was testifying
about certain delicate and embarassing circumstances. She appeared to be
suffering from no little embarassment even though she was testifying in
camera. She had embarked on a journey which many other women would dread
to undertake. It was also said by defence counsel that (she) is an unreliable
witness for the reason that she was so determined to obtain a transfer
to Kalutara that she would stop at nothing in order to achieve her objective,
including the fabrication of an entirely false allegation against the accused
and also making a false complaint to the bribery authorities. I am convinced
that this witness was speaking the truth and that she was not maliciously
motivated against the accused.
(Judgment of the HCJ which was delivered against the accused convicting
him of all charges in indictment is presently on appeal)
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Child Rights - A case in point
By a Special Correspondent
On the 18th of September, I travelled to Marawila to be present in an
M.C. Marawila Case in which the proprietor of a tile factory in the Chilaw
district was being charged by the Labour Department under Section 13(3)
of the Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children Act (1956) for employing
a child of nine years (who had lost his hand while being employed in the
factory).
The case is being monitored by ILO/IPEC and PEACE ( an activist group
for protecting environmental and children's rights). As the judge in the
court in which the case was to be called was on leave, all cases in his
court were called in the parallel court. The child was present in court
with his father and grandfather. The mother was said to be in hospital.
The accused was represented by defence counsel while two lawyers appeared
for the Labour Dept. I was told unofficially that since there was a police
case with regard to the same matter, there was no question about the accused
pleading guilty of violating the labour laws, as this would compromise
his position in the police case. On the other hand, the payment of the
stipulated fine of Rs 1,000/= was a simple matter for the Mudalali.
The father of the child, according to the Labour Dept. is unwilling
to give evidence for the prosecution as he is also in the employment of
the accused. His grandmother had told PEACE volunteers that the child is
not attending school.
To my unpracticed eye, he seemed undernourished. An expert witness due
to appear for the prosecution was absent and the judge warranted all witnesses
listed who did not appear in court. The case had to be postponed. However,
after a request made by lawyers appearing for the Labour Department that
the child was undergoing hardships, the case was fixed for hearing in early
October. Whether it will be actually taken up on that day is anybody's
guess.
This case illustrates very well, the current weaknesses in the system
inspite of ambitious laws that are passed by the country's legislature.
Due to absence of coordination between the Police and the Labour Dept,
more than one case has been filed with regard to the same matter.
The most obvious and effective procedure would have been to have filed
ONE case and have it conducted by State Counsel
The child will meanwhile have to testify in probably three cases, as
there is some talk of a prosecution under the Factories Ordinance as well.
The Department of Social Services has no involvement in the matter though
it has a clear duty to look after the interests of the child.
Expert witnesses including doctors are obliged to travel endlessly to
Court and waste valuable time. Postponement of cases due to their absence
is all too common.
The case points also to obvious deficiencies in the law.
The recent amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code will not apply
in this case as the ( expanded) definition of child abuse in the Code only
refers to Penal Code offences and NOT all offences relating to children
under other laws. In the instant case, the child apparently has no birth
certificate, and the defence will naturally insist on proof of age. It
is also high time that the amount of the fine imposed under the Employment
of Women, Young Persons and Children Act is revised in keeping with modern
day standards. The continuation of the present practice of hearing child
related cases in "adult" courts is meanwhile a far from healthy
practice and should be subject to revision as it violates the rights of
the child under international law, as the Law Commission has recently pointed
out.
What was the most ironic fact was that the child himself was unrepresented
in this case. The prosecuting counsel was looking after the public interest
under the Labour Laws. Likewise, the police and the Attorney General (Where
they do appear) would represent not the child but the State. The child,
on whose behalf the sleeping machinery of the State was aroused was present
as a mere witness and not the central figure in the drama as he should
have been.
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