Quarrelling and carrying-on, while waiting for the
LTTE
By Our Political Editor
What does the LTTE want? This consideration colours the political
landscape, while both government and Opposition awaits the LTTE's
so called counter proposals to the government's Interim Administration
document which has been widely discussed by LTTE legal experts in
Paris. An opposition front-liner says that it is almost certain
that "we are going to be opposed to whatever the LTTE decides
-- because we are opposed to an Interim administration without any
agreement on the core issues.'' "Yet,'' he says, ''we will
wait and see.''
But much goes
on until the waiting game is played out. The PA-JVP talks have officially
broken down and the same PA frontliner says that it was mutual suspicion
that led to the breakdown of the talks. But meanwhile, the President
is said to have told a group of guests from her party that her father
and mother will both "lambaste her from the grave'', if she
gave all the concessions that the JVP wanted which included key
Minister-ships amounting to four of the fronline Ministries in any
future Cabinet, and the Chairmanship of the Alliance.
The ground
war on the issue of the LTTE camps between the Lakshman Kadrigamar
led PA group and the G. L. Peiris led government peace front goes
on unabated. Says Prof Peiris that "if the opposition had any
real facts about the issue of the camps it should have convened
a general press conference and told the press exactly what these
camps are and exposed the entire issue -- instead of which a few
select journalists were invited to a private residence for a briefing''
It's a cloak
and dagger spoiler scenario, says the Minister. But the PA frontliner
quoted above says that all major newspaper organisations were invited
except one publishing organisation which produces what "we
have for long not considered a newspaper.'' Kadirigarmar's main
intention is to drive home the point that troop morale is low, because
the LTTE is flexing its muscles and the government has on the other
hand categorically asked troops to maintain maximum restraint.
Disputed
camp
The government's position articulated by Cabinet spokesman G.L.
Peiris is that the only disputed camp was in Manirasakulam -- and
that the other 12 were either set up before the ceasefire or out
of government controlled areas. But, while Kadirgamar was firing
from all cylinders and the government was firing back with the retort
that it was a case of plain panic - mongering the LTTE seemed to
have taken the initiative to say that there is no Southern consensus.
In its official
publication, the man who now seems to be in charge of articulating
the LTTE's official position has said that Southern consensus is
not forthcoming, and words to the effect that the South seems incapable
of coming up with a political consensus on a resolution to the conflict.
He had cited
political scientist Jayadeva Uyangoda to substantiate his claim,
pointing to a recent article by Uyangoda which argued that a political
consensus due to various reasons is elusive in this part of the
country. Basically, there was a three pointed development in the
political/party scenario in the South this week, and it can be briefly
put down as follows:
Trigger-happy
a) The Tamil United Liberation Front (which was
always marginalized and made a fool of by Prabhakaran's brash audacious
and trigger-happy LTTE -- see separate BOX story adjacent…)
was as usually hapless, not knowing what to do in the face of the
Anandasangaree issue. Anandasangaree the party leader after Sivasithamparam,
went to town in a manner of speaking, saying that the LTTE is not
the sole representative of the Tamil people.
But, now with
one faction of the party wanting Anandasangaree out, but not quite
knowing how to get about it, the party is in disarray - - and there
are disagreements on how to get Anandasangaree out and also as to
who will replace him. Joseph Pararajasingham, the Batticaloa long-timer
wants to fill the vacancy and he visited the LTTE office in Batticaloa
recently for what was seen as a photo opportunity and an ingratiating
exercise with the LTTE.
But the TULF
leader has always been a Northerner, and an Easterner has only been
a second in command. So there is still friction on the issue. Mavai
Senathirajah is not favoured by the LTTE which was not happy that
he supported the recent Nambiar report. Meanwhile the Amirthalingam
commemoration event was boycotted by the TULF for the most part
but was attended by some of its parliamentarians, and it opened
up still further trouble for the TULF with the LTTE because Amirthalingam's
late wife for the first time said in public that her husband was
assassinated by the LTTE.
This has not
gone down well with the LTTE, but yet, the TULF wants to maintain
with the UNF government the position that it is the only conduit
for the government to the LTTE. But that's not quite the position
and yet the TULF wants to be in that position (of being the conduit)
but does not quite know how to decide the Anandasangaree question
which puts it in a state of undecided-ness and general chaos.
b)
The government is meeting the Opposition's alarm call over Trincomalee
by saying that the peace dividend is massive - - and this week the
government further developed on this line of attack. The Prime Minister
addressed a group of backbenchers who met at the Culture Club at
Kandalama, and Minister Peiris for instance explained the peace
message and how to take it to the grassroots. He also hammered-on,
as the PM did on the peace dividend message. But the party continued
to disgrace the Prime Minister, with two Southern hot-heads headed
by the bull in the Chinashop Mahinda Wijesekera said to have been
behind a cowardly attack on protesting unemployed undergraduates.
