Situation Report -How Devi planned her date with doom

* More revelations on the April 25 attack on Army Chief
* New moves causing extra security concerns at Army headquarters

Some months ago, a state intelligence agency checked out how effective security measures were at Army Headquarters (AHQ).

They tasked a female operative. Believe it or not, she placed two mangoes in the cups of her bra, wore it and turned up at the main entrance. She produced her National Identity Card that bore a Sinhala name. Her name was recorded in a book. She was not subjected to the "walk through" or metal detector. There was none there. She was allowed in. The exercise meant she could have smuggled in two grenades in her bra. Inside the AHQ where security was purported to be very heavy, she moved around very freely. No one asked her questions.

She returned to her office later and filed a damning report. Pointing out some of the lapses, which for obvious reasons cannot be spelt out, she summed up her findings in just one sentence. Due to the existent lapses guerrillas from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or members of the underworld helping them for money can easily enter AHQ with false National Identity Cards.

This was just weeks before a female suicide bomber; Kanapathipillai Manjula Devi, (34), infiltrated and made a suicide attack on the Commander of the Army, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka on April 25. The finding by the intelligence agency came amidst their repeated warnings that Lt. Gen. Fonseka was a high profile target. This caused serious concern in the intelligence community.

So much so, they forwarded reports on the female intelligence operative's findings together with their observations to Lt. Gen. Fonseka. Copies were also sent to Commanders of the Navy and Air Force. This was intended to help them take preventive measures. Evidently not much had been done at Army Headquarters.

And now, after the major event that shook the nation, hectic measures are under way. Several directorates, units, offices within AHQ are being moved out. Some buildings are being demolished and much wider roads are taking shape. It is on the grounds that their existence inside AHQ poses security threats. Perhaps some may. But it is being done, according to senior officers, at great cost without even the barest study or appreciation of how it will affect the working of the nation's top most security establishment.

Some high ranking retired officers too have made representations to President Mahinda Rajapaksa of the serious security implications that may arise. The sole criterion to thwart attacks it appears is the mere shifting of them. If this tends to spawn other problems, the overriding factor, the need to enhance security measures to prevent an infiltration and attack appears to be lost in the process. Here again, sad enough, there appears to be no checks and balances at the highest levels.

Is the current situation the result of professionals in the Army, trained on planning security tasks being ignored? The question comes to the fore since an officer forcibly retired on serious disciplinary grounds has been unofficially given the responsibility of looking after some of the security inside AHQ. Serving senior officers are worried he was giving some of the orders but are helpless. Others are reluctant to intervene for fear of reprisals or for being held accountable in the event of any problem.

They say there have been instances when this former officer's car, an Army issue which he still uses, was not checked when he entered AHQ. However, vehicles of all Majors General are subject to regular checks after the April 25 attack. He has also been allowed free access to the Senior Officer's Mess inside AHQ. The former officer was dealt with on very serious breaches of discipline after a duly constituted Court of Inquiry found him guilty. However, in the recent past, a new probe had been launched to "exonerate" him and help him return to service. However, this has not yet been approved by the Ministry of Defence. Another security breach at AHQ, due to the continuing absence of proper checks and balances at the highest levels, can come as a devastating blow to the government of President Rajapaksa. It could cause further public anger and disgust.

This is in the backdrop of a fresh Army recruitment drive and other measures to ensure greater military preparedness.

Only the completion of ongoing investigations by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) will lay bare how exactly the female suicide bomber and her accomplice, or accomplices, gained entry. But the hard work of a high-ranking and highly commended CID officer, Senior Superintendent of Police Ravi Waidyalankara, has paid dividends. He has been trained by Britain's MI 5 on telephone analysis. He toiled for months with a broken SIM card from the mobile phone left at the scene of attack by the female suicide bomber.

First success came when SSP Waidyalankara, who is also an Attorney-at-Law, was able to identify, with technical assistance from a leading mobile phone operator, the cell phone used. It was a "four by four" or one where an economy package restricted calls to four different subscribers. Technical staff confirmed that of the four, one was not functioning after the suicide bomb explosion. It belonged to the female suicide bomber. The last call on that mobile phone had been a few minutes before she blasted herself. That call was the one that alerted her that Lt. Gen. Fonseka was leaving his office. Earlier, there had been calls to Rambukkanna, Weliveriya, Delgoda and Maradana.

When details of several calls made on April 25, the day of the attack on AHQ became clear, DIG CID Asoka Wijetilleke assigned a team under Director, Sisira Mendis SSP to widen the probe into many areas. By then, SSP Waidyalankara had achieved a second breakthrough. The scope of the probe was similar to the one Mr. Wijetilleke, then Director CID, had launched into the LTTE attack on the Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA) and the adjoining Air Force base on July 25, 2001. In this probe SSP Waidyalankara was also commended.

