Shock killings jolt Tigers into action

For the guerrillas, a retaliatory strike to avenge the September 26 killing of leader Velupillai Prabhakaran's confidante, Shankar alias Vythialingam Sornalingam, appeared uppermost. So much so, one leading state intelligence arm predicted a reprisal attack within 48 hours.

Nothing untoward, however, happened except the discovery of a suicide jacket at the Viharamahadevi Park in Colombo. Bomb disposal experts of the Police Special Task Force (STF) took charge of the jacket containing 4.5 kilogrammes of C-4 plastic explosives.

A report to the Ministry of Defence by the STF Commandant Nimal Gunatilleke, cast some doubts on its authenticity. The lining was made of rexine material compared to the regular denim cloth used by suicide cadres. The batteries meant to activate the explosives were wrapped in a small polythene bag and lay inside the jacket. One might argue it was being carried by a guerrilla cadre from one point to another, a highly unlikely move in view of easy detection.

Moreover, discovery of suicide jackets in the past occasions have been only at hideouts raided by security forces or the police. This is perhaps a rare and unusual case, where a suicide jacket supposed to have been carried by a guerrilla cadre in a polythene packing, has been left behind in a park during transit. Certainly not good news for those who strive hard to tell the international community Colombo is safe.

That discovery apart, one should not be lulled into belief that a revengeful reprisal is not on the cards. There is every indication of guerrilla preparations though they may not hurry purely to confirm intelligence forecasts. A recent example is the time taken for a reprisal attack after the Sri Lanka Air Force was ordered to bomb targets in the north beginning June 30. What is now known clearly to be a retaliatory strike came on July 24, when Black Tiger cadres carried out attacks on the SLAF base and the adjoining Bandaranaike International Airport.

Sri Lankan Air Force Mi-24 helicopter gunships in the North. Heavy clouds last Friday prevented attack missions.

Shankar's death, like those of a few key guerrillas in the recent past, for which the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) pointedly accuses "deep penetration patrols of the Army," has jolted the Tiger hierarchy. Their leader, Mr. Prabhakaran has not only ordered his senior cadres to take precautions but has also put into place other measures to avert what he feels are incursion and attacks by the Army. 

The Political Headquarters of the LTTE, shifted some weeks ago from Mallavi to Kilinochchi, has been heavily fortified. So are other military installations in Puthukkudiyiruppu and surrounding areas, according to reports reaching Colombo.

Sources in non governmental organisations serving in the area spoke of guerrilla cadres being tasked to picket roads used by senior members every day. Civilians have also been debarred from more roads and other localities frequented by Tiger guerrillas. In some areas, picketing tasks, these sources said, have been placed in the hands of armed female groups who have been assigned sectors. Guerrilla groups have formed "Vigilance Committees" with civilian groups in practically every village. Their task is to provide early warnings to the LTTE leadership. "Leopard Commando Units" (or Sirithapulikal) and "Border Force" (Ellai Padai) cadres, these sources said, had also been tasked to seal off suspected routes of infiltration into the Wanni. But the area is so wide it would be impossible to block all routes.

Shankar's killing on September 26, when the LTTE commemorated the 14th death anniversary of Thileepan, a cadre who ended his life in a fast unto death demanding the withdrawal of Indian Peace Keeping troops in 1987, has renewed fresh allegations against the Army over other deaths.

The catalogue includes the death of "Lt. Col" Kangai Amaran (real name Anthony Johnson), his bodyguard Thasarthan and "Major" Das Rajan at Ethawetunuwewa (near the Weli Oya sector) on June 29. He was the deputy leader of Sea Tigers. His child was also killed and another cadre injured. Guerrilla Intelligence Wing leader for Batticaloa, "Major" Nizam was killed on June 14. LTTE Political Wing leader, Thamil Chelvan escaped death but his vehicle was damaged in an explosion close to Madhu Church in March. Thereafter, Thamil Chelvam had a narrow escape again when his convoy was hit by an explosion when he was on his way from Kokavil to Mallavi for a meeting with Norwegian Special Envoy, Eric Solheim on May 15. LTTE military wing leader Balraj also escaped death miraculously from an explosion in the Wanni in July this year. The chain of events has also raised fresh concerns for the security of Mr. Prabhakaran himself.

