That it was a warning all round was in no doubt. It came at his first official conference last Tuesday, five days after orders to return to Colombo from the United States.
Chief of Defence Staff General Sarath Fonseka, pointing to his uniform, told his weekly conference with armed forces commanders, senior military and intelligence officials, "when I remove this, nobody should worry. I will say what I want. However, he was quick to add, "As long as I wear this uniform, I will remain loyal to the Government." With a broad smile, he began the conference at the OCDS (Office of the Chief of Defence Staff) with remarks that they were meeting after three weeks. In a preamble he noted, "You would have heard about the Department of Homeland Security and all that…."
Post-independent Sri Lanka's first serving four-star General, the decorated war hero who gave leadership to troops that militarily defeated the Tiger guerrillas, was in fact saying he could be disloyal after he quits. His remarks were an allusion to President Mahinda Rajapaksa's request not to testify before officials of the Department of Homeland Security during his visit to the United States. The CDS had agreed to a meeting with them on November 4 though he declared he was to be used as a "source" for information on Defence Secretary Lt. Col. (retd.) Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. Like all good soldiers, through his assertion, he wanted to be honourable enough to avoid accusations of behaviour unbecoming of an Officer and a Gentleman.
On Thursday, he wrote to President Rajapaksa, expressing his desire to retire from December 1. There was speculation in some quarters that tried to make out that the President would not accept Gen. Fonseka's retirement thereby frustrating any attempt by the General to come forward as a “common candidate” of a united opposition at a presidential election that is widely expected soon. There was sufficient legal opinion that held the view, broadly, that the Constitution, the country's supreme law permitted "any citizen" the right to contest a Presidential election. The Constitution overrides all other laws and regulations in the country. But more than that, the President himself had no qualms about the move. He was quoted in dailies this week as having said that he would accept the General's resignation within half an hour should he offer it. He was surely not going to be seen as someone churlish enough who was going to strip the civic rights of a would-be opponent. That would have been a terrible start to his own re-election campaign.
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| Gen. Fonseka with the Kelaniya Vihara Chief incumbent Ven. Kollupitiye Mahinda Sangharakkhita. Pic by Sanka Vidanagama |
So, true to his word, the Government sprang a surprise on him by accepting Gen. Fonseka's resignation letter w-e-f Friday, i.e. with-immediate-effect. In an annexe to his letter, Gen. Fonseka says there has been a deterioration of the "high standards he was capable of introducing" to the Army. Despite those claims of "high standards", he had been consulting the opposition parties after his return from US. Just a day after his arrival, on Friday night (November 6), the Sunday Times learnt, he had a meeting at a secret location with three key players of the United National Front (UNF) -- Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, Mangala Samaraweera (SLFP -M) and Mano Ganeshan (NDF). This week, he was in touch with opposition parties again over his letter and the annexure that gave the reasons for his retirement.
There was heartburn yesterday among some. They were disappointed that there were changes after the two drafts (the letter and the annexure) Gen. Fonseka was to hand over were agreed upon. He had on his own added some matters and deleted others. "It does not augur well for the future. What if he does that kind of thing after he gets elected as President," one of them said speaking on grounds of anonymity. It was too late. The Opposition parties had gone public. Yesterday, most media had published the version that was released by these Opposition parties, and in fact, not the one handed over by Gen. Fonseka to the President.
The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) newspaper Lanka ran the Sinhala version whilst its web site lankatruth.com posted the letter and the annexure under an EXCLUSIVE tag in English. That is barely three hours after Gen. Fonseka handed over his retirement letter to Lalith Weeratunga, Secretary to the President. By then President Rajapaksa, had not even read it. He was in Kandy meeting visiting Myanmar's military dictator Senior General Than Shwe. He hosted a banquet in honour of the visiting General on Thursday night and was busy with other official engagements.
The Sunday Times can reveal today that the text prepared in consultation with the Opposition parties was not the exact one handed over by Gen. Fonseka to Weeratunga. There are serious differences in the two texts, some of them raising significant questions. In the letter, seeking retirement as well as the annexure giving reasons for it, the Chief of Defence Staff has deleted some parts and added others. Gen. Fonseka's prerogative to change documents he originates is unquestionable. After all it is his resignation letter. However, this has left his political allies both embarrassed and worried. They had gone public with a different version. It was now too late to circulate the copy later made available to them by Gen. Fonseka. It was a clear message from the General that he was his own man.
The full text of Gen. Fonseka's real letter seeking retirement together with the annexure he handed over to the Secretary to the President appear in box stories in this column today. (See P 14)
In the three- page letter dated November 12 to President Rajapaksa, Gen. Fonseka, has among other matters, made the following additions. On the first page, he has added (to paragraph 2) that, "I was determined to achieve this victory as I wanted to ensure that there is permanent peace and security for the future generation of the motherland."
