No war, no peace – for how long?

Last Wednesday’s talks between the Norwegian delegation led by special envoy Erik Solheim and LTTE’s political wing leader S.P. Thamilselvan. LTTE photo

Norway's Special Envoy for the Sri Lankan peace process Erik Solheim reached out for his mobile phone last Tuesday and rang London. "Any message?" he asked Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) chief negotiator Anton Balasingham.

This was part of his preparations in Colombo for the visit next day (Wednesday) to Wanni. That was for the crucial meeting with LTTE Political Wing leader S.P. Thamilselvan. Mr Balasingham had very little new to add. Having explained that, he engaged in some light-hearted banter. He told Mr. Solheim his impending journey to Wanni would be momentous for it would be by air, on land and even over water. He said the Special Envoy would be able to see the sufferings of the people caused by raging floods.

The LTTE ideologue was by then aware that a new UPFA Government policy required Mr Solheim and his entourage to fly only from Colombo (Ratmalana) to Vavuniya and then travel along the Alpha Nine (A-9) highway to Kilinochchi. Mr Solheim ended his conversation saying he looked forward to meeting him on Monday (December 20) in London.

That Tuesday night President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga was chairing a conference on the peace process at the Janadipathi Mandiraya. Taking part were Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar and Secretary General of the Peace Secretariat Jayantha Dhanapala.

Dr. Dhanapala was away in Finland when the Government took a policy decision not to operate Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) helicopter flights to "uncleared" or guerrilla dominated areas. He raised issue. He said the ban on such flights should not apply to either the Norwegian peace facilitators or the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). The point was well taken by President Kumaratunga. Around 8.30 p.m. that night she telephoned the Commander of the SLAF Air Marshal Donald Perera and ordered him to airlift Mr. Solheim and his entourage in a helicopter to Kilinochchi. But bad weather forced the chopper to land in Talawa near Anuradhapura. More on that episode as well as the ban on SLAF flights to "uncleared" areas later.

The same Tuesday, The Sunday Times learnt, the Tiger guerrilla leadership in the Wanni was discussing their response to Mr Solheim. An unexpected development, the havoc caused by the floods, also became an over riding factor. They felt any position they took should be one that did not add to the burdens of the people who were severely affected.

There are many other reasons too according to reports from Wanni. Some of the stepped up military preparations in the past two months were still incomplete. One was a new recruitment drive for fighting cadres with offers of a monthly stipend of Rs 10,000. This has failed to draw the required numbers with youth wishing to pursue other professional pursuits. More military hardware was due. Some medical professionals who went abroad for training had just been told to return. Propaganda campaigns through posters and leaflets to educate the people had just been launched.

The need to buy more time was underscored by these factors. Hence Mr. Solheim's latest visit dubbed as "make or break" made no new progress or no breakthrough. He said the peace process was at its lowest ebb. See box story. This was despite his arrival in Kilinochchi after two important pronouncements by the LTTE. One was LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran's "Maveerar (Great Heroes) Day" declaration that "if the Government of Sri Lanka rejects our urgent appeal" for an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) "we have no alternative other than to advance the freedom struggle of our nation…." The other was Mr. Balasingham's address to the Tamil diaspora in London where he declared that "Velupillai Prabhakaran is ready and ready for war….."

The official account of Solheim - Thamilselvan talks posted in the web site of the LTTE Peace Secretariat clearly highlights the gravity of the situation. It says "Mr Solheim sought a clarification on the National Leader Mr. Prabhakaran's speech…….. to take forward the Tamil people's freedom struggle….."

This, no doubt, was a diplomatic way of trying to ascertain whether Mr Prabhakaran's remarks amounted to a declaration of war and thus threatened the future of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA).

Mr Thamilselvan's response, according to the official account was "….Tamil people have a history of peaceful and non violent expression of their political grievances which were all repressed by the Government military and ultimately pushed the Tamil people to the extent of taking arms for their liberation; at this juncture the people have a right to demonstrate their protest by non violent means since their expectations on the peace dividends have been shattered." He adds: "….it is the response of the Government and its military that would decide the form of struggle…"

Firstly, he justifies a non violent struggle, which I said last week, had already got under way. Secondly, he says, it is the response of the Government and the military that would decide what he calls the "form of struggle." Does this not mean that a resort to hostilities will follow what he calls any "provocation" by the military? Could not such a "provocation" be caused by the LTTE itself? Could not the military be blamed thereafter?

