National
policy on law and order urged
Law and order, or the lack of it, remains a nagging concern for
the business community and the general public alike. Despite repeated
reassuring noises made by government leaders from time to time,
there appears to be no visible improvement in the law and order
situation. This has serious implications for the economy, particularly
with regard to the investment climate in which perceptions and appearances
perhaps matter more than reality.
The fact is
there are serious lapses in maintaining law and order and doubts
about the ability and willingness of state agencies in charge of
implementing the law and ensuring justice to do their job effectively
and impartially.
Among emerging
markets, Sri Lanka has a good reputation for having the required
laws and regulations to protect investments and settle business
disputes. But if these are not implemented properly and impartially,
investors, particularly foreign ones, are not likely to look favourably
at investing in the island. Even existing enterprises would naturally
feel jittery about continuing their business or expanding into new
areas if they have no confidence in the law enforcement agencies.
This lack of
confidence in the state machinery, particularly the police and the
judiciary, has led to a situation where the public simply does not
bother to complain because they believe, sometimes based on previous
experience, that nothing comes of it. Sections of the police, along
with other related state agencies, are known to be in cahoots with
criminals, as are ruling party politicians.
For example,
in the Free Trade Zone, police say they are often unable to proceed
with investigations into complaints by investors for lack of evidence.
Witnesses are reluctant to come forward because they know criminals
have links with police or ruling party politicians who can intervene
to get them off the hook. The rate of crime remains unchanged, according
to official police figures, and only 22 percent of cases that go
to court end with the culprits being convicted. This is partly because
of the reluctance of witnesses to give evidence.
Police say
civil society is not doing its part to help fight crime. On the
other hand it is well known that sometimes people are even reluctant
to report crime because of the unholy alliance between the underworld,
police and politicians. Crime affecting the business community must
be treated with more seriousness if the country wants to succeed
in attracting the investment required to speed up economic growth.
Earlier, the
war was made a convenient excuse for the inability of the police
to maintain law and order and fight crime better. The police maintained
that they were under-strength with many of their cadres deployed
on anti-terrorist work in the north and east and that they did not
even have enough manpower to conduct that most basic of police duties
- the beat or neighbourhood patrol.
But there has
been no fighting for over a year now and the pressure on the police
would surely have eased. It is high time the police resumed their
normal police work and did it more effectively. A welcome development,
and indication of what can be done if the will is there, is the
manner in which the corporate world has worked with the law enforcement
authorities in raising police strength in tourist resorts to prevent
harassment by the pimps, touts and petty criminals who prey on visitors.
There is an
urgent need for the government and police to get together with civil
society and come out with a national policy on law and order, which
has the support of all political parties, as suggested at a panel
discussion organised by The Sunday Times last week on this subject.
This should include measures to tackle corruption in the police
force and to prevent political interference in their work. The business
community can play its part by cutting off the supply of funds to
politicians known to have links with criminals or to be prone to
interfering with police inquiries. Perhaps this could be included
in a code of conduct for businessmen.
Revenue
generation in a federal structure
Professor
Willie Mendis, Senior Professor of Town and Country Planning University
of Moratuwa Background
A recently reported study by a researcher attached to the International
Centre for Ethnic Studies estimated "that the LTTE was earning
Rs. 2.34 billion through its domestic taxes". However, it "criticised
the LTTE for not undertaking any development work with the revenue".
The latter
highlighted the dichotomy of a reverse position in the areas elsewhere
in the country wherein the elected Local Authorities who are statutorily
empowered to frame By-Laws for revenue generation from authorised
sources in its areas of jurisdictions were not fully utilising such
provision. Consequently, they too have not undertaken any development
work and should be equally criticised but for a different reason
of lack of capacity for performing its functions. On the other hand,
it is to overcome same that the Sri Lanka Institute of Local Governance
was established by Act No: 31 of 1999.
Nevertheless,
the finding of this research study provokes further insight into
the whole area of `Revenue Generation by Local Authorities and Provincial
Councils'. The lack of revenue has been the cause of the Centre-Periphery
dependance which has adversely affected the democratic ideals expected
from a process of devolution.
Consequently the demand for power-sharing rises at the periphery
often causing conflicts of incredible proportions at high cost to
life and property. Its spill over across the entire nation forces
its own development to retreat to the backwoods.
This in turn puts the country into the spin of the vicious cycle
of poverty and further conflict.
It is in the
above context, that it has become significant to note the agreement
reached between the government and the LTTE to negotiate at its
next round of Peace Talks, the issue of the fiscal aspects of the
already agreed Federal Structure of governance. It's underlying
principles being power-sharing and self-determination, within a
united Sri Lanka. The former implies the delineation of powers and
functions between the Centre and the Periphery.
The latter comprises
the political ideology of democracy in electing a representative
leadership at the periphery. In this connection it is pertinent
to note that the findings of the ICES research study constitute
the core of the conflicting situation in the northeast wherein the
`revenue-collector' is not a democratically elected leadership in
a defined structure of governance at the periphery. Consequently,
it does not have
the legitimate
privilege of revenue collection from any source until it enters
the democratic mainstream and it's powers & functions are delineated.
