Attacks abroad strengthen Mahinda’s image at home

Nearly 20 years ago my late brother Mervyn told me of a fascinating encounter he had with the then President Premadasa. If I remember correctly now, during this one –to- one meeting that lasted some 2 ½ hours Mervyn had the impression that President Premadasa actually enjoyed India’s criticism of him and the attacks against him by the Indian media. In fact President Premadasa seemed to invite criticism by sometimes actually baiting India. This was at the height of the JVP inspired anarchy that appeared to grip the country, and Premadasa wanted to legitimise his rule by being seen as a true nationalist demanding Indian troops quit Sri Lanka.

After a month long stay in Colombo coinciding with the SAARC Conference I had this inescapable impression that Mahinda Rajapaksa had only one constituency in mind. That is the one at home and that is the constituency he is appealing to. He, unlike Premadasa, is not deliberately inviting criticism from the world at large. He would like to see such criticism muted and be acceptable to the international community, meaning the West. But if the choice is between international popularity and acceptance abroad and the prosecution of a war against a ruthless enemy then for him the choice is very clear. He will resolutely follow the latter because that is what he wants and believes the people want too.

Opinion polls have shown that he is correct in his assessment. The public, except perhaps some elite circles in Colombo and elsewhere who find life rather an annoyance in today’s Sri Lanka, would want an end to this conflict one way or another, preferably by making the LTTE militarily impotent. Still many would like to ensure that in pursuit of this goal basic rights are not violated, that collateral damage as the American’s so euphemistically put it, is reduced to a minimum and sections of the Tamil community who have no truck with the Tigers or their aspirations are not marginalised.

Western governments and their agencies do not seem to understand this. The more they castigate President Rajapaksa, the more the people close ranks round him. The people see a small nation being intimidated by a bullying Goliath. Yet there are obvious dangers springing from the current Sri Lankan policy. The dangers are not so much at home but in the world outside. The sooner that is recognised and dealt with as effectively as the government could, the more it could concentrate on economic and social reconstruction at home and cementing a fractured society.

One thing I gathered from official and military circles and from visiting journalists from the subcontinent, especially India, who are well versed in our conflict, is the perception that the LTTE is facing a severe recruitment problem. The split with Karuna, the loss of the Eastern province and now apparently Mannar and the lack of free access to Jaffna, have all cost the LTTE in terms of available manpower. Even if they have the weapons, the Tigers don’t have the cadres to use them. With what seems like relentless pressure on the LTTE’s remaining strongholds, the Tigers are being hemmed in, if the military assessment is correct.

This will have an important consequence abroad which one hopes has been properly assessed.
The more the LTTE comes under pressure at home, the more its cadres and supporters abroad will be activated to whip up international opprobrium against the Rajapaksa government. This will take a twin-track approach. The LTTE will use its diaspora members and supporters in positions of political influence and with connections to lobby policy makers and decision makers in western governments in particular to pressure Colombo to abandon its present course of action and instead pursue a political course to a solution. Western governments and the LTTE’s pet politicians will apply that pressure in numerous ways but ultimately the goal is to ensure that the Tigers are not cornered in their own lair. India could do that with political and military pressure because it is on our doorstep. Others will be more circumspect.
The other track is to use western-funded international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) with some kind of reputation and through them get to the media and UN agencies such as the Human Rights Commission, UNICEF, etc, where there is some sympathy for the Tamils if not the LTTE.

Even organisations such as the Asian Human Rights Commission based in Hong Kong, whose credentials have been questioned by the media and is known in South Asia and ASEAN, would be used to beat the Rajapaksa government. While Mahinda Rajapaksa might not be particularly concerned with what the world thinks about his military policy, if the coming months are going to see an escalation of anti-Sri Lanka invective the burden of countering that will fall mainly on our foreign policy establishment.It is Foreign Minister Bogollagama and our diplomatic missions abroad that he runs that would be in the frontline to meet and counter the fresh barrage of criticism that is bound to come with increased military pressure against the Tigers at home. While the public criticism of Sri Lanka will come mainly from the West and institutions funded by the west, there will be more subtle help and pressure from the diaspora and LTTE sympathisers or beneficiaries in other parts of the world especially in Southeast Asia and the East and southern Africa. Foreign Minister Bogollagama for all his travels and efforts to win friends and influence people cannot fight this battle alone. He must rely on his diplomatic foot soldiers in our missions abroad to make the day to day contacts and need to justify government policy. This raises a vital question. Do we have in place in our key diplomatic posts in the West and elsewhere people with confidence, ability and in-depth knowledge to articulate the government’s case cogently and in a manner that has legitimacy.

Diplomacy in the coming months is going to be a more arduous task. It is not enough to be able to mix socially with the Sri Lankan diaspora and win brownie points as a “nice person”. Diplomats are there to try and convince those in the countries to which they are posted why their government is doing what it is doing. It is not enough to chastise the enemy and expose it for what it is. That is not difficult. The greater task is to be able to articulate with conviction the validity and honesty of your own policies. How many of those now serving as heads of missions, one wonders, are up to that task.