A technical team from the mobile phone operator helped him track down the tower from which the most number of calls had originated to the phone used by the female suicide bomber. It was located at Rambukkanna. That find was to lead to a significant breakthrough. It remained a closely guarded secret until early this week. That was when Police Chief Chandra Fernando announced the development at a news conference on Wednesday. Both the CID and the mobile phone operator did not want to discuss the process used. They fear it would give away vital information that should remain secret in the interest of future investigations.

Last month a team of CID detectives were in Rambukkanna. A detailed search led to a vacant house. They found that it had been occupied by Shanmugalingam Sooriyakumar of Chunnakam. The son of a driver, he had come to Rambukkana when he was 12 years old. He had later married a Sinhala girl, Asha Dilrukshi. Her parents lived in the opposite house. Sooriyakumar was the driver of a three wheeler scooter. Later he had begun driving lorries and vans.

With the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement between the Government and the LTTE in February, 2002, Sooriyakumar drove lorries. He travelled often along the A-9 highway to Jaffna carrying goods. LTTE intelligence cadres spotted him and began developing a relationship. Soon he was introduced to Nixon, who was to become his handler.

Detectives believe he is the same Nixon who was handler for the Sea Tiger group tasked to attack the Colombo Port. He spent three years in Negombo winning friends and influencing people. He disappeared after the attack failed due to rough seas as revealed exclusively in The Sunday Times (Situation Report - June 25)

Nixon succeeded in persuading Sooriyakumar to provide shelter to 34-year-old Kanapathipillai Manjula Devi in their Rambukkanna home. She had made her first visit to the house in July last year but did not stay there. Thereafter, she returned in January and was living with them. The presence of Manjula Devi became the subject of regular quarrels between Sooriyakumar and his in laws. They were suspicious of her presence. However, Sooriyakumar had insisted that she was his uncle's daughter.

During their stay there, Sooriyakumar is alleged to have paid a large sum of money to the Grama Sevaka and obtained his help to secure a National Identity Card. Another case of money being used to make people in the south turn traitors. Detectives are probing whether Manjula Devi was her real name or whether it had been given so she could move around freely in Sinhala areas. Many in Sinhala households also used the same name. She spoke and read Sinhala very well. Though the name had begun with Kanapathipillai in the NIC, she was called Manjula Devi. When his in laws continued to quarrel, Sooriyakumar found a house in Weliveriya and shifted there. Asha Dilrukshi, her four-year-old daughter Anushya and Manjula Devi went along.

Whilst at Weliveriya, Sooriyakumar drove lorries through Wanni to Jaffna. On many occasions he had broken journey in Kilinochchi to meet LTTE intelligence cadres. Manjula Devi would leave the Weliveriya house during the day saying she was going to Colombo to meet relatives or friends. She would return, sometimes with large tubs of ice cream for little Anushya. She also brought food items. There had also been occasions when she would provide money for household expenses. She had also purchased a brand new three wheeler scooter for Sooriyakumar.

When Manjula Devi did not travel to Colombo, she would be in the Weliveriya house reading. Mostly she read Sinhala newspapers and magazines. She was in the habit of playing Sinhala music. The volume was turned loud for the neighbours to believe it was a Sinhala household and thus avoid creating any suspicion.

On Monday April 24, the day before she exploded herself inside AHQ, Manjula Devi behaved normally. In the night she took a meal of string hoppers, sprats, dhal and pol sambol. The next morning, Tuesday, she packed all her belongings in two different bags. She had a cup of tea and left the house promising Asha Dilrukshi she would return in a few days time.

CID detectives have established categorically that Manjula Devi was not pregnant. They have obtained proof beyond any doubt of this fact after they interrogated Asha Dilrukshi.

Both Sooriyakumar and Asha Dilrukshi, it has come to light, had also quarreled with each other over Majula Devi. Asha Dilrukshi was not in favour of her staying in their house in Weliveriya. Days after the attack on AHQ, both Sooriyakumar and his wife had seen a photograph released by the CID in the newspapers. It showed a touched up face of the female suicide bomber. The picture had been taken after the head was severed in the suicide bomb explosion. Asha Dilrukshi promptly told her husband, Sooriyakumar this is "Akka," the name by which she called Manjula Devi.

It is immediately not clear how Manjula Devi found her way to Colombo. It is also not clear whether she was accompanied by an accomplice. However, detectives have identified an area where she had been dressed up with the suicide jacket placed in her stomach in such a way as to show she was pregnant. Sooriyakumar, Asha Dilrukshi and the Grama Sevaka are now in custody.

It is clear from the latest CID findings that by introducing Manjula Devi to the Sooriyakumar household in January this year, they had been making elaborate preparations to target Lt. Gen. Fonseka. In the light of this, it also becomes clear that intelligence planning towards the attack had been going on even before that period. So, for six months Manjula Devi waited for her orders. Though unsuccessful, she executed them on April 25.

It would be foolish not to assume that there are many similar cases where would-be assassins are awaiting orders to hit their targets. Never before has there been a greater need for the country's defence establishment to ensure checks and balances with the security forces. If they do not, the problems they pose President Rajapaksa and his government are enormous and very costly.