Is there a doctors' right to strike?
One remembers a somewhat grimly hilarious
moment not so long ago when a one time predecessor of the present
Minister of Health (held equally to ransom by striking doctors at
that time), pointed out, desperation writ all over his face, that
if Sri Lankans had the right to life constitutionally protected,
'then surely the doctors will be stopped from resorting to such
action'.
Possibly, the
exquisite agonies suffered by the then government must have been
forcibly recalled to the mind of People's Alliance parliamentarian
Nimal Siripala de Silva when he advised the members of the striking
Government Medical Officers' Association (GMOA) this week, that
they must first secure the needs of patients before engaging in
any action on behalf of their trade union.
For the GMOA,
however, the issue has been very clear. The dispute concerned a
matter of salary anomalies which they say, has been prevalent for
a long time and which has resulted in discrepancies between salaries
of Assistant Medical Officers/Registered Medical Officers and graduate
medical officers.
The former,
however, claim that the 44 percent increase in the starting salaries
of doctors that the GMOA is demanding, is grossly disproportionate
and concedes only a lesser increase of some 8% (on an average).
While the dispute went on and the unfortunate Minister of Health
wavered between one or the other of these two lobbies, we witnessed
patients who are at the receiving end of the strike action, becoming
the first victims, despite so called 'emergency services'.
In a country
where consumer rights are virtually non-existent, patients' rights
are a similarly highly disregarded category. The recent formation
of a National Association for the Rights of Patients is therefore
a salutary development. The Association has called for a ban on
strikes by doctors and is considering requesting the government
to provide safeguards in this regard by law.
In India, with
its highly proactive consumer rights bodies and considerable public
interest jurisprudence enforcing duties upon hospitals and doctors
based on the right to life expressly contained in the Indian Constitution,
there is clear reasoning as to why the right to adequate health
comprises an essential part of the right to life.
Thus, the Supreme
Court of India has categorically pointed out that the right to life
does not mean an animal existence but connotes access to basic nutrition,
health care, clothing and shelter and fundamentally, the right to
live with human dignity.
Many thought
provoking judgements have been delivered in this regard by the Court,
including one particularly stern judicial reprimand to as many as
seven government hospitals in Calcutta who refused to admit a seriously
injured agricultural labourer on the basis that they did not have
vacant beds. The hospitals were warned to be more responsible about
patient care. Similarly, other decisions by the Court have established
the rights of patients as consumers to protest with regard to questions
of inadequate health care.
Framers of
Sri Lanka's constitutional documents, past and present, have not
been as far sighted as in India, as far as rights provisions are
concerned. We do not therefore, curiously enough, have the right
to life. Consequently, the actions of doctors in state hospitals
in refusing all but the most dire medical emergency care for patients
remains arguably contestable only under the general prohibition
against arbitrary action. Thus, a patient able to afford only the
services provided by the state hospitals could very well plead that
the action by the striking doctors amounts to unequal treatment
in that the end result of the strike action affords medical care
only to the well heeled.
In this respect,
it is also relevant that an April judgement of the Sri Lankan Supreme
Court referred to Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic
Social and Cultural Rights which recognizes the right of everyone
"to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical
and mental health". The reference by the Court was in the explicit
context of ordering the State to bear the private medical expenses
of a man who had been arrested, detained and tortured by police
officers of the Wattala Police station, horrendously enough due
to mistaken identity. (Gerald Perera vs OIC, Wattala Police Station
and Others, SCM 4/4/2003)
In this instance,
responding to an argument by the police officers that the man could
not claim medical expenses incurred after being taken for treatment
at the Nawaloka Hospital, the Court specifically took the view that
citizens have the right to choose between State and private medical
care. The fact that the wife of the petitioner in the case took
him to a private hospital, (which was moreover in consequence of
medical advice given when he was first admitted to an ayurvedic
hospital), was held to be not unreasonable and was probably motivated
by nothing other than the desire to save his life.
Notably, the
Court pointed out that, how ever good the standard of treatment
in State hospitals may be, there is no doubt that many Sri Lankans
do opt for treatment in private hospitals - sometimes in the belief
that treatment and care is better, and sometimes because of fears
in regard to delays, over-crowding, strikes, shortages of equipment
and drugs, etc.
Optimists could
further take heart from the fact that the proposed Draft Constitution
of 2000 also contains unequivocal rights provisions in this respect,
guaranteeing not only the right to life but also the right of every
citizen to health care services, including emergency medical treatment.
These provisions would therefore directly cover situations where
medical personnel at state hospitals refuse treatment of patients
on the basis of trade union action or the right to strike.
For the moment,
however, a temporary way was found out of the present impasse not
with the striking doctors summoned to a stronger sense of their
essential responsibilities, despite a juggernaut lobby that ostensibly
speaks on their behalf but with the Government giving way to their
demands.
The truth is
that if their complaint regarding their salaries being unreasonably
lower than medical officers in other categories (or indeed, as contrasted
to other public officers in general), are justified, then the public
should have been apprised of this fact by comprehensible data and
won over. In contrast, resorting to strike action in this peremptory
manner only signified an insensitive arrogance, which the medical
profession can ill afford to boast of. |