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Navy
between bravery and brickbats
When the Navy band, assembled in their white regalia, struck the strains of late endearing maestro C.T. Fernando's enchanting oldie, Hela Jahtika Abimaney, the patriotic fervour it generated seemed difficult to contain. Tears welled into their eyes. They were choking with emotion. Many tried hard to hide their feelings. One or two brought out their handkerchiefs, ostensibly to freshen up their faces. In fact they were wiping away the tears on their cheeks. They were tears of joy during that traditional naval ritual - Manning the ship. The occasion was welcome home for some 150 officers and men in five naval vessels. They had successfully accomplished an operational task - search and destroy Tiger guerrilla cargo ships loaded with military hardware in the deep seas off north-east.
In a scene reminiscent of a war movie, SLNS Nandimithra, a former Fast Missile Vessel (FMV) of the Israeli Navy, secured to a buoy. Senior officers boarded a boat. Four other Fast Gun Boats (FGBs) came alongside the Gun Boat Pier and the men began to alight. Those lined up at the pier stood to attention. The band struck to the strains of another Sinhala golden oldie, Latha Walpola's Peradiga Muthu Eta Yai Mey. Rear Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, Commander, Eastern Naval Area (COMEAST) shook hands with the returning officers after they saluted him. With the ceremonial rituals over, emotions peaked as there were hugs and handshakes all round. That was how the Navy men at Trincomalee paid tribute to their colleagues who had engaged themselves in a daring deep sea drama to prevent Tiger guerrillas from amassing more weaponry and becoming much stronger. If that action boosted the morale of their own men, those in other state security arms and even their fellow countrymen, it was short lived. Just two days later, in an unprecedented move, some unidentified members of the ruling United National Front cabinet called the Navy attack an act of sabotage - a sobriquet now labelled lavishly on those responsible for any statements or actions not pleasant to them over the ongoing peace process. The accusations were reportedly made at "a special meeting of Ministers" held in Parliament on June 17 according to state run Daily News, Rupavahini and Independent Television Network (ITN) among others. Significant points made in these reports were that Defence Minister Tilak Marpana and Chief of Staff of the Navy, Rear Admiral Mohan Wijewickrema "did not know anything about the incident until it was over." A Government inquiry is reportedly under way to ascertain how and why Mr Marapana came to be left out, a serious omission indeed. But The Sunday Times has learnt that Rear Admiral Wijewickrema was fully aware of the Navy operation from the time news arrived about the suspicious vessels. However, there had been complaints of serious lapses by subordinate command in keeping him up to date about developments after the operation to search and destroy the vessels was launched. Another inquiry is also reportedly under way to ascertain why Rear Admiral Wijewickrema was not officially appointed acting Commander of the Navy as on previous occasions. Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri was away on a visit to the US Pacific Command in Hawaii. However, Rear Admiral Wijewickrema did play a lead role by initiating action after information was received. In probing how Defence Minister Marapana came to be left out, a serious lapse, it would be pertinent to ask whether some of the major causes that fuelled and exacerbated internecine rivalry at the highest levels of the Navy hierarchy would be examined even at this late hour. If this is done, factionalism or other parochial issues that override national interests can easily be avoided from the lessons learnt. It is now public knowledge that sharp differences of opinion arose between the Commander of the Navy, Vice Admiral Sandagiri and his number two, Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Wijewickrema. When a Sunday newspaper highlighted allegations of misdemeanour against Rear Admiral Wijewickrema and other senior officers associated with him, he made representations to Defence Secretary, Austin Fernando. As the senior-most bureaucrat responsible for security forces one would have expected him to resolve the matter. Instead, he advised them to go to the same newspaper and relate their side of the story. (Situation Report - August 18, 2002). They did. It is not unusual for feuding and factionalism to occur in security establishments. But after the exposure it received, the fact that there was open feuding between number one and two in the Navy leading to factionalism became public. That is not all. The matter then went to court where some of the officers concerned declared in affidavits that Mr. Fernando had not only advised them to go to the newspaper in question. He had also later advised them to seek legal remedy. Whilst the case was pending in courts, it is no secret that factional rivalry intensified. Eventually it took none other than Defence Minister Marapana to undo the colossal damage his own Secretary had caused, either out of inexperience or lack of foresight. He negotiated a rapprochement between the two senior-most officers and ensured that an amicable settlement was arrived in courts. The case was withdrawn. One would have thought things had settled down. Sadly it was not be. There is no gainsaying whoever was responsible for not informing Defence Minister Marapana deserves a severe reprimand. But that very serious lapse apart, to accuse the Navy of sabotage is a puerile attempt that has serious and sinister connotations. Is this not a veiled warning? Not only to the Navy, but the Army, Air Force and even the Police not to act hard on Tiger guerrillas? Accusing them of sabotage, by implication, is charging them of being anti-national and warning them not to resort to any lawful actions that are their responsibility. What is the
