Masked accomplice led Black Tiger cadres to airbase

CID detectives have found this cloth hood at Major Raj Fernando playground in Kurana, located in the outer perimeter of the air base. This has given them the first clue to confirm suspicions that there was collaboration, either from within the airbase or from someone who knew its geography very well. This has also increased their fears for the man is still at large and could continue to liaise with the enemy.

The balaclava, or the attire used by those commonly referred to as billa in Sinhala, was found a distance away from the spot where the guerrillas left behind a trail of evidence – empty casings that once held Night Vision Devices and material used by manufacturers to pack grenades and RPGs. There was also left over food and drink.

Detectives believe the collaborator wore a balaclava and helped the group to cut the perimeter fence to gain entry into the base. He is suspected to have returned to the playground to discard not only the balaclava but also an encrypted hand held communications set. The radio had been used to keep in touch with the guerrilla attackers who had gained entry into the airbase.

Over a sixty strong team of CID detectives, forming into various groups have been assigned for the investigation. They have not only recorded statements from Air Force officers and men but are also interviewing residents living near the outer perimeter fences of the airbase and those at the international airport.

Senior Air Force officials at the Katunayake airbase, The Sunday Times learnt, have in their recorded statements made available details about security practices in force before the July 24 attack. Whilst the security of the airbase itself came under Wing Commander Nihal Ratnayake, Ground Defence Officer, supervisory aspects as well as all administrative matters came under the purview of the Base Commander, Air Commodore R.A. Ananda. He was directly answerable to the Commander of the Air Force.

Security at the Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA) was also in the hands of the Air Force. It was placed under the charge of Wing Commander Bhuvanaka Abeysuriya. He came under the direct control of the Director, Operations of the Air Force. Thus the SLAF Base Commander did not exercise control over airmen deployed at the international airport. One senior officer is learnt to have said that a defence plan for the international airport has been prepared and forwarded for approval to the SLAF Directorate of Operations as far back as November, last year. However, it has not been approved and returned.

Other officers had contended that they had complained to Air Force Headquarters in Colombo about inadequate strength and other shortcomings. Just over 500 men have been tasked for security duty at the 700 acre base whilst the number allotted for security at the international airport had been less than 600. But Air Force Headquarters held a different view. They say strength alone is not the sole criteria and assigning men have been on the basis of resources available. They are also probing why there was a prolonged delay by base commander Air Commodore R. A.Ananda in positioning over a 100 closed circuit television sets to monitor perimeter security.

Another subject of controversy after the attack on the airbase and the international airport is the question of electronic fencing. In a news report headlined "AIRPORT CHIEF BLAMES SLAF," Airport and Aviation Services Chairman, Anselm Peiris, was quoted as saying that the NIB (reference is to Directorate of Internal Intelligence – DII – the successor to National Intelligence Bureau) and the Western Province DIG had warned of possible LTTE attack on these two installations and had recommended that the area be secured by establishing an electrified fence around it."

A former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, retired Air Vice Marshal Peiris, added "The Air Force had scorned the idea and replied that it was not necessary as they had a force of over 2500 men together with the Airport security to guard the place. However, despite the Air Force's boast a mere 15 member LTTE contingent had attacked the installations and caused heavy damage…"

The Sunday Times has learnt that references by AVM Peiris was not to an electrified fence but to electronic fencing – a move, contrary to the claims he made to the Daily Mirror, he had strongly opposed.

The Secretary to the Ministry of Aviation and Airports Development, W.P.S. Jayawardena held a discussion at his Ministry on March 1 this year, to discuss the installation and commissioning of an Electronic Perimeter Security Fence and CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) at Bandaranaike International Airport. This was during a meeting of the National Civil Aviation Committee. The next day, AVM Peiris, who took part in the conference wrote the following letter to Mr. Jayawardena, in his capacity as Chairman, Airport and Aviation Services (Sri Lanka) Limited:

"I refer to the discussion held at the Ministry on 01st March, 2001, regarding Voted Funds for year 2001.

"A sum of Rs. 150 million has been allocated for the installation and commissioning of an Electronic Perimeter Security Fence and CCTV at Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA) under Voted Funds for the year 2001.

"According to the information available with the undersigned, the establishment of Electronic Perimeter Security Fences in Sri Lanka have been complete failures. The Board of Investment of Sri Lanka constructed an Electronic Perimeter Fence (DTR type) using Israel technology in 1987 spending a colossal amount of money and within approximately 1 _ to 2 years malfunctioning of the Electronic Fence was observed together with frequent false alarms. The fence went out of commission totally within a period of about 3 years.