On the second page, he has added (to paragraph 5) the following:
"….Your Excellency I do further request that a suitable protected government resident (sic) be made available for me to live in. Also it is requested that approval be granted for me to continue occupation of the present official residence of the Commander of the Army - 'The General's House' in Bahudhaloka (sic) Mawatha until I am provided with a suitable married quarter…"
A deletion in the letter (paragraph 5) is the reference by name to former Commander of the Navy, Admiral (retd.) Wasantha Karannagoda. He is only identified as former Commander of the Navy.
Another addition on the same page (to paragraph 6) says, "Though during the operations I conducted myself in a daring manner disregarding threats to my life, on conclusion of the war I have absolutely no intention to endanger my life."
However, more significant are the additions and omissions made to the annexure to the letter. If the document seen and agreed to by Opposition parties only lists 16 reasons, there are 17 given by Gen. Fonseka, as is revealed in the box story page 14. Whilst the entirety of the additions and omissions could be easily discerned, some aspects warrant special mention.
In Reason 3 in the annexure seen and endorsed by the Opposition parties, he has added the following: "Due to this action you also denied me of my desire to streamline the career planning of Common Stream Officers whom I wanted to ensure that they are given with career prospects of becoming experts/specialists in their fields."
Reason 8 in the annexure seen by the Opposition parties have been omitted completely. It is replaced with the following: "Your Excellency, I wish to remind you that whilst the Eelam War IV was being fought I repeatedly requested to increase the compensation paid to those Next of Kin of the officers and men killed in action from Rs 150,000 which was the amount sanctioned in year 1985, to Rs 500,000.00 as the approved amount is grossly insufficient in the present context. This request was not considered favourably thereby I feel extremely guilty that the Army and the Government at large has not looked into the welfare of those who paid the supreme sacrifice."
There are additions to Reason 14 given in the annexure seen and endorsed by the opposition parties. A paragraph (on top) says: "Resettlement of the IDPs was also a point of concern. The IDPs are resettled in an ad hoc manner without proper infrastructure facilities to the dismay of most inmates. The Government has resorted to this course of action merely refusing to incur an additional expense for the betterment of the IDPs. This is indeed a short-term remedy to get rid of the IDP issue. I strongly advocated that the resettlement should commence only after proper demining, providing necessary infrastructure facilities and on confirming of the identity of any infiltrated terrorists, thereby ensuring 100% safety and security of the younger generations among IDPs."
Another paragraph (added at the bottom) says, "The troop requirement for resettlement is grossly insufficient and cannot sustain the demanding needs in the resettled areas, thus placing the innocent people in turmoil. Your Excellency's government is yet to win the peace in spite of the fact that the Army under my leadership won the war. There is no clear policy to ensure the security of the Tamil people thereby leaving room to ruin the victory attained, paving the way for yet another uprising in the future due to lack of security arrangements in the resettled areas."
What is even more glaring is the deletion of Reasons 15 and 16 in the annexure seen and endorsed by the Opposition parties. Whilst reason 15 is included in some form in reason 14 (see paragraphs above), the omission of reason 16 altogether has raised serious questions. In this paragraph, the Opposition parties noted that the draft contained the following reference, "The economic hardships faced by the people have increased while waste and corruption have reached endemic proportions; media freedom and other democratic rights continue to be curtailed…"
Why did Gen. Fonseka choose to delete matters relating to corruption, which the Opposition parties allege, are rampant and growing. Why did he also completely delete references to media freedom and other democratic rights? Thereafter as Reason 17 he had inserted a paragraph dealing with some 10,000 guerrilla cadres who have surrendered.
The deletion of references to curtailment of media freedom and other democratic rights as one of the reasons for his retirement, despite agreement with the Opposition parties to do so, is noteworthy for many reasons. Although one Opposition politician strongly canvassed sections of the media on Friday to incorporate these aspects as issues raised by Gen. Fonseka, his 17-point annexure clearly shows there is no such reference.
Though Gen. Fonseka has publicly spoken out about dealing with corruption, he has remained silent throughout on issues relating to media freedom. It is no secret that both local and foreign media rights organisations accused Gen. Fonseka of condoning attacks on the media, branding media personnel as traitors or lackeys under LTTE pay. He even told the national television network Rupavahini that immigration officials at the Colombo airport have been asked to stop some journalists leaving the country. That did not happen. This is in the backdrop of reports that persons in white vans were abducting journalists, assaulting, threatening or intimidating them. These white van abductions and assaults, including murder were placed on the door of President Rajapaksa's Government, and an exasperated President once told a meeting of editors that these attacks were "mata gahuwa wage" (as if someone attacked him) -- clearly trying to send a message that he was not to be blamed. It was said to be the same with pro-democracy activists. In a bid to stop such outbursts on state-run TV networks, among other reasons, the Defence Ministry ordered that armed forces commanders would require prior approval for media interviews.
