The Situation Report

23rd May 1999

Lanka lures Thais for Tiger hunt

By Iqbal Athas

Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Srilal Weerasooriya, chaired a top level military conference last Wednesday to assess how the latest military offensive of the security forces - RANA GOSA III - was executed. Like in all such offensives, hiccups do occur and the last one was no exception. Lapses were identified and taken note of.

The next day (Thursday), he was off to Bangkok accompanied by Col. Shan Vidurupola of the Military Secretariat and his Aide de Camp. Chief of Staff (and Security Forces Commander, Wanni), Major General Lionel Balagalle, took over as acting Commander of the Sri Lanka Army. He represented his Commander at last Friday's meeting of the National Security Council.

Lt. Gen. Weerasooriya is among several top rung military officials in the Asian region invited to witness the 18th annual COBRA GOLD joint military exercise between United States and Thai troops. More than 10,000 US and over 6,000 Thai troops are taking part in this annual event to test and improve the ability of the two militaries to work together.

For several weeks, during preparations for the annual COBRA GOLD exercise, both US and Thai troops work on community projects to build schools and bring medical care to areas where it is badly needed. Then for two weeks, the skies, rivers and ocean are filled with military professionals practising their trade and learning from one another. An interesting feature is the involvement of US and Thai ships, aircraft and personnel engaged in a Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise (CALFEX) that simulates an invasion on a beach.

Upon Gen. Weerasooriya's return to Colombo, Air Force Commander, Air Marshal Jayalath Weerakkody and Navy Commander, Rear Admiral Cecil Tissera, are to take turns visiting Bangkok during the conduct of COBRA GOLD.

The separate visits of the three service commanders during joint US-Thai military exercise assumes significance since Sri Lanka is to receive observer status during future US-Thai COBRA GOLD military exercises. This will mean military delegations from Sri Lanka will be able to study the various phases of the exercise and liaise with both US and Thai military officials.

A more significant aspect is the new co-operation Sri Lanka is forging with Thailand in a bid to deny the LTTE any facilities in that country and the ocean around it. The first step in this direction came when General Mongkon Ampornphisit, Supreme Commander, Royal Thai Armed Forces, who led a religious delegation to Colombo in March, this year, held talks with Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar. The move led to the arrival of Thai Deputy Foreign Minister, Sukumbhand Paribatra, last month. Both Mr. Kadiragamar and Mr Paribatra discussed the need for closer co-operation between not only Sri Lanka and Thailand but also other countries in the Indian ocean region to curb illegal trafficking in arms and narcotics.

Lt. Gen. Weerasooriya is expected to call on Gen. Ampornphisit and his senior commanders to discuss matters of mutual interest.

These talks come at a time when there is increasing concern in Colombo's defence establishment over reports of LTTE successfully smuggling in military cargo, fuel and other supplies in the recent months. Military sources said that on April 28 an unusually large consignment of medical supplies were smuggled across the Palk Straits via the north western coast near Nachchikuda, where the Sea Tiger guerrillas are known to operate a major base. As reported in these columns (Situation Report- May 2), the LTTE had unloaded an arms shipment in the high seas off the Mullaitivu coast on April 17.

Earlier, a captured Tiger guerrilla confessed (Situation Report April 18) that another load of military hardware - a Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL), SAM 14 Surface to Air Missiles (SAM), medical supplies and artillery/mortar shells had arrived.

High ranking intelligence sources admit these and several other shipments have slipped periodic cordons placed by the Sri Lanka Navy. In the recent past, the only exceptions have been the cases of 'MV Mariamma' and 'Showa Maru.'

On March 3, following reports from fishing vessels some 120 nautical miles north west of Mullaitivu that they were fired upon, Sri Lanka Navy patrol craft moved to deal with what was suspected to be an LTTE vessel. It was four days later (March 7) when another fishing craft identified the vessel as an LTTE logistics vessel. The Sri Lanka Navy claimed the vessel carried ten million US dollars worth of cargo but did not explain how the figure was arrived at or what it contained. The Navy said the presence of its fast attack craft prevented the LTTE from unloading the cargo. Reports of the presence of the vessel also prompted the Sri Lanka Navy to raise the issue with the Indian Navy through diplomatic channels.

