News/Comment

9th December 2001

INDEX | FRONT PAGE | EDITORIAL | NEWS/COMMENT | EDITORIAL/OPINION | PLUS | BUSINESS | SPORTS | MIRROR MAGAZINE | TV TIMES | HOME | ARCHIVES | TEAM | SEARCH | DOWNLOAD GZIP
The Sunday Times on the Web
INDEX

FRONT PAGE

EDITORIAL

NEWS/COMMENT

EDITORIAL/OPINION

PLUS

BUSINESS

SPORTS

MIRROR MAGAZINE

TV TIMES


HOME

ARCHIVES

TEAM

SEARCH

DOWNLOAD GZIP


Clean gimmicks and preference votes

Thank God, the elections are over, even if it is after six months of uncertainty and at a cost of half a billion rupees and 46 lives. Hopefully, by the time this is read, it will be all done with barring the swearing in and the wounded egos of the defeated candidates. The coming days will no doubt see the analysts having a field day, but this note is about that other contest within the contest-the battle for the 'manaape' which showed two contrasting candidates take second slot in the hotly contested Colombo district: Milinda Moragoda and Arjuna Ranatunge.

Ranatunge's victory is easy to understand. He is nationally known and whatever the shortcomings of the party that he represents, he is venerated for bringing home the World Cup five years ago. Someone quipped that had he contested from the UNP he would have earned more preferences-that's probably so but it is also true that had he contested from, say the Sihala Urumaya, he would have been a non-starter.

And this is a peculiar travesty of the proportional representation system. High-profile candidates get a virtual free ride to Parliament, simply because their faces and reputations are readily etched in the voters' minds. More baffling is Milinda Moragoda's harvest of preferences which eclipsed those who conducted campaigns with higher profiles, despite Moragoda being a relative newcomer to politics. His only difference was promising not to use posters and polythene-but he is not the first to do that either. At the last election, Dallas Alahapperuma adopted the same strategy in Matara and came a poor last on the preferences list and barely scraped through to Parliament. What then is the big difference? What did Moragoda do that Dallas didn't? Moragoda took out high-priced newspaper advertisements listing the "things I will do" and the "things I won't do" but what he didn't say was that despite the lack of posters he more than compensated for it by other, subtler means.

Professionals in various organizations were individually written to, almost everyone listed in the phone book was spoken to and most voters were mailed brochures. The candidate's mobile phone number was offered to anyone wanting to contact him and he was even available at a given place at a given time for anyone wishing to meet him. 

But, make no mistake, this is no simple, charming campaign without gimmicks-though it gives the impression that it is. All the tactics resorted to by Moragoda costs money and lots of it and that is why Dallas Alahapperuma failed where Moragoda succeeded. But both Milinda Moragoda and Arjuna Ranatunge better watch out. This time, they rode on their politically unblemished reputations: neither has been elected by voters before. Now that they have been given that chance, they will be judged next on how they perform and not on their reputations or campaign styles.


Will the President be checkmated?

By Victor Ivan
Using or misusing state resources to the maximum, a desperate PA even played its last trump card — the Tiger card — but the people disregarded all that and defeated the government with the power of their innocent vote. 

The PA government will go down in history as a government which destroyed itself by arrogance, inefficiency, corruption and lack of culture. 

Although the UNP has gained control of Parliament, the executive power of the state is still in the hands of the President who is the leader of the PA — a party that was rejected by a majority of the people. In a sense, the UNP's victory at Wednesday's polls nullifies the PA's victory at the 1999 Presidential elections. Though constitutionally, she can stay in office until the expiry of her term, the Parliament can remove the President if it thinks that she hinders its function.

During the election campaign, the President repeatedly said in a language of hatred that she cannot function in a spirit of co-existence with a UNP cabinet with a UNP Prime Minister. However, the leader of the UNP said at the end of the election that he is prepared to act in co-operation with the President who happens to be the leader of the PA. He, however, suggested that, for that purpose, she must not accept any portfolio and must become a nominal President. 

It is this contradiction between these two institutions that will function as the central issue of the power struggle. 

What is the President's next step? Will she give up power? Or will she be able to follow President Wijetunga's example and assume a nominal status? How will the UNF liaise with the executive presidency? 