It was only on October 21 that President Rajapaksa told a ceremony at the Aluvihare Stadium in Matale to honour troops for their victory against LTTE guerrillas (The Sunday Times Political Commentary - October 25), "I remember when the Army Commander was to be given an extension of service, there was a protest. Some sections of the media too got involved. There was a protest in Colombo. Some said the Commander was not even fit to lead the Salvation Army. Whenever a journalist was attacked or a white van was used for abductions, the Army was blamed. They criticised the Army, but they did not attack me. I said allow us to liberate the country……..".
The omission of references to defending media freedom therefore is bound to cause some ripples in the future for the newly formed United National Front which has laid great emphasis on the re-introduction of lost democratic freedoms, among which is media freedom.
After chairing the weekly meeting of armed forces commanders on Tuesday, Gen. Fonseka attended the National Security Council (NSC) sessions the next day at 'Temple Trees'.
President Mahinda Rajapaksa chaired it. As is the practice now, participants took part in the buffet lunch that is served daily. Thereafter, Gen. Fonseka was asked to stay over for a meeting with Rajapaksa and Presidential Secretary Weeratunga. Fuller details of what they discussed are not available, but it is known that Rajapaksa queried the CDS about reports he was entering politics and urged that he quit his office if he had any such plans. Last week the Sunday Times revealed exclusively on its front page that UNF had reached consensus on Gen. Fonseka as the 'common candidate'.
According to sources at the Presidential Secretariat, Gen. Fonseka had complained to President Rajapaksa that he had been given only 48 hours to switch positions from Army Commander to Chief of Defence Staff. The President had responded by pointing out that then Commander of the Army, Lt. Gen. Shantha Kottegoda had been only given two hours to quit his post to pave the way for Gen. Fonseka. "He asked me a week's time so he could remain at General's House (the official residence) for the wedding of his daughter. Don't forget you were opposed to it and therefore he had to go," said Rajapaksa.
Later, Fonseka told Opposition party leaders that Rajapaksa had offered him either the post of Prime Minister or Defence Secretary but he had declined both. Rajapaksa had reminded Fonseka that he treated him with as much affection as he did his own brothers and urged him to continue to serve the Government and the country.
The fact remained that Rajapaksa had sent a contingent of commandos to protect Fonseka's children in the US while the battle against the LTTE was in progress, and after the war was won, a block of land was gifted to him, as was to the other service chiefs. Even the legal fees were paid for the notarial deeds. But the General was also upset with a string of events that took place after the war was won, especially matters relating to purges in the Army top brass and relating to certain inquiries, both those initiated by him, and one's against his conduct. The President had also asked him to be present at the arrival reception next day (Thursday) for Burma's (Myanmar) Senior General Than Shwe.
When Gen. Fonseka joined the receiving line at the ceremonies at the Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA), he found that his arch rival, former Commander of the Navy, Admiral (retd.) Wasantha Karannagoda was just ahead of him. In the precedence table of the Government hierarchy a Secretary of a Ministry is above the Chief of defence Staff, and as Secretary to the Ministry of Highways, Karannagoda is above Fonseka now.
When the ceremonies were over, Gen. Fonseka remained cool when the loquacious non-Cabinet rank Labour Minister Mervyn Silva walked up to him and declared "Naginna Epaa Kunu Bakkivalata. Api Gahanava (Do not get onto garbage buckets. We will attack). By evening, a group of some 60, said to be Silva's supporters, had gathered outside the Kelaniya Raja Maha Viharaya. Gen. Fonseka had shed his Army uniform and gone to pay his respects in white national garb.
When he was returning after a meeting with the Chief Incumbent, Venerable Kollupitiye Mahinda Sangharakkhita Thera, a crowd of persons who had gathered outside the Viharaya began to hoot him. They chanted slogans saying, "We will not allow the country to be betrayed for conspiracies of foreign powers." For the likes of Mervin Silva, Government's point man to counter any one who turns adversary or is presumed to be one with such strong-arm tactics, even a General who had given military leadership to defeat the guerrillas and won wide acclaim in Sri Lanka and abroad was of no consequence. Neither did it matter that he had come for religious observances at one of the island's most venerated places of worship. He had also forgotten that at one point of time, not so long ago, the Government was keen on appointing Fonseka as the Deputy Chairman of the Dayaka Sabha (Lay Trustees) in what was then seen as a move to curb the influence of the Chairman of the Dayaka Sabha, Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe. How tables have turned.
