LTTE air wing: How it began and what it means

• October 2005 shooting down of UAV should have set off alarm bells
• Repeated Sunday Times disclosures were buried in denials

By Iqbal Athas

Police and Army in Ampara conduct checks on vehicles. This is part of stepped up security measures in the wake of fears of Tiger guerrilla attacks during the Avurudhu season.

An incident in the skies over Wanni in October 2005, just months after it came to be known that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had built an airstrip and acquired light aircraft, seems the first occasion when the guerrillas demonstrated their air capability. Yet, the implications of this encounter, strange enough, were buried in denials both from the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). These came after an Israeli built Searcher Mark II Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was lost in the skies over guerrilla dominated Wanni on October 19, 2005.

After The Sunday Times (Situation Report - October 23, 2005) revealed details of how the UAV went missing, Air Force officials claimed publicly that it happened due to a "technical fault" whilst on a "training mission." The LTTE, on the other hand, responded with a claim that media reports that the UAV was grounded "either by a radar guided gun or by an air borne attack" were mere speculation. The LTTE response appeared in the Tamilnet web site of October 24 2005, just the day after The Sunday Times disclosure.

Through that response, which was clearly unusual, was the LTTE trying to hide any "premature" exposure of their air strike capability? That is by trying to deflect suggestions that one of their aircraft shot down the UAV? Was it the reason why members of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) were refused permission to proceed to Vingnanakulam (20 kilometres north east of Omanthai), where the UAV fell? This is despite repeated LTTE claims that "surveillance activities violated the Ceasefire Agreement." On the other hand, the Government leaders then insisted that the CFA did not and could not preclude the Security Forces and the Police from taking measures to protect Sri Lanka's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Several developments that followed in the past year, six months and two weeks (since October 2005) tell a shocking story. They raise more questions than answers on why scant attention has been paid to national security interests. It also goes to show that despite many a tragedy that has resulted following guerrilla attacks there has been no accountability or deterrent action. To understand the backdrop of these developments, first to excerpts from The Sunday Times of October 23 2005.

"The Searcher Mark II was 23 nautical miles north of the Air Force base in Vavuniya cruising at an altitude of 10,000 feet at a speed of 75 knots. Just then, men at the Ground Control Centre saw pictures disappear from the television screen. Three different warnings appeared simultaneously across the screen thereafter. One warned of engine failure, the second about a generator failure and the third a communications failure. On no previous occasion when a UAV was lost did all three warnings appear on the TV screen at the same moment. More importantly, the communications link powered by a battery that worked the onboard day-night television camera had an endurance of 15 minutes if the generator failed.

"This was strange indeed. On no occasion in the past did all three systems pack up simultaneously. If either the engine and the generator or both packed up, we could still have been left with 15 minutes of battery power to work the TV cameras," a senior Air Force officer in Colombo told The Sunday Times. Speaking on grounds of anonymity he said "This could have given us some idea of what was going wrong. The immediate non-functioning of the engine, the generator and the battery system, all at the same time could occur only if the UAV sustained sudden destruction. Such destruction, in all likelihood, could have been caused only by enemy action.

"Air Force officials are puzzled as to how a destruction of the UAV could have occurred. They say the heat generated by a 73 horsepower UAV engine was not sufficient for it to be acquired by a Surface to Air Missile (SAM). Moreover, the afternoon sun would also have deflected the heat seeking missile. The LTTE is known to possess Igla type Russian made SAM missiles. However, these officials say it is possible that a radar guided gun may have been used to bring down the UAV. There have been reports of the guerrillas acquiring such guns to secure the airstrip and their air assets.

"They also do not rule out the remote possibility of an airborne attack by the guerrillas using one of their light aircraft. Since the TV camera on board the UAV is positioned facing the ground, an LTTE aircraft known to have twice the speed of the UAV, they say, could have climbed over the UAV's flight level to destruct it through gun fire. "However, other than making educated guesses, we are yet to gather concrete evidence," the official added. The Air Force has made contact with the Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) to obtain expert opinion on the reasons for the unprecedented simultaneous malfunctioning of the engine, generator and communication links.

"The Searcher Mark II built by Israel Aircraft Industries is an advanced fourth generation UAV system. Its overall length is 5.85 metres (19.20 feet) and Wingspan 8.55 metres (28.10 feet). Its maximum take-off weight is 426 kilogrammes (940 pounds) and the maximum payload weight is 100 kilogrammes (220 pounds). This UAV has an endurance of 15 hours. On a direct line of sight, it has a range of 200 kilometres (105 nautical miles) and 250 kilometres (130 nautical miles) beyond the-line-of-sight of the Ground Control Centre. According to Air Force officials, the Searcher Mark II cost US $ 1.3 million dollars or Rs 130 million. In addition the on board day-night television cum infra red camera cost US $ 600,000 or six million rupees."

