Situation Report

Land hunt on a land mine
The United National Front (UNF) Government is coming under increasing pressure from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to scale down the presence of Security Forces in the Jaffna peninsula.

The proposed Army base: Work on the Rs. 55 million construction project has come to a stamdstill.

During the Hakone (Japan) peace talks last month, Chief Negotiator Anton Balasingham, strongly urged the reduction. He said the stationing of some 40,000 troops (and Policemen), as against 400,000 civilians, was too big. The ratio of an armed person to every 40 civilians, he felt, was not a desirable equation. His demand, even before core issues to settle the ethnic conflict finds a place in the peace talks agenda, underscored its importance.

To conclude that Mr. Balasingham's demand in Hakone has alone put pressure is to invite a denial from the Government's hawk-eyed media monitors. They are now on full alert, with their finger on the trigger, to shoot off rebuttals. Hardly a day passes without a denial, clarification, elaboration or a combination of all. When unsubstantiated reportage is challenged, they are indeed a very welcome move. They clearly educate the public. Those responsible for reporting are kept under check and even exposed if there is any wrongdoing.

The site for the new Army base: The board says, “This is a govt./military property. Any unauthorised intruders will be dealt with minimum force.”

But what if a denial is unsubstantiated? Does that mean the facts reported are a pack of lies or an assertion that a correctly reported event has not (or never) taken place? Will that help save embarrassment or further exacerbate suspicion in the public mind? Such rebuttals, now becoming a new culture, raise more questions than they answer. The doubts cast when rebuttals are used as tools to suppress substantiated facts further clouds reality.

The latest Tiger guerrilla pressure on the UNF Government comes in this murky backdrop. True, the Government-LTTE Ceasefire Agreement of February 22, last year, spells out specific "measures to restore normalcy." Among them:

* Places of worship (temples, churches, mosques and other holy sites etc.) currently held by the forces of either of the Parties shall be vacated by D-day + 30 and made accessible to the public. Places of worship which are situated in "high security zones" shall be vacated by all armed personnel and maintained in good order by civilian workers, even when they are not made accessible to the public.

* Beginning on the date on which this Agreement enters into force, school buildings occupied by either Party shall be vacated and returned to their intended use. This activity shall be completed by D-day + 160 at the latest.

* A schedule indicating the return of all other public buildings to their intended use shall be drawn up by the Parties and published at the latest by D-day + 60.

The deadlines set out in the Ceasefire Agreement are now long past. These measures to "restore normalcy" have been given effect to. This is largely in areas outside the High Security Zone (HSZ). As a result, nearly a half of the Security Forces camps located strategically in the peninsula have had to be shut down in areas outside the HSZ. Others were merged. Plans were formulated to shift yet others to newer locations.

As for security forces presence in the High Security Zone itself, a "self-inflicted" controversy for the Government remains in cold storage. Its fuller effect will be felt only after the report of retired Lieut. Gen. Sathish Nambiar, a former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, who has been called upon to help sort out the issue, is handed over to the Government later this month.

This issue arose due to the professional brilliance or the lack of it by the controversial Defence Secretary Austin Fernando. A five-page "secret" document titled "De-escalation Plan" formulated by Security Forces Commander, Jaffna, Major General Sarath Fonseka for the Government was forwarded to the LTTE without being "sanitized."

The blunder was both costly and embarrassing for the UNF. The Sub Committee on De-escalation and Normalisation (SDN), one of the instruments agreed upon by the UNF and the LTTE for the process of normalisation became defunct. During last December's talks in the Thai resort of Nakorn Pathom, both sides agreed to call in Lt.

Gen. Nambiar to make recommendations on re-settlement of displaced persons in the HSZ. He will now report on how the Security Forces/Police installations within HSZ in the peninsula - over 150 square kilometres in extent and making up 15 per cent of the land mass - should make way for the re-settlement of internally displaced persons.

Whilst Lt. Gen. Nambiar's report was being awaited, both the UNF and the LTTE embarked on plans to re-locate security forces installations outside the HSZ. Defence Minister, Tilak Marapana, in a Cabinet Memorandum he submitted to Ministers on February 25, this year, better explains the position. It was unanimously approved by the Cabinet. This is what he said:

"In implementing the Ceasefire Agreement signed between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, some of the government buildings and private houses occupied by the troops in Jaffna Peninsula have to be vacated and handed over to the original owners for them to return to their properties.

"This issue was taken up for discussion in Bangkok and Oslo at the Peace Talks. In consequence, the Government's team of negotiators agreed to relocate the military camps wherever possible, currently sited outside the High Security Zones in the Peninsula. There are 152 such camps. The Sri Lanka Army has planned to adjust the locations without loosing (sic) the strategic security of the Army and establish 88 camps.

"In liaison with the Government Agent Jaffna a detailed survey was carried out by the Security Forces Headquarters (Jaffna) in order to find such state lands available in the peninsula to re-locate the Headquarters of the Sri Lanka Army, presently established in Subash and Gnanam Hotels, and in about 80 houses. My Ministry had held discussions with the Government Agent, Jaffna to explore the possibility of selecting private lands suitable for this purpose. It has been found that there is no possibility of finding suitable private land due to very obvious reasons. Therefore, the Armed Forces have to depend on lands belonging to the State.