On the other hand, some residents did complain that there was a deployment of over 100 troops in and around the temple area. They had checked and sometimes stopped other pilgrims from visiting the temple. Later, an armed motor cycle squad had also been summoned from Colombo to disperse the crowds. The media spokesman for an Opposition party and a journalist now in a Sinhala daily (after being transferred from a weekly due to his close ties with Fonseka) had sent out sms messages inviting both local and foreign media to the temple saying Gen. Fonseka was coming there, alerting all and sundry to the event.
That Gen. Fonseka was using his official authority to deploy troops for personal engagements, which had a political flavour, angered Government leaders. It is rarely that one goes for such religious observances when one gives up a job. The usual practice is to do so when one is about to embark on a new endeavour. That was one of the contributory factors for the announcement on Friday that his offer to retire has been immediately accepted.
Presidential Secretary Lalith Weeratunga drove to Kandy on Friday. He carried with him Gen. Fonseka's letter and discussed issues with President Rajapaksa. The latter directed that the retirement be accepted forthwith. Weeratunga thereafter telephoned the Director of Information, Anusha Pelipita and asked that an official announcement be made that the retirement request has been accepted with immediate effect. A detailed reply to Gen. Fonseka, the Sunday Times learnt, is being formulated. It will provide answers to the 17 reasons in addition to listing out the benefits that have accrued to him from the Rajapaksa administration.
The same day, Gen. Fonseka's security was drastically cut down by the Government. He will now have only a platoon (one Officer and 34 men) and two escort Jeeps. This is besides a bulletproof BMW for his travel. Since he is no more Chief of Defence Staff, Gen. Fonseka has been asked to quit his official bungalow inside Army Headquarters. Defence Ministry officials claim that troops assigned together with two Jeeps comprise the 'personal security detail' to any retiring armed forces commander. Fonseka was now going to be treated as any retired armed force commander.
Gen. Fonseka, who asked for more security, pointed out that Admiral (retd.) Karannagoda had over 100 men, six escort vehicles and a bulletproof car. It is quite clearly unfair to deny Gen. Fonseka the adequate security he has asked for. He himself has cited the example of the Indian Army chief who was led Operation Blue Star to oust Sikh militants from the Golden Temple in Amritsar and was assassinated two years into his retirement. If as the Government claims there is still a threat for VIPs, despite the guerrillas being militarily defeated less than six months ago, General Fonseka is obviously one of the top most targets. Even if he has bluntly or arrogantly denied many others including his senior subordinates' security when he himself was at the helm, this is no reason for the Government to deny him his, and particularly so, if he is the likely “common candidate” from the Opposition at a forthcoming Presidential Election. It also sends the wrong message to others who have tirelessly fought in the separatist war.
To reduce his security contingent purely for political reasons, therefore, is to make him vulnerable and place his life in grave danger. His contribution to this Government and the country far outweigh the punishment he befits. This shows that personal protection in Sri Lanka is no more guided by security considerations but by personal preferences of the most powerful against the less powerful or the powerless. Leaders of some Opposition parties interacting with Gen. Fonseka say they would prune down their own security details and assign them to him. However, such a move will only expose the men involved to disciplinary charges from their respective units.
Rumbling within UNP
The acceptance of Gen. Fonseka's retirement with effect from Friday means he will enter politics earlier than expected. In such an event, despite the consensus reached by leaders of constituent parties of the UNF, there are still rumblings within its main partner, the United National Party (UNP). The Sunday Times learnt that some seniors, who were unhappy about moves to field Gen. Fonseka were incensed by an interview their leader Wickremesinghe gave the Tamil language daily Sudar Oli. Here is an English translation:
"There will be Presidential elections very soon. I have agreed to nominate General Sarath Fonseka. I have also urged the JVP and the TNA to extend their support to him.
"Mr Wickremesinghe was speaking to the Sudar Oli Editor, N.Vithiyatharan last Saturday.
"I am ready to support the common candidate and work collectively. I also want to tell you that we have to reach consensus on certain basics. It is not only the UNP, I have also appealed on behalf of the UNF to the JVP and the TNA to extend their support to Gen Fonseka. To get the support of the TNA, Gen Fonseka has to clear the doubts of the Tamils. He has to come out with convincing answers. In case the TNA considers the responses of Gen Fonseka, it would be easy to get the support of the TNA. The JVP and the TNA also have to reach a consensus.
