The Situation Report

6th December 1998

Op. Jaya Sikurui: longest ever military campaign called off

By Iqbal Athas

Even if the Govern ment chose to main tain official silence over LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran’s offer of peace talks through third party mediation, the security forces responded with a new military thrust.

Just three days after his call during the “Maveerar (Heroes) Week address over clandestine Voice of Tigers, two Divisions of the Sri Lanka Army (53 and 55) launched “Operation Rivi Bala”, a surprise strike to extend their eastern defences.

The Ministry of Defence said on Friday night that troops had brought “an area of 134 square kilometres” under security forces control.

This in effect means the boxing in of a chunk of land. Troops seized Oddusuddan (on the Mankulam – Mullaitivu Road) linking it (southwards) to Nedunkerny and (westwards) to Puliyankulam along A 9, the Kandy-Jaffna highway.

Not a drop of blood was shed until the troops linked up at 2.10 p.m. on December 3. Thereafter sporadic mortar fire began to rain periodically on troops busy building new defences. By Friday night, one officer and 12 soldiers were wounded.

“Operation Rivi Bala”, the first military offensive after President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, (who is also Commander-in-Chief) took over the reins of directing the military campaign against Tiger guerrillas, formally began on December 1.

That Tuesday, Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Rohan de S. Daluwatte, was in the Wanni to see his troops move out of their positions at the auspicious hour of 6.42 a.m. That over, the men took a small break. The next day (December 2), they proceeded to their Forward Operational Bases (FOB) and broke out at crack of dawn. By 2.10 p.m. they had reached their designated positions and linked up without any resistance.

Lt. Gen. Daluwatte, who returned to Colombo after his men had moved to their forward operational bases flew again to the Wanni on Thursday to congratulate his new Security Forces Commander,(Wanni), Major General Lionel Balagalle, his officers and men. Later, he returned to Colombo to give the good news to President Kumaratunga.

High-ranking military officials were elated by the new move. One of them claimed that “secrecy and surprise” were the reasons for their unopposed success. “The LTTE never expected us to come that way. They didn’t know our plans. We took them by complete surprise,” he said.

Other sources, however, said LTTE had only a limited presence on the eastern flank. They had made a hasty retreat in the face of a heavy troop advance. I reported in these columns last week that “the days before “Maveerar Week”, according to intelligence sources in Colombo, saw LTTE shifting some of their key camps located on the eastern fringe of the A9 Kandy-Jaffna highway.” The same sources confirmed yesterday that LTTE strength from these areas had been re-deployed much ahead of the security forces defences north of Mankulam.

Yet, “Operation Rivi Bala” had conferred on the security forces a great advantage. Areas further east of their new defences, particularly around Mullaitivu, were now within their artillery range. If that meant the LTTE had to shift their positions further away northwards, it also portended the emergence of a new and significant security forces thrust. The ongoing censorship prevents any elaboration of this aspect.

But there is also a daunting task ahead for the security forces. With increased land area now within their control, preventing infiltration and attacks becomes increasingly difficult. It was only last week, troops shot dead three Tiger guerrillas from a group of at least seven who had infiltrated defences ahead of Omanthai. Troops on trailer motor cycles have been assigned to patrol re-captured areas. With the new areas that have come under “Operation Rivi Bala”, Army authorities are pressing for a larger fleet of trailer motor cycles – a request which will come under tight Ministry of Defence scrutiny in view of tighter controls on military procurements.

The re-capture of the new area came with a sizeable number of civilians. The Ministry of Defence said “approximately 500 civilians including men, women, children and infants” had come to the controlled area. However, the LTTE said that over 11,500 Tamil residents of Oddusuddan have fled their area and sought refuge in Puthukudiyiruppu. Its claim was contained in a news release issued from its “International Secretariat” in London. It added that SLAF Kfir jets had carried out air assaults in the area.

I also said in these columns last week “A major thrust or a renewed “Operation Jaya Sikurui” is certainly not likely until next year, the year before Parliamentary and Presidential elections are scheduled. It is no secret that adequate resources are being awaited. That includes even strength. The Army has already launched an ambitious countrywide recruitment drive to enlist 20,000 soldiers.”

But in a surprise move, the Government made it clear on Friday that there would be no more “Operation Jaya Sikurui” or “Victory Assured.”

The press release from the Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence, which announced the launch and conclusion of “Operation Rivi Bala”, said:

“This is a fresh operation conducted by security forces after the completion of operation Jaya Sikurui which consisted of three phases:

a. Phase 01 - Capturing of Omanthai

b. Phase 02 - Capturing of Puliyankulam

c. Phase 03 - Capturing of Mankulam”

If that paragraph in the news release left an element of uncertainty on whether more phases of “Operation Jaya Sikurui” were on the cards, they were ruled out categorically by Sri Lanka Army’s Director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier Sunil Tennekoon, who is also the Official Military Spokesman.

In a tape recorded interview with the BBC’s Sinhala Service, “Sandeshaya”, Brigadier Tennekoon made it clear that “Operation Jaya Sikurui” had ended with the conclusion of three phases. He gave no reasons for the move but was categorical in his assertion.

When it was launched on May 13, 1997, with much fanfare, the main aim of the operation was to establish a land based Main Supply Route (MSR) along A 9 highway to Jaffna. This was by re-capturing 74 kilometres of the highway north of Nochchimodai (near Vavuniya) to Kilinochchi, an extent which was not under Government control. Only a near two thirds remains re-captured after nearly 18 months.