"Accordingly suitable State/Provincial Council owned lands have been identified by the Security Forces in Jaffna, as depicted in the plan and schedule at Annex "A." It includes:

(a) Jaffna Fort and surroundings.
(b) The Town Hall which is destroyed fully.
(c) Lands belonging to the Department of Police.
(d) The Rest House and a small extent of private land which is unoccupied and the owners are not available. Rest House too is damaged.

"As the Government Team of negotiators has promised to relocate the Jaffna city military establishment in May 2003, the SLA has commenced procurement procedure to buy pre-fabricated building materials under the Indian line of Credit.

As these materials are to reach Sri Lanka soon, as there are no lands belonging to the State to undertake construction of the relocated military camps, the SLA requires access and authority to enter the lands owned by Government and Jaffna Municipality, stated in the schedule in the Annex, and to undertake construction of temporary camps/office for the use of the Armed Forces.

"As the authority to release the lands belonging to the North East Provincial Council (NEPC) is in the hands of the Governor of the NEPC, my Ministry has obtained the concurrence of the Governor of North East Province to temporarily (sic) release the Provincial Council owned lands to the Sri Lanka Army.

“As these lands are urgently required, Cabinet approval is sought to vest them temporarily for a period of two years to construct temporary buildings for the Military Headquarters and other military establishments in Jaffna city thus releasing the above mentioned two hotels and about eighty private houses for business and resettlement purposes."

It is relevant to note two significant points made by Defence Minister Marapana in his memorandum to the Cabinet. He says "It has been found that there is no possibility of finding suitable private land due to very obvious reasons." The Sunday Times learnt that the "obvious reason" was the ban placed by the LTTE on private land owners from selling their property to Sri Lankan Security Forces or the Police.

Another is Mr. Marapana's observation that "The Sri Lanka Army has planned to adjust the locations without losing (sic) the strategic security of the Army." In other words, the security factor has been taken into consideration when a location shift was found necessary.

Armed with Cabinet approval and a vesting order (via a Gazette notification) issued by Maj. Gen. (retd) Asoka Jayawardena, Governor of the North East, an extent of two acres of land was acquired. That encompassed the old Jaffna Fort and its environs including part of the destroyed Town Hall and the former Police office area.

The Army placed a board warning trespassers to keep away (see picture on this page) from the recently acquired land and laid the foundation for a complex to house the Headquarters of the 51 Division and the Headquarters of the 512 Brigade and troops - those now occupying the hotels Gnanam, Subash and some 80 houses. Pre-fabricated concrete slabs for which orders were placed from India under a credit line had arrived and were being shipped from Colombo under a Rs 55 million project. And now, all the work has come to a standstill.

This is the result of a new turn of events. Last week, intelligence sources spoke of the intercept of a radio conversation between two Tiger guerrilla leaders. One was asking the other whether the construction of the new site to re-locate the troops would pose an impediment. That is in their efforts to seek the withdrawal of the Security Forces from the peninsula if there is no negotiated settlement.

Within days after this news reached the UNF leadership arrived a letter from the Tamil National Alliance (TNA). It called upon Defence Minister Marpana not to go ahead with the construction work at the existing site and to shift it to a new location.

The result - a joint Government and TNA delegation were in Jaffna last Wednesday to identify new sites. The Government team comprised S.B. Karaliyadda, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Maj. Gen. Lohan Gunawardena, Chief of Staff, Sri Lanka Army, Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, Security Forces Commander, Jaffna, and Chelliah Pathmanathan, Government Agent, Jaffna.

The TNA team was led by R. Sampanthan and comprised Parliamentarians K. Thuraisingham, G.G. Ponnambalam, M.S. Senathirajah, A. Vinayagamoorthy and N. Ravirajah. The TNA's position is that the lands that belonged to local authorities should be returned to them and not to the military. They argue that the presence of the Army in the new area would be an impediment to the ongoing peace process.

Whatever the concerns of the TNA, or for that matter the LTTE, the re-location of the troops to the new area is only a temporary move. Undoubtedly the presence of the Security Forces in that area, or in the Jaffna peninsula itself, once permanent peace is negotiated, remains to be ascertained.

But the question that arises is whether the re-location again of the Army installation at the behest of the TNA will ignore Mr Marapana's own assertion to the Cabinet that "The Sri Lanka Army has planned to adjust the locations without loosing (sic) the strategic security of the Army…"

The joint team visited two different locations last Wednesday. They have been suggested by the Government Agent and agreed to by the TNA. They are Kalandaveli and Ariyamadam - both locations a distance away from the present, which get flooded during monsoons. They are said to be the worst wastewater collection point and according to senior security sources in Jaffna will place the troops at a serious disadvantage and health risk. "It is better for the troops to return to the south than be located in the new areas suggested. They will be non effective there," exhorted a senior Army officer in the peninsula who did not wish to be named.

During various rounds of peace talks and behind-the-scenes contacts with his UNF counterparts, LTTE's Chief Negotiator, Mr. Balasingham has defended his organisation's actions in recruiting, training and re-arming on the grounds that they should be prepared if peace talks fail. Should that not apply to national security strategy as well?

Suggesting that military preparedness be at a higher level is quite clearly not to suggest going to war. For a sovereign Government, being prepared militarily is a sine qua non to enhance the country's sovereignty.

But the question remains whether being passive or negative on issues over national security considerations would help. If one is to apply the LTTE's own argument, would that not place them at an advantage militarily in the event of peace talks not being successful? Would they not have then achieved their military objectives without having resorted to war? Or, would pointing out these hard realities be construed as being anti peace?

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