Nagar Kovil clashes reveal LTTE's new anti-aircraft guns

A Sri Lankan Air Force helicopter was shot down at Nagar Kovil on Thursday (19.10.2000). The Russian built MI-24 helicopter had been supporting troops defending the Nagar Kovil area  from a ferocious attack by the LTTE. The helicopter had burst into flames after being hit by an  unidentified anti-aircraft gun and had crashed behind army lines. The three member crew -  pilot, Co-pilot and Gunner on board escaped unhurt.

The Cabinet Ministers who took their oaths before President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga at the Janadipathi Mandiraya last Thursday, during a nationally televised ceremony would have shuddered at what they learnt.

Any one of them who chose to return past the Green Path junction (across the road outside Saumya Bhavan, the Ceylon Workers Congress Headquarters), to attend to their other chores for the day, faced instant death. That was where a young man, explosives strapped to his chest, was to wait for his target to arrive.

But two others, who arrived at the scene a little earlier, were to change the course of events. They were two policemen from the Ministerial Security Division (MSD), who had been detailed for surveillance duty in that vicinity, a security measure that has been introduced after recent suicide bomb explosions. The suspicious movements of the young man, whose attire appeared slightly out of proportion to his body, drew their attention. He was at a kiosk.

Police Sergeant (22966) Sarath and Constable (3389) Priyantha decided to check him but he began moving away. The policemen followed the young man through Green Path junction, Dharmapala Mawatha to the Hyde Park corner end of W.A.D. Ramanayake Mawatha. It is here that the duo came face to face with the young man. During the stand off, he uttered a few words in Tamil. The message was clear to the two policemen – he was carrying explosives strapped to his chest.

The policemen took a few steps back, but followed the young man who was walking away hurriedly, leaving his slippers behind, towards Dharmapala Mawatha, past the J.R. Jayewardene Centre, across the road towards F.R. Senanayake Mawatha, to a point opposite the Town Hall. The policemen had tipped off a police mobile patrol that was parked at W.A.D. Ramanayake Mawatha and followed the young man in a three wheeler.

By then the police mobile patrol had arrived opposite the Town Hall. One of the constables alighted from the vehicle, cocked up his Chinese built T-56 assault rifle and took aim at the young man. Noticing that he was to come under fire, he moved towards a van that lay parked and detonated the explosives strapped to his chest. His head and parts of the body lay strewn along the road. Another Tiger guerrilla suicide cadre had struck.

But he failed to get his victim, like his female colleague, who exploded herself hugging an explosive lined hand bag in a spot barely a hundred yards away, in December, last year. The victim on that occasion was to be President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, who was winding up her campaign for the Presidential elections. She escaped but lost her sight in the right eye.

Last Thursday's suicide bomb explosion caused injuries to 23 persons, six of them critically. Police Driver (PCD 33969) Hettiaratchchi, who was in the police mobile patrol and Sithy Habeeba, a passer by died in hospital. Among the injured were three American women, two of them assigned to Technology Initiative for the Private Sector (TIPS) – a USAID funded private sector project. The third was described as the wife of the project director.

Thursday's incident was the fourth suicide bomb explosion in the City during the New Millennium. The first was when a female suicide bomber exploded herself outside the Prime Minister's Office on January 5. She evidently missed her target. A male suicide bomber detonated explosives strapped to his chest at Ratmalana on June 7 killing then Industrial Development Minister, C.V. Gooneratne, his wife and others. On September 15, a suicide bomber exploded himself outside the Colombo Eye Hospital when a policemen chose to check him. That action prevented him from going for his target. Hence, of the four suicide bomb attempts this year, three had failed – not encouraging news for the LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran.

Yet, that was not the only attempt he made on Thursday to mar a significant occasion for the People's Alliance – the formation of its new Cabinet that is to run the day to day affairs of the country for the next six years. That evening, he resumed the fourth phase of "Operation Oyatha Alaikal" (Ceaseless Waves). launched on September 26, Tiger guerrillas forced troops to withdraw some two and half kilometres to their rear along the defence line that extended from Kilali, Eluthumaduval to Nagar Kovil.

Shortly after 5 p.m. last Thursday, Tiger guerrillas mounted attacks on the new defence lines at Kilali, Eluthumaduval and Nagar Kovil – the main defence lines that lay on the gateway to Jaffna peninsula from mainland Sri Lanka. The main thrust, however, was concentrated on the beach end at Nagar Kovil. The heavy volume of fire, both from artillery and mortar, forced the troops to fall back. On Thursday night, Tiger guerrilla re-inforcements arrived, a few by boats and others along the coastal stretch south of Nagar Kovil. Some of the LTTE boats were beaten back by Navy patrols. Intermittent firing continued Thursday night through Friday morning.

A Navy patrol alerted the Army to what appeared to be a trap for them. A heavy calibre weapon appeared to be located on the beach near Nagar Kovil. Two boats lay nearby, along the coast. The Navy believes it may have been a ploy to draw a patrol closer to the shore and open fire on it. Army fired artillery on the position after obtaining the co-ordinates from the Navy. Army officials say they saw smoke billowing skywards from the area but were not sure whether it was a loaded heavy calibre gun or an ammunition dump. A Navy patrol also attacked three LTTE boats reportedly heading to the area from the Sea Tiger base at Chalai, north of Mullaitivu.

