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Security alarm
over Tiger rise in East The UAV had
been spotted. Someone at a guerrilla base barked out orders to open
fire. Controllers immediately manipulated a throttle. The UAV gained
altitude and was guided to a safe landing. If those were
the precautions taken by the guerrillas when the controversial camp
was in the making, security measures have been stepped up. During
nights heavily armed groups of guerrillas were dominating the vast
ground area surrounding the camp. The move was not only to prevent
Army reconnaissance teams coming into the area but also to confront
them if the need arose. Although they withdrew during the day, the
cadres deployed in the camp formed a cordon around as others fortified
security. That included the construction of new bunkers, placing
of gun positions and observation posts. But the guerrilla
fears of any Army intrusions were unfounded. In June when news arrived
that they were constructing a camp, the Army had in fact worked
out contingency plans. Commando units carried out reconnaissance.
With photos from aerial shots taken by fixed wing aircraft of the
Air Force, measures were mapped out to force the guerrillas to leave.
That included a plan to place a siege, cut off supplies as an alternative
to a direct confrontation. But the United National Front leadership
had made clear no military options should be resorted to. That was not
all. They also reacted promptly to apprehensions expressed by the
guerrillas. When reports circulated that the Army was positioning
long range artillery guns in the direction of the new camp, guerrillas
raised issue. It turned out there was no such move. On another occasion
when two main battle tanks (MBT) were moving in an area close to
Manirasakulam, they sought assurances it was not to be part of preparations
for an assault. Fears grew since guerrilla political wing leader,
S.P. Tamilchelvan, was visiting the nearby guerrilla dominated Sampur
the next day. UNF leaders sought immediate clarification from the
Army. They had to be assured the two MBTs were on a training mission
and were not Paradoxical
enough, the Manirasakulam (or Kuranku Paanchan Kulam) guerrilla
camp of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had taken root
with some acquiescence from the UNF. If its leaders had prevented
any move by the Army to evict the guerrillas after the determination
by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) that the camp is in a
Government controlled area and should be dismantled, there was stoic
silence over the issue. Last Wednesday, the SLMM deadline to shut
down the camp came to an end. There was no
official appeal from the UNF, in the form of a public statement
or otherwise, that the LTTE should withdraw. To the contrary, there
were only leaks to the state and sections of the private media that
they would dismantle the camp within 72 hours. But barely three
hours after they had become public, had the guerrilla leadership
issued a firm denial. There was no move to close down the camp.
Some of them who were embarrassed by the reports they published
made the situation worse through follow-up stories. Those spoke
of the camp being converted into a political office. They turned
out to be pipe dreams too. And last Tuesday,
an official appeal to follow the SLMM ruling came from far away
United States. State Department Deputy Spokesman, Philip T. Reeker
said "…the Tigers continue to maintain a military camp
in Trincomalee District, identified by the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission as a violation of the February 2002 Ceasefire Agreement."
He called upon the LTTE to "renounce terrorism and cease terrorist
acts, including political assassination, and to comply with the
terms of the Ceasefire Agreement they signed." After the disclosure
in these columns last week (Tiger
trap for Trinco siege - Situation Report - August 3), about
the guerrilla military build-up in Trincomalee, The Sunday
Times learnt that concerns have been raised both in Washington
and New Delhi. The US and Indian Governments were closely examining
the disclosures made last week. An influential
section of the UNF Government, The Sunday Times learnt,
had moved for a much stronger US statement over the matter - one
underscoring a need for neighbouring India to help protect the security
interests of Sri Lanka. However, a Cabinet minister spearheading
the peace process is said to have shot down the move when he was
consulted. He opined that such a statement would harm the peace
process. Hence, the statement from the deputy State Department spokesman
was shorn of those aspects. Had they been
included, it would have bolstered the mission of Minister Milinda
Moragoda, another UNF peace negotiator, who was on an official visit
to India this week. He briefed Indian leaders and officials on the
current status of the peace process. A meeting with Indian Defence
Minister, George Fernandez, where the latter declared that the security
of India and Sri Lanka is one, was not without significance. More so after
revelations in these columns last week that the LTTE camp at Manirasakulam
(Kuranku Paancha Kulam) , now set to remain despite
all protests, is endemic of the gradual transformation of the landscape
around Trincomalee. I said "Tiger guerrillas have opened
up new military camps, re-occupied ones they abandoned and set up
a string of satellite camps around bases that existed. Newly recruited
cadres have been trained and moved in. New weaponry and communications
equipment have been widely distributed. "The
rapidly developing scenario in and around Trincomalee is signalling
a marked shift to the military balance. The Tiger guerrillas are
continuing to become stronger militarily whilst the ground they
dominated are expanding. This is in the backdrop of the Security
Forces being plagued with desertions, hit by lack of resources and
forced to maintain an inactive profile lest they be accused of sabotaging
the peace process. "They
are yet to receive even the three months requirements to replenish
their dwindling stocks of ammunition and other items. The long term
impact of this change may lead to a virtual siege of Trincomalee
- a move that will threaten not only Sri Lanka's but now India's
own interest." Now that Mr.