Answering questions from the media after talks with Mr. Solheim, Mr. Thamilselvan made a further elaboration. He said: "As far as we are concerned the people have lost their patience. Army threats and atrocities are on the increase. Attacks on the people and disturbances are creating many crisis for the ceasefire. ….Therefore the situation is developing for the people to put forward their stance in the very near future and express their demands, aspirations and involve themselves in action……" See box story for the questions he answered.

Therefore, aren't the Solheim-Thamilselvan meeting a replay of the Brattskar-Thamilselvan talks on December 1? During these talks in Kilinochchi (Situation Report - December 12), Norway's Ambassador to Sri Lanka Hans Brattskar asked whether Mr Prabhakaran's remarks were a "political ultimatum." In his reply Mr. Tamilselvan said "the LTTE is fully committed to the CFA" but added they were only waiting for "Government's response to resume negotiations on the basis of their demand for ISGA."

This time too, the LTTE has insisted that only ISGA should form the basis for any discussion. According to LTTE's official Peace Secretariat web site, "Asked by Mr. Solheim whether the LTTE can still be more flexible in working out the agenda for the talks, Mr. Tamilselvan said the response to this question has been adequately addressed in the national leader's speech….." He has added that "if the Government has qualms about any of the proposals included in the ISGA draft, it can well be discussed in the negotiation table…"

President Kumaratunga has once again rejected this demand. During the meeting with Mr. Solheim and party on Thursday, a day later than scheduled, she declared "the commitment of the Government to negotiate a final settlement along the lines of the Oslo decision of 5th December 2002 and the establishment of an interim authority in that context." This meeting came a day later than scheduled - the result of an anthrax scare at the Norwegian Embassy at Ward Place.

Hence, the Solheim visit this week has not seen any change of positions either by the LTTE or the UPFA Government. The LTTE insists on an Interim Self Governing Authority. The UPFA says it would offer only an interim authority based on a federal structure within a United Sri Lanka - the position spelt out in the "Oslo decision." President Kumaratunga told Mr. Solheim during talks that she was doing her best to get the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the junior partner in her Government, on board. In the highly unlikely event of a success, the question still remains whether she could accede to LTTE's ISGA proposals. The guerrillas have already rejected a settlement on the lines of the Oslo decision.

Going by Mr. Solheim's brief to sections of the Colombo based diplomatic community; three positions have firmly emerged from his latest visit. They are: (1) there are no immediate prospects of a return to the negotiating table by the Government and the LTTE, (2) there is a growing reluctance on the part of the LTTE to do business with UPFA leaders, and (3) there are no indications of an immediate return to hostilities. Hence, the increasingly important task for Norwegian facilitators now become their efforts to make sure the Ceasefire Agreement remains in place. This is whilst they engage in the almost miraculous task of achieving a breakthrough.

After his meeting with Mr. Thamilselvan in Kilinochchi, this prompted Mr Solheim to remark "both sides must strictly maintain the ceasefire. The peace process is in a very critical situation. The ceasefire is also in such a situation. This is their (the Government's and the LTTE's) peace effort. They themselves have to find a consensus. It is their responsibility. We will give them encouragement."

It is therefore very clear now that Sri Lanka enters the New Year 2005 with this critical situation posing both uncertainty and anxiety to her citizens. Indisputably the LTTE, that exploited the ceasefire period to build a strong military machine, is openly preparing for war. What of the security establishment? Many there believe this is only LTTE psy ops and there will be no hostilities. This defies all logic. Is it not the responsibility of the security establishment to be prepared?

This mood was further reflected yesterday when top brass gathered at the Army Training Centre in Diyatalawa for the passing out parade of 114 officer cadets. They were made up of 56 cadets from the 56th intake, 46 cadets from 56B intake, 11 cadets from 40th Volunteer intake and one Maldivian officer. The subject of a presentation by them on Friday night was not in any way related to preparedness. It was on how to conduct peace keeping operations abroad.

