The inherent limits of the Norwegian peace initiative

By Victor Ivan

The Norwegian attempt to bring about peace in Sri Lanka is being discussed from various view of points . While those who are devoted to talking about peace sing poems of joy about that attempt some others who always think that war alone should be the decisive factor attack it with all their might.

If Norway is to play a fruitful role as a facilitator at this time, it will be possible only if it learns the lessons that have to be learnt from the unsuccessful attempt made by India earlier and also understands the importance of creating a conducive political climate which may be considered a necessary precondition for a political solution and works to achieve it. It was here that India blundered. India failed totally to realise the importance of creating a suitable political climate for a political solution to the ethnic problem.

As the regional super power India thought then that if it was possible to bring about an agreement between the armed Tamil political groups and the ruling UNP agreement of the other political parties was not essential. India thought that although there could be objections from other political parties at different levels, it would not be difficult to control them.

Some of the vital facts which India had disregarded were as follows:

1. Due to 11 years of continuous rule the UNP by that time had become a ruling party against which there was considerable public discontent, and due to the anti-democratic repressive policy which had been followed against the opposition parties an attitude of hatred had built up in those parties against the ruling party;

2. India entered into an agreement with the ruling party at a time when Sri Lanka was on the verge of a presidential election and a parliamentary general election. The signal given thereby was that whatever be the extent of public discontent against the government, India would do everything possible to ensure the return to power of that ruling party in the interest of the secure continuance of that agreement.

These circumstances created a situation which compelled the anti-government parties to necessarily oppose India's programme. Making use of the special circumstances that were emerging the JVP started a massive rebellion. The number of resultant deaths in the South was more than twice the number of those who had died in the war and the riots that were related to the ethnic crisis. Finally India's action, instead of bringing about a solution to the ethnic problem, widened the gulf between the Sinhala and Tamil communities and contributed to put the whole country into a mess.

If India had, instead of following a wilful policy of giving weightage to the UNP and the Tamil armed group, succeeded in getting the ruling party to bring forth a programme of democratic reforms that could create an environment in which all political parties competing for power could be function with mutual respect and trust, and finding a solution to the ethnic problem was made part of that programme, and not only - the Tamil political groups which were outside the mainstream of democratic politics, but also the JVP were made active parties of that programme, and a consensus was reached on the programme of reforms, and a clear election was held under an all-party caretaker government and the winning party was given the main responsibility for implementing the programme of reforms, the result that could have been achieved, no doubt, was more salutary than that which actually ensued.

Norway's approach too appears to be somewhat similar to that of India. Sufficient attention does not appear to have been paid to the necessity of creating an atmosphere in which political parties competing for power can function with mutual respect and trust. What has been considered more important is the necessity to bring about an accord between the two main parties. If Norway's attempt is to bring about a solution to the ethnic problem solely through an accord between the two main parties in addition to an agreement with the LTTE, there is no doubt that Norway's efforts will end in disappointment in the same way that India's efforts had ended in disappointment.

Glib talk at leadership level between the two main parties, alone cannot bring about unity among the social forces represented by them. Although agreement between the major parties is vital in bringing about a solution, disregard for smaller parties can have dangerous consequences. There are occasions when one thousand organised persons can wield greater power than a million of unorganised persons. What the country requires is an approach that will not exclude any party big or small. Although it may not be easy to get all to agree, it would be important to keep those who disagree in a non-antagonistic position, at least.

It might be possible to get all political parties to contribute to a programme of reforms which will bring about a revival in the democratic system which is now in decay. Without confining it to the ethnic problem such a programme of reforms must necessarily have as its elements, putting in place a programme for inquiring into election malpractices that have occurred, creation of an institutional framework which will not permit organised electoral malpractices again, making the judiciary which is now in the grip of the executive independent, abolition of the executive presidency or bringing the executive presidency to a position of accountability to parliament and to the judiciary, bringing about a system of ethics for MPs and creation of a machinery to inquire into complaints against offenders and to punish them after inquiry, making legal the right to obtain information so as to ensure transparency of all transactions made at state level, creation of a framework which will not permit any ruling party to oppress opposition parties or their supporters and evolving a national policy on education, health services, transport, industries, agriculture, trade and national resources.

No political party is likely to refuse joining such a programme which will be of benefit to the nation. Such a programme of reforms will remove the factor of hatred in the competition for power and will create an environment in which all can act in mutual trust and respect. It is only in such an environment that a consensus will be possible for a solution to the ethnic problem.

(The writer is editor of the Ravaya)