Moragoda had, on behalf of Defence Minister, Tilak Marapana, invited
Mr. Fernandez, to visit Sri Lanka, safeguarding the security interests
of both India and Sri Lanka will undoubtedly be a focal point of
attention. More so with the current developments in the Trincomalee
district. This week the
Sri Lanka Navy formulated a comprehensive study on the threats facing
Trincomalee, particularly the strategic harbour. They appreciated
that the military resources currently available in the area were
woefully inadequate to effectively defend the area. This is particularly
with the guerrillas, through the changing scenario, developing a
high element of surprise. The four reasons attributed by the Navy
are: 1. The continuing
Tiger guerrilla build up, particularly in the southern parts of
the Trincomalee port which houses the headquarters of the Eastern
Naval Area. 2. Relaxation
of controls on fishing in and around the port area disregarding
advice given by security authorities. This has made it easy for
guerrillas to conduct close surveillance of naval activity and related
matters. 3. The easy
access to guerrilla cadres to move around freely in the Trincomalee
town area and its immediate environs including the outer harbour
area. This has facilitated the easy gathering of intelligence. 4. Lack of
what the Navy calls a "credible" counter intelligence
mechanism of their own. The Navy study
notes that the progress of the peace talks has been slowed down
with regular interruptions due to certain demands by the LTTE which
the Government cannot concede, even for the sake of peace, without
jeopardizing national security. It notes that the guerrillas have
gained a considerable area of ground, especially in the Eastern
Province where they were a weak force prior to the signing of the
Ceasefire Agreement. The Navy complains
that the guerrillas deploy attack craft in the seas off Mullaitivu
and conduct live firing practices whilst their own craft were in
the vicinity. This was a violation of the Ceasefire Agreement. It
notes that Trincomalee port is "extremely vital" since
it is required to keep the life-line open to some 40,000 troops
deployed in the Jaffna peninsula. In the event of an abrogation
of the Ceasefire Agreement, it warns, the continued smoother functioning
of a civil administration in the peninsula will break down if this
lifeline is interrupted. Adding to the
gloomy forecast of the Navy was an Air Force source who spoke on
grounds of anonymity. He said the guerrillas have positioned long
range guns (122 mm howitzers, 130 and 152 mm artillery) around camps
that have been set up after the ceasefire and with the expanded
thereafter. He says that in a confrontational situation, it would
be difficult, if impossible, to land troops in the area by fixed
wing aircraft since they would become vulnerable to artillery fire. The Navy has
made a number of recommendations to improve the situation. For obvious
reasons one cannot elaborate on all these. However, two of the main
ones which could be spelt out is the urgent need for more troops
and equipment - two important issues over which the UNF Government
seems to adopt a different policy to that of its predecessors. Even
before the Ceasefire Agreement, the UNF had formulated plans to
down-size the Security Forces and send its personnel on UN peace
keeping missions. It had also made the Treasury impose very tight
controls on procurement of equipment by the Security Forces. The need for
more troops is being addressed again. After several efforts, the
Army will next week re-commence its latest recruitment drive. Its
target is to enlist 5,000 troops. But Army Commander Lt. Gen. Lionel
Balagalle has told his senior officers that if the campaign is successful,
they should continue until at least 10,000 are enlisted. That is no
easy task for the Army. In the past recruitment campaigns, they
have not been that successful. They have not been able to fill a
shortfall of over 17,500 in their approved cadre. Here is how the
past recruitment campaigns have fared:
Coupled together
with this situation is the increasing rate of desertions, much higher
during the ceasefire than during a war. Needless to say a consequence
of this has been the increased crime rate. In the year 2000 there
were 4972. The numbers increased in the succeeding years: 2001 (6018),
2002 (7326) and 2003 (4337 for the first five months). If repeated
calls to the Ministry of Defence by respective services to remedy
disturbing trends in their organisations fell on the deaf ears of
the Ministry of Defence, some of the glaring instances came to light
when President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga summoned a conference
of field commanders of the North and East in June, this year. It
was to discuss the security situation in their areas. It transpired
during the conference that the Security Forces would be badly hit
in the event of a resumption of hostilities - the result of the
Government continuing to ignore military preparedness and readiness. This was in
marked contrast to preparations made by the LTTE, both by inducting
new equipment and recruiting additional cadres. In view of
these developments, the Commanders of the Army (Lt. Gen. Balagalle),
Navy (Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri) and Air Force (Air Marshal Donald
Perera) handed to the Government last month a joint appeal for a
salary revision for troops. But the joint appeal has been shot down
by the mandarins in the Treasury. The three service
chiefs have pointed out that the current salary structure of the
Security Forces was last revised by the Salaries Commission in 1995
and was implemented in 1997. They have pointed out that service
personnel opt to seek release from service prior to or on completion
of the obligatory period of service for the purpose of seeking employment
with better financial prospects and minimal risk in the non-governmental
sector. They have said
that a large number of soldiers have opted for leaving after 12
years of service. Finding replacements for such mature and experienced
Non Commissioned Officers is a serious problem. They have said that
there is also the case of Officers attempting to leave at early
stages. The main reason was the monetary benefits offered by the private sector for experienced military personnel. The three commanders have warned that delays to have the proposals implemented would have serious consequences. The enlistment
and re-equipment of the Security Forces is essential to restore
the balance of power, particularly in the Eastern Province. This
is to maintain superiority in military readiness and preparedness.
This apart from restoring the balance of power will also strengthen
the hand of the Government in continuing peace negotiations from
a position of military strength. In this context, therefore, the recommendations of the service commanders should not be dismissed lightly.
Iqbal Athas is on overseas leave. The next Situation Report will appear upon his return. |
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Copyright © 2001 Wijeya Newspapers
Ltd. All rights reserved. |
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part
of any plans for an offensive.
