Clean gimmicks and preference votes
Thank God, the elections are over, even if it is after six months of uncertainty
and at a cost of half a billion rupees and 46 lives. Hopefully, by the
time this is read, it will be all done with barring the swearing in and
the wounded egos of the defeated candidates. The coming days will no doubt
see the analysts having a field day, but this note is about that other
contest within the contest-the battle for the 'manaape' which showed two
contrasting candidates take second slot in the hotly contested Colombo
district: Milinda Moragoda and Arjuna Ranatunge.
Ranatunge's victory is easy to understand. He is nationally known and
whatever the shortcomings of the party that he represents, he is venerated
for bringing home the World Cup five years ago. Someone quipped that had
he contested from the UNP he would have earned more preferences-that's
probably so but it is also true that had he contested from, say the Sihala
Urumaya, he would have been a non-starter.
And this is a peculiar travesty of the proportional representation system.
High-profile candidates get a virtual free ride to Parliament, simply because
their faces and reputations are readily etched in the voters' minds. More
baffling is Milinda Moragoda's harvest of preferences which eclipsed those
who conducted campaigns with higher profiles, despite Moragoda being a
relative newcomer to politics. His only difference was promising not to
use posters and polythene-but he is not the first to do that either. At
the last election, Dallas Alahapperuma adopted the same strategy in Matara
and came a poor last on the preferences list and barely scraped through
to Parliament. What then is the big difference? What did Moragoda do that
Dallas didn't? Moragoda took out high-priced newspaper advertisements listing
the "things I will do" and the "things I won't do" but what he didn't say
was that despite the lack of posters he more than compensated for it by
other, subtler means.
Professionals in various organizations were individually written to,
almost everyone listed in the phone book was spoken to and most voters
were mailed brochures. The candidate's mobile phone number was offered
to anyone wanting to contact him and he was even available at a given place
at a given time for anyone wishing to meet him.
But, make no mistake, this is no simple, charming campaign without gimmicks-though
it gives the impression that it is. All the tactics resorted to by Moragoda
costs money and lots of it and that is why Dallas Alahapperuma failed where
Moragoda succeeded. But both Milinda Moragoda and Arjuna Ranatunge better
watch out. This time, they rode on their politically unblemished reputations:
neither has been elected by voters before. Now that they have been given
that chance, they will be judged next on how they perform and not on their
reputations or campaign styles.
Will the President be checkmated?
By Victor Ivan
Using or misusing state resources to the maximum, a desperate PA even played
its last trump card — the Tiger card — but the people disregarded all that
and defeated the government with the power of their innocent vote.
The PA government will go down in history as a government which destroyed
itself by arrogance, inefficiency, corruption and lack of culture.
Although the UNP has gained control of Parliament, the executive power
of the state is still in the hands of the President who is the leader of
the PA — a party that was rejected by a majority of the people. In a sense,
the UNP's victory at Wednesday's polls nullifies the PA's victory at the
1999 Presidential elections. Though constitutionally, she can stay in office
until the expiry of her term, the Parliament can remove the President if
it thinks that she hinders its function.
During the election campaign, the President repeatedly said in a language
of hatred that she cannot function in a spirit of co-existence with a UNP
cabinet with a UNP Prime Minister. However, the leader of the UNP said
at the end of the election that he is prepared to act in co-operation with
the President who happens to be the leader of the PA. He, however, suggested
that, for that purpose, she must not accept any portfolio and must become
a nominal President.
It is this contradiction between these two institutions that will function
as the central issue of the power struggle.
What is the President's next step? Will she give up power? Or will she
be able to follow President Wijetunga's example and assume a nominal status?
How will the UNF liaise with the executive presidency?
Sri Lanka's presidential system is a combination of the American system
and the French system. According to the American political culture, one
party can dominate the Congress while the rival party holds the presidency.
Conventional wisdom is resorted to when conflicts arise between the two
institutions in accordance with a tradition which has developed through
experience over the past two centuries.
However, in France, Charles De Gaulle, like J. R. Jayewardene, did not
visualise a conflict situation between the executive and the legislature
when he was drafting a presidential system constitution. However, at the
parliamentary election of 1986 in France, when the Gaullists and the Destnizists
together won a majority, President Francois Mitterand bowed to the popular
will and allowed Jacques Chirac to become the prime minister.
To avoid a conflict between the two centres of power, he not only allowed
the prime minister to select the cabinet at his discretion, but also handed
over the full responsibility for internal administration of France to the
cabinet headed by the prime minister, making the executive President a
mere adviser to the government. Thereafter, that arrangement became a political
tradition in France.
A president from one party and the rest of the cabinet from another
party happened in 1994. But it lasted only for a brief period because it
took place when President Wijetunga's term was coming to an end.
However, the present situation is different. The UNF has won the election
at a time when there are more than four years more for the term of the
President to end. If Ms. Kumaratunga had been a far-seeing leader of wisdom,
she would have known that parliamentary power could go to the opposition.
It is unlikely that she was unaware of the probability of the opposition
coming to power at this election. Instead of following a flexible policy
that would facilitate co-existence in the future, she followed a policy
of harassing and oppressing the opposition.
In such a circumstance, a conflict, rather than peaceful co-existence,
between these two centres of power is inevitable. In the present circumstances
some of the options and possibilities available are as follows:
1. Voluntary resignation by the President
By this method, an unpleasant conflict between the two centres of power
can be avoided. If that happens, Ranil Wickremesinghe will get the opportunity
to become President without a Presidential Election.
However, it is unlikely that her clique, who are responsible for some
grave offences, will allow her to resign. The President herself might think
that the best way to protect herself now is to remain in power, exerting
all her strength for the purpose.
2. Establishment of a peaceful co-existence with the opposing power
For such a policy, it will be necessary for the President to confine
herself to holding the post of President and to hand over the entire administration
to the opposition party.
However, even if she becomes a nominal president, the two parties will
have great suspicions against each other because of the immense powers
vested in the President. Such suspicions can be dispelled only through
constitutional reforms. If that does not happen, the opposition will inevitably
think that she is a cobra who has temporarily hidden his head but will
blow it later. The President himself, on the other hand might think that
the opposition has agreed to peaceful co-existence in order to buy time,
but will later take action to oust her through an impeachment motion.
However, it is unlikely that a victorious party would like to permit
its rival party to have greater power. But instead of peaceful co-existence,
we see a mutual hatred between the two parties. The UNF members feel deeply
that when they were in the opposition, she oppressed them. Those who left
her and joined the UNP also have bitter feelings about her.
3. Removal of the President from her post through a Constitutional process
What is more likely to happen very early or later is that the opposition
party will seek to remove her from her post through a constitutional process.
The extent of their strength in Parliament and the nature of the strategies
they adopt for the purpose will have a bearing on the matter.
By presenting an emergency budget without allocating funds for the President,
too, the President can be made powerless by constitutional means. Or, she
can be impeached.
In such a course of action, an unpleasant clash between the two centres
of power will become inevitable. As in the Philippines and Indonesia, a
situation could arise with people taking to the streets.
The biggest lesson to be learned from this pending crisis is the necessity
to remove the contradictions in the constitution.
If the existing executive presidential system is to continue, the executive
President must be made answerable to parliament and the Judiciary. The
President's right to dissolve parliament arbitrarily must be abolished.
Parliament must have the right to chose a prime minister and the prime
minister must have the right and obligation to chose a suitable cabinet.
The internal administration of the country must entirely be the responsibility
of the prime minister.
The writer is the editor of Ravaya |