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Could Kebitigollewa have been averted?

It’s not too late to establish the FDL suggested way back in 1995 and protect these villages

By Lt. Col. A.S. Amarasekera

The Sinhala villages in the Kebitigollewa divisional secretariat area first came under LTTE threat during the Eelam war II. These threats intensified and several villages were attacked around 1990.

Kelebogahawewa, Konwewa and Veherawewa in the Padaviya divisional secretariat area were the northern most villages of the Anuradhapura district, bordering the Vavuniya district. These were the first to be attacked by the LTTE during the Eelam war II, with several innocent villagers being hacked to death. These threats and attacks extended southwards and many villages such as Mahakollewa, Kudakollewa, Siyambalagaswewa, Nambakadawewa, Nelligollakadawewa, Hammillapotanawewa, Hettigamawewa, Walalubindawewa, Kuda Hettiagamawewa, Manewa, Nikawewa, Kandagahawewa, Meneriwewa, Maha Etambagaskada and Indigollewa were abandoned.

The mass funeral procession of the Kebitigollewa victims one month ago

In 1993, villages such as Dikwewa, Yakawewa, Maha Kanugahawewa, Palu Hammillewa, Halmillawetiya, Puliyankulama, Kongollewa, Maha Kandigala, Kuda Relapanawa, Kuda Kandigala, Maha Relapanawa, Maha Halmillewa, Kuda Halmillewa and Viharahalmillewa came under LTTE threat. Even Kunchuttuwa, Olugaswewa and Kele Puliyankulama, Sinhala villages on the Kebitigollewa-Vavuniya main road, faced the threat.

Many Sinhala families, therefore, moved into camps put up for internally displaced persons (IDPs) close to the Kebitigollewa town.

Around 1995, Talgahawewa, Maha Nikawewa, Morakewa, Herath Hammillewa and Tammannewa were attacked and several villagers massacred by the LTTE. The main road from Kebitigollewa to Padaviya was under threat. To make this main road safe, a bunker line was constructed from Kebitigollewa to Bogashandiya, a distance of about 25 kilometres.

However, the Jaya Sikuru Operation of 1997 resulted in the establishment of a forward defence line from Kanagarayankulam to Nedunkeni and all the villages south of this line were rendered safe from LTTE threats and attacks. The people who were living in camps returned to their villages. Even the villages of Kele Bogahawewa, Konwewa and Veherawewa in the Padaviya divisional secretariat area were resettled.

With the collapse of the forward defence line from Kanagarayankulam to Nedunkeni in November 1999, the Sri Lanka Army requested the villagers of Kele Bogahawewa, Konwewa, Veherawewa and Kambilliyawa to withdraw to Padavi Parakramapura and these villages were abandoned once more. Thus a situation was once again created wherein the LTTE was able to threaten and attack all these villages. However, due to the so-called Ceasefire Agreement of 2002, the LTTE refrained from attacking the villages in the Kebitigollewa area.

These villages came under LTTE threats and attacks once more in May 2006. The June 15 claymore mine attack that claimed the lives of 67 innocent civilians travelling in a bus, has shown the imperative need to prevent further LTTE attacks.

The lack of security in these villages in the Anuradhapura district — far south of the so-called LTTE controlled area — has to be addressed without further delay. These villages are terrorized by small LTTE gangs that are able to infiltrate this area due to the absence of a forward defence line between Padavi Parakramapura in the Anuradhapura district and Mahakachchakodiya in the Vavuniya district.

The present police posts that are south of the villages along the Kebitigollewa-Madukanda road or the bunker line along the Kebitigollewa-Bogaswewa road that has been constructed east of the villages, are of little use to prevent any LTTE infiltration, let alone protecting the villages from threats and attacks. The maximum these police posts or the present bunker line is able to do is to give some form of protection to the road by first clearing the road each morning and then stationing pickets to prevent possible claymore mine attacks.

A comprehensive project proposal was submitted recently to the Defence Secretary to establish a 14-mile forward defence line between Pirappammaduwa and Buddhangala. The police personnel and home guards now deployed to protect the eight-mile Madukanda-Kele Puliyankuluma stretch and the 15-mile Kebitigollewa-Bogashandiya stretch could be re-deployed to meet the manpower requirement of the new forward defence line.

Since the suggested forward defence line will traverse a distance of only 3.5 miles in the Vavuniya district, which also happens to be in the Vavuniya South Sinhala divisional secretariat area, with the balance distance of 10.5 miles in the Anuradhapura district, there is no reason for the non-implementation of this defence line, as it is well within the government-controlled area. Such a defence line will not only give security to the villages now threatened but will also make it possible to resettle people in the villages that have been abandoned. It will also make it difficult, if not impossible, for LTTE terrorists to use a land route from the Mullaitivu district to the Trincomalee district through the Anuradhapura district.

In May 1995 when I was the Officer Commanding Troops in Anuradhapura , I submitted a letter to the Divisional Commander of the Second Division, Sri Lanka Army then headquartered at Ranasevapura, Anuradhapura. The relevant part of that letter is reproduced elsewhere. (Please see box)

Excerpts from the letter to the Divisional commander

Defence of border villages

The three cardinal principles of defence — All-round defence, Mutual support and Defence in depth — were incorporated for the first time by 2VIR troops at Ulukkulama, where bunkers were constructed every 50 metres with each providing its own all-round defence and mutually supporting each other.