There were
three meetings in the NCP, meanwhile with the PM's and Peiris's
participation at which the UNP Chairman and Secretary were also
present. Lawyers, students and political activists were all addressed
particularly on the peace dividend message.
Special
drive
The peace dividend message was being taken to places as
far afield as Bibile and Deniyaya - and Medawachchiya, Mihintale
and Kabithigollewa with Prof Periis himself on board. There was
a special drive in Matara to empower women by developing cottage
industries etc., on the rationale that the woman voter will convince
the general community that prosperity can be secured only if there
is peace.
c)
As said earlier the JVP-PA talks broke down. But there are two distinct
positions on this matter. One is that call it "mutual suspicion''
or whatever, the talks broke down because there was no essential
accommodation between the two parties, and there was disagreement
on how the pie (Ministries etc.,) was going to be sliced.
But, on the
other hand, the two sides have agreed to disagree. They are not
going for each other’s throats, and the JVP says it will stand
by and support any move to topple the UNF government -- predictably
of course.
But also, the
JVP has expressed willingness to talk to the LTTE which is significant
- - according to PA insiders. But they have rejected devolution,
saying any talks should be within the parameters of the unitary
state. Though Anura Bandaranaike has been the most enthusiastic
PA supporter of alliance with the JVP, he has essentially been checked
by a President who has while keeping doors open to the JVP, got
around, deftly, her troops to the position that a JVP on the outside
is better than a JVP "on the inside pissing out'' ie: a JVP
that's within an alliance and creating problems for the SLFP frontline.
In a way there is no deep political analysis to it -- the PA wants
the UNP out, but not badly enough to replace it with a weak JVP
dominated government.
Prabha's
profile in review: never chickened out?
Last week these columns carried a sneak-preview of "Inside
an Elusive Mind: Prabhakaran'' by M. R. Narayan Swamy. This week
the book is out in Sir Lanka (Vijitha Yapa publications.) The following
comment is more by way of review:
Undoubtedly, it is a hugely interesting book which the author says
has been the result of over one hundred interviews in India, Sri
Lanka, Europe and North America over the years. It traces the development
of the Tiger leader from a shy boy with bizarre proclivities (pricking
insects to death with needles, inserting pins under his nails, wrapping
himself in bags used for carrying red chillie) to a cocky leader
of a ruthless organisation that took the fight to the fourth largest
army in the world.
Whether the
author likes it or not, the book appears to romanticise Prabhakaran,
even though words like "megalomania'' are used to describe
his state of mind. (At one point he writes 'Prabhakaran's father
wanted him to stick to a humdrum career -- but he chose to be a
killer - albeit with a cause.'') But it's a good collection of facts,
well put together, and has enough almost titillating material about
Prabhakaran's days on the run in Tamil Nadu etc., that would satisfy
the appetite of anybody who wants to know about the LTTE's rather
nebulous past.
There is for
instance the story of the gunfight between Prabhakaran and Uma Maheshwarn
on Pondy bazaar in Madras. The author writes Prabhakaran was quicker
on the draw than Maheshwaran, which was what saved his life -- and
did not save Sri Lanka of trouble and upheaval for years to come.
Prabhakaran
was however cornered by the Madras police after this shootout, and
the Daily News in Colombo exulted that the "prize catch has
finally been caught.'' But with a bizarre mix of luck, political
backing and unexpected intervention from Indira Gandhi who opened
a channel to Prabhakaran through the RAW, he escaped deportation.
In some ways,
it comes across as a testimony to the fact that a ruthless organisation
like the LTTE has certain advantages over a government that needs
to think of various bearings and ramifications before setting upon
any course of action.
For instance
when Prabhakaran wanted his negotiators out of Colombo after what
he thought were fruitless session of talks with the President, his
men sent him back a terse message that "it is not so easy to
get out of Colombo in a hurry.'' But Prabhakaran told the men around
him that he will show them how to get them back. He ordered the
killing of TULF's Amirthalingam in Colombo. Premadasa was so embarrassed
that he summoned the LTTE delegation, told them that "Amirthalingam
has been killed - you better get back to your headquarters.'' He
provided a helicopter, and soon the LTTE delegation was grovelling
at Prabhakaran's feet in Jaffna.
The book confirms
the widely held view - - which is that he kept a leg up over his
competition because he was a killer, nay a torturer, when others
had compunctions about murdering despite what the cause was thought
to be. But he is also portrayed as a man who revelled in the simple
delights of life. Smiling from ear to ear, he loved his chicken
curry, and played carrom, and let off errant cadres if pleas were
made from the right quarters.
Whatever it
may be, the book leaves no doubt about the fact that the LTTE is
Prabhakaran, and that the Tamil liberation struggle is his one man
show. It also gives no indication that this script is changing,
or is bound to change in the near future. |