If Gen Fonseka is to come as the common candidate, he will have to declare that the following would be fulfilled;
- If he is elected as the President, the Executive Presidential system should be abolished within a given time frame.
- He has to spell out his policy on resettling the internally displaced persons.
- He has to form a caretaker government, where I will be appointed as the Prime Minister. In the Caretaker cabinet the JVP and TNA will also be given important portfolios.
- He should withdraw the state of Emergency with immediate effect and fully implement the 17th amendment.
- Within a given period, the General election should be held and powers of Parliament should be strengthened.
"I believe that all the members in the UNF will agree upon these proposals."
Earlier, in an editorial Sudar Oli had exhorted Tamils to rally round to support Gen. Fonseka. Some senior UNPers, who did not wish to be identified, complained that Wickremesinghe had no mandate from the party to make such public declarations. "He should have first obtained the party's formal approval for Gen. Fonseka's candidature and the basis on which he was coming forward. We only learnt of it in the media," one of them said. However, Wickremesinghe loyalists argued that the idea behind the interview was to lay the groundwork for the Tamil minority to support an Army General widely seen as the one who prosecuted the war against the LTTE in which many Tamil civilians were also victims. Without the Tamil vote, Fonseka might face the same fate that Wickremesinghe himself faced at the 2005 Presidential Election, they said and claimed consultations within the party would follow.
Wickremesinghe's remarks have fuelled speculation that some UNP members may appear at today's Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) annual sessions at the Khettarama stadium. However, confident UNP leaders claimed that it was unlikely and added that "some important cross overs" from the Government were imminent when Gen. Fonseka's common candidature at a Presidential Elections is formally announced.
Even the JVP, which is to support Gen. Fonseka's candidature, was disturbed by the Wickremesinghe interview. "The best thing for him (Wickremesinghe) would be to keep his mouth shut," exhorted K.D. Lalkantha during a TV talk show. There are strong indications that the TNA too would veer around to support Gen. Fonseka. The task of negotiating with it has been placed in the hands of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) leader Rauff Hakeem.
TNA leader Rajavarothayam Sampanthan told the Sunday Times, "We will have to wait and see which of the elections are going to be held first. In case they decide to hold the Presidential elections, we should see who the candidates would be. They should declare a clear-cut policy. It is thereafter we will decide whom we will support. So far we have not taken any decision on this matter" (Other issues concerning the TNA are carried separately on page 6).
Signs that the newly formed UNF is gathering support emerged on Friday when it launched a vehicle procession from Colombo to Kandy. The purpose was to hand over to the Mahanayakes and other religious leaders their programme of action and receive their blessings. At Horagolla, where the S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike Samadhi is situated, there were plans for the UNF leaders to pay homage to the two former Prime Ministers, SWRD and Sirimavo Bandaranaike. The aim being to show that the UNF was an almost un-thinkable alliance of the two historical foes, the UNP and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Vehicles were carrying cut-outs of SWRD, Mrs. Bandaranaike, Chandrika Bandaranaike-Kumaratunga - and Mangala Samaraweera. They had blue flags - along with the UNP's green.
Just ahead of the Samadhi, the ruling party (SLFP) organisers for the area burnt tyres and tried to prevent the motorcade from proceeding. Wickremesinghe turned into the Bandaranaike walauwwa and from there entered the Samadhi area without going through the front entrance. Traffic was held up as stones were pelted. One journalist covering the event was injured as the Police restored order after some time. The Kandy road was decorated with green buntings, but mainly at the town areas. One could not say that there were masses thronging the streets to greet the motorcade as it sped along to its final destination.
A further shot in the arm for Wickremesinghe came when he flew to New Delhi on a four-day visit beginning last Sunday. He was unable to meet Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, but met most other senior leaders, including Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee, Home Minister P. Chidambaram, External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna and spoke to National Security Affairs Adviser R.K. Narayanan on the telephone. The latter was in Chennai. Most of the leaders had been on alert at the time with a cyclone warning in Mumbai.
The Indian leaders had expressed concern about the IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) and Wickremesinghe had told them that the newly formed Joint Opposition, which includes the JVP and hopefully, the TNA, would come up with a joint action plan for IDPs. The Indian leaders had asked about the political situation in Sri Lanka and who might challenge President Rajapaksa. Wickremesinghe had told them that such a decision would be taken only after the President formally announced a Presidential Election.
However Gen. Fonseka's name had emerged in the talks, and Wickremesinghe was to say that de-mining was an issue before re-settlement, and that Gen. Fonseka had wanted more soldiers to be trained in de-mining to expedite the re-settlement process, and that these soldiers could be sent to other world hot-spots on de-mining exercises. He was expected to make a public announcement at a rally at Gampaha yesterday (Saturday) on this matter.