A striking feature of all these incidents, for which the LTTE is accusing the Army, is the use of claymore mines. All the attacks had been carried out with the use of only these mines.

The claymore mine has its origins in World War II. A German named Schardin devised an anti-tank mine in 1944 which consisted of a round, flat dish with explosive with a concave plate of steel on its face. He then turned it on its side and fired it. Incredibly, the plate was blown off and went through the front of a Panther tank at 80 metres range. After the war the Americans took the idea and swapped the steel plate for steel slugs. A very effective anti-personnel weapon was born.

The claymore fires metal balls over a fan shaped area to a range of 100 metres, shredding anyone unlucky enough to be in the way. It can be activated manually or electrically fired by command or tripwires. During the Vietnam war, the Viet Cong used to strap them to tall trees surrounding likely helicopter landing zones. When any choppers came into land, the Viet Cong fired the mines and took out the aircraft. Both Tiger guerrillas and the security forces use claymore mines.

Repeated security forces denials they were not responsible for Shankar's killing or the previous incidents appear to have failed to allay guerrilla suspicions. This is confirmed by recent intercepts of guerrilla radio communications. A sampling of conversations between one major base and other smaller ones in the Wanni gives an idea:

June 29: ……Now they are hanging around here. If seen, open fire. There is no need to ask us…

…… they are in guerrilla uniforms and shorts. They come like us. There are times we mistake them for our movements. They come during times we move… If our people have not informed in advance that they are coming, open fire. Later we can see who they are……

June 30: …… don't forget. Look for wires. Always check…..

July 2: …….. From a distance our people have seen the Army people. They have attacked them….

….. a little while ago they have gone. Two or three have come. There are marks of their footprints….

July 5: ……why didn't you wait till they come close… Why did you attack from a distance….

…..without running, speak from the same place.. Ask….. not to make a noise…….

Quite clearly, the guerrillas are worried about the recent developments. They are pre-occupied with the task of strengthening the security of their leader and others, in addition to securing their installations. Despite denials by the Army, worries of surprise attacks on them appears to be of serious concern. Whilst focusing greater attention to this aspect, the guerrillas have also been busy making other preparations.

Sources in non governmental organisations speak of hectic activity both in the Wanni and in the east. Movement of loaded trucks, suspected to be carrying military hardware, training activity for both guerrilla cadres and civilians, were among preparations under way. Added to this were reports of preparations by Sea Tigers practicising manoeuvres in the seas off Mullaitivu.

It is in this backdrop that the security establishment in Colombo reviewed the posture of Tiger guerrillas in the past many weeks and the weeks to come. The emerging consensus was that the guerrillas did not want to risk international exposure by carrying out any major attack at this juncture, particularly in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. 

"They were particularly careful to avoid condemnation for attacking civilian targets or facilities," one high ranking intelligence source told The Sunday Times. He said they were particularly conscious of the US State Department review this month of 29 groups that are classified as terrorist organisations but added this did not in anyway mean they would not attack military targets.

And on Friday the State Department re-designated the LTTE as a terrorist organisation together with 27 other groups world-wide. Since declaring a unilateral ceasefire on Christmas eve, last year, and renewing it monthly, the LTTE invited the Government for peace talks and refrained from major offensive military action, scrupulously avoiding civilian targets. 

This, and other measures, senior security officials believe, were pitched to draw the attention of the international community, particularly the State Department. Now that they have been redesignated, the focus turns to the battle front.

This indeed is the dilemma for the Government. Since ordering air raids by the Air Force on targets in the north and drawing a devastating retaliation in the form of attacks on the airbase and the adjoining international airport at Katunayake, all major offensive operations have been put on hold. So are air attacks barring targets in the high seas. Hence, security forces have remained on a defensive posture ever since the failed "Operation Agni Khiela" (Rod of Fire) in April.