On March 1, following intelligence warnings, Sri Lanka Air Force aircraft located a vessel, some 80 nautical miles north east of Mullaitivu. Sri Lanka Navy patrol craft which were moving into the area intercepted LTTE boats returning ashore reportedly with cargo from the unidentified vessel. They were engaged and one boat was destroyed. Eleven LTTE cadres were killed. Navy recovered two barrels that were floating and found what was believed to be hi-octane fuel used for outboard motors. Suspicions have now arisen as to whether they were fuel for aircraft. Four other boats landed in the Mullaitivu coast reportedly with their cargo. Like in the case of 'MV Mariamma', Naval authorities informed the Indian Navy through diplomatic channels. Confirmation was later received that the Indian Naval craft were tailing the vessel. Indian Navy also later helped identify the vessel as 'Showa Maru' according to highly placed defence sources in Colombo.

As predicted in these columns, two senior Sri Lanka Navy officials - Director of Operations, Commodore T.N. Thuduwewatta and Deputy Director, Captain T.S.G. Samarasinghe - raised the issue of the fate these two vessels during talks with high ranking Indian Navy officials in New Delhi. The talks were held on May 13 and 14.

Both Commodore Thuduwewatta and Captain Samarasinghe joined Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Cecil Tissera, early this week to give two separate briefings, first to Defence Secretary Chandrananda de Silva and later to Foreign Minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, on these talks. It came before Mr. Kadirgamar left on an official visit to Vietnam. Vice Admiral Tissera gave an overview of the talks and allowed his officers to explain the details.

The Indian Navy, Vice Admiral Tissera had told the two separate briefings, had acted on the request made by the Sri Lanka Navy. Together with the Coast Guard, they had mounted surveillance on 'MV Mariamma' and had later closed in on the vessel. It was then observed to be on fire. There was no sign of life on board. An air and sea search had also shown no survivors. Indian Navy suspects that 'MV Mariamma' transported fuel . They are learnt to have said that they picked up some barrels of fuel. That was the official Indian version on the fate of 'MV Mariamma.'

As for 'Showa Maru', Vice Admiral Tissera, is learnt to have explained the Indian Navy position that they had monitored the vessel. However, it had sailed out to international waters before the Indian Navy/Coast Guard could engage or apprehend them.

Vice Admiral Tissera is learnt to have pointed out, both to Defence Secretary, de Silva and Foreign Minister, Kadirgamar, that the Indian Navy officials were embarrassed over news reports in Sri Lanka about the 'MV Mariamma' and 'Showa Maru' episode. They had urged that media exposure to the two events and the talks be avoided.

Needless to say Vice Admiral Tissera himself felt uneasy that his Indian counterparts were embarrassed. The Navy chief is known to personally direct his organisation's media campaign on various successes in the high seas. They have not only run parallel to news releases put out by the Operational Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence but have received much bigger play both in the print and electronic media. He also sends in detailed reports on these successes to the Ministry of Defence. And now, he has to appeal on behalf of his Indian counterparts to keep events out of media spotlight. Even if one cannot go into the deeper nuances of the 'MV Mariamma' and 'Showa Maru' episodes in view of the greater sensitivities involved, the following facts are known.

In the case of 'MV Mariamma', it was the Indian national media (Indian Express, Hindu etc) that reported that 'An Indian Navy operation launched at the Sri Lankan Government's request to nab gun runners near the Andaman and Nicobar islands ended in a fiasco…. Indian Navy ships closed in on the trawler. However, inexplicably, it was decided that 'MV Mariamma' would be intercepted in the night. But that night, the Indian ships found that the trawler was sinking 200 km off the Andaman coast…

On the other hand, it seems strange how the Sri Lanka Navy estimated that the cargo on board 'MV Mariamma' to be worth ten million US dollars and were still unaware what it contained. Although a public statement to this effect has been made, no explanation was offered by the Navy. Now with the Indian suspicion that 'MV Mariamma' contained fuel, could the cargo be worth US dollars 10 million or over 700 million rupees ? The answers will show how credible some claims made in news releases or hand outs are, particularly at a time when there is a censorship and the media is banned from operational areas. In the case of 'Showa Maru,' it appears that the Indian Navy high command did not issue orders to the vessels that trailed it to take any action. This is said to be in view of the fact that 'Showa Maru' had been in international waters and such Indian Navy action would have precipitated adverse legal consequences for them.

On January 13, 1993, Indian Coast Guard intercepted an LTTE ship with Kittu alias Sathasivam Krishnakuar, the one time Jaffna Commander and other members on board. He died in a shoot out that occurred between a Coast Guard vessel and the Honduran registered ship in which he was travelling - the 'MV Yahat.' At the time of the detection, the letter 'Y' had been erased with paint. The 'Showa Maru' is most likely to go through a name change in similar fashion to avoid detection.