Whether Wickremesinghe's visit was to get India's 'blessings' for the Joint Opposition, or not, it is significant that Gen. Fonseka's resignation came only after Wickremesinghe's visit to India. This is whilst a three-member delegation comprising Presidential Secretary Lalith Weeratunga, Senior Presidential Advisor Basil Rajapaksa and Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa are still awaiting a date from the Indian Government for a visit to New Delhi.
Wickremesinghe's visit was at his own request. Significant enough, Indian leaders and officials had raised with the UNF and Opposition Leader their plans to field General Fonseka as the "common candidate" at a Presidential Election. The Sunday Times learnt they informally expressed some apprehensions over his candidature and asked Wickremesinghe what guarantee he had if Gen. Fonseka won and did not fulfil the promises sought by the opposition parties. Indian concerns were based on the many military takeovers in Pakistan and fears of a possible military regime in their southern neighbourhood. Wickremesinghe had replied "good faith."
Like the Indian leaders and senior officials, there are many in Sri Lanka who are posing the same question, perhaps quite justifiably. If the Opposition leaders have not been able to get Gen. Fonseka to execute the simple task of handing over a letter seeking retirement with an annexure that has been agreed upon by all of them, this question may become even more relevant.
A greater responsibility rests in their hands for therein lies the future course of political events in Sri Lanka and the destiny of its people. In the attempt to oust whom they see as a monster, is the Joint Opposition in the process of creating one whom they won't be able to control.
Gen. Fonseka’s real letter
Here is the full text of the real letter General Fonseka sent President Rajapaksa seeking his retirement,
His Excellency the President
Through the Secretary, Ministry of Defence,
Public Security, Law and Order
Presidential Secretariat
COLOMBO 12th November 2009
Your Excellency
REQUEST TO RETIRE FROM THE REGULAR FORCE OF THE SRI LANKA ARMY
1. I, General G S C Fonseka RWP RSP VSV USP rcds psc presently serving as the Chief of Defence Staff, was enlisted to the Ceylon Army on 05th Feb 1970 and was commissioned on the 01st June 1971. On the 6th Dec 2005 due to the trust and confidence placed on me, Your Excellency was kind enough to promote me to the rank of Lieutenant General and appoint me as the Commander of the Sri Lanka Army in an era when the Country was embroiled with the menace of terrorism and was in a stalemate state after having toiled for a solution politically or otherwise for over 25 years without a success.
2. During my command of 3 years and 7 months, the Sri Lanka Army managed to eradicate the terrorist movement having apprehended an unbelievable stock of arms and munitions and decisively defeating the LTTE and its murderous leadership which Your Excellency is obviously aware of. I would not be exaggerating to state that I was instrumental in leading the Army to this historic victory, of course with Your Excellency's political support, which helped to materialize this heroic action. Though the field commanders, men and all members of the Army worked towards this common goal, it is with my vision, command and leadership that this yeomen task was achieved. I was determined to achieve this victory as I wanted to ensure that there is permanent peace and security for the future generation of the motherland.
3. I do appreciate the fact that the Country and Your Excellency did recognize my services which led to me being promoted to the first ever serving four star general to command the Army, nevertheless the courses of action which initiated subsequently greatly depressed me which I have enumerated in the Annex hereto.
4. Considering the facts mentioned in the Annex and more which I am privy to withhold, I am compelled to believe that Your Excellency and the Government has lost your trust and faith bestowed upon me for reasons only known to Your Excellency. Hence as the senior most serving military officer in the Country with 40 years of service, such a situation does not warrant a continuation of my duties any longer, thereby I have the honour to request that I be permitted to retire from the Regular Force of the Army with effect from 01st December 2009.
5. Furthermore I have the honour to request that on retirement Your Excellency would be kind enough to grant me sufficient security which includes trained combat soldiers, a suitable vehicle with sufficient protection (Bullet proof), escort vehicles and dummy vehicles for my conveyances due to the fact that I am considered as one of the highest priority targets by the LTTE, which they are yet capable of achieving. Also, I wish to bring to Your Excellency's kind notice that over 100 men, six escort vehicles and a bullet proof vehicle have been placed at the convenience of the former Commander of the Navy who recently retired. Your Excellency, I do further request that a suitable protected government resident be made available for me to live in. Also it is requested that approval be granted for me to continue occupation of the present official residence of the Commander of the Army - "The General's House" in Bahudhaloka Mawatha until I am provided with a suitable married quarter. I presume that such arrangements would be made available to me, considering the threat factor I am facing, which Your Excellency is well aware of.
