12th March 2000

The deadly dusk-to-dawn drama

Attired in what looked like security forces uniforms from a distance, the group of Tiger guerrillas, estimated to be around ten, drew little attention as they lay in ambush. It was near the roundabout at Castle Street, parallel to Cotta Road, just opposite the Ayurveda Hospital at Rajagiriya.

The streets were clogged with traffic, mostly office workers, returning to their homes on Friday evening. Dusk was setting in. In a brazen move, they had placed two claymore mines in the direction of the road, virtually under the nose of policemen who were on duty almost every 100 metres. They had pulled them out from long bags, the types used to carry cricket gear.

Around 5.40 p.m. Rohitha Cooray had arrived to check on his house nearby. It was not occupied during nights though his wife conducted English classes for young children during mornings. As he entered, he observed some suspicious looking persons inside. He walked to a relative next door to complain about the men. The lady there did not think there was anything serious. She said they must be some "kudu karayo" or drug addicts. But Mr. Cooray was not satisfied with that answer.

So he walked up to the checkpoint just near the Royal Park junction to alert the Policemen. Three of them picked up their weapons and rushed towards the house to check on what they have been told. A Tiger guerrilla who saw them coming mowed down one after another with a T-56 rifle. All three dropped dead.

For the LTTE group that had successfully infiltrated the security cordon around Parliament, that is where things began to sour. The firing had alerted other policemen assigned for duty along Castle Street and beyond. Parliament was in session and a debate on the customary monthly extension of the State of Emergency was part of business. In addition, the votes of the Ministry of Defence were being debated at the Committee stage. Service Chiefs and the IGP accompanied by their senior officers were in the House.

Quite clearly, Cabinet Ministers, top defence officials, heads of security forces, Police and even Parliamentarians were targets of the LTTE's group. But the cold blooded killing of the three Policemen had raised hell.

A Jeep load of commandos from the Police Special Task Force (STF) moved in from a command post nearby to encounter the group. One of the guerrillas who had an explosive laden suicide jacket strapped to his chest, ran along Castle Street, in the direction of Parliament and detonated himself. He was blown to pieces.

His severed head lay a few feet away from the statue of the late Dr. N.M. Perera. The commandos opened out with their M-16 assault rifles. Two guerrillas dropped dead. The explosion of two claymore mines, placed to take on convoys of VIPs or security forces top brass, were exploded. It caused damage to sign boards 50 metres away. The rebels then fired two Light Anti-tank Weapons (LAW) to divert heavy gunfire they were attracting from troops and the police.

Office workers returning in a Dolphin van were hit by the fire and died on the spot. So were some in a bus and other passers by. Yet others hugged the ground and remained motionless until the firefight, which lasted for well over an hour, ended. Residents in the area fled their homes leaving them wide open. Some returned later but other houses remained abandoned as police and troops went on a house to house search.

Coming under pressure, at least six guerrillas proceeded along Castle Street upto the level crossing . They walked along the rail track to Wanathamulla. Hardly half an hour later, six of them had holed themselves up in the third floor of Serpentine Flats at Serpentine Road. They had reached the area by firing their way through and causing panic among the dwellers. Army and Police units surrounded the building as Operations Commander, Colombo, Major General Nihal Marambe, put together an operation for a commando assault.

Shortly before midnight, a Sri Lanka Air Force Mi-17 helicopter ferried a group of heavily armed commandos from the Bandaranaike International Airport. They were part of a specialised group trained in anti hijack and hostage rescue techniques. It was not until 5.20 am last morning that they went into action. By then, only the ground floor dwellers of the flats were evacuated. Others on the three other floors were unable to move out for fear of attack by the guerrillas.

Five commando teams moved in. They were made up of four man specialist teams. There were three assault teams, a sniper group and a gas team. Soon after they moved in, a member of the sniper team shot one of the guerrillas dead. Moments later, loud explosions ren`ted the air. The guerrillas, who wore suicide jackets, had exploded themselves. What remained of their bodies were skulls and pieces of flesh. Four commandos were injured, one of them critically. It turned out that the remaining four guerrillas committed suicide. Two civilian flat dwellers were also killed in the commando operation.

Commandos found a General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG), two Multi Purpose Machine Guns (MPMG), two Light Anti-tank Weapons (LAW), two T-56 assault rifles and three 40 mm grenades (Tomba).

As dawn broke, troops cleared the building of its dwellers and carried out a thorough check. Later in the day, the dwellers were allowed to get back after the Army gave an all clear signal.

When they abandoned their ambush at the Castle Street roundabout, the guerrillas had also left behind some of the hardware they smuggled into the City for their assault. Among them were three Light Anti-tank Weapons, two large sized bags (like the ones used to carry cricketing gear), two empty shells of LAW and two empty shells of 40 mm grenades.

As the mayhem ended, at least 23 were killed. That included six policemen and three guerrillas. More than 48 were injured. Details of the gory sequence of events, some of them related by innocent victims, appear elsewhere in this newspaper.