A more serious development came soon after Tiger guerrillas broke through three bunkers on the defence line. The Army called for air support and soon Mi-24 helicopter gunships arrived in the battle area and began strafing Tiger guerrilla positions. Just then, one of the Mi-24s was hit by gunfire. It was engulfed in flames but the SLAF pilot had the presence of mind to make an emergency landing, fortunately within a few hundred yards inside the defence lines. Concerns for their safety grew around Thursday evening. But the pilot in the second helicopter reported that the three member crew – the pilot, co-pilot and the gunner ran towards a bunker after they made the forced landing. The area was under heavy mortar fire.

A debrief from the crew of the Mi-24 and other evidence gathered after the shooting incident have caused some serious concerns for the security authorities. The Mi-24 had taken three hits from a heavy calibre gun. One was in the nose area whilst the other two were in the rear, near the tail rotor area. They are believed to have been fired from a radar guided anti-aircraft gun. The shell fired from that heavy calibre gun is believed to have had an explosive head. Upon impact, it had blown the fuel tanks engulfing the helicopter in fire. The Mi-24 has been damaged beyond use.

The hitherto unidentified heavy calibre gun has emerged as the new threat to helicopter gunships and other SLAF attack aircraft operating in battle areas of the north. In the case of the threat posed by LTTE surface to air missiles, the installation of counter missile systems on SLAF aircraft became the answer. The systems were either automatically activated or turned on by pilots in the face of a missile threat. However, the heavy calibre gun, yet to be identified, now remains a serious threat to aircraft providing air cover to ground troops during operations.

The subject figured at a special meeting of the National Security Council on Friday night, chaired by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. This was the first meeting she chaired after swearing in her new People's Alliance Cabinet on Thursday. Questions are being raised on how the LTTE had acquired the latest gun and also the 130 mm artillery gun it has been using to fire at areas encompassing the Security Forces Headquarters in Palaly.

During a previous meeting of the Council, intelligence reports of the LTTE having smuggled through the north eastern coast a large quantity of unknown weaponry on or around September 20 this year, was discussed. The Commander of the Navy, Vice Admiral Cecil Tissera, however, had insisted that it was impossible since Navy patrols in the area had been intensified in the past several months.

If the weaponry that has helped the LTTE sustain a prolonged high intensive war were not smuggled into the north east coast via the international shipping lanes, the serious question as to how they reach the LTTE becomes relevant. Large pieces of weaponry, even if they are smuggled through the Colombo port, cannot be moved surreptitiously to the Jaffna peninsula since there is no land based route.

Movements from the Colombo Port by sea and landing them in a port in the peninsula is an impossibility in view of not only the security precautions but also enormous logistic difficulties. The only other means, moving them by air, would require transport aircraft that would have to take off from Colombo and land in a location in the peninsula – another total impossibility. Hence, there is an imperative need not only to further secure the coastal waters around the country, but also seek assistance and co-operation from neighbouring India.

The Sri Lanka Navy is alive to this issue. Its Commander Vice Admiral Tissera is to discuss matters relating to this as well as other related aspects when he visits New Delhi next month. He is travelling there on the invitation of the Indian Navy.

Be that as it may, the Army launched an operation shortly after 9 a.m. on Friday to evict the LTTE from a triangular stretch extending 500 metres each side they captured at Nagar Kovil. The operation continued throughout Friday after Security Forces Commander, North, Major General Anton Wijendra, who was in Colombo, flew to the area. By 7.30 p.m. that night, troops had re-captured the small area they lost on Thursday. Six soldiers were killed and over 75 wounded in the two days of fighting. LTTE casualties were not available.

A conspicuous absentee at last Friday's National Security Council meeting was Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte, the former Deputy Minister of Defence. President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga is yet to name her Deputy Ministers. It is expected to be announced next week, possibly Wednesday.

I reported in these columns last week that Minister Ratwatte would remain as Deputy Defence Minister. The report said there was no intention on the part of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga to replace Minister Ratwatte and that he would be sworn in.

Like the delay in the naming of Cabinet Ministers, the result of protracted negotiations with the SLMC, NUA and EPDP leadership, the appointment of Deputy Ministers has also turned out to be a long drawn affair.

Since the Situation Report said last week that Minister Ratwatte would continue as Deputy Defence Minister, The Sunday Times learns there was continued pressure on President Kumaratunga, not to appoint him to that position. The TNL news bulletin on Wednesday night said protests to President Kumaratunga had increased after The Sunday Times said Minister Ratwatte would continue as Deputy Defence Minister.

A day after last week's Situation Report, those in the security and defence establishments were recipients of a fax from a purported "Armed Forces Movement." Carrying the address as "HQ's, Baladaksha Mawatha, Colombo, Sri Lanka, a so-called Press Release, called upon President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga not to appoint Minister Ratwatte as Deputy Minister of Defence. The widely circulated two page fax gave several reasons for its claim and signed off as "Joint Services Command, Armed Forces Movement."