However, Army Commander Lt. Gen. Shantha Kottegoda who was present took the opportunity during his closing remarks to make an important announcement. He said the Army would not send any more troops on peace keeping operations abroad. He said in Sri Lanka peace has not yet arrived. Is this not a belated admission that sending troops, trained and equipped at tax payer's expense to fight a threat to Sri Lanka's national security, was a mistake? Already a hand picked battalion is in Haiti.

The only criteria for sending troops for peace keeping abroad was the claim that they could earn more foreign exchange for the country and receive international exposure. No country in the world trains its troops to earn foreign exchange. Those countries who have not been burdened by internal security problems do contribute to UN peace keeping efforts as a furtherance of their foreign policy. Interesting enough, Sri Lankan troops who have fought a separatist war for nearly 20 years have acquired considerable experience. So much so other armies in the developed world want to learn from them. An example is the United States Army which studied their expertise in coping with Tiger guerrilla improvised explosive devices. I have highlighted on a number of occasions the futility of packing off troops on peace keeping operations abroad even before a permanent peace settlement is reached.

But no one seemed to care. And now that the LTTE is raising war cries, it has dawned on the defence establishment that our troops will be required to keep the peace here than abroad. As I pointed out, the most common complaint of field commanders during a contingency is to plead that they had no troops. It is not too late for defence authorities to learn from this lesson and take steps in the future to prevent such colossal blunders.

Now to the decision not to fly SLAF helicopters to "uncleared areas." It came after Air Marshal Donald Perera raised issue at a meeting of the National Security Council chaired by President Kumaratunga. He pointed out that during recent confrontations between guerrilla cadres loyal to the Wanni leadership and the renegade Karuna group many had died. Neither side had taken responsibility for the killing or for any attacks on each other. In this context Air Marshal Perera expressed the view that if an SLAF helicopter were to come under attack, no one would own up. Therefore the need to seek an assurance for the safety of SLAF helicopters from the SLMM. The decision was thereafter conveyed verbally to the Peace Secretariat.

Unfortunately, like some of the other decisions or moves by the defence establishment, the policy not to operate helicopter flights to "uncleared" areas was taken without any proper study. In as much as the Government of Sri Lanka cannot give an assurance that the LTTE's assets are secure from an attack, one cannot expect the Tiger guerrillas or the SLMM to do so.

The fact that the Government and the LTTE signed a Ceasefire Agreement on February 22, 2002 and helicopters had been offered for use by the LTTE since then belie the mutual trust both sides established. A unilateral withdrawal therefore could be argued as an act of bad faith. What makes it worse is when those invited to facilitate peace have also been denied this facility. This no doubt is among a number of contributory factors for the LTTE's declared reluctance to talk peace with the UPFA leadership.

There has been too many contradictions and inconsistencies. However, a lapse on the part of the former United National Front (UNF) and thereafter by the UPFA Government has been the absence of any criteria. The result - helicopters were allowed for use not only for matters connected with the peace process but also for theatre to theatre transfers. The latter instances no doubt amounted to Government help for their one time arch enemy's military planning and preparations.

The ban on SLAF helicopter flights to "uncleared" areas became official after Ambassador Brattskar wrote to the Peace Secretariat on December 5. He sought their help to make arrangements for Mr. Solheim and his entourage to fly to Kilinochchi. The names of those who wanted to travel were given. In the absence of Secretary General Dr. Dhanapala, his deputy John Gunaratne responded with a reply on December 6.

Mr Gunaratne conveyed the decision not to fly to "uncleared" areas taken "very recently" by "defence authorities in view of the prevailing security concerns." He told the Norwegian envoy that LTTE military commanders therefore could not be flown from Kilinochchi to Colombo. Nor could they be flown in helicopters from guerrilla dominated areas in the Wanni to the East or vice versa. He therefore told Mr. Brattskar that arrangements would be made to fly them from Ratmalana to Vavuniya. They would be provided escort up to the Omanthai check-point. Similarly, requests from the LTTE for flights were to be arranged from Vavuniya and Ratmalana.