6. I would also wish to quote an example in the case of the former Indian Chief of Army Staff General A S Vadiya, instrumental in leading the Indian Army in Operation Blue Star against the Sheiks at the Golden Temple, Amristar in 1984, was assassinated whilst on retirement in 1986 purely in revenge of his victories achieved. I do not wish to experience a similar incident as I have already sustained serious injuries after the attempt on my life by a suicide cadre of the LTTE, in spite of I being injured twice previously during military operations. Though during the operations I conducted myself in a daring manner disregarding threats to my life, on conclusion of the war I have absolutely no intention to endanger my life. Thereby, I am compelled to entrust you with my security which is requested for life.
7. Furthermore, I would like to emphasis on a statement made by me during my tenure as the Commander of the Army. In that, I mentioned my dislike to be in command forever and also I would ensure that my successor would not be burdened with the task of fighting the same war, which I abided with. Hence, as I have already overstayed my retirement date by 4 years, I wish to proceed on retirement without further delays.
8. Forwarded for Your Excellency's kind consideration please.
I have the honour to be
Your Excellency's
Obedient Servant
G S C FONSEKA RWP RSP VSV USP rcds psc
General
Chief of Defence Staff
And the real annexure
Here is the full text of the 17-point annexure that accompanied Gen. Sarath Fonseka's letter to President Mahinda Rajapaksa, seeking to retire. It is different from the version seen and agreed to by opposition parties:
ANNEX 'A' TO
LETTER CDS/1
DATED
12h NOVEMBER 2009
FACTORS AFFECTING MY RETIREMENT FROM THE REGULAR FORCE OF THE ARMY
1. Various agencies misleading Your Excellency by stating a possible coup immediately after the victory over the LTTE which obviously led to a change of command in spite of my request to be in command until the Army celebrated its 60th Anniversary. This fear psychosis of a coup is well known among the defence circle.
2. Appointing an officer pending a disciplinary inquiry who performed duties only as a holding formation commander in the final battle as my successor, disregarding my recommendations to appoint Major General G A Chandrasiri as the Commander of the Army who was the then Chief of Staff and an officer with an exemplary service as the Security Forces Commander in Jaffna for over 3 years. This has already led to a deterioration of the high standards I was capable of introducing to the Army, to my bitter disappointment.
3. Appointing me as the Chief of Defence Staff, though a senior appointment to that of a service commander, with basically no authority, except for mere coordinating responsibilities in a manner which mislead the general public of the country and most members of the Armed Forces. In that the Secretary Defence pushing me to vacate the post of the Commander in just two weeks after the victory and Your Excellency insisting me to hand over duties in less than two months depriving me of my moral obligations in revamping the welfare and providing a sound administration to the men who fought a gallant battle. Due to this action you also denied me of my desire to streamline the career planning of Common Stream Officers whom I wanted to ensure that they are given with career prospects of becoming experts/specialist in their fields.
4. Further, prior to my appointment I was misled on the authority vested with the CDS. I was made to understand that the appointment carried more command responsibilities and authority than earlier over all three services, but subsequent to my appointment a letter by the Strategic Affairs Adviser to the Secretary Defence indicated that my appointment was purely to coordinate the services and not that of overall operational command. The letter is attached herewith for Your Excellency's information. Such actions clearly defines Your Excellency's and the Governments unwillingness to grant me with command responsibilities which leads to believe in a strong mistrust in me, which is most depressing after all what was performed by me to achieve war victory.
5. During a subsequent Service Commanders Meeting, the Secretary Defence was bold enough to state an unethical and uncalled statement by mentioning that "if operational control of all three services is granted to the CDS it would be very dangerous", which indeed was a loss of face to me in the presences of subordinate services commanders.
6. Your Excellency, you too made a statement at the very first security council soon after the 18th of May 09 when the battled was declared over, to the extent that "a strong public opinion is in the making to say that the Country is in possession of a too powerful army, which will lead Sri Lanka to another State like that of Myanmar". It was surprising to hear such a comment from Your Excellency in spite of your repeated praise and boast of the war victory brought about by the same Army. I personally felt that Your Excellency has commenced mistrusting your own loyal Army which attained the unimaginable victory just a week ago. You again repeated the same statement even after I handed over the command. Over these comments I felt disgusted as these comments indirectly insulted those who made the supreme sacrifice during the war victory.
7. The present Army Commander immediately on assuming duties commenced transferring senior officers who immensely contributed to the war effort during my command tenure including those junior officers working with my wife at the Seva Vanitha Army Branch which was involved in looking after the welfare of the troops, was clearly to challenge the loyalty of officers and most discouraging to the officer corps of the Army, with a wrong signal being transmitted on my authority.