When the operation began, military planners did not envisage a three phase offensive that would culminate with the re-capture of Mankulam. Why then did it become necessary for “the completion of Operation Jaya Sikurui” prematurely ? And that too without its main aim being achieved ? The ongoing censorship prevents not only Sri Lankans but also the outside world from knowing the truth. But, it could yet be said that the country’s worst disaster in military history, the sad events at Kilinochchi and Paranthan, was the breaking point. In other words, the human and material losses reached such disturbing proportions that a re-think was imperative. Needless to say this prompted none other than President Kumaratunga herself to assure security forces top brass they would not be pressured into keeping deadlines.

One man who would undoubtedly be disappointed that “Operation Jaya Sikurui” had ended unceremoniously for him is General Anuruddha Ratwatte. He personally directed this campaign for one and half years and repeatedly asserted in the recent months that it was at a ‘critical stage’. Wearing camouflage, the red beret of the commandos and the regalia of a full General, his exploits in the Wanni battlefield made prime time TV slots and adorned front pages of newspapers. There were also occasions when this General wore camouflage uniforms of even the Sri Lanka Air Force and the Sri Lanka Navy, making a disgraceful mockery of all accepted military norms. Needless to say many of the officers, trained, qualified and entitled to wear them were most embarrassed.

Their predicament was worse because they could not tell their political boss that it was an insult to their intelligence and professional dignity.

They feared the wrath they faced would be worse than the enemy’s.

It was only an year ago, on December 11 to be precise, General Ratwatte spoke to members of the Foreign Correspondents Association at a dinner hosted at his Stanmore Crescent residence. He declared that a land based Main Supply Route along the A9, Kandy-Jaffna road would be achieved by February 4, (1998) – the Golden Jubilee anniversary of Sri Lanka’s independence.

“At any cost, we have to reunify the country. Those who scoff at our plans are in for a shock,” he told an attentive audience that included several diplomats.

Asked whether there would be talks with the LTTE (after February 4), when the MSR is established through the completion of “Operation Jaya Sikurui”, he said that the LTTE would have to lay down arms first. Asked whether he would meet Velupillai Prabhakaran, General Ratwatte declared “I will meet him and shake hands with him, but only after we win and he is defeated.”

Since then, like the operation he con ducted, General Ratwatte’s deadlines have extended from one to another. His last deadline was when he declared that “Operation Jaya Sikurui” would accomplish its objective before the end of November, this year. Instead, November has come and gone and his own Ministry of Defence has now declared “the completion of Operation Jaya Sikurui which consisted of three phases.” It is clear General Ratwatte had very little to do with the news release since he has gone on public record that the aim of “Operation Jaya Sikurui” was to establish a Main Supply Route to Jaffna and not to end it with a third phase at Mankulam.

If “Operation Jaya Sikurui” became the most important military operation in Sri Lanka’s history, its significance increased after General Ratwatte ordered that more and more troops and policemen be withdrawn from non operational areas and deployed in the Wanni. The move not only led to the closure of some smaller military camps in the east but also the deployment of a large strength of women Police cadres in the City and suburbs. The regular Police strength was withdrawn to be deployed in the operation. So much so, General Ratwatte, stoutly refused security forces and police strength for the conduct of Provincial Council elections. Not until “Operation Jaya Sikurui” was concluded, he argued.

These measures also caused serious concern in influential sections of the defence establishment. They feared that the deployment, after thinning out from the east, central province, south, the City and suburbs made these areas vulnerable. Moreover, they also feared that the mass deployment in the Wanni denied to the security forces the possibility of conducting any other major military operation.

Needless to say that the events surrounding the conduct of “Operation Jaya Sikurui”, where one politician’s actions in the garb of a military General, has caused serious and costly reversals for the war effort, will remain the darkest, bloodiest and saddest chapter in the battle against Tiger guerrillas.

The largest number of brave soldiers have laid down their lives. Others have lost their limbs or have been maimed. There are mothers, fathers and loved ones who do not know where their next of kin are. There are children crying for their fathers.

In fact, even after the incidents at Paranthan and Kilinochchi, Gen. Ratwatte was insistent that the troops continued their advance not withstanding the casualties. However, the subsequent events saw President Kumaratunga taking over the reins of directing the war machine. The move undoubtedly underscored the seriousness of the situation.

General Ratwatte’s role in the conduct of the separatist war, including “Operation Jaya Sikurui”, assumes greater public importance because of his utterances and actions. He has declared that 96 per cent of the war is now over and only a mere four per cent remains to be completed. He was a strong advocate of censorship and claimed that the media provided information to the enemy. Yet, it was when a censorship was in force that the worst military debacles have occurred, like the LTTE attack on the Mullaitivu military base in July, 1996 and the disaster at Kilinochchi and Paranthan last September. All this was during a period when he personally ran the military machine.

And now, after four years of PA rule and an Eelam War III, its not only General Ratwatte’s own credibility (if there is any left) that has taken a beating but also that of the PA Government. Need one say that increasing desertions from security forces and decreasing numbers of recruits are some of the by products of this syndrome ?

Now that President Kumaratunga has taken control of the situation, an immediate need would be to review the ongoing censorship and relax the ban on media access to operational areas. The latter is of course on the basis of procedures that have been laid down by the Ministry of Defence in the past. That is the only way the Government can re-build its credibility, give the security forces their due place and the public a correct picture. There is also an urgent need on the part of the Government to examine its own information dissemination machinery, now replete with amateurs. This includes the defence establishment. Their ignorance and inefficiency has caused as much harm as the LTTE propaganda. One of their biggest drawbacks has been their inability to establish a dialogue or a rapport with the media, which is as much committed to the national objectives as is the Government and the military.

Taraki's Column

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