On the other hand, until then, it cannot also be held accountable
for the lapse in not undertaking any duties of development in the
said area.
It is in this
backdrop that research was undertaken into the already permitted
sources of revenue generation by democratically elected bodies which
have also been empowered with the duties of undertaking development
from same in its areas of jurisdiction at the periphery.
It may provide
a beacon to what works and also to what does not work. The system
of democratically elected government at the periphery comprises
the Provincial Councils & the Local Authorities. The former
was established by the Provincial Councils Act No: 42 of 1987. The
latter comprises three types of Local Authorities, each established
under its own respective statute as follows: -
Municipal Councils
……Municipal Councils Ordinance (Chapter 252)
Urban Councils …………Urban Councils Ordinance
(Chapter 255)
Pradeshiya Sabhas …… Pradeshiya Sabhas Act No: 15 of
1987
The statutory
powers, functions, and duties of the Provincial Councils have been
set out in the Ninth Schedule - List 1 of the 13th Amendment to
the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.
It is supplemented by those in List III of the same Schedule, which
has `Concurrent Subjects' on any of which "every Provincial
Council may, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, make
statutes applicable to the Province for which it is established
……. after such consultation with Parliament as it may
consider appropriate in the circumstances of each case" (Section
154 G 5b of the constitution).
The statutory
functions of each type of Local Authority are identical and are
provided as follows, in Section (4) of the MC Ordinance, Section
(4) of the UC Ordinance, and Section (3) of the PS Act, respectively.
"…the
regulation, control, and administration of all matters relating
to public health, public utility services, and public thoroughfares,
and generally with the protection and promotion of the comfort,
convenience and welfare of the people and the amenities."
In order that
these bodies at the periphery can perform its mandated functions,
the enabling powers to generate revenue in its respective areas
of jurisdiction have been statutorily provided as follows:
Provincial
Councils: As per the Ninth Schedule - List 1, of the 13th Amendment
to the Constitution. Municipal Councils: As per Part XII of the
MC Ordinance and the framing of By-Laws under its Part XIII. Urban
Councils: As per Part VII of the UC Ordinance, and the framing of
By-Laws under its Part VI.
Pradeshiya
Sabhas: As per Part V of the PS Act, and the framing of By-Laws
(Section 186) or by Resolution (e.g. Sections 151 & 152) The
above peripheral bodies are also entitled to receive funds by transfer
from the Centre, under the following statutes: Provincial Councils:
As per the Section 154(R) of the Constitution
Municipal Councils: As per Part IX (Section 185(2) (f) and (g) )
of the MC Ordinance, in conjunction with its Part XIV on Central
Control.
Urban Councils:
As per Part VII (Section 158(2) (h) ) of the UC Ordinance, in conjunction
with its Part VIII on Central Control. Pradeshiya Sabhas: As per
Part V ( Section 129(2) (i) ) of the PS Act, in conjunction with
its Part VI on its Supervision and Control. The experience to date
indicates that the above powers are not wholly utilized at the periphery
in order to raise revenue needed to carry out its mandated functions.
Consequently,
the elected bodies therein are always in a resource-scarce environment
and dependant on transfer from the Centre to meet the needs of its
Constituents. It will therefore be relevant to contrast the same
with the reported actions of the LTTE.
The contrast
of the reported sources of revenue generation at the Periphery by
the LTTE indicate a parallel with the statutorily permitted sources
at the periphery by elected bodies, as follows:(see table) It is
also interesting to contrast how violations are prosecuted in respect
of the above:
Municipal Council:
As per Section 168 of the MC Ord. by the Municipal Magistrate conducted
& governed by the rules, forms, & procedure prescribed for
and observed by the Magistrate's Court and no appeal shall lie from
any judgement or order of a Municipal Magistrate, except as provided
for by the Code of Criminal Procedure Act.
Urban Councils: As per Section 163(9) of the UC Ord. by the Magistrate's
Court.
Pradeshiya Sabhas: As per Section 212 of the PC Act, every offence
shall be trial-able summarily by the Magistrate having local jurisdiction.
A parallel
reportedly exists in the LTTE areas, which has its own assembled
Courts conducted & governed by its own rules, forms and procedures.
Meanwhile, it will also be appropriate to contrast the means of
promoting development between the two parties, which could lead
to revenue generation.