"The Security Fence at the BOI Free Trade Zone at Biyagama which was also constructed with Israel technology in the latter part of the 1990s is also malfunctional and about 70 % of the electronic fence is currently not serviceable.

"The Sri Lanka Air Force constructed a perimeter electronic fence in 1997 along the boundary of the Kfir Aircraft Hangar spending approximately Rs. 16 million. This fence did not function effectively even for one year and is completely unserviceable at present.

"Further, it is pertinent to mention that the Electronic Fence equipment utilized does not provide early warning indications of intrusion. A force of two pounds or more has to be exerted on the fence for an indication on the console monitor. Under this scenario, an individual could proceed right up to the fence and lob grenades or bombs etc., over the fence, thereby causing absolute destruction without an indication of intrusion on the console monitor.

"Taking all of the above into consideration, I am of the opinion that the establishment of an Electronic Security Fence at BIA is an absolute waste of scarce resources and I strongly recommend the omission of the construction of an Electronic Security Fence. However, the CCTV system may be installed in the passenger terminal building. A provision of Rs. 70 million may be retained for the CCTV system and the balance amount of Rs. 80 million could be put to better use by re-allocating this sum for other urgent and productive development projects at BIA."

AVM Peiris has made an interesting revelation which warrants inquiry even at this late stage. He says that around Rs 16 million has been spent on an electronic fence to guard the hangar housing the Israeli built Kfir interceptor jets. He says the fence did not last even an year. Who was responsible for this deal ? Did large amounts go into the pockets of the enthusiastic promoters of deals then in the Air Force ?

The period during which this electronic fence had been installed, 1997, was one of the controversial years where allegations of widespread corruption in procurements in the Air Force was highlighted in the media. It would be wise for the Government to have this aspect and also other procurement deals relating to security of the airport probed by the newly appointed Presidential Commission of Inquiry that will probe the Katunayake attacks.

However, AVM Peiris in a letter under his own signature makes it clear to Aviation and Airports Development Secretary that an electronic fence was not a great idea – a position that contradicts what he has told the Daily Mirror. This prompted Mr. Jaywardena to ask his Senior Assistant Secretary to clarify matters from the Air Force.

Senior Assistant Secretary G.S. Withanage wrote to the Commander of the Air Force, Air Marshal Jayalath Weerakkody, seeking his observations and comments on "the facts given" in AVM Peiris' letter. Copies were also sent to Secretary, Ministry of Defence Chandrananda de Silva and then Chairman of the Board of Investment, Thilan Wijesinghe. To the former, it was to keep him informed of developments and the latter, in view of the references made to the BOI.

On March 5, Air Marshal Weerakkody responded. He wrote to the Secretary, Ministry of Aviation and Airports Development W.P.S. Jayawardena. This is what he said:

"At present the SLAF is entrusted with the Security of the BIA. The areas of responsibility allocated to the SLAF are as follows: `

a. Providing all round perimeter defence for BIA (approximately 11 kilometres)

b. Checking of all Vehicles/Personnel proceeding to BIA at the Main Entrance check point, SriLankan Airlines, ATC Tower, Fire Section, VVIP Lounge and VIP Lounge.

c. Providing EOD (Explosive Ordance Disposal) assistance and checking of Air Cargo prior to entering the cargo village, Sri Lankan Airline Catering Cargo, all Sri Lankan Airline Aircraft prior to departure.

d. Providing EOD teams to search and escort the fuel train from Seeduwa Railway Station.

e. Security at the Apron area, Petroleum complex at the BIA.

f. Manning road blocks on all approach roads.

g. Providing EOD assistance at X-Ray machines at departure / arrival terminal and physical baggage check at departure lounge.

h. Providing sniffer dog assistance at Heavy Vehicle check point, Departure terminal entrance, Departure Baggage belt, Sri Lanka Airline Catering Cargo check point and SriLankan Airlines office complex entrance.

"To carry out a very effective perimeter security, guards should be positioned at least 30 Metres apart on a 2 hours "on" and 4 hours "off" duty basis. It has been informed that apart from the SLAF hangar frontage, BIA has approximately 11 kilometres of perimeter. Therefore at any given time SLAF should have 366 Guards and for a day about 1100 guards.

"If a "Guard Off" to be given on the following day additional 1100 guards are required. Considering additional 25 % on supervision, leave, sick etc. SLAF needs a strength of at least 2800 for perimeter security alone. Even with this strength human error factor cannot be avoided. Considering the other areas of responsibility SLAF needs over 3300 strength to meet the task. The present strength available at the BIA is one sixth of this requirement. Having an electronic fence at the airport perimeter will allow the SLAF to effectively secure the perimeter with the available manpower.