Other LTTE members on board 'MV Yahat' were arrested and later charged in Indian Courts. The Courts released them on the grounds that the Coast Guard had no legal jurisdiction to arrest since 'MV Yahat' was in international waters when the incident occurred.

Did the Indian Navy fear a similar fate if they attacked or apprehended 'Showa Maru' ? Is this the reason why the Indian Navy high command did not issue orders to the Naval craft trailing 'Showa Maru' ? These and many other questions will continue to linger as the LTTE enjoys a virtually easy access to smuggle military cargo to the north eastern shores.

These developments came as the Government prepared to increase financial allocations to develop and strengthen the Sri Lanka Navy further. Last week, Vice Admiral Tissera gave President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga and other high ranking defence officials a presentation on the role of the Navy and the areas that required development. He had to curb all his social engagements to formulate detailed requirements for modernisation and to discuss issues with senior intelligence advisors to the Government. In an interview with last Wednesday's (May 19) issue of Jane's Defence Weekly, Vice Admiral Tissera has detailed out the Navy's role in the ongoing separatist war and how it should develop in the next century. (See box story on this page).

Whilst successfully smuggling in military cargo, the LTTE appeared to continue with its battle preparations. One of the main areas Tiger guerrilla leaders in the Wanni had continued to focus is the compulsory military training it is providing to civilians of all walks of life in the Wanni. Residents returning from the area say the preparations are on a wide scale.

With the help of Grama Sevakas, the LTTE has sent out letters to practically every citizen in the area. The letter signed by Anbu Chelvam points out that 'liberation' is a 'national commitment' which every person in the area has to take part. He has branded those unwilling as 'traitors' to the cause.

Groups of Tiger guerrillas have been tasked to identify those who do not heed Anbu Chelvam's call for participation in military training. The punishment is a total reduction of rations and fuel quotas - proof that the LTTE is using food supplies sent to uncleared areas as a weapon to coerce people to obey its orders.

The LTTE training for non members have been categorised into three main age groups - 15 to 30 years, 30 to 45 years and those above 45 years. The first two categories are expected to take part in training whilst the latter have been required to be present and observe what is going on. That is if they cannot participate.

If training earlier was focused largely on school children, it has now been extended to teachers, both male and female. The latter have been told to come with shirts and trousers to wear during training. The training programme is said to encompass three weeks physical training and two weeks of military training including how to handle firearms.

Persons who are not physically fit to undergo training are also being grouped for other tasks - taking part in literary/propaganda activity. Those completing LTTE's 'programmes' for civilians are being rewarded with a 'certificate' which entitles them for preferential treatment in many ways including issue of rations.

An interesting feature during the training programmes, according to residents returning from the Wanni, has been the surprise presence of LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. He is said to be making brief appearances at training areas.

A significant development in LTTE's physical and military training for non members came early this week. Well informed residents in the area say Tiger guerrilla leadership have now sent out instructions to their area leaders in the eastern province to launch similar training programmes. These residents believe letters would be sent out to civilians in guerrilla controlled areas urging them to take part.

An assessment of the LTTE activities in the past few months clearly indicates that they have focused their efforts to consolidate themselves organisationally and logistically. In prioritising those objectives, they appear to have given lesser emphasis to military operations.

This would explain for the token resistance offered to the Rana Gosha III operations. Basically the LTTE strategy seems to have been to sacrifice space in the Wanni to strengthen themselves organisationally. A typically Maoist move. The acquisition of stand off MBRL and SAM weapon systems on the one hand indicates that their weapon re-equipment is also designed to compensate for their flagging access to human resources. On the other hand it is also an ominous signal of the nature the war is likely to take. That the LTTE has managed to smuggle weapons and material by sea exposes badly how defective has been the organisation of maritime security. This is primarily a task for the Navy. Even whilst granting the limitations of equipment available for the task, there are still many questions that can be asked as to whether the 'MV Mariamma' could have got away.

In addition, the situation emphasises the need for greater liaison with India both at the Naval and diplomatic level. That this has not been so even with the heightened Indian concern of LTTE activity after the murder of then Premier Rajiv Gandhi exposes an unacceptable tardiness.

Unless and until there is a co-ordinated military and diplomatic offensive against the LTTE, they will continue to capitalise on any weaknesses in the system.

The Fifth Column

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