Contrast of
Statutorily Permitted Means for Promoting Development as per the
Mandated Functions at the Periphery, and the Corresponding Reports
on Same in the LTTE Areas: The means by which development is promoted
at the Periphery is principally by the formulation and implementation
of `Development Plans' as per the various Statutes, as follows:
a) Housing
and Town Improvement Ordinance:Empowers the MCs, UCs and PSs to
formulate schemes for better housing and the improvement of towns.
b)Town and Country Planning Ordinance and its Amendment Act No:
49 of 2000:Empowers the formulation & implementation of the
`regional physical plan' in a Province, and an `outline physical
plan and detail plan' in a Local Authority area, by the Provincial
Planning Committee and the Local Authority respectively.
c) Urban Development
Authority Law No: 41 of 1978:Empowers the formulation and implementation
of an `integrated urban development plan' by a Local Authority under
delegated authority of the UDA. d) Southern Development Authority
of Sri Lanka Act No: 18 of 1996:Empowers the SDA to be responsible
for `co-ordinating the planning & implementation of development
projects within its designated area'.
e) Board of
Investment Law of 2002. (Appointed day not yet gazetted):Empowers
the BOI & the Regional Economic Development Commissions to formulate
and implement an Investment Promotion Plan to `foster and generate
the economic development of each region', acting in consultation
with the Provincial Councils.
The Development Plans are envisaged to broaden the revenue base
which were mentioned previously.
In this connection
it is in the formulation of such plans that it will become possible
to accommodate the following principles set out in Section 154R
(5) of the Constitution which shall be taken into account by the
Finance Commission in effecting Centre-Periphery transfers:
The population
of each Province;
The per capita income of each Province;
The need, progressively, to reduce social and economic disparities;
and
The need, progressively, to reduce the difference between the per
capita income of each Province and the highest per capita income
among the Provinces.
The above are
important considerations because as per Section 154R (3) of the
Constitution it is on the recommendation and in consultation with
the Finance Commission that the government shall allocate from the
Annual Budget, `such funds as are adequate for the purpose of meeting
the needs of the Province'.
In these circumstances,
the nexus of the Statutory Functions of the Elected Peripheral Bodies
- Development Plan - Revenue Generation constitute the process by
which the periphery can prosper and thereby mitigate social conflict.
With the enactment of the BOI Law 2002 it may be mentioned that
the `regions' in the periphery have become co-terminus for undertaking
economic development and in the formulation of its corresponding
Development Plans.
Meanwhile,
it is relevant to note from recent reports that the Chairman of
the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce has stated that the LTTE "has
prepared a Development Plan for Sri Lanka's north and east with
the help of the Tamil Diaspora". The latter suggests that the
LTTE too is creating a similar nexus.
Salient Issues
on the Fiscal Asprcts of a Federal structure of Governance within
a United Sri Lanka: The overall goal in conflict resolution is to
bring the LTTE and its aforementioned actions on fiscal matters,
into the democratic mainstream. In this connection, the government's
Chief negotiator in the Peace Talks with the LTTE has stated that
the government "has requested a halt to the illegal taxation
by the LTTE." Consequently, what has become essential is the
formulation of a blue -print for a commonly applicable legitimate
framework for revenue generation by authorised devolved bodies.
In the same
way it is important that revenue transfers also take place at the
tier of Local Authorities which have the statutory mandate for ensuring
the protection, comfort & convenience of the citizen in his
or her habitat on the ground. Democracy will be further strengthened
if this transfer process can involve the revitalized Gramodaya Mandalayas,
under a new law of its own as indicated in the Regaining Sri Lanka
policy framework.
In the above
connection, it is encouraging to note that the Regaining Sri Lanka
policy framework has also made specific reference on reforms to
local governance, inclusive of the following: Issuance of a single
code of local governance law;
Improvement of local government strategic planning, M & E and
financial management capacities;
Publication
and dissemination of local government revenues and expenditures
through modern means of communication such as the Internet. Expansion
of Partnerships between Provincial Councils and local government
bodies; and
Implementation of improved fiscal equalisation measures to insulate
it from any political interference and to ensure transparency and
accountability.
In operationalising
the fiscal aspects of a Federal Structure, the Centre-Periphery
relations need to be harmonious. The latter should however not be
conceived as a continuum of policy planning and implementation.
On the other hand it implies that it is essential to ensure the
synergy between the systems that will benefit the citizens in the
periphery. In this connection, as previously mentioned the groundwork
may be available in the new BOI Law which has not yet been assigned
an `Appointed Date' for its enforcement.
It provides
for the establishment of Regional Economic Development Commissions;
the objects of which, in consultation with the Provincial Councils,
offer a platform for further progress on the fiscal aspects of a
federal structure. It's linkage to the Local Authority Statutes,
the Urban Development Authority Law, and several other allied enactments
given in the Schedule of the new BOI Law, consolidates the desired
synergy between the Centre and the Periphery. The reinforcement
of the same is inherent in Section 154R of the Constitution.
Concluding
observation
The fiscal aspects of a federal structure comprise the inventory
of enabling instruments for a sustainable system of devolved governance.
Consequently, in the recent past the Finance Commission had commissioned
a Consultancy assignment supported by the United Nations on "Fiscal
Devolution".
The latter could
offer substantial guidance at the forthcoming negotiations. Its
complement of security is what will ensure confidence and trust
between the different levels of governance. Both form the twin pillars
for moulding a stable and developed United Sri Lanka.
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