The Situation Report

25th October 1998

As President reviews security situation

New changes in Army top brass.

By Iqbal Athas

Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the state. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver. There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on the highways. As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their labor.

Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory that is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition, simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments, is the height of inhumanity.

One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no master of victory. What enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation.

Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men. Knowledge of the spirit world is to be obtained by divination; information in natural science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of the universe can be verified by mathematical calculation; but the dispositions of the enemy are ascertainable through spies and spies alone……

These words of wisdom come from one of 13 chapters of "The Art of War" by the Chinese General Sun Tzu.

His work, over 2,500 years ago, is obligatory reading in most militaries in the world today.

So it was in the former Soviet Union's politico-military hierarchy where the work has been available in Russian. It is also claimed to be the source of all Mao-Tse-tung's little Red Book of strategic and tactical doctrine.

Modern day historians hail Sun Tzu's truths as showing the way to victory in all kinds of business conflicts, boardroom battles, and in humanity's day to day fight for survival.

Sun Tzu's references to spies was twenty-five centuries ago. But today, spying has transformed itself into a more sophisticated art that has blended harmoniously with the technological revolution and acquired a respectable nomenclature – intelligence.

Yet, Sun Tzu's words ring true in today's Sri Lanka, like it has been during the 17-year-long separatist war between the security forces and Tiger guerrillas. Intelligence lapses have forced successive Governments to face the ignominy of setbacks and debacles.

Like the change of name boards or corporate identities when ownership changes from one to another, state intelligence apparatus has undergone face-lifts too. If the UNP Government of the 1965s saw the working of a Special Branch, in the 1970s under an SLFP Government, an Intelligence Services Division (ISD) was born. Again during a UNP Government from 1977, the ISD gave way to a National Intelligence Bureau (NIB). How much each of these units contributed or did not contribute towards the escalation of the separatist war over the years is as debatable as who or which came first – the hen or the egg ?

Now, the recent months have seen the demise of the National Intelligence Bureau and the birth of two brand new national intelligence apparatus – a Directorate of Internal Intelligence and a Directorate of External Intelligence. Both function under the umbrella of the Ministry of Defence and include intelligence elements from the three services.

For obvious reasons, I will not refer to the workings of the two new bodies or the newer personalities at the helm, who are making changes and introducing newer measures. Most of them have proven capabilities and it is too soon to expect dramatic results, both locally and internationally.

But the changes have not helped erase the widely known perception that the intelligence community is still on the heels of political personalities (both opposition and others), journalists (both local and foreign) and an assortment of other targets. It is no secret that electronic telephone surveillance has become rampant. It is no secret that a relentless hunt is on to track down sources of selected journalists. It is no secret that surveillance is mounted on them. Hence, how much terrorism-related information gathering is receiving their attention is a big question.

If this phenomenon was underscored heavily after what was then the worst military debacle – the July, 1996 LTTE attack on the Mullaitivu Military Base – it has come into focus again. This time, it is not only because of its increased intensity but also because of the blatant abuse of the intelligence mechanisms for political gain. One aspect, among many, which can be revealed is highlighted by the recent Kilinochchi debacle.

A censorship on both the local and foreign media has been in force for the past five months. The only source of information for the people of Sri Lanka, who are funding the war effort, are news releases put out by the Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence. They are under the name of the Military Spokesman, Brigadier Sunil Tennekoon. This post has been held by other Brigadiers earlier, like Sarath Munasinghe (now a Major General) and Tissa Jayatunga (now retired).

But Brigadier Tennekoon is unusually different. He is also the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI). In that capacity he heads the Sri Lanka Army's Directorate of Military Intelligence, the main intelligence gathering arm of the Army. He is the first in the Army's 49 year history to be Military Spokesman too.

The fact that he is the Government's main spokesman on the war, that too under an Army censorship, has made him the only source of information both to Lankans and the outside world. He spoke on the casualty counts at Kilinochchi. He should know for he is, in intelligence terms, the eyes, ears and nose of the Army. But alas, his political boss, Deputy Minister of Defence, General Anuruddha Ratwatte, who is personally running the war, pruned the figure down. Suddenly a large number of those who were officially declared dead became alive. The resurrection was not an act of god but the inhumanity of the state. Suddenly a large number were declared missing in action – in Sri Lankan terms more an euphemism for those feared dead. General Ratwatte's claims in Parliament about the casualty count in Mullaitivu two years ago also spoke of a handful dead and a large number missing in action. Nothing is known about the fate of the missing. There was a censorship then. There is a censorship now too. Hence, no figures can be given.