T.V. Sumanasekera, Additional Director General of the Directorate of Internal Intelligence (DII), who has been kept very busy during the Parliamentary election period and its aftermath, has asked his men to inquire into the bona fides of the so called "Armed Forces Movement." The idea is to ascertain whether there is in fact such a group made up, as suggested in the press release, of men from the three armed services or whether it was the handiwork of a smaller group of disgruntled elements. In a bid to give credibility to the "press release," the fax number in the office of a key Army officer, has been made to appear as the origin of the document. It has, however, turned out that the faxes did not originate from there. The number had been programmed into another fax machine.

There was widespread speculation that President Kumaratunga would name Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake as Deputy Minister of Defence. But other highly placed Government sources said the move was highly unlikely. They point out that replacing Minister Ratwatte as Deputy Minister of Defence at this point of time would be politically unwise for the PA. This is purportedly on the grounds that a replacement would amount to the formal acknowledgment of the many allegations against him, including the conduct of the polls in the Kandy district.

On the other hand, Minister's Ratwatte's controversial conduct of the ongoing separatist war in the past six years have come in for bitter criticism by the military leaders. Though they have not formally taken up any public positions over the matter, many have pointed out in off the record conversations and in private briefings to the PA leadership that the highest casualties and the worst debacles came during his conduct of the military campaign. They have also complained of what they call unrealistic goals during the conduct of military operations.

This, they say, included impossible time frames to accomplish tasks which did not fully appreciate battlefield realities. 

In responding to his critics, Minister Ratwatte himself had argued with Government leaders that if he did not give directions to the war efforts, the military machine would not have moved. He has claimed that it was only because he prodded the military establishment that things began to move. Protagonists of Minister Ratwatte planned a procession to call upon President Kumaratunga not to remove him as Deputy Defence Minister.

The sponsors had gathered at George E. de Silva Park on Thursday for the event but found there were not enough numbers to proceed.

Adding weightage to the criticism against Minister Ratwatte is the conduct of Parliamentary elections in the Kandy district. It is now widely known that State vehicles, personnel from the security forces, Police and military deserters backed Minister Ratwatte's polls campaign. Allegations that it affected the conduct of a free and fair poll have been made not only by Opposition parties but also by two of Minister Ratwatte's Cabinet colleagues – PA General Secretary, D.M. Jayaratne and SLMC co-leader, Rauff Hakeem.

As Deputy Minister of Defence, Minister Ratwatte is de facto Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the armed services and the Police, an exalted position which casts on him the responsibility of protecting national security interests and ensuring the maintenance of law and order. Critics in his own party complain he has forfeited his claims to that high office. Some even say the ongoing media censorship and ban on media visits to operational areas (except on conducted tours) were done solely at his request.

In the wake of the fresh protests, President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga will undoubtedly weigh all these factors in choosing who her next Deputy Minister of Defence should be. Those looking forward to the naming of the new Deputy Ministers are all focusing their attention on who would be the number two political head for the nation's defence. 

From the pattern of operations in the past few months it would appear that the LTTE by maintaining a threat to Jaffna is pursuing a deliberate strategy of compelling the Army to deploy maximum resources to maintain a defensive posture in the North. By doing so, the LTTE have been able to restrict the capability of the Army to engage in mobile offensive operations not only in the North but also in other areas. This at the same time confers on the LTTE a greater choice of operation that they have pursued relentlessly as evidenced by LTTE operations in the East and the series of suicide bombings in Colombo.

The Army is locked into an inescapable situation of having to maintain a long line of defence against the threat of attack by the LTTE, pressure that the LTTE can maintain merely by threat without even getting into major confrontation. To break this deadlock the Army which is now adequately re-equipped must be able to launch credible offensive operations to divert the LTTE from concentrating on the Kilaly – Nagar Kovil line of defence. A positive strategy in the North is therefore required not only to break the LTTE grip in the peninsula but also with a view to disrupt the total control the LTTE now has in the Wanni.

This includes the off shore control of the eastern coast of the Wanni which is of strategic value due to its significance to arms smuggling by the LTTE. The Wanni is the "Sierra Maestra" of the LTTE and the disruption of its domination will weaken the overall military position of the LTTE.

In as much as the pronouncements by the PA at the elections were to fight the LTTE to a finish, the new Government has nonetheless announced its willingness to negotiation through a Norwegian initiative. 

This, however, should not detract from the formulation of a positive military strategy to get over the present ineffective situation the Army is locked into in Jaffna. A twin track approach to the problem is unavoidable given the intransigence of the LTTE to negotiate and their track record at earlier cease-fire agreements.

Successful military operations have in the past been hindered by the lack of a clear and positive politico-military strategy. This is essential if the LTTE is to be softened militarily to convince them of the need to negotiate. Hopefully this time around there will be political consensus on the need for an objective military strategy towards a defined political goal.

The Fifth Column

Editorial/ Opinion Contents