Pressure from the international community to resume peace talks have once again prompted the Government to make diplomatic contacts with Norway, which is playing the role of facilitator. Whether the LTTE, now armed with stronger reasons including the PA-JVP Memorandum of Understanding (which debars devolution of power for an year), would agree to talks remains the crucial question. Under such circumstances, it is Hobson's choice for the Government. Whilst asking the security forces to refrain from major offensive operations, they would have to maintain a stepped up defensive posture to deal with the new guerrilla threats. In fact, in the past six months, this is what they have been doing. This week is no exception.

Last Friday (October 5) was not particularly an auspicious one for the Sri Lanka Air Force. Troops on board Antonov 32 transport planes left Ratmalana in the morning but were unable to land at the Palaly airbase. On two successive flights, pilots observed heavy cloud cover and had to return to base. Later in the day, however, they were successful. 

October 5 was also a day of significance in the LTTE calendar. Eleven Tiger guerrilla cadres, including Kumarappa, then Batticaloa leader and Pulendran, a Trincomalee cadre known for carrying out several civilian massacres, were arrested by the Sri Lanka Navy in 1987. It was when they arrived in Sri Lankan waters from Tamil Nadu in a boat with weapons on board. Whilst a debate over their arrest ensued, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) took custody of the group and held them in a building in the security forces complex in Palaly. 

When the group's request for meals to be delivered from their homes were allowed, cyanide capsules were smuggled in. When the then Minister of National Security, late Lalith Athulathmudali, ordered that they be flown to Colombo, the men bit the capsules and committed suicide. Only one survived. Just five days later, Indian troops switched from their peace keeping role to fight the LTTE when they launched "Operation Pawan" on October 10.

On Friday morning, Air Force top brass were further frustrated when they found it difficult to scramble fighter jets into the sky to attack a logistics run, some 25 nautical miles in the deep seas off Mullaitivu. That time too, the cloud cover was heavy.

It was shortly after noon on Friday when the now depleted "Operation Waruna Kirana," the Naval blockade off the north eastern shores, observed a cluster of Sea Tiger boats. They had in fact been warned the previous day of a possible logistics move. Visibility that day was very poor and the radar range, as a result, was very short.

Two Fast Attack Craft each from the Northern and Eastern Naval area were rushed to the location. In addition, the Israeli built Fast Missile Vessel (FMV) "SLNS Nandimithra," which was in the vicinity was also diverted. They soon noticed seven Sea Tiger boats heading towards the shore from the deep sea. 

A confrontation ensued. Three hours later, it became clear that one logistic boat and Sea Tiger attack craft were destroyed. A Dvora Fast Attack Craft was also damaged.

Navy Commander, Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri, told The Sunday Times at least 20 Sea Tiger cadres were killed in the encounter. There has been no word from the LTTE about its casualties. A sailor who was injured and was being moved by boat to Trincomalee succumbed to his injuries. Two others were wounded. It came to light that the guerrillas were smuggling in stocks of diesel and petrol. The origin of the consignment is not known.

In a separate incident at Palampattaru, near Trincomalee, a Navy route clearing patrol was ambushed between the Naval Headworks, the source of water supply to Trincomalee, and Palampattaru, 14 kilometres south west of Trincomalee. Two sailors were killed and one wounded in the incident.

Vice Admiral Sandagiri today accompanies Defence Secretary, Chandrananda de Silva, on a visit to Malaysia. Their itinerary will include visiting the annual Aerospace and Maritime Exhibition in Kuala Lumpur to be declared open tomorrow by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed.

The Navy's only Advanced Offshore Patrol Vessel (AOPV), "SLNS Sayura," obtained from India, has already left Colombo on a voyage to Kuala Lumpur. It is to co-incide with the exhibition and a fleet review sponsored by the Malaysian government. It was this AOPV that was to form the platform for the Navy's Air Wing, a project which has since been abandoned.

At last Friday's National Security Council, President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga heard Vice Admiral Sandagiri describe the Navy's latest success in the seas off Mullaitivu.

But there is no doubt the Navy will face much bigger threats from the guerrillas in the coming weeks. So will the battle areas, particularly the east, as the guerrillas fine tune their preparations. For the security forces now on a defensive posture, and a Government still chasing elusive peace, only the coming weeks will tell where the guerrilla offensives – ahead of their annual "Heroes Week" next month – will lead. 

The Fifth Column

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