13th August 2000

A blue water Navy with India's help

Neighbouring India has joined the list of countries backing Sri Lanka through military assistance to fight the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Significantly their support is in an important area – to prevent Tiger guerrillas from inducting weapons supplies to sustain the high intensity conflict now going on.

This is by the sale to Sri Lanka of an Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV). The news was broken on August 11 by the widely accessed Tamilnet website. It quoted another website, newindpress.com run by the Indian Express newspaper group to say "India has decided to sell military hardware to Sri Lanka and negotiations are on to clinch the deal on an offshore patrol vessel for the Sri Lanka Navy…."

Extracts of what the Tamilnet report said: "The newindpress.com website quoting sources in India's Ministry of Defence (MOD) said the Indian Navy has earmarked an offshore patrol vessel (OPV), INS Shardae, made at Hindustan Shipyard Limited, Vishakapatnam for Sale to India.

"The OPV is for the Sri Lanka Navy to effectively patrol its coast and mainly try and prevent the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from bringing in arms and ammunition.

"The Sri Lanka Navy will also be getting weapon systems like surface-to-surface guns fitted in the OPV from India, the website run by the Indian Express newspaper group said.

"India had purchased OPVs from South Korea in the late 80s and early 90s. The fast crafts are fitted with guns and special sights and devices for the effective patrolling of the waters even at night, an official Indian Naval headquarters told newindpress.com.

"An OPV is not a warship. It is an auxiliary support system. It is like a support ship and can carry troops, food and water supplies. It is good for patrolling and for troops induction. Presently she (OPV) is being retrofitted to suit the needs of the Sri Lanka Navy," he added.

Contrary to Indian Express claims, negotiations for the deal, which involves over US $ 20 million, have already been concluded and the Sri Lanka Navy is now preparing to accept the OPV shortly. The INS Shardae, yet to be given a Sri Lankan name, is a 101 metre long Sukhanya class vessel with a displacement of 1800 tons. It has a helipad and a storage facility for helicopters. Capable of carrying 80 on board, the Indian OPV has an endurance of three weeks. The OPV has been built in India to a South Korean design.

It is on this OPV that the Sri Lanka Navy's new Helicopter Wing will see action. The setting up of a new Air Wing (Helicopter Wing) by the Sri Lanka Navy was exclusively reported in these columns on July 30. The move is seen as the first step by the Navy to develop a blue water capability.

The fact that the Navy of a small nation like Sri Lanka is developing its own air capability, instead of seeking an input from the Air Force, has generated considerable controversy. 

This is particularly in view of the costs involved. It is argued that the Ministry of Defence has not studied the various operational and other aspects before giving the Navy the approval to set up its own Helicopter Wing.

Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Cecil Tissera, has enlisted to his Volunteer Force three retired officers of the Sri Lanka Air Force – Wing Commander Sunil Cabral, Group Captain Ranjit Yapa and Squadron Leader Romesh Mendis from August 1. They have been placed in the ranks of Commodore, Captain and Commander, respectively. Their immediate task is to prepare the ground work for the setting up of the Helicopter Wing. Initial operations of the Helicopter Wing are likely to be with a light helicopter, possibly an Indian built Chetak. The Indian Navy is expected to provide training to Sri Lankan personnel for this purpose.

It can now be revealed that the Indian offer to provide an OPV to the Sri Lanka Navy was made and accepted during top level talks a team headed by Defence Secretary, Chandrananda de Silva, had with his Indian counterpart in New Delhi in August, last year.

The fact that these talks were held was reported in these columns. But the Situation Report – August 22, 1999, avoided mention of this Indian offer of the OPV, it was still to generate an angry response from India's High Commissioner in Colombo, Shankar Menon. 

He lodged a strong protest with the Foreign Ministry that revelations in these columns, allegedly leaked by some member of the delegation, had caused them concern.

And now, an year later, the Indian Express group has not only come out with the details but have also quoted an Indian Defence Ministry official as saying that the deal was "beneficial for the Government financially and marked a quantum jump in the growth of the defence industry in the country." The MOD officials added "this means that the Indian defence industry and especially the ship building industry has acquired international stature and manufacture ships which have a demand even in the international market.