"It is sad to note that the information available with the Chairman, Airport and Aviation Sri Lanka Ltd. with regard to Electronic Fences available in the SLAF is totally incorrect and misleading. It is pertinent to point out that the term "Electronic fence" is used in broader sense for all types of electronic intruder detection systems. With the development of the technology there are different types of electronic sensors activated in different methods, which could be used effectively depending on the requirement and the demand for the task.

"It is regretted to note that the Chairman Airport and Aviation Ltd. has mentioned only one of the many methods used for intruder detection.The utilization of a high tech electronic fence defence system has its own advantages.

a. Less manpower requirement.

b. Long term cost effectiveness.

c. 24 hours defence.

d. Minimize human error, where during night, guards tend to relax / sleep.

e. Sense of increased security.

"The undersigned is of the opinion that a properly designed electronic fence with the correct types of detection methods could be effectively used at the airport perimeter. It should also cover a proper maintenance package. I am sure these type of fences are used in other countries as well as their airports.

"Hence it is strongly recommended to go ahead with the proposed electronic fence at the BIA and a proper study be done to draw the specifications to suit the requirement."

But AVM Peiris' opinion prevailed and there was no action taken to procure an electronic fence. But last Wednesday, just 24 hours after the devastating attacks on the airbase and the international airport, the same National Civil Aviation Committee decided to immediately procure an electronic fence system. They also decided that any other equipment required to ensure the security of the international airport should be obtained immediately by the Ministry of Aviation and Airports Development.

AVM Peiris' recommendation, however well intentioned it would have been, resulted in no electronic fence being installed. It may have saved Rs. 80 million then. But on July 24 the loss of aircraft and other damage would amount to nearly eight billion rupees. And now, despite the decision to install an electronic fence, it would be several months before it is done. This is in view of the preparation of specifications and resort to tender procedures. This week Air Marshal Weerakkody interdicted three officers and seven airmen. The three officers are Base Commander Air Commodore, R.A. Ananda, Wing Commander Bhuvanaka Abeysuriya and Wing Commander Nihal Ratnayake. The seven airmen interdicted were those assigned for guarding the international airport apron. They are alleged to have either not been in their assigned positions or not fired a single shot when the Black Tiger guerrillas attacked.

In strengthening security at the international airport, Air Force, which still holds the responsibility, has run into some controversy. Fortification of security positions by introducing bunkers, machine gun positions and gun turrets on the international airport side, the travel trade fears, would give the civilian airport a military character or make it look like a military encampment – a strong impediment to efforts by the Government to pursue tourists to return. But SLAF officials argue they have no alternative if they are to secure the international airport. Those in the travel trade have also pointed out that heavy military fortifications would draw an adverse response from the International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) that has laid down basic criteria to govern the functioning of international airports.

Whilst awaiting the outcome of particularly the CID inquiry, the Government has begun talking to expert groups from several foreign countries to obtain expertise to strengthen security at the international airport. Among the countries are United States, Canada, Germany and Israel. Discussions with some of them had been extensive but details are being kept a closely guarded secret.

The Government said this week it has appointed a high level Committee to recommend measures to strengthen security at the international airport. The majority of them including service commanders and the IGP are members of the National Security Council which is tasked with all matters relating to national security. The only exceptions are officials from Aviation and Airports Development Ministry, Tourism Ministry and Airport and Aviation Services Ltd. What new powers have been vested in the new Committee have not been disclosed.

The Government has also appointed several committees to strengthen security at other targets considered vulnerable to Tiger guerrilla attacks. One such target is the Colombo Port. A Committee headed by Rear Admiral Mohan Wijewickrema, Chief of Staff of the Sri Lanka Navy and comprising DIG Colombo Gerard Ignatius, Overall Operations Commander (OOC) Colombo Major General Parami Kulatunga and Wing Commander Palitha Obeysekera, who is SLAF's officer responsible for Colombo security.

It is not only in the City and suburbs that the Government has been forced to strengthen security arrangements. This week intelligence reports spoke of the strong likelihood of Tiger guerrilla attacks in the Trincomalee district, particularly in its southern parts. 

Attacks on the Trincomalee harbour are also reported to be imminent forcing the authorities to strengthen security.

There have also been reports from other sources that Tiger guerrillas were intensifying their own preparations anticipating an attack by security forces in the North. According to these reports, Tiger leadership believes that an attack was imminent not only in view of Tiger assaults in Katunayake but also in view of the impending August 21 referendum. A victory, some Tiger leaders argue, would boost Government's chances at the referendum.

With military options now taking precedence over peace initiatives, the coming weeks will see more action as the 18 year long separatist war continues. Peace initiatives will thus remain a second priority.

The Fifth Column

Editorial/ Opinion Contents