Editorial

6th June 1999

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Now a JOH to fight the war

It has taken a good six months to resolve the confusion that prevailed in the defence establishment - whether the joint control of the services should be structured on a command authority (JOC) or an advisory bureau (JOB) - if indeed it has been finally settled.

The toying with a joint command organisation for the services has been an on and off affair since a Joint Operations Command (JOC) was first set up in February, 1985. All governments since that time seem to have lacked a clear understanding of what should be the best management structure to establish in order to maximise operational efficiency by the joint command and control of the three services, and how such an organisation should function. Whether it is any different this time around remains to be seen.

Parochial political interests combined with the lack of clarity in defence thinking have interfered with the setting up of an effective joint military command. Joint headquarters have been opened and closed to suit personalities as opposed to the interests of national defence policy in as much as military strategies formulated to suit political agendas and one-upmanship. Little wonder that in such a situation those governments have been unable to achieve the best results, militarily.

In the most recent attempt at establishing a joint control system for the services a Joint Operations Bureau was set up in January, 1999 with Gen. Rohan de S. Daluwatte as its head. Its vested responsibilities were to advise the National Security Council and to monitor and co-ordinate joint military operations. It lacked command authority and for that reason lacked teeth to effectively plan, command and control joint service operations.

In effect, Gen. Daluwatte was a military eunuch, hibernating, giving time for political Generals to get accustomed to being de-linked of direct operational command.

The JOB was an organisational exercise which was not well studied. It was only after this headquarters was set up that Gen. Daluwatte was sent on a study tour of United Kingdom, France and United States to examine the command systems that prevailed in these countries. It is following the Daluwatte report after that study tour that the government has now re-structured the joint control of the services from a Bureau to a Command. This now vests the Joint Operations Headquarters with command authority and brings the services under a military headquarters as opposed to a nebulous Bureau manned by a retired General in a civilian capacity.

It was an open secret that there was no rapport between the Head-of-State, JOB and the Deputy Defence Minister in so far as operational matters were concerned.

This obviously would have created embarrassing command and control problems for the services which without doubt would have adversely affected their morale and operational effectiveness.

It is speculative whether this shift has any overtones of changing political fortunes. Equally questioning is whether this change during the crucial run-up period to a general election has any bearing on the shifting of the weight of responsibility for military operations on the Armed Forces per se as opposed to direct answerability by the political establishment. Such a move could well serve as a safety valve to relieve political pressure, be it from the doves or hawks.

Whatever be the deliberations of the politico-military vicissitudes of this change, the establishment of a JOH with a Chief of Defence Staff now brings the operational chain of command of the services directly under the National Security Council of which the Chairperson is the President. This hopefully will bring about a rationalisation between political and military objectives and national strategies - a much desired requirement. Whether it is to be so or the new JOH is another organisational experiment depends on the sincerity, will and commitment of all concerned in the national interest.

To the political leadership and the Generals one might suggest that it is now time to get down to business on hand rather than rely on the graces of astrology, auspicious times and poojas.to deliver this Nation from the evils of terrorism and separation.

Political Column

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