This report drew an unusual response from the LTTE. The Tamilnet of October 23 2005, among other matters, said: "Media reports that the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) belonging to Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) that came down in Wanni on 19 October was downed either by radar-guided gun or by an airborne attack by the Liberation Tigers were mere speculations (sic) not backed up by concrete evidence, experts contacted by Tamilnet said. A Virginia (US) based science journalist who covers UAV developments, rebuffed a report that quoted a Sri Lanka Air Force official saying: engine failure, generator failure and communications failure warning messages appearing simultaneously at Ground Control indicated sudden destruction of UAV caused by enemy action.

"Catastrophic failure of a UAV will likely have destroyed the communication system, disabling the aircraft's ability to send any valid message. In a catastrophic failure scenario it is unlikely for all the key systems to fail and only the communication system to function and correctly indicate failure of other units," a military communications expert working for a US firm told Tamilnet.

Unlike on other occasions, here was an instance where the LTTE, with the help of Tamilnet, went out of the way to argue that a "technical defect" (or as they call it a "catastrophic failure") to be the cause. Strange enough, that seemed to concur with public claims by Air Force officials that the UAV was lost due to a "technical fault." Paradoxical enough, both were of the same viewpoint though for separate reasons. For the LTTE, it seemed a way of distracting early attention on their air strike capability. For the SLAF, it was the standard euphemism when such an incident occurred.

In the aftermath of the loss of the UAV, the Air Force adopted two immediate measures. One was the appointment of a Court of Inquiry to probe how the loss came about. The other was to invite to Colombo an expert team from Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) to conduct their own probe. Both carried out their investigations separately but were denied a significant aspect that would have been vital to them. That was a visit to the crash site and an examination of the damaged UAV. However, both had access to up-to-the-minute video footage recorded by the Ground Control Centre. The reports of these two investigations still remain a secret.

However, The Sunday Times has learnt that the Court of Inquiry as well as the IAI team were convinced after reviewing the final frames of the video footage that the UAV was destructed by a foreign source. These frames show debris from the UAV get strewn in the air after being reportedly hit by the foreign source. It is this finding; The Sunday Times learnt that prompted Air Force Headquarters to order ground controllers, operating the UAV, to co-ordinate with radar all their aerial operations. The idea is to obtain the help of radar to ascertain any unidentified aircraft in the skies where the UAV was airborne.

The loss of the UAV in October 2005 came amidst periodic sightings of unidentified aircraft flying over the northern skies. And that too, when the Air Force became aware that the LTTE had built a 1.2 kilometre long paved runway in Iranamadu capable of landing a Hercules C-130 aircraft with a 15 ton load. In the public interest, a question that begs answer is whether any study was made on the enemy offensive capability that was demonstrated with the attack on the UAV. Surely, such a capability would not have been only to attack UAVs that are airborne. Did a lackadaisical attitude therefore lead to any inaction on the part of the authorities concerned? Could this have been a contributory factor to the attack on the Katunayake Air Force base on March 26?

It is only after this attack that a number of measures have been thought of. Besides calling upon the public to telephone 116 if they sighted any suspicious aircraft, other new counter measures were evolved this week. One of them is a request for all high rise building owners not to switch on their standby power generators in the event of the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) switching off power supply. This is part of air raid precautions to protect vital installations in the City and suburbs.

An Air Defence Cell has been established at Army Headquarters. Troops in the frontlines are to inform the Cell in the event of any suspicious aircraft being located. The Cell will liaise with Air Force Headquarters where calls on telephone number 116, where public report on suspicious aircraft, are received and monitored. A Lieutenant Colonel in the frontline has been placed in charge of the cell where additional personnel have been assigned.

Perhaps since World War II, at no time before during the separatist war has such air raid precautions have been taken. If that assumes greater significance during the ongoing undeclared Eelam War IV, there are a number of other measures which highlights the greater intensity of this phase. For the first time, ahead of a Sinhala and Hindu New Year, the Government has been forced to make a public appeal for civilians to take precautions on the grounds that Tiger guerrillas were set to disrupt festivities. “The Government is requesting the general public to be cautious of suspicious persons or activities especially at crowded places, inside buses and trains during the upcoming festive season,” says a note issued by the Media Centre for National Security.

