Full-scale war averted at Muhamalai

The four-year-long ceasefire paved the way for the creation of two main gateways to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) dominated Wanni.
One is at Omanthai for those passing Vavuniya, the last town under Government control. The other is at Muhamalai, for those arriving from the Jaffna peninsula. Both are located strategically along the A-9 Jaffna-Kandy highway, separated from security forces checkpoints by stretches of "no man's land."

The LTTE checkpoint at Muhamalai

The two gateways alone, state intelligence agencies have already disclosed, generate an income of more than Rs 30 million a day to the LTTE by way of "taxes". Thanks to the Ceasefire Agreement of February 2002, the vast swathe of land from the west to the east provided the LTTE with the contours of a "parallel government" of sorts. They set up their own "administrative service, police, judiciary, taxation system, law courts and other bodies." So much so, LTTE chief negotiator Anton Balasingham declared during Geneva peace talks in February that "we are a nation in waiting."

Protagonists of the CFA argued, despite all that, the truce was well worth it. There was no war and no body bags ended up in the villages. Comforted by this thought, and believing that peace had already arrived, they did little or nothing to ensure a high level of preparedness for the security forces. No, not even those who seized power screaming hoarse with patriotic zeal that national security interests were in jeopardy. A nation is paying for their follies. This is again clearly highlighted by two recent events.

One was the April 25 attack by a female suicide bomber who infiltrated Army Headquarters in an attempt to kill Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka. The other was the failed attempt in the north-eastern deep seas to attack the passenger ferry Pearl Cruise II carrying 710 unarmed troops. If they refused to believe it earlier, they would now know that whilst talking peace the LTTE had prepared for war, a war where they want to inflict more damage both in human and material terms than before.

Armed policemen guard the body of a colleague shot dead by Tiger guerrillas. The body lay at the Vanuniya Hospital.

However, the guerrillas failed in these two major attacks to accomplish their targets. On both occasions, it was bravery that stood in the way. Corporal Ruwan Yakandawala, a motorcycle outrider took the brunt of the suicide bomb explosion. That saved the life of Lt. Gen. Fonseka. Two Navy officers, 15 sailors and one Army soldier died whilst saving the lives of 710 troops and their escorts. These two major incidents together with other attacks notwithstanding the four-year-long ceasefire made clear a low-intensity war had begun.

What prevents it from becoming a high-intensity or an all out war? A section of the intelligence community still believes that the LTTE is ill equipped, unprepared and therefore unable to wage war. Perhaps they are poorly informed or wrongly briefed. A discerning study of LTTE preparations during the ceasefire would clearly confirm that the guerrillas have inducted fresh defence supplies, recruited new cadres, acquired an air capability, put through new training programmes and built a much stronger military machine. In addition they have provided military training to civilians to supplement their own strength.

What then is the divide between a low-intensity and a "full-scale war"? Is the Government's restraint, ordering troops to carry out only "limited" retaliatory strikes in the aftermath of guerrilla attacks, one of the causes? Therefore, does this mean the ongoing low-intensity phase will continue even if the guerrillas, as is clear now, continue with more major attacks? Undoubtedly the character of a new, all-out Eelam War IV would be different from the previous phases. But the answer is a 'no'. A thin line, sometimes the mindset of those ready for combat, is the divide between a low to high intensity war. A case in point was an incident that took place near the Muhamalai defence lines last Tuesday.

Other than the two gateways at Omanthai and Muhamalai, positions held by security forces and Tiger guerrillas are divided by their defence lines, again with a stretch of "no man's land" in between. Nowhere are the two sides more close to each other than the lines that extend eastwards from Muhamalai to Nagerkovil. At some points they are eyeball to eyeball or within twenty metres.

For the guerrillas, an advance by land towards Government-held Jaffna peninsula would mean breaching these defences. Conscious of that importance, the security forces have fortified their positions and evolved other counter measures. Thus the entry/exit point at Muhamali assumes greater military significance.

It was around 5.30 p.m. last Tuesday when troops in an Observation Post (OP), an elevated watch tower, observed that more than 20 heavily armed guerrillas were taking up position. Soon, small arms fire was directed at troops. It was followed by 81mm mortars and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). A soldier on an OP dropped to the ground with head injuries. He was later flown to Colombo and is now under intensive care at the National Hospital.

According to Security Forces Headquarters (SFHQ) sources in Jaffna, the attack was immediately brought to the attention of Major General Sanath Karunaratne, General Officer Commanding (GOC) the Army's 55 Division. He ordered immediate counter strikes. Troops hit back using small arms, machine guns, 120 mm mortars and 122 mm howitzers. An intense battle, that seemed conventional in character, had broken out. Alarm bells rang in the defence establishment in Colombo. There were fears that the guerrillas had launched an attack on Muhamalai defences to make incursions into the peninsula.

As heavy firing continued, these sources said, an intelligence officer walked into the room of Maj. Gen. Karunaratne to brief him on a guerrilla radio intercept. A guerrilla leader at the rear was monitoring the actions of his men on the frontlines. He seemed unaware of what was going on. When he raised queries, he was told that troops had hurled abuse at their cadres and thrown a grenade at one of their positions. The leader ordered the guerrillas to concentrate their attack on the point from which the grenade was thrown. He also told them to fire as long as the Army continues. The battle continued for 40 minutes when Maj. Gen. Karunaratne, the sources added, ordered his men to stop.

