Editorial

2nd April 2000

War of mind not of force

The LTTE's not-so surprise attack on Elephant Pass, and the ensuing fallout both military and political is not good news . It brings bad tidings particularly to aspirants for honours such as the Nobel Peace prize. Even a layman's assessment would have made it obvious that an attack on the Elephant Pass garrison was imminent, particularly because the Tigers were buoyed by their successes in the Wanni in November 1999. Our own Defence Correspondent has been forewarning such an assualt in his recent columns-but then who cares?

On that occasion, the LTTE's campaign seemed to be audacious. But, the risks paid off, and the LTTE succeeded in establishing a beachhead in Vettilaikerni, which had been recaptured by the forces from enemy hands almost ten years back.

The Sri Lankan forces responded immediately by ploughing two elite divisions south of Paranthan. But, these divisions were doing a job of holding territory and certainly didn't seem to be convinced that attack was known to be the best form of defence.

Now, with last week's onslaught by the LTTE, the equation is that the 2000 LTTE cadres are holding 16,000 Sri Lankan troops to ransom.

That's the measure of the LTTE's audacity, and going by the way things are, the LTTE's recuperating political theoretician Anton Balasingham's assertion "that its an inevitability that Jaffna will be recaptured'' cannot be ignored. Balasingham's forte is talking — and shooting from the hip. But, his loquaciousness aside, it's evident that his role is to create the political ambience in which the Tigers can negotiate. Some weeks ago, we in these columns suggested that pre-talks space will be used by both sides to attack, and create positions of strength from which talking and arm twisting will be easier. It appears now that the prediction was correct – except that only one side is doing the attacking now.

Apparently the forces had planned some offensives which were to be sprung upon the enemy when the time was about right. But, the enemy was not about ready to go by our time tables. Our Defence Correspondent has been predicting for sometime in his columns that a Tiger attack on Elephant Pass was imminent. Was the army unaware that a guerrilla force such as the LTTE, was poised to attack at the most inconvenient moment?

On the flip side, it will be easy to accuse us of being the armchair pundits/remote control Generals. All we can say is that when it comes to attacking the media, the government live by the credo that attack is the best form of defence.

Anyway, it's a free country, and our prognostications, especially in hindsight, seemed to have been quite accurate. However unkind the sound of it, a logical assessment will be that the Sri Lankan armed forces are caught in the conventional straight-jacket. It wouldn't be incorrect to suggest that the war with the LTTE is not a war of brute force but one of imagination. Right now the LTTE is winning in that department. Sri Lankan forces on the contrary have perennially been on the refrain that "there is a dearth of men and materials.''

That's a misrepresentation for the obvious reason that the LTTE seems to be repeating lopsided campaign successes, where their men attack with less numbers and get away with greater gains. Do the forces take it for granted that the LTTE has now graduated from being an unconventional rag-tag group to a somewhat conventional force, which has the advantage of flexibility and ruthless innovation? And if so, aren't the forces doomed by this mindset? Maybe the army is hamstrung by its cumbersome command structures. If so, the army has to be overhauled, no matter what it takes. To put it succinctly — its not a comfortable feeling, staring these negotiations in the face and realizing that Anton Balasingham may be dead right about Jaffna.

The Political Column