Firstly, a brief account on what the Situation Report (August 22, 1999) said to draw outgoing High Commissioner, Shanker Menon's protest:

"A general election only weeks away and heightening security concerns over fighting with Pakistan did not deter India from addressing the security concerns of her southern neighbour, Sri Lanka early this week.

"A top level delegation led by Defence Secretary, Chandrananda de Silva, held talks with high ranking officials of the Indian defence establishment over security related matters. 

If he was happy the talks ended on a successful and harmonious note. He was equally happy his three day long mission to New Delhi went off without glare of any publicity.

"Until the departure of Mr. de Silva and his entourage from Colombo last Sunday and their return during the early hours of Thursday, there was no mention in the Sri Lankan and even the Indian media about the visit or the issues that were to come up (or discussed) during a string of top level talks.

"Mr de Silva was accompanied by a high level team. It comprised retired Inspector General of Police, Frank Silva, now Director General, Directorate of Foreign Intelligence( DFI), Rear Admiral Daya Sandagiri, Chief of Staff, Sri Lanka Navy, Captain T.G.S. Samarasinghe, Deputy Director, Operations, Sri Lanka Navy, Air Commodore Lal Perera, Director, Aeronautical Engineering and two Foreign Ministry officials – Dr Rohan Perera, Senior Legal Advisor and Romesh Jayasinghe, Director, South Asia and SAARC. Sri Lanka's High Commissioner in India, Mangala Moonesinghe, was also associated with the team together with Defence Attache Captain D.W.A. Dissanayake.

"Mr de Silva and his delegation are learnt to have discussed security related bi-lateral issues with his Indian counterparts headed by Defence Secretary, T.R. Prasad. Some members of the team also met their respective counterparts.

"One of the main areas of discussion, according to authoritative sources, were security matters of interest to Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean region including the Palk Straits – a subject which had earlier been raised at an operational level during talks between officials of the two Navies (Situation Report – May 9, 1999)

"That time, it came in the backdrop of reports that LTTE arms shipments were arriving on the north eastern coast. Two senior Sri Lanka Navy officials – Commodore T.N. Tuduwewatta and Deputy Director, Captain T.S.G. Samarasinghe – raised the issue during talks with Indian Navy officials in New Delhi. The talks were held on May 13 and 14. Of particular concern then were two vessels, "MV Mariamma" and "Showa Maru."

"The Indian authorities then explained that the Indian Navy had acted on representations made by the Sri Lanka Navy. Together with the Coast Guard, they had mounted surveillance on "MV Mariamma" and had later closed in on the vessel. It was then observed to be on fire. There was no sign of life on board. An air and sea search had also shown no survivors. The Indian Navy suspects that "MV Mariamma" transported fuel. They had said they picked up some barrels of fuel.

"As for "Showa Maru," the Indian Navy had explained that they had monitored the vessel. However, it had sailed out to international waters before the Indian Navy/Coast Guard could engage or apprehend them.

"These and other related incidents in the Palk Straits were in Mr de Silva's brief. But by some coincidence, as the delegation sat down to talks in New Delhi, more developments in the north eastern waters were to further bolster the position of the Sri Lanka delegation….."

Mr. Menon's concerns were expressed on the above revelations. The Sunday Times did not reveal the offer by India of the OPV or its acceptance by Sri Lanka. Nor were any specific details of any of the subjects discussed revealed. Yet, Mr. Menon's protest to the Foreign Ministry saw the Defence Ministry order a CID investigation.

Its purpose was to ascertain which member of the delegation leaked the story to The Sunday Times. Needless to say, most members of the delegation and even Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Tissera, had their statements recorded by senior officials of the CID. One of the questions asked from them was whether they leaked the story. Though I am aware, I would not wish to comment on the findings.

But, there appears to be a moral in this episode. Even without the Indian protest, The Sunday Times did not divulge the offer of the OPV or details of the subject matters of discussion. Even if they tried to force local authorities to hunt for sources of The Sunday Times, evidently Indian officials have not been able to prevent details from appearing in their own media. Perhaps a case for the CBI now.