However, Dr. Dhanapala raising the issue at Tuesday night's conference changed matters. President Kumaratunga is learnt to have agreed to review the policy decision further when the National Security Council meets. Evidently Air Force Commander, Air Marshal Perera is unaware of these developments. He told the media invited to cover an Air Force passing out parade in Diyatalawa on Friday that provision of chopper rides for Norwegian and LTTE delegations to and from guerrilla controlled areas will be decided on a case by case basis. Indeed a welcome change.

But who in the first place wanted a ban on such flights, a move that has now embarrassed the Government? As one wag remarked, it should be the UPFA Government that should ask an assurance from the air chief not to go on embarrassing them. It was not so long ago, Air Marshal Perera declared media reports were wrong and it was to "do some patch up work" when his Commander-in-Chief President Kumaratunga had obtained Cabinet approval for a "complete rehabilitation of the runway" at Palaly.

Mr Solheim and his entourage were airborne in an SLAF Bell 414 helicopter last Wednesday morning. The pilot Squadron Leader Bandara had reached Talawa (near Anuradhapura) when he found there was heavy cloud cover. He landed at the Central College playground. Later Police helped hire a van for Mr. Solheim and party. The driver asked for Rs 2,500 to take them to Anuradhapura but received Rs 5,000. An Army team met up with them and escorted them to Omanthai.

The helicopter was available in Vavuniya for the return journey. However, Mr. Solheim and party were able to fly only upto Anuradhapura. Once again, heavy clouds had built up. From there, they boarded a fixed wing aircraft to reach Ratmalana. On Friday Mr. Solheim flew to New Delhi to brief the Indian Government on the latest developments.

Another problem for the Air Force last week was the detention in Rostov, Russia of two pilots, ten crewmembers and two An-32 aircraft. This happened when the two aircraft which had gone to Kiev, Ukraine for airframe overhaul was returning to Colombo. From Kiev they had touched down in Dinapastrov for re-fuelling and were heading for a touch down in Baku, Azerbaijan (and not Uzbekistan as erroneously reported last week).

In Baku air traffic controllers had refused permission for them to land and advised them to proceed to the closest airport, Rostov in Russia. Short of fuel the two aircraft touched down only to be surrounded by armed Russian security personnel. The pilots and crew were held in their respective aircraft for 20 hours in temperatures as low as 10 degrees Celsius.

After diplomatic contacts between Colombo and Moscow, the SLAF personnel were shifted to one small room in the terminal building. They were kept under close guard. They were released only after landing charges were remitted this week.

The two An-32 aircraft and the SLAF personnel have returned to Kiev and were applying for approval of fresh flight plans. They were up against a serious problem. A Russian approval to over fly their territory has been made conditional upon the two Air Force planes touching down in that country for Customs inspections. It is only after such inspection and clearance that they are to be allowed to proceed.

The shaky ceasefire no doubt will continue though both sides will trade allegations against each other over violations. But in the New Year, for how long the stalemate could go on with no breakthrough in sight remains the biggest challenge for Sri Lankans in 2005.

Army is preparing for war – Thamilselvan
The LTTE Political Wing leader, S.P. Thamilselvan, answered questions put to him by the media soon after last Wednesday's talks with Norway's Special Envoy, Erik Solheim. Here are excerpts:

Q. What do you wish to say about today's meeting?
A. We had lengthy discussions on the crisis. We told Norway our stance as enunciated by our national leader on the "Great Heroes Day." We insisted that that the Sri Lanka Government is told of the crisis and the firm stance of our leadership.

Q. Erik Solheim has said that the peace efforts have been entangled in a crisis. Is there any possibility of it breaking up?
A. Considering the incidents that are taking place, the anti peace thoughts that are prevailing in the south, we can only say that it is not giving us any hope. Peace efforts are not proceeding in a constructive direction.

