Courting
danger
Four judges of the superior courts took oaths of
office recently, three in the Court of Appeal and one in the Supreme
Court.
Normally, such events in the rarefied atmosphere
of Hulftsdorp would have been greeted with an incurious response
from the public. But, in this case, they have triggered debate due
to President Mahinda Rajapaksa appointing the judges directly, despite
the 17th Amendment stating that the approval of the Constitutional
Council (CC) must be first obtained "upon a recommendation
made to the Council by the President."
He has also opted to disregard a recommendation
by the former President and by the Attorney General that, as per
tradition, one of the vacancies should be filled by a senior officer
from the official bar.
Other similar Presidential appointments have been
made to commissions on the police and the public service. These
cannot, in all conscience, be referred to any longer, as 'independent
commissions'.
The recent appointment of judges takes this constitutional
transgression to even more dangerous levels.
Judges, by virtue of their very role, are expected
to uphold the rule of law and hold the scales of justice evenly
in their hands. What is the impact on this time-honoured role when
their very appointments are scrutinized on the basis of constitutional
legitimacy? In what position does this put lawyers appearing before
them or litigants taking their grievances to court? What damage
does this cause to the institution of the judiciary which has already
suffered trenchant criticism in recent years? These are grave questions
that go to the very heart of Sri Lanka's democratic system.
As our Legal Columnist pointed out last week,
a dangerous precedent has been set for the future, particularly
when the Government proposes constitutional solutions for the North-East
conflict. When the Constitution is disregarded at will where processes
of governance are concerned, what sanctity can be attached to it
otherwise? Are we not lending support to those who mock Sri Lanka's
Constitution as a worthless document? Then again, we had a recent
discussion on a "new Bill of Rights for Sri Lanka" hosted
by the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs even while the non-implementation
of the 17th Amendment was being loudly justified by the Government.
The ironic ignoring of the Constitution on the
one hand and the farcical proposing of expanded constitutional remedies
would have been immediately highlighted by conscientious civil society
organisations elsewhere in South Asia. Energetic protests would
have ensued as we have seen in Nepal where a monarch who dared to
bypass that country's constitution is now sidelined. Barring a few
groups, Sri Lanka's civil society, by its polite acquiescence if
not complicity in such exercises of constitutional hypocrisy, is
partly to blame for this present situation of chaos.
An early excuse as to why the President was not
filling the vacancies to the CC was the inability of the smaller
political parties, (the JVP, the JHU and the TNA) to agree on nomination
of the last member to the CC. However, senior lawyers have subjected
the relevant constitutional articles to careful interpretation and
opined that this hurdle could be overcome by preferring that option
that is the most constitutional.
This is that the President should forthwith appoint
the five nominated members to the CC already sent to him some months
back by the Leader of the Opposition and the Prime Minister. This
would enable the Council to function with its ex officio members
(the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the Speaker
as Chairman) thus satisfying the required quorum of six members.
In addition, it is solely in the Presidential hands to give effect
to the sitting of his own appointee.
Thus, insisting on the last member to be nominated
by the smaller parties before he makes the appointments appears
to be unnecessary. Past practice during the term of the first CC
was that all appointments were not made at one and the same time.
We have asked this earlier and ask it again. If
the President justifies his appointments to the commissions on the
basis of necessity, (or inherent powers) why cannot this same doctrine
be invoked by him to compel the remaining nomination to the CC?
The Attorney General's opinion that the JVP cannot constitute part
of the smaller parties who can make the nomination by majority vote
of the remaining member to the CC should act as a further impetus.
The 17th Amendment was passed in 2001 purely to
limit what had earlier been sole presidential authority in making
the appointments. It could not be said surely that the President,
in making the appointments directly, has chosen the alternative
that gives full effect to the intention of Parliament in passing
the 17th Amendment in the first place. Rather, the contrary seems
to be the case.
We urge the President to choose the most constitutional alternative
to filling the vacancies in the CC rather than an option that defeats
the very purpose of the Constitution. A wider response from the
public, including concerned bodies such as the Bar Association of
Sri Lanka is needed. More conscientious voices should be heard,
urging the Government back onto the path of constitutional democracy.
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