8. Your Excellency, I wish to remind you that whilst the Eelam War IV was being fought I repeatedly requested to increase the compensation paid to those Next of Kin of the officers and men killed in action from Rs.150,000.00 which was the amount sanctioned in year 1985, to Rs.500,000.00 as the approved amount is grossly insufficient in the present context. This request was not considered favourably thereby I feel extremely guilty that the Army and the Government at large has not looked into the welfare of those who paid the supreme sacrifice.
9. With a pain of mind it was noted that the same Army which gained victory for the Nation was suspected of staging a coup and thereby alerting the Government of India once again on the 15th of October 2009, unnecessarily placing the Indian Troops on high alert. This action did tarnish the image and reputation gained by the Sri Lanka Army as a competent and professional organization who was capable of defeating a terrorist group after the Malayan Emergency, in the eyes of the World. This suspicion would have been due to the loyalty of the Sri Lanka Army towards me as its past Commander who led the Army to the historic victory.
10. During my absences from the Country (23 Oct 2009 to 5 Nov 2009) being on overseas leave, the Army Headquarters was bold enough to change the security personnel deployed at the AHQ Main Entrance and the Ministry of Defence emphasizing the withdrawal of the Sinha Regiment troops who were attached to me, as you are aware is my parent regiment and supplementing them with other regimental personnel. The Sinha Regiment troops were good enough to provide security to the Ministry of Defence for 4 years and it is surprising to note how the combat efficiency of the said troops supposed to have dropped overnight as per Secretary Defence's opinion.
Further the Sinha Regiment troops numbering a mere 4, non combatants, deployed for vehicle checking duties at the AHQ Main Entrance, were replaced by 14 armed Armoured Corps personnel, whilst a further two platoons were brought in to prevent the 4 non combat Sinha Regiment personnel performing duties, creating a mockery to the general public. This clearly indicates a questionable loyalty of troops good enough for duties for over four years purely due to the fact that the troops were from my Regiment. This also indirectly reflects mistrust on me or an indication that the persons concern wish to keep a tab on my movements and visitors to my HQ/residence which is a clear display of suspicion created on me.
11. Further on instructions of the Secretary Defence, troops from the Gajaba Regiment was brought in to the MOD complex to remove the Sinha Regiment troops which indicated the creation of divided loyalty within the Army and reasons to believe that the Army now being politicized. This is being encouraged by the Army Commander too who thinks that the Armoured Corp troops should over power Sinha Regiment troops again in the Army HQ complex which includes my office and residence.
12. Instigating malicious and detrimental news items and rumors by interested parties including several senior government politicians which led to identify me as a traitor in spite of my personal contribution of the government to change the history of our country.
13. It is with pain of mind that I note that the ordinary Army which I toiled to transform into a highly professional outfit is now losing its way. Increased desertions, lack of enthusiasm to enlist (A drop in enlistment rate by 50% is recorded), disciplinary problems on advocating divided commands indicates an unprofessional organization in the offing. During the last two months the members deserted are higher than the recruitment.
14. Resettlement process of the IDPs was also a point of concern. The IDPs are resettled in an ad hoc manner without proper infrastructure facilities to the dismay of most inmates. The Government has resorted to this course of action merely refusing to incur an additional expense for the betterment of the IDPs. This is indeed a short term remedy to get rid of the IDP issue. I strongly advocated that the resettlement should commence only after proper demining, providing necessary infrastructure facilities and on confirming of the identity of any infiltrated terrorists, thereby ensuring 100% safety and security to the younger generations among IDPs.
15. The conditions in the IDP centers is also a point of great concern to me. Thousands of valiant soldiers including members of the Navy, Air Force, Police and the Civil Defence Force sacrificed their valuable lives to liberate these unfortunate civilians from the brutality and tyranny of the LTTE in order that they could live in an environment of freedom and democracy. Yet, today many of them are continuing to live in appalling conditions due to the lack of proper planning and the reluctance to incur expenditure on the part of the Government.
16. The troop requirement for the resettlement is grossly insufficient and cannot sustain the demanding needs in the resettled areas, thus placing the innocent people in turmoil. Your Excellency's government is yet to win the peace in spite of the fact that the Army under my leadership won the war. There is no clear policy to ensure the security of the Tamil people thereby leaving room to ruin the victory attained, paving the way for yet another uprising in the future due to lack of security arrangements in the resettled areas.
17. Sri Lanka Army ensured the safe custody of approximately 10,000 surrendered LTTE cadres. But it is regrettably noted that so far no constructive action has been taken to methodically rehabilitate them in order to ensure that they get back to the society as properly rehabilitated law abiding citizens. |
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