The aborted mission by LTTE group delivered some important messages to the security establishment in Colombo. There were no intelligence warnings of the incident itself though recent arrests and other information came as conclusive proof that infiltrated guerrillas, including suicide cadres, were planning attacks on VIPs. That too in the current year which has been declared The Year of War by the LTTE. That alone would have been sufficient warning for contingency planning and a blueprint for crisis management.

How did the guerrillas manage to enter a security zone, and that too with a considerable quantity of weapons? How did they position the two claymore mines without being noticed by policemen on duty or the mobile patrols that operated during days when the Parliament is in session ? Is the security of the City and suburbs adequate with guerrillas being able to carry out such an attack with impunity? Where did a suspected support group helping Friday's attacks escape to. This group was to have tipped off when a convoy was to pass the ambush point.

Embarrassed security forces and Police officials met in conference at the Ministry of Defence yesterday to identify lapses and work out further measures to tighten security.

Friday's incidents caused widespread confusion with senior security forces and Police officials unaware of what was going on. Cell phone networks were clogged. So were the exchanges of the Sri Lanka Telecom as word spread that a gang war was under way.

Radio traffic at the Police Communications Centre, including the IGP's Command Room, crackled with desperate messages to officers in the field. They were trying to ascertain what was going on. In turn, they were being bombarded with radio calls by the Presidential Security Division (PSD).

President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga was busy recording a meet-the-people programme via satellite at Temple Trees when the incident broke out. PSD officials were seeking information to brief her. For well over 45 minutes confusion reigned.

Colombo's outgoing Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jagath Jayawardena began to slowly piece together a cohesive picture of what has been going on. It was no easy task. Earlier he was erroneously told by his officers that fighting had erupted at Model Farm Road . Initial reports later spoke of at least 40 guerrillas, many in camouflage operating from an abandoned house. Between appeals to the Sri Lanka Air Force to scramble helicopters to track down the guerrillas, he began to feed the Police Comcentre clearer details later. Heavy traffic had clogged Castle Street and other nearby roads. This impeded the evacuation of casualties. Worse still, troop re-inforcements could not come through. Panic reigned. Police units moving in were ordered to clear the area and seal it off. That denied exit to those trapped inside and entry to those outside. A house to house search began. Senior officials at the Comcentre in the meanwhile directed senior security officials in Parliament through safe routes to their offices and homes. One VIP was driven to Pelawatte and through a circuitous route to High Level Road and later to his official residence,

Friday's incident throws open a whole gamut of questions on the effectiveness of anti terrorist measures in the city. This incident took place cheek by jowl to a police check-point on the road to Parliament that has been in that location for perhaps a couple of years. That the LTTE selected this as their ambush site by itself questions the efficacy of the system.

It is also a matter of conjecture whether the failure of the LTTE to target a VIP was as a result of effective anti-terrorist measures or whether it was due to inefficiency of LTTE planning or whether it was due to accidental exposure of the LTTE presence. To question so is not to detract from giving credit to the swift counter measures that were taken against the LTTE attackers.

Anti-terrorist measures, include many defensive aspects of countering terrorism. Judging from Friday's incident and other LTTE attacks in Colombo that have proceeded is questionable whether anti terrorist measures are effective. No doubt, the technical aspects of anti terrorist operations will be reviewed in the light of this incident, but it is a matter of closing the stable door too late.

It is acknowledged that it is a difficult and thankless task to implement anti terrorist measures in large cities. Nevertheless effective anti terrorist operations in the city are critically important considering the option of targets available, their high vulnerability, and the political and economic repercussions of such attacks. These operations demand imaginative planning and implementation by well-trained personnel. Skills that are different to those required in theatres of combat.

It is questionable whether operations in Colombo meet these high demands. At least judging from the many check points in Colombo that have been more or less permanent over years, it would appear that a bit more imaginative planning will not be out of order.

Friday's incident underscores the point. This attack also demonstrates a change of LTTE tactics. An attack involving suicide bombers in pairs backed by squad support of small arms and LAW is a new feature. How it will manifest itself in the future is a matter for study by intelligence. For the government however it means that military counter measures must be swift, as it is effective. Apart from the military aspects of the attack, there is also a significant political dimension. The comparative slow down in operations in the north and east has been accompanied with an increase in political pressure.

Beginning with the abortive attempt on President Chandrika Bandaranayake Kumaratunge on December 18, 1999 there has been an increasing threat of suicide bomb attacks on VIPs. At the same time the LTTE have stepped up their efforts for third party mediation with international opinion overtures to the government in this regard.

Behind the talk of overt willingness to negotiate, the LTTE declaration of this being the "Year of War" does not give credence to their willingness to open a dialogue. Neither does their previous track record. Add to this the threat of increasing LTTE offensive in Colombo and in other areas outside the north and east, the question of meeting at negotiation still remains a distant hope.

The Fifth Column

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