Demanding
powerful symbols of integrity in public life
Some significant developments this week compel
me to revisit the notion of what is actually meant by combating
corruption in all its forms and at all its levels.
Firstly on Thursday, a Supreme Court Bench headed
by Chief Justice SN Silva issued an interim order restraining former
Chief of Defence Staff and Navy Commander Daya Sandagiri from functioning
as the Deputy Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, Law and Order.
The interim order was issued upon a petition filed
by a "typist specialising in legal work", (undoubtedly
a public-spirited typist of the highest conscience notwithstanding
his puzzlingly sudden emergence into the public forum). The Petitioner
had called for the Court to restrain the appointment whilst a Presidential
Commission was probing Admiral Sandagiri's role in an allegedly
corrupt purchase of military equipment. The Order of Court was issued
upon the judges proclaiming that newspaper allegations about the
deal were "serious and not merely speculative."
Secondly, newspaper reports on the arrest of the
Officer in Charge of the Wellawatte police Station for general bribery
and corruption charges were also prominent. The arrest was in stark
contrast to the minnows normally caught in the police service.
These discussions are also framed within a focus
on seminar discussions hosted this week by the UNDP for High Court
judges wherein amidst other clarion calls for action, it had been
pointed out that if judges are vigilant, bribery and corruption
in court houses could be minimised.
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Former Navy Commander and Chief of Defence
Staff Daya Sandagiri |
All these reports beg some interesting questions.
What is exactly is meant by corruption? Does it involve only the
mundane transfer of money whether in billions as signified in arms
purchases or in relatively smaller amounts from ordinary citizens?
What about political corruption as signified by public officers
at the highest levels, including judicial officers, (and not only
court staff) being politically influenced into delivering a decision
in a particular manner or refraining from so doing? Would this amount
to corruption? And what would be the remedy when consistent evidence
of such judicial corruption is found? To what forum should public
spirited petitioners go in such instances?
Section 70 of the Bribery Act, No 11 of 1954 as
amended particularly by the 1994 legislative amendment, (to the
Bribery Act of 1954) certainly encompasses an extravagant definition
of what is meant by corruption.
Thus, any public servant who acts with the requisite
intent to cause any wrongful or unlawful benefit or favour or loss
(and so on) to the Government or any person is brought within its
ambit. Liability arises upon such intent being manifested in conjunction
with a number of consequent actions.
These include the doing or refraining from doing
of any act which that public servant is empowered to do by virtue
of his or her office and direct or indirect inducement in that same
context. The section catches up the using of information obtained
in that regard and even the pure participation in the making of
a decision by virtue of the office as public servant. In all it
was an ambitious if not fairly imaginative conceptualization of
an efficient strategy to tackle graft.
The background in which this Act was passed in
1994, along with the bringing in of a robustly conceived Bribery
and Corruption Commission through a separate act, is now common
knowledge. Indeed, there are lugubrious parallels with this and
the 17th Amendment to the Constitution. Both were passed with rare
parliamentary unanimity. Yet, both had signally failed in their
objectives within a few years of their coming into being.
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Chief Justice Sarath N Silva |
The well documented fate that befell the Bribery
and Corruption Commission during the first decade of its existence
needs no repetition here. The infighting within the Commission,
its very severe politicisation and its inactivity for a number of
very disturbing years was part of this problem. Thankfully, the
present Commissioners, (approved and nominated by the Constitutional
Council at a time when there was a semblance of constitutional order),
appear to have freed themselves to some extent from this dark legacy.
Doubtless though, we have a long way to go to
achieve the heights of anti corruption bodies elsewhere, as for
example, Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC).
Growing public opinion (including mass student protests over the
fleeing of a prominent police officer after taking huge bribes)
was the primary reason why the earlier endemic culture of corruption
in the territory changed. The ICAC was set up under Ordinance in
1974. A striking comment made at that time by one of its originators
was that " To combat corruption, good laws and good organisation
are essential but I put my trust principally in the services of
sound men and women...."
The functioning of the ICAC since the years that
it has been established has been remarkable. In a Transparency International's
Corruption Perception Index survey released recently, Hong Kong
was ranked the 14th least corrupt place amongst 102 places polled,
and the second cleanest in Asia. This has had obvious results in
so far as development and international investors are concerned.
But to return to Sri Lanka's considerably sadder
reality, let us look at how much the current malfunctioning of the
judicial system itself has contributed to this problem. Corruption
in these instances involves a range of documented actions, from
the exercise of undue judicial influence in compelling lawyers and
clients to settle cases (even those of the most grievous torture)
against their will and hearing cases where a judge himself is cited
as a respondent (despite protests). It also includes judicial insistence
on particular matters being listed before that particular judge
with the preconceived objective of granting relief or dismissing
the petition.
Undoubtedly these are all actions caught up within
the expanded definition of corruption as discussed above, particularly
in regard to the integrity of judicial proceedings involving access
to justice, fairness of judicial decisions/outcomes and impunity
from judicial action for certain individuals.
Within the general context of judicial integrity,
we have been unable to devise good systems of judicial discipline
of judges, whether of the subordinate courts or at the higher courts
level. The political nature of the impeachment process applicable
to judges of the higher courts is of historical record (as evidenced
both by the attempted impeachment of former Chief Justice Neville
Samarakoon as well as the two lapsed impeachment motions against
the current Chief Justice SN Silva). These instances show us the
deplorable consequences of subjecting judicial accountability to
parliamentary supervision. But then again, we have been quite unable
to break free from this stranglehold of the politicised remedy of
impeachment and initiate effective and fairer scrutiny of judicial
conduct.
Even the limited efforts that were legislatively
brought in by the 17th Amendment to restrain political appointments
of public officers involving independent supervision by the Constitutional
Council are now set at naught. And the very functioning of the Judicial
Service Commission in whose hands is vested the power of disciplining
minor judges have been affected by direct Presidential appointments
being made to this Commission, among others, despite the CC not
being in existence. Was this action on the part of the President
not evidence of political corruption at the highest executive levels?
As has been remarked relevantly by the Asian Human
Rights Commission recently, "the direct selections by the executive
is a prescription for undue influence and corruption in public institutions.
For any system to function rationally, its institutions must be
protected from undue political interference through the implementation
of objective criteria."
However, here again, where is one to go to when
the notion of "blanket immunity" protects such Presidential
appointments? When the Executive President is corrupt, where is
the remedy? In this case, this is alleged corruption of constitutional
governance. In so far as former President Chandrika Kumarantunge
was concerned, there were also allegations of direct financial corruption
made against her whilst in office where again, immunity protected
her. There is no perceptible effort made to address these issues
even after she was reluctantly compelled to leave office.
And this brings us to the core issue of these
discussions; while restraints imposed on senior military officers
by stern court orders are well and good, the problem is wider than
that and the questions are more profound than that. We need to acknowledge
this fact and bring ourselves to discuss as to how best the pervasive
scourge of corruption in public life could be dealt with.
What Sri Lanka needs are not seminars and conferences
on combating corruption replete with the usual pontifications by
Ministers and public officers. What we need are powerful symbols
of integrity in public life and a healthy public demand for effective
systems of accountability at all levels, including the judiciary.
If needs be, the Constitution and subordinate laws should be changed
for that purpose. Above all, we need wholesale respect shown for
constitutional governance at all political levels, starting from
the Presidency and mechanisms to impose accountability in its default.
In the alternative, restraint orders issued against
service personnel and Presidential Commissions investigating corrupt
arms deals will accomplish only very little.
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