Hence, Brigadier Tennekoon finds himself in an unenviable position and is easily the most embarrassed man in the security forces. Besides making public utterances, he is also responsible for secret reports. That include weekly intelligence reports, monthly intelligence summaries and periodic briefs. These reach senior military commanders in the battle areas. Junior officers attached to their respective secretariats have access to them.

The comical contradictions in the public utterances and the secret revelations have often become the talking point. Many senior officials not only ask which is the truth but are also worried that their own and the Army's legitimate role is being undermined by two contradictory positions. The holder of one of the most credible official positions is also the propaganda mouth piece of the state. They fear that not only erodes their credibility but also has a bad impact on morale. Much worse, they say, is the portrayal of an erroneous image in the public mind about the Army.

There were no such problems for the LTTE in their propaganda efforts after the Kilinochchi debacle. As reported in these columns, news agencies, satellite television networks, foreign newspapers and radio stations had voluminous accounts about the disaster. They gave the casualty figures. Many of the stories were pegged to LTTE accounts. Press releases issued by the LTTE from London reached many world capitals as well as the media in Colombo.

And last week the LTTE embarrassed the intelligence community by smuggling in a load of video tapes titled the "Kilinochchi Debacle" to Colombo. They were delivered to selected opposition personalities, representatives of non governmental organisations, foreign correspondents, Editors of leading Sinhala and English newspapers. Needless to say the tapes were the most in demand in Colombo's social circuit. Still pictures from these tapes have begun to adorn English and the vernacular media.

Footage transferred to a 180 minute Japanese made video tape contains some 15 minutes of material repeated twice. One bears an English commentary and the other in Sinhala. It shows what is claimed to be preparations by LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran (and his "battle commander" Jeyam) for the launch of Oyatha Alaikal II (Unceasing Waves Two). Footage includes what is said to be the devastation caused at Paranthan and Kilinochchi with shots of live firing. It also shows armed LTTE cadres moving around Kilinochchi and Paranthan. How did the LTTE manage to bring the material into the City with all the security precautions ? Is this the way they smuggle their suicide cadres, weapons and explosives to attack targets in the City ?

If that was a question for the intelligence authorities, there was an equally embarrassing poser for the Army Censor whose reported task is to ensure no "sensitive military information" reaches the enemy through the media. Here is an instance of LTTE feeding "highly sensitive" footage of the Kilinochchi debacle to the local and foreign media in Colombo. Needless to say the LTTE move was a clever ploy to embarrass the Government. As is expected, the word spread that the "stunning" video footage put paid to the claims made by the Government. Quite clearly, the Tigers are exploiting the propaganda aspects. What of the Government ? The only campaign in focus, that too locally, is a General Ratwatte in military camouflage hoisting the national flag in Mankulam. Must anything more be said about the censorship and what it seeks to hide ?

These new developments came in the backdrop of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga devoting her personal attention to the prevailing security situation. During the past several days she has presided at late night sessions with service commanders and defence officials to take stock of the situation and to decide on immediate measures. Undoubtedly she is conscious not to allow the present security situation to deteriorate any further. It has been no easy task since she has to devote considerable attention to formulate the forthcoming budget proposals. This is in her capacity as the Minister of Finance.

One of the important decisions President Kumaratunga has to make, authoritative sources say, is the creation of a fully fledged Joint Operations Command (JOC), with legal powers to collectively plan and execute counter terrorism operations. With her approval, the Ministry of Defence, on August 3 created a JOC administratively and named the Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Rohan de S Daluwatte, as its Chairman. Made up of the three service chiefs and the Inspector General of Police, the present JOC, which does not enjoy any legal status, meets weekly to review the security situation.

According to these sources, Deputy Defence Minister, Anuruddha Ratwatte, who in the uniform of a four star General, is running the military campaign, particularly the ongoing "Operation Jaya Sikurui" (Victory Assured) is strongly opposed to the setting up of a JOC. He is of the view that the security forces should continue with their thrust from Mankulam to re-capture Kilinochchi and thus establish a Main Supply Route to Jaffna – a demand which has met with great reticence from the senior military command. They are of the view that the troops should not be rushed and that they be allowed to execute the task on a militarily pragmatic way. I understand that many proposals in this regard have been made and are being closely studied.

These proposals have been made bearing in mind the current resources available. It has been pointed out that the shortage of transport planes by the Sri Lanka Air Force has become a big impediment. Only a single Antonov 32 was operational for flights to Jaffna causing great hardships. For nearly two days this week, this single aircraft was also hit by a snag.