Sri Lanka's presidential system is a combination of the American system and the French system. According to the American political culture, one party can dominate the Congress while the rival party holds the presidency. Conventional wisdom is resorted to when conflicts arise between the two institutions in accordance with a tradition which has developed through experience over the past two centuries.

However, in France, Charles De Gaulle, like J. R. Jayewardene, did not visualise a conflict situation between the executive and the legislature when he was drafting a presidential system constitution. However, at the parliamentary election of 1986 in France, when the Gaullists and the Destnizists together won a majority, President Francois Mitterand bowed to the popular will and allowed Jacques Chirac to become the prime minister. 

To avoid a conflict between the two centres of power, he not only allowed the prime minister to select the cabinet at his discretion, but also handed over the full responsibility for internal administration of France to the cabinet headed by the prime minister, making the executive President a mere adviser to the government. Thereafter, that arrangement became a political tradition in France. 

A president from one party and the rest of the cabinet from another party happened in 1994. But it lasted only for a brief period because it took place when President Wijetunga's term was coming to an end.

However, the present situation is different. The UNF has won the election at a time when there are more than four years more for the term of the President to end. If Ms. Kumaratunga had been a far-seeing leader of wisdom, she would have known that parliamentary power could go to the opposition. It is unlikely that she was unaware of the probability of the opposition coming to power at this election. Instead of following a flexible policy that would facilitate co-existence in the future, she followed a policy of harassing and oppressing the opposition.

In such a circumstance, a conflict, rather than peaceful co-existence, between these two centres of power is inevitable. In the present circumstances some of the options and possibilities available are as follows: 

1. Voluntary resignation by the President

By this method, an unpleasant conflict between the two centres of power can be avoided. If that happens, Ranil Wickremesinghe will get the opportunity to become President without a Presidential Election. 

However, it is unlikely that her clique, who are responsible for some grave offences, will allow her to resign. The President herself might think that the best way to protect herself now is to remain in power, exerting all her strength for the purpose. 

2. Establishment of a peaceful co-existence with the opposing power

For such a policy, it will be necessary for the President to confine herself to holding the post of President and to hand over the entire administration to the opposition party. 

However, even if she becomes a nominal president, the two parties will have great suspicions against each other because of the immense powers vested in the President. Such suspicions can be dispelled only through constitutional reforms. If that does not happen, the opposition will inevitably think that she is a cobra who has temporarily hidden his head but will blow it later. The President himself, on the other hand might think that the opposition has agreed to peaceful co-existence in order to buy time, but will later take action to oust her through an impeachment motion.

However, it is unlikely that a victorious party would like to permit its rival party to have greater power. But instead of peaceful co-existence, we see a mutual hatred between the two parties. The UNF members feel deeply that when they were in the opposition, she oppressed them. Those who left her and joined the UNP also have bitter feelings about her.

3. Removal of the President from her post through a Constitutional process

What is more likely to happen very early or later is that the opposition party will seek to remove her from her post through a constitutional process. 

The extent of their strength in Parliament and the nature of the strategies they adopt for the purpose will have a bearing on the matter.

By presenting an emergency budget without allocating funds for the President, too, the President can be made powerless by constitutional means. Or, she can be impeached.

In such a course of action, an unpleasant clash between the two centres of power will become inevitable. As in the Philippines and Indonesia, a situation could arise with people taking to the streets.

The biggest lesson to be learned from this pending crisis is the necessity to remove the contradictions in the constitution.

If the existing executive presidential system is to continue, the executive President must be made answerable to parliament and the Judiciary. The President's right to dissolve parliament arbitrarily must be abolished. Parliament must have the right to chose a prime minister and the prime minister must have the right and obligation to chose a suitable cabinet. The internal administration of the country must entirely be the responsibility of the prime minister.

The writer is the editor of Ravaya



More News/Comment
Return to News/Comment
News/Comment Archives

INDEX | FRONT PAGE | EDITORIAL | NEWS/COMMENT | EDITORIAL/OPINION | PLUS | BUSINESS | SPORTS | MIRROR MAGAZINE | TV TIMES | HOME | ARCHIVES | TEAM | SEARCH | DOWNLOAD GZIP


 
Please send your comments and suggestions on this web site to
The Sunday Times or to Information Laboratories (Pvt.) Ltd.