Some five to ten minutes later, the guerrilla firing came to a halt. A grim silence befell the area. The decision by Maj. Gen. Karunaratne to halt his troops from engaging the guerrillas prevented a full-scale confrontation. Needless to say such a course would have paved the war for an "all-out war." The next day, Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, still recuperating at his bed in the Army Hospital, received a full brief of the incident on the telephone from Maj. Gen. Karunaratne. Though still unable to get to his office, Lt. Gen. Fonseka was in touch this week on the telephone with most of his field commanders.

That does not mean that the travails of security forces at Muhamalai are over. If it is peace during the day with civilians entering or leaving the checkpoint, at night it was different. On Wednesday night a soldier at a listening post made a costly mistake. When a guerrilla on the opposite side raised a cry, he rose to see what was going on. He was shot dead. Close upon midnight on Thursday, troops observed groups of women cadres being deployed along the defence lines.

They retaliated hours before dawn when they came under RPG fire killing two guerrilla cadres. It turned out that the additional cadres had been deployed that night to determine mortar positions of the troops. They were firing RPGs to various locations to observe from where mortar fire would originate. Firing of RPGs at troop positions continued on Friday night.

Yesterday morning, a group of soldiers were busy repairing a bunker along the Muhamalai defences. A guerrilla group had noticed them. The troops came under RPG and mortar fire. Troops retaliated. The security forces checkpoint at Muhamalai was immediately closed for civilian movements from 8.45 a.m. Four CTB buses, 12 private coaches and 69 lorries were among a fleet of vehicles held up. It was re-opened at 10 a.m. after the exchange of fire stopped.

If the security forces at Muhamalai are well fortified, so are the Tiger guerrillas. This week they were further strengthening their defences using civilian labour. This is prompted by fears of a possible security forces advance into the Tiger guerrilla centre of power, Kilinochchi and surrounding areas. Trees in the locality have been felled and more concrete bunkers were coming up along their defence lines. Intelligence sources say beyond the defended localities of the guerrillas lay their artillery positions. They had also deployed snipers on more locations. This week guerrilla snipers shot dead an officer and two soldiers in Vavuniya area in two separate incidents. One officer and soldier were from the Special Forces Regiment. According to intelligence sources stocks of telescopic sights smuggled in unchecked baggage through the Colombo Airport during the early stages of peace talks were now being put to use.
The LTTE continued their low-intensity attacks both in the north and east this week. A box story on this page gives one an idea of how they continue unabated.

In this backdrop, around 7.30 p.m. last Wednesday radar at the Air Force base in Vavuniya observed an unidentified aircraft flying some 17 kilometres northwards. This was over Tiger guerrilla dominated territory in the Wanni. Some analysts in the Air Force believe this might have been a deliberate move by the guerrillas to convey a message that their newly acquired air capability was still intact.

After the May 11 confrontation in the deep seas off Mullaitivu where Sea Tigers failed to attack the passenger ferry Pearl Cruise II, the Air Force, for the first time, conducted air attacks on LTTE targets in the Wanni. It was focused on the 1250 metre long LTTE airstrip located south east of the Iranamadu irrigation tank. Contrary to official claims, the bombing raids on the airstrip that evening failed to hit the runway or adjoining installations. It was no fault of the Air Force.

The sorties were carried out during dusk and visibility had remained poor. However, reports from Wanni said the bombs fell within the so called high security zone of the LTTE. Though the Air Force had planned to resume raids the next morning, President Mahinda Rajapaksa had directed that no offensive action should be carried out that day on account of Vesak.

According to foreign intelligence sources, the LTTE is said to have acquired five light aircraft capable of a maximum range of 600 nautical miles. This is at a speed of 200 knots at altitudes up to 15,000 feet. These aircraft which include the already identified Czech-built Zlin Z-143, these sources say, are capable of carrying 250 kilogrammes of explosives. Though the LTTE does not have the capability or the assets for air-to-air combat, these sources point out, that the light aircraft could be used as a flying bomb to attack targets in any part of the country. It is feared that the LTTE could use aircraft to carry anything between 250 and 450 kilogrammes of explosives, these sources added.

However, the Government has examined perceived threats arising from this situation and taken counter measures. Such measures are now being further strengthened. Besides the Government, India has also publicly expressed concerns over the LTTE acquisition of air capability and the construction of the runway. This is in view of threats posed to vital installations in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu.

It was only last week that President Mahinda Rajapaksa told me in an exclusive interview that his Government was firmly committed to the ceasefire. However, he warned that his silence should not be misconstrued as weakness and pledged to defend the nation against any threats.

This week, LTTE chief negotiator Anton Balasingham declared in an interview with The Sunday Times that his organization is also "seriously committed to peace and a negotiated settlement." The full text of his interview appears on Page 5.

Mr. Balasingham admits a "low intensity conflict" has developed and warns that it has a "dangerous potential for further escalation." "Though conditions for an outbreak of war are developing," he says "there is still a space in which meaningful steps could be taken by the government to contain the violence of the paramilitaries and the excesses of the armed forces and create a congenial environment for de-escalation."

But he insists "I do not think Eelam War IV has already begun." No doubt he is referring to a high intensity war. Going by the escalating violence, such a war, as Mr. Balasingham says, has the dangerous potential for escalation. It may only be another major guerrilla attack or two away. But it would take more than the Government of Sri Lanka to initiate meaningful steps to resume peace talks. And that no doubt turns the spotlight on the LTTE.

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