Five different telephone numbers have been given. They are Police Emergency (119), Defence Ministry Emergency (118), Suspicious aircraft movements (116), Colombo Emergency 43333333 and Bomb Disposal Unit (2434251). This clearly highlights the countrywide impact the undeclared Eelam War IV has had so far. It has directly affected every Sri Lankan in a way that is unprecedented. Nowhere during the past three phases of the separatist War, which were all formally declared and fought, has a similar situation ever arisen.

The Government has appealed to India for more Air Defence radars and other related hardware. At present Indian built 2-D Air Defence Systems are being used and are to be upgraded later to 3-D. India gifted the 2-D radar systems after Sri Lanka cancelled a contract with China to procure 3-D radars worth US $ 5,151,190.60 was cancelled. Of the cost, an advance of US 973.000 which was twenty per cent of the Letter of Credit value was also paid to China. This is in addition to US $ 486,500 which was ten per cent of the Performance Bond. India is learnt to have assured that the Air Defence systems would soon be made fully operative. Details of such measures, however, cannot be spelt out.

Last week Group Captain Vijitha Gunaratne was appointed by Air Force Headquarters as Air Co-ordinator. He will be in charge of Air Defence. Wing Commander Ravi Jayasinghe has been appointed as his deputy. The Army and the Navy have also appointed Air Co-ordinators to liaise with the Air Force. A number of other counter measures utilizing existing resources have been put in place. But, upgraded measures, now under consideration, would entail enormous costs.

Little known details of the Tiger Air Wing attack on the Air Force base in Katunayake are unfolding only now. Soon after the attack, if it took more than 20 minutes for a K-8 trainer aircraft to be airborne to chase the fleeing Zlin Z-143 Tiger aircraft, the take off by a second K-8 had to be aborted. This was after the unexpected fall of the pilot. His side arm fell on the ground. It triggered off a round slightly injuring his ankle. A three member Court of Inquiry is now probing how the events that led to the attack. It is headed by Air Vice Marshal P.B. Premachandra, Chief of Staff of the SLAF.

Although claims have been made that the LTTE's Air Wing was begun only in 1998, preparations to create an air wing and acquire air capability have been under way by the guerrillas from 1984. This was when guerrilla cadres began joining flying schools in the UK and France. At that time the LTTE acquired Microlights and at least two US built Robinson R 44 helicopter. However, the guerrillas lost these assets over a period of time. The helicopters were known to have crashed. Here is a brief chronology of the last stages of how the LTTE built a runway and acquired aircraft:

1993: LTTE clears a vast stretch of land south east of the Iranamadu tank and begins construction of a runway. Work was completed two years later. On March 19, 1995 LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran declares it open. One LTTE cadre operates a hang glider during the opening ceremonies. Air Force later bombs it making it unusable.

1995: LTTE sets up an "air wing" or "air force" in memory of former "Jaffna Commander" Sathasivam Krshnakumar alias Kittu. A former Prabhakaran bodyguard and one time aeronautical engineer in Air Canada, V. Sornalignam alias Shankar is named as its head. More pilots are sent to UK and France for training in ultra light aircraft. Cadres are also taught how to handle surface to air missiles and anti aircraft guns.

1995: April 28 Shooting down of Air Force AVRO aircraft near Palaly.
1995: April 29 shooting down of second SLAF AVRO aircraft near Palaly.
1995: November. During "Operation Riviresa", troops in Neerveli find a dummy aircraft in an LTTE hideout. They also find parts of the downed AVROs.
1998: November. 27 A microlight aircraft is found showering flowers over Vattapallai Amman Kovil near Mullaitivu.
2000: LTTE declares 2000 as "Year of the Air Tigers"
2003: November. An SLAF UAV acquires video footage of a considerable clearing in the jungle east of Iranamadu.
2004: February. SLAF reconnaissance observes construction work on a runway at this cleared site recommence.
2004: September. The new runway has been paved, threshold and centerline markings added. It is 1.2 kilometers long.
2005: January. Air Force Unmanned Aerial Vehicle spot Tiger guerrilla light aircraft.

One of the biggest benefits for the LTTE, since its demonstration of air strike capability, has been the response of the Tamil diaspora abroad. Intelligence sources confirmed that funding, which slowed down, had resumed in a big way. This is whilst defence and security establishments worldwide are focusing fresh attention on the guerrillas and how they have developed their military arm over the years.
For Sri Lankans countrywide, the reverberations of the March 26 attack continue to echo. That it came amidst high pitched official claims that the guerrillas have been weakened, or even largely defeated, is one thing. But fears of a repeated attack either through air, land or sea have caused concerns. More so with the Avurudu season next week.