Sri Lanka Navy's crime to earn the accusation of being saboteurs? One cargo vessel identified itself as "MV Soshin" and claimed they were heading from Surabaya in Indonesia to Belize, the former British Honduras, a Central American nation third the size of Sri Lanka, located near Mexico. Navy Headquarters checked the facts and found they were false. After a gun duel, the vessel exploded and sank. The five Navy vessels were deployed in the operation despite several shortcomings. Since the Ceasefire Agreement of February 22, 2002, requests by the Navy for spares for its fleet or to replenish other requirements have not been forthcoming. There had been no positive response from the Ministry of Defence. In executing operations to apprehend Tiger guerrilla weapons shipments, it is relevant to mention that the Navy has learnt the hard way that absolute secrecy is essential. Even the need to know principle on which information was shared with a limited circle had to be restricted. This was after information they were compelled to share with some foreign entities it turned out, had reached the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This not only compromised their operations but also their sources. The details of the damage caused are too sensitive to reveal. Here is an account pieced together by The Sunday Times on how the Navy's latest operation was carried out. The Sri Lanka Navy received credible information that two Tiger guerrilla cargo ships, each towing a heavily laden boat, were heading towards Sri Lanka through the north-eastern deep seas. Among the cargo were 23 mm anti-aircraft guns, assorted ammunition including artillery shells and surface-to-surface missiles, ones which could be used to attack battle tanks and ships. The two cargo vessels were said to be around 600 tons deadweight - much the same as "MV Koimar" which the Navy sank in the deep seas off Mullaitivu on March 10. The two brand new boats, said to be around 18 metres each and equipped with fifty calibre (.50) guns, are learnt to have been manufactured in an unknown foreign country. They were being delivered for use by Sea Tigers, the newly emerging naval arm of the LTTE in the Indian Ocean. The boats were being towed by the cargo vessels only until they reached a distance from where their own fuel capacity would enable it to move independently. Navy Headquarters sent out a Grouper (a highly riddled, coded) signal to Eastern Naval Area Headquarters in Trincomalee on Friday evening (June 13) conveying the information. They went into action. Four Fast Gun Boats (FGBs) - Ranawickrema, Ranajaya, Prathapa and Udara were rushed to the general area some 150 to 200 nautical miles north east of Trincomalee. Later, a signal was sent out to SLNS Nandimitra, then on a routine assignment off the Mullaitivu coast, to divert course and join the four Fast Gun Boats. It cut through the choppy seas on Friday when its radio crackled close upon midnight. It was a message from Prathapa. The radar on this FGB was recording echoes denoting the presence of vessels in close vicinity. SLNS Nandimithra radioed Udara and Ranajaya, which were in the close vicinity to join Prathapa. It was well past midnight when more news arrived. This time, whilst speeding to join Prathapa, men on board Ranajaya, looked through their night vision device. They saw a cargo vessel towing a heavily laden boat. They said the boat was mounted with a fifty calibre (.50) gun. As hours went by, SLNS Nandimithra established radio contact with COMEAST and was reporting developments. Soon after conveying what was already relayed by Ranajaya, more reports were reaching COMEAST from SLNS Nandimithra. The merchant vessel had broken loose of the boat presumably upon noticing the presence of naval craft. It had fired its own engine, turned around and begun moving in the opposite direction. This was some 175 nautical miles north east of Mullaitivu. SLNS Nandimithra radioed Prathapa and Ranawickrema to join her to pursue the boat. They wanted to round it up by morning. Udara and Ranajaya were directed to follow the cargo vessel. It was Ranajaya that succeeded, after several attempts, to make radio contact with the suspect cargo vessel. Asked to identify itself, a heavily accented voice gave the name as MV Soshin. He said they were proceeding from Surabaya and were headed for Belize. Since communications from Ranajaya were inaudible to COMEAST, they were relayed via SLNS Nandimithra. COMEAST in turn contacted Navy Headquarters. The information was verified with Lloyds of London, which has an online tracking of ships globally via satellite. The name given turned out to be false. So were the destinations. If the voice in the cargo vessel that responded to the call had an accent described by a Navy source as resembling someone who spoke Tamil, the false information provided was again a common guerrilla ploy. On January 16, 1993, when the Indian Coast Guard intercepted an LTTE ship, an incident that led to the death of former Jaffna "Commander," Sathasivam Krishnakumar alias Kittu, it turned out that the vessel had undergone several name changes. The original name of the vessel MV Emerald had changed from MV Ahata, MV Yahat to MV Ahat. Similarly another vessel, MV Ilyana was changed to MV Francis, MV Sunbird and MV Omros. Similarly, in the radio conversation between the Navy and those on board the LTTE vessel MV Koimar on March 10, this year, before it was sunk, the latter identified themselves as Motor Tanker Warlos heading for an Indian port. Both Udara and Ranajaya