These developments came in the backdrop of a continuing relative lull in the battle areas. That is not to say fighting has stopped altogether. 

A string of incidents in the Wanni, since May this year, has prompted security authorities to wonder whether Tiger guerrillas are making attempts to destablise Mannar and the adjoining areas.

Since May, intelligence authorities have been warning of a build up in the Mannar and Talaimannar areas. More guerrillas and arms were reported to have been moved into the area in what is being suspected is a bid to cut off the sea board town from Vavuniya.

Last Thursday, an officer and nine soldiers were killed at Puthukulam junction (on the road between Vavuniya and Mannar) when Tiger guerrillas set off a claymore mine and later attacked troops who were preparing a routine clearance patrol. Two Light Machine Guns and seven T-56 rifles were among items lost by the troops.

The lull in military operations continues in both the North and East. Except for occasional skirmishes and forays into bunker lines the land battle in the peninsula has consolidated on the lines drawn in the aftermath of Elephant Pass. In the East, an uneasy balance prevails with sporadic ambushes and bomb attacks on the forces to contest government control of urban areas. This is particularly so in the Trincomalee and Batticaloa districts.

Whilst the government continues with the re-equipment of the forces the LTTE do not appear to be out done either. 

There is speculation that the LTTE has obtained more sophisticated weaponry, which if so portends the escalation of the war into a new dimension whenever hostilities are intensified.

LTTE strategic operations in Colombo and outside the north and the east have also slowed down. This is not to say that their operational infrastructure in these areas have been defused. The LTTE have been long known to maintain cadres of dormant operatives to be activated when required. This is the insidious invisible arm of terrorism against which constant vigilance has to be maintained.

After the intensified military and political activity by the LTTE during the Elephant Pass campaign and immediately after, with much hype of the recapture of Jaffna the current lull by the LTTE opens many questions. The most obvious being whether the LTTE has run out of steam. It would appear that they seem to have run out of breath, for the moment, but hardly out of steam.

In that situation the LTTE appear to need a breather to consolidate on both equipment and manpower resources. The latter particularly as it is an ever-diminishing resource considering the sparse population of the Wanni.

Moreover, any operational strategy for the peninsula has to be totally different to that in the Wanni considering that the peninsula is built-up and urbanised. 

Tactics based on the LTTE preference for heavy artillery and mortar support is not possible without enormous collateral damage in the densely populated peninsula. A change of tactics and strategy require retaining and a new approach for which time is essential.

The Elephant Pass victory may have been adrenaline to the overseas Tamil diaspora but the international political concern to the threat of a unitary Sri Lanka may have surprised the LTTE. The overtly expressed concern of India in that regard could also have had its effect on the LTTE calculations of support for the cause of separation even though some rumblings of support were visible in Tamilnadu.

These combined with the mounting concern of the western democracies to international terrorism could possibly have influenced the LTTE to take a restock of their strategies. In this respect, the LTTE cannot disregard how the military situation in Sri Lanka would impact on the host countries giving refuge to Tamils who are major donors to the LTTE coffers. Any threat to that diaspora will be a serious set back to the LTTE and the financing of the war.

The impending general elections in Sri Lanka and the political controversies on amendments to the Constitution could also be a factor that has influenced a slow down of operations.

On the Government side, the evening of an election is not the time to risk military reversals or heavy war casualties. 

To place the military situation on the back burner and focus on the politics of issues to attract minority support is more profitable, indeed so for all parties.

The outcome of political confusion will undoubtedly be of benefit to the LTTE, as it will in the final outcome surely result in creating equally confusing defence strategies unfavourable to any Government.

All factors considered the LTTE have nothing to lose by a wait and see strategy. On the contrary, they have everything to gain. 

Thereby they can fashion their strategies on the weakness that would emerge from disparate politics at the national level. The lesson here is that a strong Government is essential to combat terrorism. 

The Fifth Column

Editorial/ Opinion Contents