Defence in depth was achieved by setting up a Platoon Headquarters at a considerable distance in depth followed by the Company Headquarters and then a Battalion Headquarters. This concept is now followed from Kudakachchikudiya to Tantirimale, a distance of 35 to 40 miles with around 750 to 800 bunkers. This form of defence has proved successful over three years, reducing troop casualties to a bare minimum and causing no casualties among the civilian population.

This, however, is a troop intensive method, which if extended from Periyapuliyalankulam in the Vavuniya district to Padavi Parakramapura in the Anuradhapura district, covering a distance of about 10 miles, would provide a complete defence to numerous Sinhala villages in the Kebitigollewa division. Six miles of the ten miles could be manned by relocating the bunkers from Periyapuliyalankulam to Kuda Kathcchikudiya leaving about 80 more new bunkers requiring about 500 troops. The advantage of such an action would be making the police posts at Kele Puliyankulama, Puduwa and Dutuwewa redundant, together with the detachment at Indigollewa and Etambagaskada. The police stations at Kebitigollewa and Padaviya will also be safe from possible attacks. Furthermore, it will also make the main supply route to Padaviya safe for use. The road from Vavuniya to Kebitigollewa could also be made usable.

Due to non-availability of troops this proven bunker line method has been substituted by locating police posts or army detachments in the border villages of Kebitigollewa, Padaviya, Horowupotana and Pemaduwa divisional secretariat areas of the Anuradhapura district for the purpose of providing village security.
While the detachments or police posts thus established are able to provide for themselves all-round defence, through the construction of mutually supporting bunkers around the established camp, defence in depth and mutual support from the closest reinforcement point have always been lacking, either due to non-availability of adequate resources or the distance involved.

This point was well demonstrated when Kele Puliyankulama was attacked on May 10, 1995. The closest point of reinforcement, the Kebitigollewa police station six miles away was unable to rush reinforcements in time to avoid disaster.

The detachments or police posts that are located in such isolation are targets inviting enemy attacks. As a result of seeking administrative advantages and camp comforts, lives have been lost in many of these isolated detachments and police posts. This trend will continue, unless alternative methods are adopted. When the police post or detachment is overrun, it creates fear in the minds of villagers and forces them to abandon their villages and move southwards.

The alternative to living in isolated police posts or army detachments is for the personnel to form independent mobile groups that could live under canvas tents which could be moved from location to location. This type of group could be moved into border villages where while half perform duties as buddy pairs in fortified bunkers, the other half could rest in the canvas tents, which could be relocated from time to time thus never offering a fixed target to the enemy.

The resting troops could reinforce the troops on duty in the event of attack. This method will make the enemy who uses concentration of force to achieve success vulnerable as the resting reinforcements could attack the enemy concentration rapidly.

The police or home guards must also be trained by attaching them to army buddy pairs thus building confidence in them to face enemy threats and attacks from well fortified bunkers at the outer perimeter of each village. As the police and home guards gain enough confidence the army could be withdrawn to be relocated forward of the village in the jungle to kill the enemy before they approach the village. In such a deployment the troops will work as buddy trios, with the army groups never permanently located at a jungle base, but shifting their location from time to time. This action will confuse the enemy and enable the troops to dominate the jungle, forward of the border village.

These suggestions if implemented will contribute towards saving valuable life and equipment. I, therefore, sincerely hope they will receive your consideration with a view for future implementation.

Probably, due to the lack of resources, my suggestions were not implemented. I was subsequently appointed the Manpower Mobilization and Disaster Relief Coordinator in the Second Division. One of my duties was to ensure that there was no exodus southwards of people from the villages under threat. By October 1995, the situation was becoming critical in the villages of Kebitigollewa. Many villages had been abandoned and there was a large camp for IDPs in the Kebitigollewa town.

On October 25, 1995, I wrote my second letter in Sinhala to the Divisional Commander, recommending once more the establishment of the forward defence line between Periyapuliyalankulam and Padavi Parakramapura. I went to the extent of obtaining 2,000 roofing sheets from a Sinhala youth organization in Abu Dhabi and these were donated to the Sri Lanka Army to be utilized for the construction of the bunker line, but nothing happened. I still have in my possession a signal received from the Divisional Command dated November 10, 1995, wherein it is stated in Sinhala that my letter of October 25, 1995, had been received and that my ideas and suggestions had been forwarded through the Army Commander to the Deputy Minister of Defence.

If my suggestion had received the necessary attention and the forward defence line had been established then, or even subsequently after the forward defence line between Kanagarayankulam and Nedunkeni collapsed, many valuable lives could have been saved.

Learning from the past mistakes of political leaders, I sincerely hope the Defence Secretary will be able to persuade the present political leadership to seriously consider the proposal submitted by me to alleviate the plight of the innocent people living in these Sinhala villages which are under LTTE threat, without further delay.

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