reported (through SLNS Nandimithra) that some men on board the cargo vessels were throwing packages into the sea. This was whilst moving in a south easterly direction. Just then the most unexpected happened. All three power generators on board SLNS Nandimithra packed up cutting off all radio communications. Updating these generators was one of the issues Vice Admiral Sandagiri had raised with the Ministry of Defence. Like all other requests, it had fallen on the deaf ears of the bureaucracy there. SLNS Nandimithra was manufactured in 1980. While in service in the Israeli Navy it was named INS Komemiut. This procurement was made under the tenure of the People's Alliance Government. At that time, when I raised queries in these columns about the wisdom of purchasing a 20-year-old vessel (together with another, former INS Moledet, manufactured in 1979 and later renamed SLNS Suranimala), the Competent Authority overseeing the tight censorship issued a written warning to The Sunday Times. He charged that the references violated the self-censorship that was in force then. (Situation Report - March 4, 2001). Before the communications blackout, COMEAST had rushed four more Fast Gun Boats to form a barrier some 80 nautical miles east of Point Pedro to look out for the boat. This is whilst Northern Naval Area Commander, Rear Admiral Nandana Tuduwewatte, deployed a fleet of six Fast Attack Craft (FACs) in the waters off the shores between Point Pedro to Mullaitivu for the same purpose. After men worked hard and got the generators going, radio communications resumed. It was near dawn when Udara and Ranajaya were ordered to fire warning shots over the bow of the cargo vessel in accordance with Rules of Engagement (RoE) issued to the Navy. According to a senior source at the Eastern Naval Area Headquarters, it was 15 minutes to 6 am (on Saturday, June 14) when the cargo vessel opened fire at Ranajaya. He said a sailor was wounded. The incident came at the end of an hour after the vessel was trailed. "One of the FGBs hit back. There were loud explosions from the midship area. The cargo vessel began listing heavily to one side and began to sink," the source explained. According to the same source, Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was informed barely half an hour after the incident occurred. Nearly an hour later, after dawn, SLMM members were taken by patrol craft P 416 to scene. Later SLMM members made other trips. By then, SLNS Nandimithra changed course and proceeded to the scene. Prathapa and Ranawickrema were left to continue their chase for the fleeing boat. They later lost track of it. When SLNS Nandimithra arrived at the scene, they saw more explosions. Fire had engulfed the entire vessel. By 9 am it sank to the ocean floor, some 3000 metres or three kilometres below. By then aircraft
from the Sri Lanka Air Force as well as Dorniers from the air arm
of the Indian Navy were scouring the skies. SLNS Nandimithra and
SLAF aircraft noted there were no survivors to be seen. Later Director
of Naval Operations, Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekera, sent out a
signal to COMEAST. This is what it said: Manner in which the LTTE arms ship was dealt with by a well co-ordinated effort is highly commendable. Navy has continued to perform her pressing role effectively and preserve the territorial interests of Sri Lankan waters. Bravo Zulu. Despatch preliminary report to reach NHQ by 1200/15. Please continue search by a well planned exercise for the missing boat which was detached from the LTTE ship tomorrow. Liaise with SLAF and give co-ordinates of air surveillance for Indian Dornier air search to be given to NHQ Ops Room to be relayed to Indian Navy. In mid May, the Navy received credible information that a cargo ship loaded with military hardware and towing a heavily laden boat was heading for Sri Lanka. Naval craft were able to track them at a point over 150 miles east of Mullaitivu and even photograph it. But they soon lost track of it. Whether the ship abandoned course due to inclement weather that prevailed or after finding out it was being trailed is not clear. But, this time, instead of one cargo vessel and a boat, the credible information received by the Navy was about a pair each. Yet, the Navy was able to detect only one pair. Did the second pair become aware of Naval movements? Or did they make a late start? The answers are still not clear. Thus ended a deep sea drama that spoke of the heroism of the Navy men who ventured into deep seas to do their sacred duty - protect Sri Lanka's sovereignty and territorial integrity. They were ably assisted by the Indian Navy in this task. Another feather in the cap of Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri indeed. Navy's critics and even apologists for the LTTE argue they may have engaged the guerrilla vessels in waters beyond Sri Lanka's 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). They claim that the Navy had no legal authority to engage any enemy vessels outside this EEZ limit. However, the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (June 12, 1994) permits hostile "actions by Naval forces" in "the high Seas." This Manual is formulated under the aegis of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). It chronicles International Rules of the Law of Armed Conflicts at Sea (see box story on below for details). It is for their brave deeds that the Navy has been accused as saboteurs. Stupidity in post independent Sri Lanka seems to have reached such low levels that one has to ask whether those making the accusations are not living in a fool's paradise. Time will tell. It sure will.
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Copyright © 2001 Wijeya Newspapers
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