A reported Government to Government deal to procure three Hercules C 130 aircraft has been put on hold after a dispute over payments. There were reports in defence circles that despite the claims, a local agent was very much in the transaction.

Senior serving military officials and a few retired ones who were consulted by Government are of the view that the setting up of a Joint Operations Command (JOC) would be imperative taking into consideration the prevailing security situation and the conduct of the ongoing "Operation Jaya Sikurui", now on its 18th month. Many of them have been strongly critical of the heavy pressure exerted on the military leadership to execute various phases of operations within what they call very unrealistic time frames. This, they say, is the main cause of heavy casualties to troops – a feature which cannot be ignored purely to meet political exigencies. Moreover, they complain that strategic and operational planning in many instances have been done without consulting the professionals among them and despite the disapproval of the top brass. One high ranking officer who did not wish to be identified declared "it is gratifying that President Kumaratunga is taking a personal look at the situation both for the sake of the nation and my men. If no immediate action is taken to profit by the blunders that have been made, we will court more trouble. That we cannot afford at this critical moment."

Declared another high ranking officer of the same rank "our officers and men are giving their life and limb. What we ask is very little, a proper appreciation by the political leadership of what has been going on. That has become the most urgent need.." I understand that among those whose views were sought and obtained was one from a former General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Joint Operations Command (JOC) that functioned under the UNP, General Cyril Ranatunga. The latter, who was assisted by a former close aide, retired Brigadier Daya Wijesekera, had handed in a detailed report on the JOC concept.

In view of General Ratwatte's objections, whether a JOC will now become a reality has become the biggest question. If it does not, then he will continue to run the war. Until his objections to the JOC surfaced, Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Daluwatte, was identified to be the General Officer Commanding. Whether he will receive another military posting if a JOC is not established in view of the latest opposition is not immediately clear.

Lt. Gen. Daluwatte is due to relinquish office as Army Commander and is to be succeeded by Overall Operations Commander, Major General Srilal Weerasuriya (who is also the Chief of Staff). Contrary to earlier reports, Major General Weerasuriya, due to be promoted to the rank of a Lieutenant General, is to assume office on December 15, this year – just a week before he was due for mandatory retirement after reaching his maximum in the rank.

On November 1, Major General Weerasuriya, will give up the post of Overall Operations Commander. The post of OOC is to be scrapped and President Kumaratunga has approved a change in the command structure in the northern operational theatre.

Major General Asoka Jayawardena is to take over as Commander, Security Forces, Jaffna with effect from November 1. This is in addition to his duties as the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff. As exclusively reported in these columns last week, Maj. Gen. Jayawardena was among three who were given extended terms until they reached the age of 55. Others were Major General Patrick Fernando and Major General Sathis Jayasundera.

A post of Commander, Security Forces, Wanni has been created with effect from November 1. Taking over this office will be Major General Lionel Balagalle, presently the Security Forces Commander, Jaffna. The Vavuniya based Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH) will become the headquarters of the Security Forces, Wanni.

A series of other changes arising from the above measures and the retirement of some senior officials, I understand, are now being drawn up.

There was also a change in the three member Military Court of Inquiry headed by Major General Sathis Jayasundera, now probing the Kilinochchi debacle and the attack on Paranthan defences. Brigadier Sivali Wanigasekera has been allowed to opt out of the Court in view of health reasons. He has been replaced by Brigadier Gamini Jayasundera.

As the Court continued its inquiry in Elephant Pass, security forces in the Wanni came under increased alert from late this week. This followed a warning issued by the Tactical Headquarters, Joint Operations Headquarters in Vavuniya to Army, Navy, Air Force and Police commands in the Wanni.

According to the warning, 16 pistol group cadres and 14 intelligence cadres of LTTE have infiltrated into Vavuniya town with a view to target security forces and launch a missile attack on an aircraft or helicopter. The warning also says concentrations of Tiger guerrillas have entered Vattakachchi and Welikanda areas whilst Sea Tiger movements in Chundikulam posed a threat to Paranthan and Elephant Pass defences.

In this backdrop, notwithstanding that a budget is round the corner, security concerns seem to pre occupy the PA leadership.

It is relevant to conclude with another pertinent message from Sun Tzu. He says:

"What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. But his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage. For inasmuch as they are gained over circumstances that have not come to light, the world at large knows nothing of them, and he therefore wins no reputation for wisdom; and inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage.

"He wins battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.

"Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position that makes defeat impossible and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory ………"

Fifth Column

Editorial/Opinion Contents