The
right to vote and its fragile safeguards
When the Supreme Court, in May 1996, decided that the sudden and
arbitrary stoppage of a Non-Formal Educational Programme, aired
by the Education Service of the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation,
(SLBC), violated the freedom of speech of a participatory listener,
there was a particular logic to its finding.
The
Court, (in a thoughtfully reasoned judgment of Mark Fernando J.
with whom Dheeraratne and Wijetunge JJ. agreed), quoted with approval,
decisions of the Supreme Court of India, which affirmed that, "Broadcasting
media, by its very nature, is different from press. Airwaves are
public property....it is the obligation of the State .....to ensure
that they are used for the public good." (Fernando vs the SLBC,
1996 (1), SLR, 157).
As
famously explained by the US Supreme Court, frequencies available
for television and radio broadcasts are so limited that only a handful
of persons can be allowed the privilege of operating on them, unlike
in the case of newspapers. Accordingly, a greater duty devolves
on those who have the former privilege, to ensure that it is not
abused.
These
principles were echoed in later decisions of Sri Lanka's Supreme
Court. Most particularly, the seminal decision in the 1997 Broadcasting
Authority Bill case, (by a bench comprising Chief Justice G.P.S.
de Silva, Amerasinghe and Ramanathan JJ.), articulated how a broadcasting
regime ought to be regulated. Independence from the government of
the day was a key concern.
A
further underlying thread, affirmed in numerous decisions of the
Supreme Court in the early and mid nineties, is that public property
is held by any government, (necessarily temporarily in power), in
trust for the people. Abuse of public, (or state), resources can
be clearly differentiated from the abuse of private resources. Applying
these principles to the media, for example, the government has a
clear duty in respect of the state media, inasmuch as it is funded
by the tax money of all citizens who are of widely varying political
persuasions.
In
contrast, obligations imposed on the private media flow from a different
logic, wherein political partisanship will result in the diminishing
of its own credibility and ultimately, its own profits. In that
process however, no state resources are abused.
In
sum, these principles have been given practical meaning in the 17th
Amendment to the Constitution, given that the use and abuse of the
media assumes greater significance during election time. The Elections
Commissioner is duty bound to issue guidelines on fairness and impartiality
to all media. And the general reminder that there is a moral duty
on all media in this country, (particularly on the electronic media,
state and private), to abide by those guidelines, is without question.
However,
the enforcement powers of the Commissioner of Elections, when infringement
of guidelines occur, are strictly limited to the state electronic
media, in respect of whom he may appoint a Competent Authority with
powers and functions, as defined in enabling Act, No 3 of 2002.
One might well ask as to why such a power had not been given to
the Commissioner, in respect of the state print media, (Lake House)
as well here again, the difference is in the nature and extraordinary
reach of the airwaves, in respect of which the State is put under
a very strict duty.
The
fact of the matter is, of course, that no political party in this
country has respected these principles in their management of the
state media. Notwithstanding feeble attempts to distinguish themselves
from the opposition People's Alliance, the United National Front
(UNF), also persisted in the practice of appointing absolute political
loyalists to the helm of these institutions when they came into
power in 2001. In that sense, if the Ministry of the Media had not
been taken over by President Kumaratunge last year, the provisions
of the 17th Amendment may well have been invoked against the United
National Front. As it is, however, there is an irresistible feeling
of deja vu in the current reality.
Regardless
of politics however, the Constitution, (by way of the 17th Amendment),
imposes an objective duty on the Commissioner to act if there is
abuse shown. In this context, the views of the current Minister
of Media, appointed by President Kumaratunga from her own party,
becomes of little or no account. The duty is the Commissioner's
and the Commissioner's alone. It is heartening therefore that, if
the need is so proved, the Commissioner has declared his willingness
to use his constitutional powers in no uncertain terms.
It
is also good that some civil society bodies have agreed to undertake
the practical task of monitoring such abuse as well as the abuse
of public property in general, though the actual enforcement powers
of the Commissioner in respect of the latter is more imprecise,
(a defect in the 17th Amendment long pointed out). However, the
fact that the Commissioner has stated that, in terms of Article
104B(4), he will take into his custody movable or immovable public
property if he finds that such property is being misused by any
political party, is extremely encouraging.
So
too, the consensus reached between the Commissioner of Elections
and the National Police Commission this week, that all police officers
released for election work will receive instructions directly from
the Commissioner under Article 104C of the 17th Amendment. This
complements the independent stand taken by the National Police Commission
on the issue of police transfers requested by the IGP. It is relevant
also, that Article 104D of the 17th Amendment additionally confers
authority on the Commissioner, to recommend to the President, the
manner in which armed forces may be deployed, if need be, for the
holding of a free and fair election.
Abuse
of state resources, (whether concerning the media or the police),
is however not the only factor common to the two parties. The, (yet
un-contradicted), disclosure in the daily newspapers late this week,
that the UNF has nominated three politicians, presently under investigation
for alleged threat, intimidation or assault of public service officials,
to contest the polls from Kalutara and Ratnapura, is also an indication
of how pitiful our electoral choices will be. The past record of
the People's Alliance in this respect, needs no reminding.
As
far as election malpractice is concerned, one safeguard again stems
from the Supreme Court in the Egodawela case (reported as Mediwaka
vs Dissanayake (2001, 1SLR, 177), where Mark Fernando J. (with Wadugodapitiya
and Ismail JJ agreeing), purposively construed the relevant sections
of the Elections (Special Provisions) Act No 35 of 1988, read with
the Provincial Councils Act No 2 of 1988, to protect the right to
vote.
Thus,
the Commissioner of Elections can annul a poll and order a re-poll
if election malpractice, (including the threatening and intimidation
of voters), results in the preferences obtained by the candidates
being affected and therefore, the result of the elections. Interestingly,
the Court cautioned that even though a repoll might have caused
considerable delay in determining the overall result for that area,
(in this case, the Kandy District), delay or inconvenience could
not be used as an excuse for depriving voters, however small their
number may be, of their vote.
Cumulatively,
these are some of the safeguards, fragile as they are, that Sri
Lankan citizens can claim, when they vote in April. However, the
basic question as to whom one can vote for, given the present chicanery
of all political parties, is a different matter altogether. For
that question, one has not, (and may never have), an effective answer.
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