Q. What proposals have you sent through Mr. Solheim to the Government for a settlement of the crisis?
A. The hopes of the people on taking forward the peace process have been shattered. People have lost their patience. That means our people who had been undergoing suffering due to a prolonged war and hardships are frustrated. They have totally lost their hopes on the peace talks. If hopes are to be re-established among our people, the humanitarian problems facing them must be solved. This requires constructive action. Our national leader has explained our stance to the Government. He has made an urgent appeal. We have insisted through the Norwegian facilitators that it is only by securing a favourable reply from the south early that these crises can be resolved.

Q. Did the Norwegians offer any hope?
A. It does not appear to us to be so. The facilitators have explained their stance with the best of intentions. They are taking serious efforts. But they are unable to give us any assurance that they could get a favourable response from the Government.

Q. So what are your expectations?
A. As far as we are concerned today's meeting has not given any hope.

Q. If there are no hopes what action do you propose to take next ?
A. As far as we are concerned people have lost their patience. Army threats and atrocities are on the increase. There are attacks on the people. There are disturbances. This is threatening the ceasefire environment. In such a situation people are fighting for their rights. They are proposing many struggles. It is our expectation that the Government must heed to the aspirations of our people and must find a settlement to a few issues. We told this to Norway today. Therefore the situation is developing for the people to put forward their stance in the very near future, express their demands, aspirations and get involved in action. We have told Norway and the SLMM that actions and violence of the Army that were existent during wartime should be avoided.

Q. How is the ceasefire environment?
A. You are aware that the ceasefire environment has got into a severe crisis. The incidents that have taken place recently in Mannar, Trincomale and Jaffna are examples of how the ceasefire has been threatened. We have told Norway very clearly of the actions of the Government. People were attacked in front of the SLMM members. Firing has taken place in front of them. There have been baton charges. We have pointed out to them today that these are very severe violations of the ceasefire. We have insisted on Norway and the SLMM to obtain for us an assurance from the Government and the security forces that they would maintain the ceasefire environment.

Q. What are the reasons for the threats against the "Great Heroes Day" when there were none last year?
A. Since the new government took over the ceasefire is not being maintained. This was not so before. Although talks were suspended ceasefire was maintained to some extent during the time of the previous government. But during the tenure of this government, violations of the ceasefire by the security forces and incidents disregarding the ceasefire have increased. It appears to us that the forces do not like the cease fire environment. In the Army controlled region all the activities of the security forces are moving towards war. We have explained this through Norway to the SLMM. We expect Norway will bring this to the attention of the Sri Lanka Government and the international community.

Q. You say that the forces are proceeding towards war in the north- east. It is also said that the LTTE is also preparing for war.
A. It is wrong. As far as the LTTE is concerned whenever violence is unleashed and instigated on our people and our country, we will be firm in facing it and protect our people and our country. There shall be no change in it. Attempts for war are found only in the security forces sector. More financial allocations are made for defence expenditure. There is no necessity for such a massive amount to be allocated when there is ceasefire environment, peace efforts and the environment for talks.

In the Army controlled areas, preparations for war are in progress. New sentry points are being established and the security forces have increased their threats on the people. They are having military agreements with other countries and joint exercises are taking place. All these appear to our people that the Government and the security forces are proceeding towards a war environment. It is our calculation as well.

Q. The JVP is against the ISGA. Norway has funded a Ministry which is theirs. Did you tell anything about this to Norway.
A. We have made this point very clear in today's talks. We have told Norway it appears that even the international community itself is relaxing from this position which they have already taken and we have expressed our condemnation in this matter. We have insisted that the international community must not deviate from the decision they have already taken.

Q. Explain how you propose to take forward the "liberation struggle?"
A. Taking forward the struggle without war is not in our hands. The Army has tampered with many parts of the Tamil homelands. The Army of the Sri Lanka Government has increased aggression and threats on the people. In such an environment it is natural that the people come out to express their feelings and their opposition. People are taking forward their struggle. If this is rejected and the Army would engage in violence, the situation will worsen. In such a situation the Tigers will take some decisive action.

Q. According to the Ceasefire Agreement 14 days notice has to be given to withdraw from ceasefire. Did you say anything about it to Norway today ?
A. We have explained ourselves clearly.

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